

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF WORLD POLITICS, DIPLOMACY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IN THE FOREIGN POLICY

Elgiz POZDNYAKOV

I THINK any author undertaking to write an article on the above subject runs a twofold risk. He may incur the scorn of the experienced reader, whom articles of this nature remind of the recent past with its stand-by themes and their authors' premises and conclusions known in advance.

On the other hand, taking a new approach to the problem may provoke accusations of "undermining the foundations" from those who, while paying lip-service to new approaches and trends in the spirit of perestroika, actually find it impossible to renounce postulates of the Stalinist period near and dear to them because these interpreted all the intricacies of the world around with disarming simplicity and artlessness, by means of a few elementary concepts. Veiled or open accusations of this kind are still quite frequent. They indicate that the old refuses to surrender without fighting back.

I am prepared to take a risk, though glasnost has made risk-taking much easier, stripping it of the gloss of the heroic, thereby reducing it to an ordinary phenomenon and bringing us somewhat closer to civilized relations.

Before going any further, I must call the reader's attention to the difficulties in store today for any social scientist. I see one of the greatest of them in the amazing confusion existing in our country over many key concepts. We often forgot in the past the original meaning of many words. We somehow lost sight of many principles; many concepts were turned inside out, so to speak, and so was our worldview. We began to identify the party with the state, the state with society, internationalism with great-power chauvinism, the dictatorship of leaders and bureaucrats with that of the proletariat, and so forth.

It would be unfair to blame this confusion solely on scholars and science generally, even though they contributed their share. Of course, people are the makers of all their ideas and notions. But where an ideology turns people and their mutual relations upside down, this is due to the historical process of life. In our country, this process was such that science became a distorting mirror, with the result that, rather than reflecting a distorted life, it embellished that life to give it the "right" image and please those in power.

This is why I must touch on some theoretical questions to spell out the complicated subject mentioned in the title. One of them is the relationship between national and state interests.

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NATIONAL AND STATE INTERESTS

What prompts me to begin with this relationship is that I see it as the source of many of our deliberate or inadvertent misinterpretations of concepts. The outwardly harmless and seemingly immaterial substitution of the concepts of national or social for the concept of what relates to the state, and vice versa, may in reality conceal a serious distinction between them, giving the impression of their complete unity or even identity whereas there is none.

Take, for instance, Russia, where the state always played a tremendous role, there never really being any adequate counterweight to it in the form of society and its institutions. This resulted in the emergence of a way of thinking that historically bore the stamp of the state, in revering authority and its prestige, absolutising the state and identifying its interests with those of society and with national interests at all levels of consciousness. Absolutising the state became more marked in postrevolutionary years.

The general trend towards absolutising state power due to revolutions was noticed by many analysts. The famous French historian and sociologist, Alexis Tocqueville, examining the aftermath of the French Revolution, wrote that as a result the French had got a stronger and much more absolutist government than the one overthrown by the revolution.¹

It is largely for this reason that we need more than anyone else to ascertain the real relationship between state and national principles, between state and society, with due regard to their unity and difference. This task is gaining in relevance now that our society is engaged in perestroika and social and civic sentiments are awakening in it.

What is meant by the national interest is the interest of the whole nation, an interest which state power presumably leans upon and proceeds from in taking a stand on the outside world. But is it right in principle to consider that the foreign policy of the state expresses the interests of the "whole nation"? Is there any reason at all to speak of a common national interest, especially in a multinational state like the Soviet Union?

There exists a perfectly obvious difference between state and national interests even in mononational states meeting more than others modern, civilised, economically progressive conditions. At certain historical junctures, this difference may translate into a sharp contradiction between the two and lead to the fall of the government, civil disobedience and other inner political crises.

The question of the relationship between state and national interests is much harder to answer in multinational states. If the nation is internally divided on class, political, ideological, religious, professional and other lines even in mononational states, this is all the more so in multinational states, where the situation is compounded by contradictions and disunity on ethnic grounds. In such states, natural dissociation is often made up for by a strong political authority. It is not accidental, therefore, that the more a society is heterogeneous ethnically, the more the state concerned is centralised politically. Using its authority, the state tries to establish common ties in society and ensure its economic development as a single whole.

However, the situation may also evolve in reverse order, with the effort to balance the influence and interests of diverse ethnic components of the country lessening the political influence of the central authority and strengthening the principles of a civil society. But such a situation can only be brought about and maintained in a country whose people

have attained a sufficiently high degree of social maturity and have lasting democratic traditions. Switzerland is the most vivid example.

A common national interest is virtually non-existent in multinational states unlike mononational ones. Its place is taken by a common state interest, which inside the country has to do with the interests of individual nationalities or with those of civil society—provided, of course, that the consciousness of the majority of the population has reached a definite level.

Let us leave out relations between the state and the various ethnic formations inhabiting it (this is beyond our theme) and look into relations between the state and civil society, whose awakening in our country is unmistakable.

The reasons prompting me to go over in my analysis from the nation to civil society and, accordingly, from the concept of the national to that of the social are as follows. First, the concepts of nation and state are constantly considered in the political or even the scientific vocabulary as supposedly interchangeable, which makes it difficult to analyse them accurately. Second, the interests of the nation are not expressed abstractly as common "national" interests, but through two very different groups of interests: (a) state interests and (b) social interests *per se*, that is, the interests of diverse classes and groups of society expressed through definite social institutions. Third, it is civil society and not the nation that correlates with the state, as the foregoing indicates.

This correlation is characterised by the dialectical unity of form and content, with the state representing the form and civil society, the content.² It follows that theoretically civil society (the content) has priority over the state (the form).

Yet practice does not always correspond to theory—far from it. The history of relations between the state and civil society may therefore be described as a continuous struggle for this priority whose success has varied from country to country and from period to period.

In the course of history, the state has generally sought to assume increasing responsibility for the organisation of the whole of society, often at the latter's expense. Where civil society is underdeveloped, the state may usurp its rights. By usurping them, it holds up society's development still more. The transposition of the functions and roles of the state and civil society that is an inevitable result expresses itself in the state performing not only its own functions but those of society, formulating society's interests and tasks for it and demanding that it submit unquestioningly to decisions made by the state. This applies in equal measure to home and foreign policy matters.

There are many reasons for the absorption of the social element by the state. Apart from socio-economic backwardness and ethnic heterogeneity and concomitant fragmentation, this may be largely due to political causes which arise in periods of social tension, such as revolution or war. Marx noted that when, in such periods, the state is particularly aware of its strength, it strives to suppress its prerequisites—civil society and its components—and to assert itself as an entity free from it. But the state can achieve this "only by coming into *violent* contradiction with its own conditions of life, only by declaring the revolution to be *permanent*". As such a "*violent* contradiction" is essentially unnatural, this "political drama necessarily ends with the re-establishment of religion, private property, and all elements of civil society, just as war ends with peace".³

Thus developing civil society as the basis brings its form, the state, into harmony with itself sooner or later. Historical experience invariably confirms this truth although grasping it always requires much sacrifice. Society advances to it by fighting for its rights and privileges, assuming

a more democratic character while the state comes to be governed increasingly by law. In line with this process, changes occur in the correlation of the interests of the state and society, with state interests reflecting in growing measure the interests of society as a whole and not those of narrow groups.

Our own society, too, absolutises the role of the state and is inadequately developed as a civil society. There is an inversion of the functions of both. Society is virtually at the initial stage of the evolution and formation as precisely a civil society, at the stage of forming and, to a degree, of re-establishing its own democratic institutions independent of the state. Clarifying its relations with the state is only just off to a start.

Society's advance in this direction was given a powerful incentive by the democratic perestroika launched in our country from above, which is typical of a country with strong state traditions. Be that as it may, the state and society will undoubtedly have to travel a long and arduous road before relations between them reach a "golden mean" making it possible to respect the rights and interests of both civil society and the state to the maximum extent. This still has to come, and so we may speak mainly (if not exclusively) of state interests with reference to the foreign policy activity of our state (or party).^{*} Hence the words "the relationship between state and national interests" are a mere tautology in our case.

Going back to the title of this article we apparently have every reason now to put "state" instead of "national" in it. But then this replacement plainly changes the very essence of the problem, and therefore the task is to look into a qualitatively different relationship, that between the state and internationalist aspects of the foreign policy of our country.

THE STATE VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM

IN OUR POLITICAL vocabulary, we generally use the word "internationalism" in such set phrases as "proletarian internationalism" and "socialist internationalism". While differing to a degree, they are essentially close to each other.

Internationalism towards the outside world implies the international solidarity of the working class and Communists of all countries in the struggle for a common goal— the overthrow of bourgeois power—and their solidarity with other peoples fighting for national liberation and social progress. The slogan "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" gives it political expression.

Internationalism towards the internal development of mostly multinational states means defending the freedom and equality of all nations and their right to self-determination and fighting against chauvinism and nationalism.

I will deal with the former kind of internationalism and its relation to state interests.

In this context I would like to draw attention to a very important circumstance. The point is that the fundamental principles of internationalism are, in effect, principles of social relations, that is, relations between classes, social groups, parties, and so on, as the above definitions show very clearly. In any case, they have no direct relation to the state as a political formation. They become principles of state policy where the state absorbs the social component and arrogates to itself the right

^{*} The two concepts may be regarded as interchangeable even today, for there is virtually no division of powers in our society, the party held a monopoly position in the power structure until very recently, and the party and state apparatus merge together.

to speak for the whole of society. Owing to the independence of political authority from society in general and to the distinctive interests of the state, which not only differ from those of civil society but often contradict them, these principles inevitably undergo a metamorphosis, changing beyond recognition and often becoming their opposite. Lenin derided the "internationalism for export", saying that "ardent internationalists and Marxists" were sympathetic to every manifestation of internationalism in the enemy camp, anywhere but in their own country and in the case of anyone but their allies; they sympathised with democracy when it was infringed elsewhere but not when this happened in their own country; they were sympathetic to the "self-determination of nations" but not in the case of nations dependent on their own nation. In short, they did all this when "internationalism" was "one of the 1,001 varieties of hypocrisy".⁴

Where internationalism is made a state policy it acquires (*ex officio*, so to speak) the characteristics of precisely "internationalism for export", thereby becoming a further political and ideological means of pursuing great-power interests at home and abroad. This was chiefly what it became in the Stalinist period, when it transformed into what Lenin called the "*international chauvinism*" expressing itself in the aspiration to *seem* internationalist but to *be* in fact chauvinist.⁵

The process of transforming the principles of internationalism into state policy, of fusing the two under the aegis of the state, was not simple. It went on along with the usurpation of society's rights and freedoms by the state, a process which developed fast from the latter half of the twenties onwards. The state was convinced not only of following the right course, a course benefiting the whole of society, but of truly expressing the interests of both society and the whole "international proletariat", the whole of "progressive humanity". Thereby it arrogated to itself the exclusive right to distinguish between good and evil, between the progressive and the reactionary.

This phenomenon may be defined as a sort of "state messianism" which gradually supplanted genuine internationalism and had certain of its causes and roots in recent and more remote history.

Its recent causes lay in the revolutionary messianism of the early post-October years. The October Revolution was begun in the belief that it not only might but was bound to be the signal for a world proletarian revolution. When "we began working for our cause we counted exclusively on the world revolution," Lenin wrote.⁶ "It was clear to us," he said later, speaking to the Third Congress of the Comintern (1921), "that without the support of the international world revolution [in Russia—E. P.] the victory of the proletarian revolution was impossible."⁷

By adopting the concept of the world revolution, writes the Soviet historian Vladlen Sirotkin, we wanted to split the world into the proletarians and the bourgeois, and the Decree on Peace was directed not so much to governments as to peoples, over the heads of their governments.⁸

By the way, the practice of appealing to peoples over the heads of their governments was traditional in our country until recently. It was justified during a universal upsurge in revolutionary sentiment but is unacceptable in a different context and runs counter to civilised international relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The idea of proletarian internationalism and the slogan "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" in those years of worldwide revolutionary ferment truly had a concrete revolutionary content and seemed attainable in the short term even to the most sober-minded. Revolutionary ideology and revolutionary practice were still marching hand in hand without

dissociating from or contradicting each other. In addition, the slogan of proletarian internationalism was still separated from the state since there was no state as such at the time; indeed, the whole concept of the world revolution was based to a considerable extent on the idea of abolishing the state and its institutions.

Left revolutionary slogans and the ideas of proletarian internationalism expressed as directly as by, say, the effort to use the Red Army for liberating working people clashed increasingly with reality. By 1921, the situation at home and abroad had changed drastically. It was clear that the hope for a world revolution had failed to materialise and that the young Soviet Republic would have to build socialism unaided and, moreover, encircled by hostile forces. It became necessary to build up Soviet statehood and to establish and improve relations with the outside world.

The requirements of the day, which increasingly contradicted the original ideological guidelines, failed nonetheless to result in renouncing the idea of a world revolution, which continued to coexist, strange as it might seem, with the task of establishing normal state-to-state relations with the capitalist world. This coexistence generated the amazing phenomenon of a dual Soviet foreign policy, which concerned itself with practical foreign policy tasks of the state, on the one hand, and with class-party ideological concepts, including the principles of proletarian internationalism, on the other. *

In the second half of the twenties, this dualism was also a reflection of the struggle between supporters of the concept of the world revolution, without which Russia could not build socialism as they saw it, and those who counted on building socialism in one country encircled by capitalist countries. The struggle was won in the late twenties by the latter group. The line that prevailed was Stalin's policy of building a strong centralised state equal to holding its own against an "external" or "internal" threat. This seemed logical in those circumstances. Yet Stalin and his followers, taking advantage of the centuries-long tradition of Russian command administration, the people's reverence for official authority, their being used to arbitrary rule and oppression, the absence of democratic traditions and institutions, and the underdeveloped condition of civil society, succeeded in imposing without any particular difficulty their concept of building socialism, with absolute state power and the indisputable prestige of the leader as the principal, in fact the only instrument.

After concentrating all power in the country in their hands as the result of an uncompromising fight against their political and ideological opponents, Stalin and the state machine created by him usurped the right to act as the sole exponent of not only state wisdom but social reason and morality, thereby opposing themselves to the people. But such a state can remain in power only by using force, according to Marx; its invariable foundations were unscrupulousness, immorality and a grossly utilitarian view on the state. "Our society knows by experience how very correct Marx was.

In the process of usurping power and the rights of society, programme slogans and ideas such as that of the world proletarian revolution and proletarian internationalism acquired a new content. Having become part of state ideology and having assumed the character of official principles of the state, they began to serve as a means of sanctifying the rigid state structures in the making, which ultimately found expression in the "imperial foundations of Stalinist statehood" and a home and foreign policy corresponding to them.

* This dualism was typical of our foreign policy in one form or another until recently. It found particularly striking expression in Khrushchev's well-known statement: "We will bury you."

As a consequence, the revolutionary messianism of the early post-October years transformed into Stalinist state messianism (with proletarian internationalism becoming great-power internationalism); the latter was akin in substance if not in form, to the messianism of Russia's autocrats, who skilfully used in their imperial interests the internationalism sentiments of Russian people and their readiness to sacrifice their lives "for their friends".

The "messianism" of Stalinist great-power foreign policy was an amazing and indivisible combination of two types of messianism: revolutionary (at least as to phraseology) and great-power. The revolutionary ideas of internationalism often provided an ideological rationale or merely a cover for state interests pure and simple.

Just as revolutionary messianism became great-power messianism, so the sincere dualism of the twenties degenerated into the hypocritical dualism of the period of Stalinist foreign policy, assuming its own, occasionally ugly forms in subsequent years, above all in the period of stagnation, when the lofty idea of internationalism found expression in what the West calls the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and, in particular, in the Afghan action. One may insist on describing the latter as an act of internationalist aid but it will remain what it really is, namely, a foreign policy action by the *state* that was, moreover, ill-advised and unfortunate in every respect, as has repeatedly been said and written in our country.

A very dangerous aspect of messianism as a phenomenon is that where the world rejects it its exponents enter into confrontation with the world. It was messianism that gave rise to the leftist slogan: "Who is not with us is against us." Its realisation at home took an appalling toll in lives and suffering. Besides, having become a principle of our foreign policy under Stalin, it greatly damaged our relations with the outside world, lending them a confrontational character for a long time to come.

I agree in principle with the opinion that nowadays demagogy in the spirit of the "world revolution" (as well as of the policy of "proletarian internationalism", I would add) is a mere ideological disguise used by the caste of bureaucrats trying to cover up by means of revolutionary talks their selfish interests as a nomenclature misusing a great idea.

I would not say, however, that the idea of internationalism was a mere ideological disguise serving in all instances to cover up someone's selfish interests. To say so would be simplistic. The trouble is that many sincerely believed (and still believe) in the internationalist essence of many of our *state* actions. This belief played an appreciable role in shaping a special, unparalleled diplomacy comparable to a queer combination of good intentions with narrowly pragmatic interests. It bred innumerable illusory projects, plainly unacceptable proposals meant for "progressive humanity" and suited least of all for the actual solution of complicated foreign political problems. It gave rise to a strange phenomenon where we overstated our diplomatic achievements.¹⁰

The discrepancy between foreign policy imperatives arising from real and constantly changing relations in the world and ideological imperatives left practically intact since the twenties and thirties and no longer corresponding to either present-day international relations or the role of our state, has begun at long last to change in favour of recognising the priority of reality. What is more, we have only been witnessing this over the past two or three years as a result of formulating and implementing the principles of new political thinking.

We are coming—not without difficulty and on the basis of our own bitter experience—to realise that we can no longer live in a state of ambiguity, of dualism, to appreciate that ancient exhortation: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God⁹ the things that

are God's", or, with reference to our own problem, "Give the state what is the state's and to society what is society's."

A state gaining the upper hand in this equation turns the common interest into a universal one by suppressing the interest of the social and the private. Thereby the monism of the state interest overpowers the pluralism of the interests of civil society. And where it is backed, furthermore, by a common religion (or ideology) binding on all citizens, the state takes a theocratic form (as an alliance between the state and religion or an alliance with ideology). *

By combining in one person the strength of the state machine with the power and prestige of the only religion (ideology) allowed in society, this kind of authority rises above society, the individual, law, society's intellectual and cultural life, trying to achieve uniformity of thinking.

However, the state and ideology (religion) have different foundations: the former is based on the principles of law while the foundations of the latter are moral or ideological. They are basically independent of each other although history has recorded numerous instances of their merging into theocratic formations. But in a theocratic state a doctrine becomes binding on both believers and the rest of the population. This is why a theocracy can survive only by destroying freedom of conscience and convictions, that is, man's moral nature itself. Thereby it undermines the independence of the state itself, which is compelled to submit to ideology even in its own legal sphere and to invade man's inner world, which does not belong to it.

Yet, as soon as society recognises freedom of conscience and allows for the existence of different convictions and a pluralism of opinion, the state necessarily separates itself from religion (ideology).

As I have noted earlier, we often confuse the concepts of the state and society, with the result that the separation of ideology from the state is regarded as its separation from society. But it is the other way round. Every ideology is itself a product of the evolution of social relations and may therefore be said to belong to society. It is alienated from society only when the state monopolises it or returns it to society in the form of a "religion" binding on all.

The real development of civil society and the individual as well as of the state itself begins where and when various spheres of the mind are freed from theocratic bonds, with social evolution assuming a secular trend. One of the most important tasks, that of creating a rule-of-law state in our country, is inseparable from a certain "secularisation" of it. ** A rule-of-law state is secular even by definition, and therefore the

* It has repeatedly been noted in our country that dogmatists and doctrinaires transformed Marxism into a kind of religion. Philosophers and sociologists have yet to investigate this phenomenon. It reminds me of the fact that early in this century our "God-seekers", including Lunacharsky, saw Marxism as a "new religion". But where there is a religion there are also priests. Nor is it accidental that Engels is said to have used the expression "priests of the Marxist parish" (Mehring). He witnessed cases of transforming Marxism into something of a new religion, mainly in countries where the forces of communication had not yet become universal and were limited by local conditions burdened with superstition.

** I would define this "secularisation" as a twofold process that has already begun, strictly speaking. A. A. Shchedev writes in "The Last Religion" (*Voprosy filosofii*, No. 1, 1989, p. 54) that new political thinking with its orientation towards democratising public life will simply be out of the question unless we recognise the need to "stop making a fetish of any ideas or people and return the party to a consistent atheism ruling out all ideological and political myth- and legend-making, that is, an atheism ensuring that convictions never become beliefs, that singleness of purpose is not inherently teleological nor tends to become fanatical and that loyalty to principle does not gravitate towards intolerance". This is one aspect of the process. The other is steadfast application of the principle approved by the 19th All-Union Party Conference and calling for the division of functions between the party and the state, which should result in law and legal acts becoming the chief regulator of life in the country.

principle of deideologising state-to-state relations proclaimed by us should also extend to inner political relations, to the life of the state and of society as a whole. The two are inseparable and so are home and foreign policy.

As for the concept of internationalism, when it is freed from the shackles of the state, it will take a fitting place in the system of relations and values prevailing in civil society, of the democratic institutions and agencies created by it freely and on its own initiative and capable of establishing independently and of their own accord various internationalist contacts and ties with ideologically kindred social groups, parties and institutions, both at home and abroad.

Following this path, we can probably expect to recover gradually from the "infantile disorder" of "left-wing communism" in both our consciousness and our behaviour and to stop identifying the state with society, class interests with the interests of the state, internationalist with state interests, and so on.

INTERNATIONALISM AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I WOULD CALL the present time a period of great reappraisal. We are revising and rethinking many concepts and notions that until recently seemed unshakable: the state, the class struggle, internationalism, sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and much else.

This very fact is evidence that we have entered a stage of transition in the evolution of humanity in general and our society in particular, for such stages have always been accompanied by a revision of ideological values and the established system of views and slogans, and by work to bring them into line with changed realities.

Rapid scientific and technological progress, the internationalisation of production, growing integrational processes, the revolution in communications and transport, the development of weapons of mass destruction and, as a consequence, an unprecedented increase in global interdependence have all begun to erode our earlier concepts of the world and ourselves.

The "iron curtains" and other barriers dividing peoples and states are disappearing. The flow of information has grown, and it is now easier for ideas to cross frontiers, changing people's consciousness, freeing them from restrictions imposed by local conditions and drawing them into the mainstream of universal history. The world, once seen as black and white, is regaining under our very eyes its colourful variety as a conglomerate of social institutions, opinions, views, relations.

We can see something common to all making its way through this multifaceted planetary pluralism. It is the realisation that today's world is a single whole, that all the partitions existing in it are conventional and ultimately artificial, that not a single principle, doctrine or idea, however exalted in itself, can be above the idea of preserving peace and humanity and that, furthermore, any ideas or principles at variance with the latter are dangerous and immoral.

While the world is still rent by deep-rooted contradictions and burdened with a great lack of mutual understanding, too much fear, hostility and distrust, it is manifestly changing for the better. The fact that humanity has come close to the brink of both nuclear and ecological disaster forces people to discard rigid dogmas and patterns and look at the world through eyes free of long-standing prejudices and false stereotypes.

Ideological rethinking expresses itself primarily in the formation of what is now widely known as new political thinking. The reader will recall its main postulates: recognising the priority of universal interests over narrow state interests; desisting from regarding peaceful coexistence

as a special form of the class struggle and hence renouncing the earlier notion of state-to-state relations as a sphere of this struggle; recognising the need to deideologise foreign policy and relations between states; recognising freedom of choice as a key component of new political thinking. The principle of free choice is absolute, as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said in his address to the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly, meaning that it admits of no exception at all whatever the orientation of any country may be.¹¹

It is obvious enough that the principles of new political thinking virtually negate the earlier "internationalism" formulated in terms of state interests and assert a different kind of internationalism, one in keeping with present-day conditions in the world and inseparable from *unqualified* recognition of the right of every people to make their own choice, from respect for the interests and rights of states and for standards of international law. This lends them truly revolutionary significance, primarily for ourselves.

Let us hope internationalism based on narrow class, party, group or state interests gives way to a new internationalism based on the priority of universal interests and values and making it possible to speak of the formation of a "universal international",¹² that is, of the emergence of a single human community on earth.

This process is proceeding along two lines, I think: the line of social relations and that of relations between states. Indeed, international intercourse today is increasingly characterised by the features of what we may describe with sufficient reason as a world civil community taking shape not only irrespective of states and their policies but often against them. This trend is apparently based on two interconnected processes: the process of growing democratisation of civil societies inside various states and the process of increasing global interdependence of peoples and their realisation of the danger of nuclear and ecological disaster.

This is one aspect of the process going on in the world in favour of its closer unity and democratisation. There is another aspect that is equally if not more important. It has to do with objective world processes in the area of economic ties and state-to-state relations. The growing political, economic and military-strategic interdependence of countries is now generating common interests which in turn are paving the way for political accords and closer relations between states. Also, the growth of integrational processes in various countries of the world on the basis of the trend towards internationalising production is leading to the formation of new types of interrelationship between states. Within the framework of integrational alliance, war as an instrument of policy is in effect being eliminated. This is exemplified by the integrational alliances already there. I believe we have reason to regard these alliances as the rudiments or even the prototype of the common world civilisation to come, or the future universal international if you will, all the more so since there are now signs, if not very obvious ones, of a trend towards a gradual drawing together of integrational alliances themselves, towards breaking down the barriers between them.

The idea of integration as a real basis for the unity of peoples, for closer relations between them, and as the main route leading to peace is spreading to wider and wider sections of world opinion. Teilhard de Chardin, the French philosopher and theologian, an outstanding humanist of his day, pointed out that our dreams of improving human society could not come true unless we allowed a convergence of the world.

Fully subscribing to this idea, I wish to explain that convergence in this case does not imply the simplistic and vulgar ideological conception affirming that socialism is bound to transform into capitalism but the objective process of diverse social entities adapting to each other by in-

teracting in identical external conditions of existence and by devising common forms of contact and cooperation. It seems to me that all plans for the formation of a common global civilisation will be meaningless until such a convergence leading to the mutual enrichment of diverse systems comes about.

This is neither a simple nor a rapid process. A necessary component of it is democratisation within societies and in international relations. And this demands radical changes in political thinking and international relations; renunciation of the principle of looking at it from the standpoint of the class struggle; renunciation of the confrontational ideology, of attempts to impose anyone's values or way of thinking and life on the world. Lastly, it is essential to get rid of old, discredited ideological stereotypes justifying the opposition of some peoples or states to others and at the same time to work out a system of views opening the road to a general democratisation and humanisation of international relations, to their transformation into civilised relations centring on man and his welfare and prosperity and not on narrow state interests resting on the state's misconceived prestige in the world, a prestige whose maintenance has always necessitated assigning man the role of cannon fodder.

If I were using the standards of earlier years I could conclude my article on this slogan-like note of optimism. But I do not want the above list of imperatives to be dismissed as wishful thinking; I would like it to be heeded by those whom they are meant for, primarily by ourselves. For much too long, we proceeded in assessing the outside world from a kind of "presumption of infallibility", feeling certain that it was for others to mend their ways and not for us. We must now admit at last that implementing any plans for the creation of a better world is up to us in very large measure or even depends on us to a decisive extent. Will we be able to take the lead by overcoming our own behavioural stereotypes inculcated by centuries of our authoritarian history? Can we break the spell of confrontational thinking and the resultant view on the outside world as an environment permanently hostile to us?

¹ See Alexis Tocqueville, *The Old Order and the Revolution*, Petrograd, 1918, p. 6 (in Russian).

² See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, pp. 30-31, 153-155; *idem. Selected Works*, Vol. Three, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973, pp. 369--370.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 156.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, 1964, p. 107.

⁵ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, 1964, p. 395.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1966, p. 397.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, 1965, p. 480.

⁸ See V. Sirotkin, "A Revolution in Consciousness", *Vek XX i mir*, No. 7, 1988, pp. 17-18.

⁹ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, 1976, p. 120.

¹⁰ See V. Israelyan, "Peace Cannot Be Signed Only from Above", *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 15, 1988.

¹¹ *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1988.

¹² *Ibid.*

BULGARIA ON THE BALKANS, IN EUROPE, IN THE WORLD

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THE EUROPEAN PROCESS IN PROGRESS

THE EUROPEAN PROCESS of ensuring greater security and promoting cooperation has been a current topic of discussion. I should like to note in this connection that this process can and should be viewed above all as part and parcel of the general development of the world, of mankind. If Europe is our home, then the world is our common town. This town is now in a state of rapid change, and the change is of global significance, having a larger-than-ever effect on the destiny of mankind.

The changes going on in the world today may be assessed from different standpoints: from the standpoint of political realities, from the standpoint of the planet's environmental state and its future, from the standpoint of difficult social problems burdening many nations, from the standpoint of progress in science, culture and arts, and so on. But problem number one, which unites us in our common world, is that of peace on earth now and in the future. There was a time when the fate of peace was being made largely dependent on military confrontation. Luckily for mankind, that game was never played.

Owing to the Soviet Union in the first place and to new political thinking, which is justly associated in the world with the name of Mikhail Gorbachev and his actions, mankind is entering a new epoch. The foreign-policy programme of the Soviet Communist Party is among the main factors that have made it possible for the ark of old man Noah to enter the waters of a realistic and effective policy in the interests of all nations.

All this has helped us to clearly realise that this world must not only be saved, but also that it should be changed. Only a few years back the main striving was to survive, whereas now the common awareness of the need to transform the world is getting increasingly recognised. My recent contacts with leaders in the East and the West convince me ever more that this is becoming the chief motive in the political thinking of the world and is becoming predominant in international relations.

The evolution of international affairs in recent years has shown that positive solutions to exceptionally hard problems can be found through political dialogue and reasonable compromise, provided mutual understanding has been reached.

At present entirely new conditions are emerging in a number of important areas for making efforts to save the world and guarantee general security for mankind. I am referring to the results of the dynamic Soviet-American dialogue on the summit level. I mean also the

opportunities offered by the 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive arms. And I mean practical measures to destroy chemical weapons and to completely ban nuclear tests, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the ideas and initiatives concerning a stage-by-stage liquidation of nuclear arms, etc.

Here the breakthrough already made in some directions, and the new elements in the very approach to the vital problems confronting mankind and the philosophy of solving them are of great political and practical significance.

I was among those who directly participated in the international events after World War II. Now I see clearly that at that time the situation caused by the emergence of new types of weapons and the balance of forces in the world arena was not properly assessed. No due account was taken of the prospects for world development and therefore no correct strategy was elaborated for making use of the opportunities offered by socialism. Scientists, Einstein and Russel among them, warned us that there can be no winner in a nuclear war. But we politicians did not heed their warning then.

The socialist countries, too, contributed to the cold war. Our doctrine, as is known, was: if we are attacked, that will be the end of capitalism.

Our countries, above all the Soviet Party and government leadership, have done well to toss that doctrine into the scrapheap of history, to proclaim a new philosophy and take new approaches.

The world is changing right before our eyes. How to change and improve our common world and provide conditions for mutual understanding and cooperation, for a new type of economic, technological, scientific, cultural and other interaction—is main question of concern to all: politicians and scientists, believers and atheists, men, women and young people.

To me this is a sign of a new civilisation, of the world's changing to a qualitatively new state. This is a touchstone which may also help reveal the features, directions, goals, and gains of the general European process in the area of security and cooperation.

If I may put it philosophically, the dialectics of the universal, specific and unique is at work here. This dialectics has never been so clearly manifest before for the simple reason that the world has never been so interrelated and interdependent.

The future of the European security and cooperation process depends primarily on the strict observance of the principles proclaimed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. I signed that act, too, on behalf of Bulgaria. Our consent was an indispensable element for the consensus by which the final documents of the meetings in Madrid and Vienna were adopted. Therefore it is very important to Bulgaria that the rules registered in the above-mentioned documents, which are useful for peace and cooperation, be observed in future as well.

The process which we call European today, has gone through many trials, but in it we see a guideline into the future. Helsinki heralded the coming of detente and the emergence of a European home. I believe that the greatest gain of the European nations is that, for all the difficulties, they have managed to preserve the noble ideas of Helsinki in order to develop them in the new historical conditions of the world into an integral concept of peace, cooperation and mutual respect.

The idea of a common European home, I think, is a culmination of the all-European dialogue; I mean Europe as a military-political, economic, cultural and other reality. As a continuation of the Helsinki process, a common European home suggests the turning of relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO from a source of tensions into a

factor of European stability, and this includes the development of relations between the CMEA and the EEC, regional multilateral and bilateral cooperation, etc.

We also see the future of Europe in the context of general European understandings, based on equality, mutual respect, respect for territorial integrity, and broad cooperation in the political, economic and humanitarian areas.

So, development will depend on a set of elements of cooperation in the area of security, in economy, and in the humanitarian sphere. It is unrealistic to expect great progress, with priority given only to one of these spheres, while the others are underestimated or deliberately limited.

In my view, a major achievement of the all-European process is the decision, taken in Vienna, to start talks—unprecedented in scope and content—between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on a reduction of conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is only logical to expect that, as conditions are growing ripe for saying “farewell to arms”, economic ties and interaction will rapidly expand. Unfortunately, this is only a supposition, because in Vienna, too, the required stronger impetus to economic East-West cooperation could not be given, and the barriers erected in the cold war years in the way of mutually beneficial trade and exchange of new technologies and know-how are still there.

It is not entirely clear what the future of Europe will be after the formation of the so-called common internal market in Western Europe in 1992. So far, some countries are content with mere promises that the future market will not become a “European economic citadel” against the economies of other countries, primarily against the socialist states.

Observance of human rights and liberties was proclaimed a principle of international relations for the first time in the Helsinki Final Act. Today, thanks to the Final Document signed in Vienna, an international “human dimension” in the European process is emerging. This new dimension places new demands on all the signatories.

In Vienna, an integral set of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights was agreed upon, and it exceeds the amount of rights proclaimed in the relevant legislative acts of all the states that have signed the Vienna document. This means that *all* the states should bring their present legislation into line with the provisions of the Vienna document.

Unfortunately, there is every reason to think that some decided to read the Vienna document as the Devil would read the Gospel.

Some Western circles are trying to direct the entire strength of this document against the socialist countries and so make it a kind of an indictment of socialism.

I shall cite two examples. Recently the FRG Ministry of the Interior outlawed the neo-fascist National Assembly. (As far as I know, the Western centres did not protest against that.) But when we arrested the leaders of an unlawful group headed by a former activist of fascist organisations in our country, an organised and well-coordinated, political campaign was launched against Bulgaria, which was accused of violating human rights. Is that normal? Another example. Some Western centres eagerly exploit the question of an alleged Turkish ethnic minority in Bulgaria, though the protocol of the Vienna meeting includes our statement that there is no such minority in Bulgaria. This is direct interference in our domestic affairs, while our national awareness, history, and the ethnic aspirations of our population are passed over in silence. Is that normal?

But let us go back to the future of the European process. We are aware of the inevitable difficulties through which we shall have to go into the future based on harmonious relations, mutual trust, the absence of a military threat, a broad and unhindered exchange of material and cultural values, and direct free contacts among citizens of various countries. These difficulties may be caused by different approaches to the Vienna document, different interpretations of some of its provisions, or by the striving for political, economic or military benefits through different attitudes to all the principles agreed upon in Helsinki and confirmed in Vienna. I don't believe that these difficulties, just like the tendency to divide the socialist countries into "advanced" and "backward", will substantially hinder the advancement to the goal which is dear to all European nations—reliable security and the broadest cooperation in Europe.

THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS

THE SITUATION in the Balkans should also be seen in the context of the idea of the integral and indivisible modern world in which new historical content is taking shape. Moreover, the dialectics of the general, specific and unique is felt most keenly in the Balkans. Because in geographic terms and from the point of view of political, economic and other structures, it is a specific region with European and worldwide standards.

The word "Balkanisation" has gained wide currency in diplomatic parlance, meaning discord, disunity and military, ethnic, religious, and other confrontation. I call it a "Balkan syndrome".

What I mean is that the entire history of the Balkans is a history of converging movements. Our contradictions are in many ways "related" contradictions. In other words, we have always been one cultural and historical entity. Some people say Balkan languages have common elements and the Balkan people have common features of character. I think this is a good basis for joint efforts in the conditions of new political thinking. I believe that all sensible politicians in the Balkans admit that a good deal has been done here in this respect even before Helsinki and after.

In recent years, especially after the Belgrade meeting of the foreign ministers of all the six Balkan countries, held in February 1988, the political relations in the Balkans have been assuming a new, modern image, the image of the future, I should say. Common interests of security, understanding and cooperation are beginning to prevail over the interests of individual states.

This is the main feature of the new political status quo in the Balkans. It has been confirmed by several meetings in Belgrade, Sofia, Ankara, and recently in Tirana, at which problems that are of interest to many countries were discussed in a spirit of goodwill, and the meetings were definitely a success.

The second feature is that all the countries in the region are taking part in the multilateral process in the Balkans. It is significant that Albania has joined the process as well, which is having a most positive effect on the entire situation on the Peninsula.

A realistic approach, naturally, does not mean we can ignore the remaining differences and contradictions. But despite all this, the initiatives concerning Balkan cooperation are winning ever wider support. Conditions are being provided for qualitative changes in the integral Balkan panorama. And opportunities for lowering the level of confrontation and making the Balkans a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons are being explored. The Bulgarian ideas of the en-

vironmental protection of the Balkan countries have won wide public backing. So, broad vistas are opening up for the promotion of economic cooperation among the Balkan states. Practical measures are being taken to coordinate their actions in trade, in the transfer of technologies, in transport, power engineering, farming, public health, tourism, and so on. Cultural and information exchange and cooperation in the humanitarian area are growing ever more significant.

It is only natural that Bulgaria gives priority to the Balkans in its foreign relations. It has been constantly promoting, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, relations of understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation. We readily support any idea aimed at furthering positive tendencies in improving the situation in the Balkans. Our country is most interested in drastically improving the relations on the Balkan Peninsula, making them a sound and constructive element of stability in the whole of Europe. We are not abstract champions of European security and cooperation. We seek to achieve this primarily by suggesting constructive proposals and constructive solutions to problems in the geographic area around us.

In view of what I have just said, I am optimistic about the processes taking place in the Balkans. In our opinion, Balkan cooperation is becoming a long-term process. It may be concluded that the Balkan Peninsula may turn from a region with a common historical fate into a new type of a political community. I mean our possibilities to make use of all the positive achievements of each country, and our possibilities to use what is important for the region, what has been created as a material and cultural gain of the two social and political systems for the benefit of all Balkan nations. And I mean our possibilities together to use the common human values of modern civilisation.

The Balkan nations are known to have bright, beautiful and comfortable architecture. It would be only natural that the common European home should have elements of this architecture, its warmth and reliability.

THE MAIN POLITICAL INITIATIVES OF BULGARIA

THE NEW INITIATIVES of the People's Republic of Bulgaria as concepts and political actions are determined, so to speak, by our place under the sun. We are a socialist state, we live in the Balkans, and our population is small.

We are, in the first place, participants in the process of restructuring which is now under way in the socialist countries and has an increasing influence on the world today. To us the renovation of socialism in Bulgaria is a contribution to the general renovation of the modern world, because the better developed the internal economic, political and other resources of a society are, the more positive is its influence on international affairs.

The large-scale economic restructuring going on in Bulgaria and, in particular, the organisation of the economy into firms, is our concrete "offer" to all countries, including industrialised capitalist states, as regards broad and mutually beneficial cooperation. Bulgaria's openness to the world, notwithstanding the social and political conditions in some countries, is an expression of our new political thinking in the economic sphere as well. And, as we all known, economy and politics are interdependent.

The restructuring processes in the socialist countries and new trends in interstate relations, which have been reflected in the Vienna accords, give us reason to look in a new way at the whole set of questions associated with security. Our wish, as is known, is to shift the main stress in ensuring national security from military to political factors.

For the first time Bulgaria will become an equal participant in disarmament talks, and we are going to contribute to finding a solution which will be of common interest and simultaneously meet the security interests of each state taking part in the talks. At the parallel talks among 35 countries we shall work to extend confidence-building measures. Right after the Vienna meeting, the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria passed a decision to cut this year's military budget by 12 per cent and to reduce the numerical strength of the armed forces by 10,000 troops. The number of tanks, artillery guns and naval ships will also be reduced.

A number of socialist countries have also announced reductions. Our decision was taken following serious debate. As is known, the balance of forces in conventional arms in the Balkans and on the southern flank as a whole is part of the general balance and has its own specifics, as compared with what Central Europe has. We have thoroughly assessed all the factors and have arrived at the conclusion that the main thing now is to consistently demonstrate goodwill and pursue the policy adopted by the Warsaw Treaty of bringing the armed forces in keeping with the defensive military doctrine.

Several laws and other normative acts extending the political, economic, social and other rights of citizens have already been adopted in our country. Now we are going to see what changes should be made in our legislation as outlined in the Vienna document. These measures are fully consonant with the integral tendency of Bulgaria's economic, political, and cultural openness to the world, and they cannot be regarded as something imposed from outside.

For Bulgaria, one of the main results of the Vienna Meeting is the decision to convene an environmental forum in Sofia. This meets with our strong desire to contribute to productive coexistence and is in keeping with our main values. The environment belongs to everyone and therefore it should be preserved and restored through joint efforts, with mutual understanding and mutual aid. We cannot be indifferent to what we shall leave to the coming generations. We cannot, figuratively speaking, eat the seeds set aside for future harvests.

We are satisfied to know that the environmental problem is being given priority in the all-European process and, as the hosts of the meeting, we will do everything to make it a success.

BULGARIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

IN BULGARIA there exists a fruitful tradition in the development of social thought and practice, a tradition which reflects a specific feature of the approach displayed by the Bulgarian Communist Party to the theoretical and practical problems of socialism. This tradition is seen in the fact that at each stage of our advancement we assess the state and prospects of Bulgarian-Soviet relations. It is no secret that we have been reproached for this tradition, and not very pleasant words were said about us. But we are convinced that in the construction of socialism there are sound and immutable propositions which each communist party should adhere to.

This tradition was adhered to this time as well.

We have stressed clearly and categorically the organic relationship between what we are going to effect and are already effecting and the processes going on in the Soviet Union. The restructuring in our country as a course, as a strategy, coincides with what is being effected in the Soviet Union. The fundamental unity of the goals and tasks of the restructuring being carried out in our countries is central to our political course.

This pertains above all to the economy: first, because its development is of decisive significance for the renovation processes taking place in every area of life; and second, because in this sphere we have considerable experience and are providing ever better conditions for introducing modern forms of integration and cooperation.

We have already established quite a few joint ventures in the strategic areas of scientific and technological progress.

The establishment of firms and the introduction of new economic regulators in the activities of our producers is opening up quite new opportunities for integrating their forces and actions with their Soviet partners in all elements and at all stages of production.

At the same time we are pinning great hopes on the implementation of such decisions which will enable us to promote specialisation, cooperation and exchange with individual republics of the USSR on a new level. The agreements and programmes concerning economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation which have been signed recently by Bulgaria with the Ukraine and Georgia are an interesting and promising form of cooperation. Similar programmes to be signed with Byelorussia and Moldavia are being drafted.

New means of cultural contact keep appearing. We hope that the Bulgarian Centre of Culture and Information which opened in Moscow last year will help expand the Bulgarian cultural "presence" in the USSR. Together with the House of Soviet Science and Culture functioning in Sofia, this is yet another channel of cultural interaction, broad spiritual contacts, and an exchange of valuable experience among the scientific and cultural communities in both countries.

The new stage which Bulgarian-Soviet relations have entered in recent years is yet to reveal its content, its historic advantages and will reflect far more fully the new image of socialism, its contribution to the assertion of common human values, to the development of modern civilisation.

International Affairs asked me to comment on some events which had been "blank spots" in our history.

I shall dwell on the repressions in the Soviet Union under Stalin which affected our political refugees as well.

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU we learnt the truth about some of our comrades, but we did not have full information. That became possible only after the 27th Congress of the CPSU, when the restoration of historical truth was extended also to foreign political emigrants.

History condemned Stalin and will condemn him for many of his deeds. For repressions and for the massacre of people, masses of people. History will never forgive him that. This also concerns the hundreds of Bulgarians who became victims of terror and lawlessness.

The facts we know today tell us that there were over 3,000 Bulgarian refugees in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1944. They were among the most active revolutionaries of the Bulgarian Communist Party and in most cases they were part of its leadership. In 1923 and 1924, of the 130 members of the BCP Central Committee, 76 were in the USSR.

The repressions in the USSR, which hit political emigration, did not spare them either. According to incomplete data, over 1,000 Bulgarians suffered from the repressions, more than 600 of them died. Among them were outstanding Bulgarian leaders, such as Christian Rakowski, Roman Avramov, Boris Stomonyakov, Petr Iskrov, Ilia Vasilyev, Ivan Pavlov, Andrei Andreyev, Georgi Lambrev, Atanas Pavlov, and Vylko Radynsky, to mention a few.

Despite the efforts made by some Party leaders, above all Georgi Dimitrov, our emigration could not avoid repressions in the Stalin

years. For understandable reasons, at that time our Party was uncritical about some of Stalin's views and instructions.

We are grateful to the Soviet friends for the information provided to us on the circumstances under which some Bulgarian revolutionaries were subjected to repression. Our Central Committee, for its part, is doing everything possible to carry this process through to the end.

The BCP Central Committee has no information on rehabilitation for 227 persons. At present the work is going on and the facts are specified, and when we are ready, we shall inform the public. It is our sacred duty to restore the names and honour of all Bulgarian revolutionaries.

The April 1956 Plenum strongly condemned the personality cult as incompatible with Marxism and Leninism, with the principles of socialism. We highly appreciated the significance of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Before the April Plenum the situation in our country was difficult, indeed. Troicho Kostov, an outstanding leader of our Party and a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo, was executed, and many Party leaders were subjected to persecution. But even in that situation there were forces in the Party and Central Committee which were opposed to that, and in our country it did not come to the worst.

I should like to mention a few facts about our struggle at that time.

Even when Stalin was alive we in Bulgaria asked ourselves, why the situation was so hard in the country?

A group formed in the Central Committee which included almost the entire Secretariat and some Politburo members. Among them were V. Poptomov, a veteran revolutionary, a political emigrant in the Soviet Union and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Rabotnichesko Delo*, and E. Staikov, Secretary of the BCP Central Committee. At that time I was in charge of the Secretariat of the BCP Central Committee. The three of us decided that resistance should be organised. Regrettably, Poptomov died. I assumed the leadership of the group. The group stopped the victimisation of our comrades. A commission was set up to analyse the charges brought against Central Committee members. V. Chervenkov had agreed to setting up that commission and suggested that I should head it.

The commission arrived at the conclusion that the charges against the comrades were groundless. It was discovered that only one person, a non-Party member had been linked with a foreign intelligence service. The charges against all the other comrades, who had been accused of being "enemies of the people", were dropped. We submitted our conclusions to the Politburo, which approved them. Right after the April Plenum, Troicho Kostov and other victims from among our Party and government leaders were rehabilitated.

Incidentally, a case was being prepared against me—I was going to be accused of being a British spy. I learnt about that from my friend who was in the group conducting the investigation. He told me he could warn me, should the danger of my arrest arise. I asked him not to do that.

Chervenkov did not believe in the accusations against me, and I continued to be in charge of the Secretariat's work. But he did not stop the investigation until the April Plenum. After the Plenum two files of the case, in which I was alleged to be a British spy, were brought to me.

We did stop the repressions, but no changes occurred in other spheres. The situation was especially bad in farming.

The Secretariat drew up a memorandum on agriculture for the Politburo. It was couched in moderate terms, so that Chervenkov would not turn it down. It was proposed that a plenum be convened to consider the situation in farming. Chervenkov agreed.

The commission on the preparations for the plenum worked well, and a report was submitted to Chervenkov. In a fortnight he summoned me to his office and verbally attacked me, alleging that the report was designed to divide the Central Committee.

I replied that there had never been any intentions of sowing division, that it was simply necessary to discuss the situation in farming. But Chervenkov caustically informed me that upon my return to Sofia I should hand over the leadership of the commission to another person.

The commission came up with new proposals, but they suggested palliatives instead of solutions that were really needed. Chervenkov did not accept them. Rebellions began in the country. I was sent to Vidin. I spent one week there, and calm was finally restored. Then I was sent to the Sofia region, where disturbances had begun, too.

I arrived there at night. I got out of the car, gathered the activists, and we all went to talk to the people. We managed to put out that dangerous outburst of protest near Sofia.

The April 1956 Plenum of the BCP Central Committee was a historical milestone. After that, serious changes in the economy began. The negative consequences of the personality cult in Bulgaria and in the activities of the Party began to be overcome.

Following the April 1956 Plenum we took the course of coming closer together to the Soviet Union politically, economically and militarily. We had such ideas before, but they had not materialised on a broad scale. Then the policy of bringing the USSR and Bulgaria closer together began to be pursued in practical terms.

THE SITUATION IN THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIALISM

THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM is a question to be dealt with primarily by theoreticians: for those for whom its fate only recently was too obvious, who saw it as a stately march through history; and for those who analyse socialism as a theory and practice profoundly and with a sense of responsibility.

As for us Communists and the communist parties, this question is, as a great Russian poet put it, mercilessly clear—the future of socialism is the future of the world.

To some this assertion may sound, to put it mildly, like the position of a revolutionary from among the pre-war Marxists. Indeed, over half a century back I was in the revolutionary socialist movement and heard many forecasts of the end of socialism. The prophets have been forgotten, but socialism has remained.

Socialism today has become a common subject of debate. Little is said today about the situation in the capitalist countries and in the countries of the so-called "Third World". The subject widely discussed in the world is socialism, the situation in the socialist countries and the future of socialism as a system.

In this case it is very important to remember who began to talk of the present and future of socialism. The conversation was started by the CPSU and other fraternal parties; it began in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Before, too, we spoke about socialism, discussed and rejected the adopted guidelines, and criticised our shortcomings. But history has never known such a profound, critical and uncompromising reassessment of socialism as a theory and practice in theoretical and practical terms.

The most important thing is that the socialist world, including our community, is going through a process of deep-going change, the process of search for the methods and forms of the development of

society in keeping with our time. Each country, of course, chooses its own way, its rate of growth, and its priorities.

What is going on in the socialist world today is a profoundly positive process testifying to the immanent possibilities of socialism to develop, to produce new, more powerful, "immune" mechanisms for building up the socialist organism.

As I am saying this, I would not like to overlook more complex problems, some of which resemble crisis phenomena. Only recently we were trapped in the "theory" of socialism's foolproof and crisis-free development. We have paid quite a high price for that theory, and now we are looking more soberly at the reality.

Our common concern is quite understandable: which model of socialist economic integration should we build, considering the need to go over to a new type of international socialist division of labour, to harmonise national economic mechanisms as soon as possible, and lift the irrelevant barriers preventing direct ties between our producers of goods.

In this context our fraternal countries are discussing the question of a united market. It will, doubtlessly, have a big role to play in the renovation of our productive forces, enabling us to make better use of commodity-money instruments, and in the earliest introduction of the realistic rates of national currencies and convertibility among them and in relation to the transferable ruble.

It is too early to make a complete analysis, but in all probability the European Economic Community will be increasingly interested in the CMEA markets. We should prepare ourselves for such situation and advance a clear collective alternative, to prevent our isolation from world science and technology. We should change to become competitive.

As for the future of socialism, I should like to add the following. In the non-socialist world it is alleged that socialism has had its day, that its emergence was almost a historical mistake, and now the collapse of socialism is near. Such views may also be heard in some socialist countries.

The real problem today is not whether socialism is to be or not to be, but how to rectify the deformities of socialism. The real problem is not a question of the leading role of the communist party,—there is no other alternative to us—but its ability to effectively carry out the restructuring of socialism.

It is no secret that various social strata and groups here show impatience in accelerating the processes of change and renewal and achieving tangible results. But we realise that such profound restructuring cannot be effected unless it is duly prepared.

Life has confirmed, at the price of great excesses and mistakes, that it is necessary to remember that in the world as a whole the progress of each its component depends on how far and in what way some or other country is involved in the constructive global processes.

The interests of the socialist community will in future, in the conditions of globalisation, increasingly coincide with the common interests of mankind.

This year the working people and all progressives and democrats will celebrate the 125th anniversary of the First International founded by Marx and Engels, the centenary of the Second International and the 70th anniversary of the Communist International. Historical realities mobilise us to make fresh efforts on the path of restructuring socialism as a powerful factor of renovating the world, a factor of a peaceful advance of the human race.

A VIEW FROM TOKYO

Sosuke UNO

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Sosuke Uno. I've taken part in various international conferences, including bilateral talks. The December meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister was my first. When, 28 years ago, I was accompanying Mr. Kono, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry of Japan, during Japanese-Soviet fisheries talks, I realised very clearly how difficult it was to negotiate with the Soviet Union. I recall stories of how hard a time Japanese Foreign Ministers had during consultations with the Soviet side. But over the past three years perestroika in the Soviet Union has made headway and Japan has gained in strength, so that although we had a three-year break, each of the two countries has been developing in its own way, and this alone made the meeting worthwhile. Besides, I don't think our contacts are necessary to our two countries alone, for now is the time when we must heed our responsibilities before the world. This was how I felt when the meeting started.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is a real gentleman who listens attentively to what others say. He has renounced the diplomacy of earlier years when you heard "no" the moment you entered. This time we were able to talk calmly. And what is more, we talked for a long time—three hours, another three hours and then two and a half hours more. The conversations varied greatly in content. We heard out each other attentively and stated our opinions on the problem of bilateral relations. Mr. Shevardnadze said frankly at his press conference that the talks were excellent and very deep-going. For my part, I think highly of them, considering them very good indeed, as you know from the press.

Piadyshv. You will recall that during the meeting Eduard Shevardnadze said Soviet-Japanese relations were somewhat behind the overall progress in the Soviet Union's relations with other big powers. I believe you will agree with that. How would you account for the lag? What potential or opportunities for progress in Soviet-Japanese relations do you see?

Uno. First of all, politically, a major reason for this situation is that the Foreign Ministers of the two countries had held no talks for three years past. Secondly, there is—irrespective of the government—the attitude of the Japanese public to the Soviet Union. The public still has certain doubts about your country. To put it figuratively, the Japanese idea of the Soviet Union is roughly as follows: rising in the North, against a winter sky, is the figure of an armed man. If you just ask him the way he will answer "I don't know".

Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno received the Editor-in-Chief of *International Affairs* shortly after his talks with Eduard Shevardnadze in Tokyo late in December 1988.

The first part of this publication is a transcript of the taperecorded interview, and the second part contains the Minister's written answers received by the journal three months later.

Besides, in the 43 years that have passed since the war, the Soviet Union has repeatedly interfered in the internal affairs of East European and other countries. The latest instance was the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan. And every time the Japanese said to themselves: "Are they really at it again?" They saw in this the reason why the Soviet Union didn't say "yes" on the issue of the northern territories. And this explains, why, for the Japanese, the Soviet Union is a neighbouring yet distant country.

Lately, however, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on a "global zero" in regard to intermediate and shorter-range missiles, and the Japanese know it to be a result of the policy of perestroika the new Soviet leadership has been pursuing. And so when the Japanese see Mikhail Gorbachev's smiling face on their TV screens they respond with warmth because they perceive him as the new image of the Soviet Union. I think that in the Japanese mind the man armed to the teeth who refused to tell the way has now discarded his greatcoat and put on something less heavy.

My wife has told me that when she was showing Mrs. Shevardnadze around Tokyo they were met on coming out of the History Museum by numerous Japanese who waved their hands in greeting. The scene made a strong impression on my wife. Prime Minister Takeshita's wife was also told about it, and Mrs. Takeshita in turn told her husband. And it so happened that the following day Mr. Takeshita and Mr. Shevardnadze met. Thus the present attitude of the Japanese to the Gorbachev leadership is characterised by a desire for the governments of the two countries to make further efforts toward improving Japanese-Soviet relations and for the sentiments of the Japanese to be taken into consideration.

Piadyshchev. Mr. Minister, you've made a very interesting analysis. Let me, however, ask you a question. You've been speaking of the causes attributed to the Soviet side but isn't the Japanese side likewise responsible for the lag in our relations?

Uno. No organisations in Japan today are carrying on anti-Soviet campaigns. There are some people known as ultras who still remember well the events of 43 years ago and therefore proceed under the impact of their anti-Soviet sentiments.

Piadyshchev. I can only comment that Soviet people, too, remember well what happened 43 years ago.

Uno. Could you tell me for my information what people in the Soviet Union remember of the events of 43 years ago in connection with Japan?

Piadyshchev. During the talks a detailed description was given of what happened 43 years ago.

Uno. I heard that explanation. The fact is that 43 years ago, the Neutrality Pact was violated. And then there are the northern territories. Why does the Soviet Union refuse to restore to us the four islands where we lived? This kind of sentiment is still strong among the Japanese. I don't mean the inhabitants of Hokkaido only because all the Japanese feel the same way about it, as I've already said.

Piadyshchev. In view of that fresh mention of the events of the spring of 1945, when the Soviet Union denounced the Neutrality Pact, let me say that the move was inevitable and logical. I hate to repeat it but I must. Peace in the Far East hung in the balance throughout the war years. No secret was made of the fact that Japan's obligations to Germany and Italy had priority over its obligations to the Soviet Union. Let us recall, in particular, the order of May 30, 1945, for the Kuangtung Army to stand by to engage the Soviet Army. In that situation wouldn't it have been more reasonable for Japan to accede to the Allies' proposal for surrender? It was not until after Japan had rejected the terms of the Potsdam Declaration that we declared war.

Now for the islands. We consider there is no territorial question in our relations with Japan, for it was settled and the result written into international

agreements. The claim to the southern part of the Kuriles is unfounded, if examined without bias in the light of geographical realities, facts of history and standards of international agreements. It is international documents of the war years and the postwar period concerning the territorial settlement in the Far East that will be determinant for as long as there is no peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan.

This is a necessary comment, I believe, and now I would like to say something else. During your talks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze you twice used the word "homework", as far as I know. The talks were a success, they led to important accords of principle on the negotiating mechanism. How would you describe that "homework" in the case of deputy foreign ministers and experts?

Uno. Prior to the talks with Mr. Shevardnadze, I told Ambassador Solovyov that I was going to speak of history at them and asked him to study the problem at home. Afterwards, that is during the talks, I stated the Japanese view on history and the Soviet side stated its view. Needless to say, we differed. That, too, was a kind of "homework".

What's coming up now is discussions in standing working groups which Mr. Shevardnadze said were going to examine political, economic and geographical problems. True, I would like the concept of geographical to be defined more precisely but let it be so for now. When the working groups meet it will be necessary to decide the question of venues, the number of participants from both sides, the subjects to be given primary attention and how many meetings are to be held. All these questions must be given consideration if the Japanese-Soviet talks are to make progress. The talks will apparently raise questions concerning science and technology, the economy, space, trade, the environment, earthquake forecasts. Both sides should prepare to discuss all these items. If we take the trouble of organising such a meeting progress should be achieved in all areas where it is possible. It's this kind of preparations that I call "homework".

Piadyshv. I have a feeling that you're well familiar with Mikhail Gorbachev's UN address, putting forward new original ideas about disarmament, a bigger role for the UN, world security, debts, the environment.

Uno. Generally speaking, that address may be described as an expression of the concept which the leader of one of the two camps has of the present epoch. What I see as particularly valuable in it is the ideas about the need to seek a reconciliation between all countries irrespective of ideological distinctions and about respect for the relevant dialogue under way, as well as the announcement of a unilateral reduction in Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men. Those were excellent words. I have respect for those ideas. This time as on all similar occasions, we say: "Put that into effect." It's the implementation of those proposals that will show that the policy of perestroika and glasnost being followed by the new Soviet leadership doesn't involve the Soviet Union alone but the whole world, including Japan. We pin great hopes on that.

Piadyshv. I'm afraid time is passing very fast, Mr. Minister, and so I would ask you to answer the other questions in writing.

Uno. Good. Incidentally, I read *International Affairs* with pleasure. Mr. Togo, head of department, always recommends me to do so.

Piadyshv. Thank you for your attention to our journal.

Following are the Minister's answers in writing compiled with due regard to a further meeting which Eduard Shevardnadze and Sosuke Uno had in Paris in January 1989.

Q. How do you see Soviet-Japanese relations today and what are the expectations for your upcoming visit to Moscow?

A. Personally I am convinced that relations between our countries have what many specialists in both Japan and the Soviet Union describe as a large potential for growing cooperation in various fields, including the economy,

science, technology and culture. Regrettably, these potentialities are not being used to the full.

The issue of improving Japanese-Soviet relations has a bearing on something more than bilateral relations. Better relations could contribute in great measure to peace and stability in the Asia and Pacific region. Besides, from the point of view of East-West relations generally, I would say that in view of the two countries' standing in world politics, better relations between them are inseparable from establishing really durable East-West relations.

I think that during the latest consultations Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I reached mutual understanding on the importance of improving bilateral relations. To really improve them according to our conception, we must by all means concern ourselves with discussing the key problems involved. I believe this is the right time for it.

Top-level dialogue is highly important for the development of Japanese-Soviet relations. Proceeding from this proposition, the two sides agreed to begin preparations at the level of foreign ministers for General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Japan. They formed a peace treaty working group whose task is to assist the Foreign Ministers in their dialogue on a peace treaty, the territorial question included. By means of this negotiating mechanism, specific preparations will be carried out for the General Secretary's visit.

Like the Japanese people as a whole, I wish from the bottom of my heart for General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Japan, the first visit to our country by a head of the Soviet Union, to be full of historic content from the point of view of improving Japanese-Soviet relations. I think this is what both sides should work for.

Q. Japan has slipped from third to fifth place among Western countries as a trading partner of the Soviet Union. Is that the result of a political decision or a consequence of increased economic and structural difficulties?

A. In 1987, Japanese-Soviet trade decreased by a mere four per cent against 1986. There were several reasons for the decrease, I believe, including severe frosts in the Soviet Union in early 1987, which paralysed its economic life, the confusion that set in following the reorganisation of Soviet foreign trade, the decline in the Soviet Union's hard currency earnings due to the drop in world prices for oil, the resultant adoption of measures restricting imports, the diminished competitiveness of Japanese goods owing to the high rate of the yen and so on.

In 1988, Japanese-Soviet trade increased considerably and reached 5.9 billion dollars, the highest amount ever. Our country intends to go on promoting such mutually beneficial business relations in every sphere in which this can be done. According to our statistics, Japanese-Soviet trade, while falling short of Soviet trade with the FRG or Finland, is at the same level as trade with France and Italy and exceeds trade with Britain and the United States.

However, Japanese-Soviet relations in the political, economic and other spheres should on the whole develop in a balanced manner.

Q. Japan is unique in that, having refrained from joining in the arms race, it has made powerful economic progress. Could you tell about Japan's military policy by commenting on, among other things, frequent reports about a growing Japanese military potential?

A. Our country, proceeding from its peaceful Constitution, adheres to an exclusively defensive doctrine. It follows the fundamental thesis of the impermissibility of becoming a big military power posing a threat to other countries. Along with supporting the Japanese-US security system, we ensure civilian control, respect the three non-nuclear principles and have formed and equipped moderate defensive forces by ourselves. We are going to stick to this course. Let there be no mistake: while the media charge now and again that Japan is being "militarised", the actual situation in the defence system of our country has nothing to do with militarism, as I have said earlier.

Q. What made the Japanese "economic miracle" possible?

A. In 1987, Japan's share in the world economy with regard to GNP was 14.3 per cent. It goes on increasing thanks to our country's steady economic growth at the rate of four per cent and to the rising yen rate.

Japan, which accounts for 1/360 of the area of the globe and for 1/40 of the world's population, has made such economic progress by continuous technological advance and improving management.

As a result of these efforts, we have ended the energy crisis. We have coped with the high exchange rate of the yen and other difficulties and we are participating in international economic life on a very large scale. Besides, it seems to me that keeping military expenditures down and concentrating on steps to improve the people's standard of living constituted a further economic growth factor.

Q. How far is Japan involved in economic and political integration in the Asia and Pacific region?

A. The Asia and Pacific region today shows uncommon economic and political dynamism.

Politically, this trend expresses itself in the modernisation of China and in that country's policy of openness toward the outside world, in a growing democratisation process in South Korea, in increasing cooperation between ASEAN countries, in further steps to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula and in Indochina.

Japan supports China's policy of modernising the country and South Korea's policy of democratisation. It is building up relations of interdependence with ASEAN countries and making diplomatic efforts for detente on the Korean Peninsula and the restoration of peace in Indochina. Besides, durable relations between Japan and the United States contribute greatly to peace and stability in the region.

In the economic sphere, dynamism manifests itself in an effective transfer of resources forming the basis of the economic mechanism, in a dynamic restructuring of industry, development in the spirit of free enterprise typical of trade on every level of the international division of labour between Japan, on the one hand, and the ASEAN and new industrial countries, on the other. China will join in these processes in the nineties.

Japan is participating in the advancement of all countries of the region. It is cooperating by financing and by transferring technology as a means of further improving the economic structure of the Asia and Pacific region. In the context of free trade, the export of finished products by APR countries should grow, and to this end Japan is considerably increasing its imports from the region. As the world's biggest power aiding developing countries, it sends to the region two-thirds of its official aid for development.

And as an APR country, Japan contributes actively to the maintenance of a dynamic course of development in the region. Countries of the region fully appreciate the significance and importance of cooperation with Japan, the contribution of our country. I am certain that our relations with APR countries will go on expanding.

Q. It looks as if the APR is the only area where the arms race is still on the rise, primarily in naval armaments. Does Japan consider that the arms race will continue? Not all APR countries are well off. Arms cuts are the only source on which these countries, including the eleven poorest, could draw to develop. What is Japan's view of the present state of the arms reduction talks and the prospects of internationalising the dialogue?

A. What are the reasons for intensified military confrontation in the APR? The phenomenon is a result of the fact that ever since the early seventies, the Soviet Union has been steadily building up its armed forces in the Far East, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Soviet side is constantly referring to the military power of the United States and Japan. The limited increase in US power is a response to the increase in Soviet air and naval forces. Its

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purpose is to keep the forces of deterrence to the minimum. As for equipping the self-defence forces of Japan, I have already said that it is being done within the framework of the minimum necessity according to the doctrine of exclusive defence. Qualitatively, the armed self-defence forces present no threat to the Soviet Union.

To lower the level of military confrontation, it is undoubtedly necessary to reduce Soviet armed forces in the Far East. At the same time, the sources of political confrontation and armed conflict in the region must be removed as an inseparable factor. In Europe after the early seventies, treaties between the Soviet Union and the FRG, the FRG and Poland, the FRG and the GDR and other agreements solved political problems of the postwar period for all time, and it was in that political situation that the so-called Helsinki process began. The current talks on reducing conventional armaments are following a similar course. The political situation in Asia cannot be described as comparable. Such issues as the problem of the "Northern Territories", tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the Kampuchean problem and others remain unsolved. Arms control in the APR is not an end in itself but a means of strengthening peace and security in the region, which require primarily an end to political confrontation and a settlement of armed conflicts.

The Soviet Union makes diverse proposals, above all for cuts in naval armaments. In the Asia and Pacific region, the Americans have nothing but naval forces to deter Soviet ground, naval and air forces in the Far East. In view of the geopolitical difference between the Soviet Union as a continental country and Japan and the United States as naval powers, I must say that the Soviet proposals for reductions in naval forces are one-sided. It follows that they cannot be regarded as proposals contributing to peace and stability in the region. This is why all those proposals have failed to win support not only from Japan but from other APR countries. If the Soviet Union is seeking real peace and stability in the region, I hope it makes, along with reducing its armed forces in the Far East, a greater contribution to the lowering of the level of political confrontation and to the settlement of the regional conflicts mentioned earlier.

Q. International Affairs carries articles expressing not only the official point of view of the Soviet ministries and departments concerned but the personal opinion of individual authors. You have already referred to the journal, Mr. Minister. What contributions did you find interesting?

A. I liked the round table discussion on "The Vladivostok Initiatives: Two Years On" published in No. 8 of **International Affairs** for the last year. The publication made a very honest analysis of Soviet policy in the APR and the situation after the Vladivostok speech. It stressed that it is wrong to take a European approach to Asian affairs and criticised "stagnation in thinking" and a "stereotyped approach to problems". That detailed publication, with its honest analysis of policy and its search for a new approach, made a strong impression upon me. It was an instance of democratisation and glasnost in foreign policy.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze pointed in his speech at the conference on foreign policy problems published in **International Affairs** to the democratisation of decision-making in foreign policy. I hope the Soviet Union holds further frank discussions of that kind with **International Affairs** and other publications covering them.

Q. Many still see Japanese diplomacy as an oriental enigma. Japan is a big economic power but, on the other hand, its involvement in international affairs and major issues, primarily those of security and arms cuts as well as regional problems, is out of keeping with its economic power.

A. In the light of Japan's growing stature in the world community and a considerable increase in its economic power, the time has come for our country not to merely accept the international situation as a postulate but to participate in the life of the world community seeing that Japan is becoming a

major factor for the development of this community. It is important that Japan, while carrying forward cooperation for the good of peace and universal prosperity should not confine itself to rendering aid within traditional bounds but take the initiative of active participation in all international affairs. This is also necessary to peace and the prosperity of Japan itself.

Proceeding from this conception, we have proposed "initiative in international cooperation". It is a concrete political programme composed of three main parts: "cooperation for peace", "extension of official aid for development" and "promotion of international cultural exchange".

"Cooperation for peace" implies, Prime Minister Takeshita said at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1988, that Japan will contribute actively to world peace and security. Specifically, its contribution will consist in vigorous diplomatic efforts towards laying the foundations for peace, participation in international activity aimed at preventing conflicts, an active role in efforts for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, increased aid for refugees, a contribution to aid in rehabilitating areas hit by conflicts. Within the framework of the peace-keeping activity of the UN, which draws the attention of the whole of humanity and in addition to financial participation, we plan to send more specialists in areas where Japan has the necessary potential. Financial participation and the dispatch of personnel within the framework of the UN effort to maintain and strengthen peace in connection with the Afghan problem and the Iran-Iraq war as well as the statement made at the UN General Assembly in September 1988 about granting 60 million dollars in aid are evidence of concrete measures in this sense. UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, speaking to our Premier on February 1 last, said he had a high opinion of these efforts of our country.

This year we intend, as well as increasing financial aid for the free repatriation of Afghan refugees, to render financial aid to Namibia and assign specialists to the Namibia independence aid group. Besides, on the Kampuchean problem, we are going to seek at international level a settlement of the conflict and will help rehabilitate the country. In terms of promoting peace, it is very important to cooperate in arms control and reduction. Our country is contributing actively to the work of the Geneva arms reduction conference, the talks on signing a convention banning all chemical weapons going on under UN auspices and the discussion of problems of nuclear testing.

As for "extension of official aid for development", our country as a big economic power is steadily increasing economic aid for the industrial progress of developing countries and is expected to become soon one of the world's biggest donors of aid. In planning a qualitative and quantitative extension of aid, we must guarantee its effective utilisation. Last year we adopted Plan IV for medium-term targets (1988-1992; total amount, over 50 billion dollars), and now we are working hard to carry it out.

"Promotion of international cultural exchanges" implies bringing about mutual understanding between peoples through international cultural cooperation and ultimately contributing to world peace. In response to the growing interest in Japan shown all over the world, we are going to help preserve and advance world culture by contributing our share to humanitarian intellectual exchanges and to the preservation of the cultural heritage of the world.

Q. Japan is doing much to protect the environment and keep it clean. Take, for example, Tokyo. The air in the capital is much purer now than 15 to 20 years ago and the city's rivers, too, have become clearer. Notable results you have achieved could be utilised outside Japan as well. The Japanese experience of combating environmental pollution is of value to the whole world community. I would therefore be interested to know your opinion of the idea of setting up an ecological emergency aid centre voiced by General Secretary Gorbachev at the UN. What will the international con-

ference on environmental protection due to meet in Japan this year be like?

A. Ecological problems are universal, as General Secretary Gorbachev said at the UN. International cooperation in solving them is a must. Our country is carrying on such cooperation through the UN and other organisations. As regards your country's proposal for setting up an ecological emergency aid centre, we are still unclear about its exact meaning. We will study it when we know what it is about.

Japan and the Soviet Union have exchanged ratification instruments of the Convention on the Protection of Birds of Passage and reached agreement of cooperating from this year onwards in environmental protection within the framework of the Commission for Scientific and Technological Cooperation. We want to go on developing ties in this field step by step.

Japan has long been engaged in active international cooperation in this sphere through UNEP and other UN agencies and must make a still bigger contribution. Right now we are preparing for an international conference on environmental protection at global level to be attended by various countries, including yours. It is due in Tokyo in the autumn of 1989.

Q. How did you become Foreign Minister? What was your reaction to it? Whom do you consider outstanding politicians and diplomats of the past or of today?

A. On November 6, 1987, the Diet appointed Mr. Noburo Takeshita Prime Minister in conformity with the Constitution. The same day the Prime Minister appointed me Foreign Minister. In November 1987 a US-Soviet INF treaty was expected to be signed in December, and there was a growing trend toward a new East-West dialogue, which had been reliably carried forward since the US-Soviet summit in November 1985, held after a six-year break. Japan's economic power, which equalled only five per cent of America's (GNP) in 1945 and reached 50 percent of it in 1985, went on growing. The time came for us to give serious thought to how to use this power for the good of the world. It was in that situation that I became Foreign Minister. I was excited because my childhood dream had come true, and preoccupied with the burden of responsibility for the further development of Japanese foreign policy.

Speaking of the politicians I esteem, I immediately recall first of all Mr. Ichiro Kono, who drew me into state policy. He made a name for himself in foreign policy, especially in the sphere of relations with the Soviet Union. As regards my senior colleagues, I hold former prime minister Yoshida in esteem as a prominent politician who set the development of postwar Japan on the right course.

Q. I have a feeling that good relations of a personal nature have shaped up between you and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Does that circumstance help or should policy be made by impartial, cool minds?

A. In my initial remarks at last year's December consultations, I called for them not to be made a formal debate but a frank and sincere discussion as far as possible. Both during the consultations and afterwards, at the January meeting in Paris, Mr. Shevardnadze fully responded to my call. I think we had frank and sincere conversations that proceeded in a friendly atmosphere. Mr. Shevardnadze impressed me as a politician deserving esteem for his ability to make a rational analysis on the basis of an objective assessment of the state of affairs as well as to show political resolve where necessary.

In diplomatic talks between countries, it happens that the parties differ, and the search for mutual understanding is difficult. In such cases it is important for them to intensify their efforts in searching for common ground. This is particularly appropriate in the case of two inseparable neighbouring powers, such as the Soviet Union and Japan. Personally I would like to join efforts with Mr. Shevardnadze toward improving Japanese-Soviet ties, using as the basis the friendly relations which we established during the consultations.

Q. The Japanese diplomatic service is known for its high professionalism. Please tell me about the structure of your Foreign Ministry, its traditions and its place and role in the system of government agencies.

What are relations like between the leadership of the Ministry appointed on political principles and the career diplomatic service?

A. The Foreign Ministry system comprises a central apparatus and 170 diplomatic missions abroad. The central apparatus is made up of the Minister's office plus ten departments and two sections. It employs about 1,700 people. Our diplomatic missions employ about 2,400 people.

In 1868, a foreign policy agency was established simultaneously with the formation of a Meiji government. It was the predecessor of today's Foreign Ministry. The following year it was transformed into a ministry in the context of a restructuring of central government bodies. The same year, the Ministry moved to Kasumigaseki District, where it is still situated. Those 120 years were not always smooth sailing but the Foreign Ministry, working to bring about an international situation that would make the prosperity of our country possible, spared no pains in serving national interests.

Now that Japan holds a higher place in the world community, it should bear its international responsibility more effectively and actively with due regard to the outlook for the longer term. The time is coming when our diplomacy, too, will have to actively exercise initiative. In these circumstances the role of the Foreign Ministry, which deals with the country's foreign policy problems, is growing. So is its prestige. Besides, a big responsibility rests on the staff. Its members are proud of the job they are doing.

In the Foreign Ministry as in other ministries of our country, the posts of minister and political deputy minister are assigned to politicians. Civil servants from deputy ministers down assist the minister by fulfilling practical foreign policy tasks in collaboration with him.

AND THE WALL OF ISOLATION CAME TUMBLING DOWN

Valentin NIKIFOROV

THERE ARE EVENTS that are never forgotten. People keep reviewing them again and again, drawing conclusions, learning lessons, and planning the future.

These are the kind of events caused by the earthquake in Armenia. The tragedy of December 1988 showed what new relations in the world should be like, relations which can, and I should say must, become usual practice. That is why it is so important now to make a thorough analysis of what happened last December and what has been taking place since then.

A variety of experts are occupied with this analysis. Among them are diplomats, who were closely connected with the disaster.

THE FIRST DAYS

OUR DIPLOMATS JOINED the efforts to remove the consequences of the earthquake as soon as they learned about the catastrophe. The situation did not allow us to mark time, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs took it upon itself to coordinate the relief delivery from abroad.

That work required the utmost concentration of efforts and efficiency on the part of the central staff of our ministry and its missions abroad.

By December 8, only one day after the earthquake, the Ministry called a meeting of its Collegium to set up a working group, an emergency headquarters. I was instructed to head it.

The headquarters immediately established contact with the Politburo Commission and departments of the CPSU Central Committee, with the USSR Council of Ministers, and other ministries and departments (the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Defence, the State Security Committee, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, etc.), and public organisations (the Alliance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Young Communist League). We maintained uninterrupted contact with the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, and the permanent mission of Armenia in Moscow. A hot line was established between the foreign ministries of the USSR and Armenia. All this enabled us to respond to the incoming aid offers without delay.

Valentin Nikiforov is an Alternate Member of the CPSU Central Committee and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The first telegram to the Soviet embassies was sent right after the disaster. It said:

After the earthquake our missions abroad are addressed by officials and individuals who come up with numerous proposals on rendering various kinds of assistance. Such proposals should be accepted.

The embassies immediately responded to our recommendation, and reports came pouring in. The information had to be processed without delay, for the reports not only expressed compassion, but also contained offers of assistance.

The diplomatic corps in Moscow immediately responded to the Armenian tragedy.

Jack F. Matlock, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, visited me and handed in a message which said that in connection with the tragic natural disaster that had befallen Armenia the Embassy of the United States would deposit \$25,000 to account 700412 of the Soviet Vneshekonbank opened for donations to the earthquake victims. On behalf of the entire staff of the US Embassy in Moscow and the US Consulate in Leningrad the Ambassador expressed profound condolences to those who had lost relatives and sent best wishes to those taking part in the rescue operations.

Aenne Burda, the publisher of the *Burda Moden* magazine, sent this telegram:

"The horrible catastrophe that hit your country has deeply shocked me. Allow me to express my compassion. To alleviate the misfortune and help render undelayed aid to those who have suffered, I and my three sons send to your country 1 million deutsche marks. With profound sympathy, Aenne Burda."

Practically all correspondence on Armenia was marked "urgent". To keep the rapidly changing situation under control we needed to promptly receive thorough information. In this we were helped by the computers of the information research centre recently set up at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They helped us keep records of reports coming from embassies and ministry departments, single out and concentrate attention on the most urgent ones.

Our task was to encourage those who extended a helping hand. We stressed this in the telegrams we sent to Soviet embassies in other countries, saying that medicines and medical equipment were needed most for urgent actions to save people. Somewhat later we began to inform the embassies about the kinds of assistance required for restoring life to normal in the earthquake area.

Our headquarters worked round the clock. Besides, all the officials at foreign ministry departments were on special duty.

I should like to express gratitude to the colleagues who worked efficiently in other ministries and organisations.

On the first day measures were taken to provide most favourable conditions for the foreign planes carrying rescuers and urgent cargo to the USSR. In fact, "open sky" conditions were provided for them. Positive answers were given to all flight requests. By the end of the second week following the earthquake about 200 foreign planes had landed in the Soviet Union.

On a suggestion of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs the procedure for issuing visas and customs formalities was simplified, and rescuers, physicians and other experts were coming practically without visas. Many had group visas or received visas at the airports in Moscow and in Armenia.

It is safe to say that the earthquake dealt a telling blow to red tape—an important lesson to learn.

I think that five or ten years ago we would have rejected all foreign aid in such a situation. And if we had agreed to accept it, it would have taken, perhaps, weeks to take an appropriate decision. But now everything was done within a few hours, which was only natural in the context of the new thinking policy.

We began to hold daily press conferences and briefings at the press centre of the Ministry, which were attended, apart from diplomats, by representatives of other ministries and organisations. Radio and TV interviews with Ministry officials were broadcast live. All that helped to ease tensions and preclude false rumours.

The workers of the administrative and auxiliary departments of the Ministry were in charge of meeting, accommodating and seeing off specialists arriving in Moscow on their way to Armenia.

The Commission of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo gave a positive assessment of the "Moscow" part of our work.

However, not all was smooth in our work. At one point we faced a serious problem of delivering cargo from foreign airports. In some places abroad 200 to 300 tons of cargo piled up. Ministries and departments were not always quick enough to conduct a routine procedure between themselves, which caused delays in answers to embassies. But, on the whole, I repeat, the Ministry personnel worked competently and efficiently.

Our colleagues abroad worked well, too. It is fair to say that the large amount of foreign aid and its prompt delivery was largely their achievement. Besides, they donated over a million dollars of their own money to the fund of aid to Armenia. That money was spent mainly on medicines and medical equipment.

Now about the work of our Ministry personnel in Armenia. As soon as it became known that foreign rescuers had arrived, officials of our Ministry's Consular Department flew to Yerevan. They spent days and nights at the airport, ensuring an uninterrupted registration of official papers for foreign experts. Praise has become pretty rare in our time. Still, we should give credit to the consular workers here in the Soviet Union and abroad: they were most efficient. This gives us hope that the current restructuring of our consular service is yielding the expected results.

Many stereotypes, which for decades had seemed immutable, were discarded then. Trust among states and peoples greatly increased. For the first time since World War II, US military aircraft landed on our airfields, and air traffic controllers in Western countries guided Ruslans and Anteis with the wing markings of the Soviet Air Force to the landing strips. This would have been inconceivable a few years ago. And can it be considered an ordinary thing that the servicemen of the Soviet Army and the armies of some NATO countries worked side by side in the ruins of Spitak and Leninakan?

My first visit to Armenia was on December 17, to take part in the work of the Politburo Commission headed by Nikolai Ryzhkov.

When I arrived in Spitak, I saw what I would never be able to forget. It was a horrible sight indeed: the town looked as if it had been the target of an air raid. Volunteer rescue teams from the army worked in what had once been streets. Many coffins lay beside the helicopter site. I saw people coming to take some of them.

A rescue team in khaki uniforms was carefully making its way to a man under ruins. They cleared him from the debris, to discover that the man was dead.

The rescuers spoke in Polish. They told me they had come from the town of Zielona Góra—there were 83 of them.

As soon as the news of the earthquake in Armenia reached Poland,

these boys packed, and two hours after the alarm signal they were ready to fly to the disaster area.

Later I saw them again and talked to their loader, A. Petrakowski. Recently they again worked selflessly in Armenia.

There have been very many instances of daring exploits among the rescuers. In December the international airport in Yerevan was a veritable "air gate" for the whole world. Bearded Frenchmen wearing kepis settled themselves beside West German rescuers in orange uniforms sitting on the floor with their dogs. Czechs carried on lively conversations with British rescuers and Israeli physicians. One could hear many different languages there. People of various nationalities had arrived to save other people. It all looked like a scene from a film about the future of the human community united at an hour of trial.

There were many young people—the airport looked like a campus. Other comparisons, too, occurred to me then: medical equipment all around made it all look like a field hospital.

At that time another stereotype, the propaganda one, proved false. Thousands of foreigners were given an opportunity—for the first time without usual complications—to be present in a disaster area in the USSR. As they returned home, they told the truth about the scope of rescue operations and the proportion between foreign and Soviet aid. However, attempts were sometimes made to explain the organisational and technical difficulties, inevitable in such a situation, by a weakness of the socialist system. But the honesty of foreign witnesses prevented such views from gaining broad currency, as had been the case in the past.

It is quite obvious that the decision to accept foreign aid, taken without procrastination, was fully justified.

As early as only a few weeks following the earthquake about 200 foreign reporters had arrived in the disaster area from 40 countries. Their arrival, arranged by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, precluded the publication abroad of biased reports based on rumours.

However, some Western reporters did send false reports alleging that Armenian children were "deported", that not all goods sent from abroad reached the disaster area, and so on. As a witness to what was really going on there, I felt shame for those who were inventing and spreading those rumours. I must say even that nothing could be more immoral in that situation.

Children, indeed, were taken to neighbouring republics and to other regions of the USSR for a time, until new houses would be built. Would it be more humane to leave the children (many of whom had lost their parents) in the ruins?

As for the goods sent to Armenia, they all were registered. A special relief-distributing headquarters was set up, and all the things sent reached the Armenian people. In some places there was confusion and the delivery of goods was delayed. But whenever this became known, resolute measures were taken to normalise the situation. Today, too, we are seeing to it that all relief reaches Armenia.

In the first days, we must admit, we failed to report our actions efficiently enough to the Armenian authorities to get their timely approval. We should have made better use of our opportunities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a bit late in sending to Yerevan its officials to assess the situation. And we were justly criticised for that.

I was shown a letter sent to the *International Affairs* journal, in which O. S. Nev writes from Leningrad that the work of our Ministry in Armenia was criticised by Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, when he was in the earthquake area. "What was the matter?" the reader asks.

I should clarify this matter around which all kinds of talk is still going on. The reference here is to the Ministry's interpreters. Aware that with so many foreigners arriving in the country there would obviously be a need for people knowing foreign languages, our Ministry passed a decision to send a group of its staff member (15 persons, each knowing a few foreign languages) to Armenia on December 12, who were to work there as interpreters. Other groups, too, were prepared for a flight to Armenia.

Besides, over 100 students of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations were in Kirovakan clearing up the ruins and could be used as interpreters when necessary. About 50 persons made up a reserve group of interpreters of the Foreign Ministry of Armenia, which was to be used in the first place. However, the republican ministry declined the services of the Moscow interpreters, explaining this by the excess of their own interpreters.

So, there was no problem of interpreters. The unfortunate misunderstanding, which gave rise to the talk that everybody helped Armenia, while the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not even get round to sending interpreters, had been caused by the failure duly to distribute the available forces.

We drew proper conclusions from the criticism, however, and an additional group of our Ministry's personnel soon arrived in Yerevan. It did not do the job of the Armenian Foreign Ministry and, solving all arising problems through that ministry, helped to establish a smoothly operating mechanism for receiving and using aid from abroad.

"NEW SPIRIT OF HUMAN RELATIONS"

MERELY A FEW DAYS after the earthquake people from all Soviet republics worked side by side with about a thousand people from abroad—rescuers, physicians, firemen, seismologists, steel-bar cutters, communications men, and others.

Most impressive was the efficiency of the national civil defence services of many countries. Within a few hours they sent us fully equipped teams of rescuers and physicians provided with the most up-to-date search equipment and medical instruments. Every minute mattered, and their high competence proved most valuable when people buried under the ruins were being rescued.

In order that *International Affairs* readers could have a clear idea of worldwide solidarity with Armenia, I shall review, if only briefly, the actions of some states.

Among the first who extended a helping hand to us were Cubans. Fidel Castro personally took charge of that work and on December 9 he gave his blood for transfusion to the earthquake victims. He said that urgent aid to Armenia "may demonstrate a new form of cooperation for the whole world, cooperation in which not only big but also small countries can take part".

On December 13, I received Franz Spasov, chargé d'affaires of Bulgaria in the USSR. On behalf of his embassy staff and all Bulgarians who work or study in the Soviet Union, he expressed condolences for the tragedy.

He told me that right after the news of the earthquake reached Bulgaria, a government relief commission was set up there. It was headed by Grigor Stoichkov, alternate Politburo member of the Bulgarian Communists Party's Central Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. A special account for donations from the population was opened at the National Bank of Bulgaria. Several planes were flown

to Armenia from that country during the first few days after the earthquake, bringing medical equipment, medicines, baby food, and clothes.

The delivery of goods was not easy, even dangerous. The Yugoslav plane crash evoked grief in the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs had decided to dispatch two planes to Armenia: one carrying medical equipment, instruments, and rescue gear, and the other carrying a rescue team.

The cargo plane crashed as it was approaching Leninakan. All seven crew members died.

However, the courageous Yugoslav rescuers did not refuse to fly. They waited until the other plane was loaded and flew to Armenia.

As I met Milan Vereš, the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, I expressed admiration for the courage and solidarity of the Yugoslav rescuers and informed him that Soviet state awards had been conferred on them.

In general, Yugoslavia helped us a great deal. In December it dispatched to Armenia over 130 tons of cargo to the tune of more than 5 billion dinars (over \$1 million).

I could write here far more about the contribution made by the socialist countries to eliminating the consequences of the earthquake, but they were not the only ones which helped Armenia, and our country. More than fifty countries came to our aid immediately. A flow of equipment, foodstuffs and medicines came to Armenia. The amount of dollars, marks, lire, rupias and other money sent to the earthquake relief fund was growing every day.

Already a day after the disaster the French people heard that a special code, "36-15 Armenia", appeared in the teleinformation system Minitel, which is used by many families. Through that code one could learn the number of the account to which money was to be remitted for the earthquake relief fund.

Soon the organisation "SOS Armenia" was set up with the participation of famous chansonnier Charles Aznavour. It was joined by many influential persons, including former prime minister Jacques Chirac, now the mayor of Paris. It collected and dispatched medicines, foodstuffs, clothes, and toys to Yerevan.

The France-USSR Association staged a gala performance in the Olympia hall. The takings went to the aid-to-Armenia fund.

Many Frenchmen opened their hearts, as well as their wallets and wardrobes, to help the people who had suffered from the disaster. Heaps of gifts were mounting at schools, offices and churches. Big sums were donated by firms (for instance, Heibron and Gobert donated 100,000 francs each). French people themselves were amazed at the extent of solidarity.

At the same time they spoke about the changes in the Soviet Union. "We felt no barriers," said a pilot from Marseilles who delivered cargo to Yerevan in an interview to newsmen. He told them that the customs formalities were made very quick and easy for him, though he had no visa.

Commenting on the pilot's story, a Paris newspaper wrote: "In 1948, under Stalin, over 100,000 people died in an earthquake. That was kept secret. Even in 1986 the USSR kept silent about the Chernobyl catastrophe during the first days. This time everything was different. They showed their misfortune to us and allowed us to share it with them."

A telegram from the Soviet Embassy in the United States said that three American firemen, who had been in a group taking part in the rescue operations in Armenia, had paid a visit to the Soviet embassy to tell how they had worked together with Soviet people. They said they were shocked by the proportions of the disaster. In the United States, they said, it was easy to criticise the way the rescue work was organised,

especially in the first days, but if the same had happened in the United States, the problems would not have been smaller. The firemen spoke warmly about Soviet people and recalled that they had worked side by side with people of different nationalities. That joint rescue operations reminded them of the "Elba spirit", noted one of the firemen.

In December, 27 planes flew to Armenia from the USA, bringing 180 experts and 665 tons of cargo: fire extinguishing equipment, medicines, small prefab houses, tents, communications equipment, seismic instruments, and foodstuffs.

The Americans allowed their air bases to be used for receiving and loading Soviet planes, and they paid the cost of their fuelling and maintenance.

A group of US geological experts installed equipment for seismic observations in the earthquake zone.

On December 8, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced that her country was prepared to extend urgent aid to the Soviet Union. That day London declared that a relief fund of 5 million pounds sterling was established for the purpose. An interdepartmental group was set up at the British Foreign Office to coordinate all questions related to the relief actions. A team of 75 rescuers arrived in Armenia with up-to-date equipment designed for finding people under the ruins. British aircraft delivered to the disaster area construction machines and medical equipment, including four big grader-tractors of the Jane CB firm, 500 blood-transfusion devices, 200 sets of first-aid instruments, 60 resuscitation installations, 500,000 dispensable syringes, and blood-sampling equipment. Besides, the British provided 200 tons of blood plasma and 192 portable "artificial kidney" devices.

In Italy, on the first day after the earthquake was reported, a government headquarters was set up to coordinate relief measures. Ciriaco De Mita, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who took part in organising assistance, ordered everything necessary to be delivered to the USSR without delay along a constantly operating "air bridge".

In the short period between December 8 and 16, eight military transport planes were dispatched from Italy to Armenia carrying rescue teams and dogs, acoustic instruments designed for detecting people under the ruins, motor vehicles, means of communication, including satellite communication, as well as medicines, donor blood, bandages, clothes, and foodstuffs.

Italian aid came in various ways. Italian Ambassador Sergio Romano told me that the personnel of his embassy and of the Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce had raised about 6,000 rubles.

So many noble deeds were carried out those first weeks! Now that I have started to cite figures, I shall mention a few more. An unprecedented fund-raising campaign was launched in the FRG. It was joined by government and public organisations, businesses, educational establishments, and individuals.

FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl set aside 10 million deutsche marks from state funds for purchasing 16 heavy-load cranes for Armenia. The governments of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and some other *Länder* donated one million deutsche marks each. The same amount of money was offered by the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by Rudolf Augstein, editor of *Der Spiegel*, the authoritative magazine.

By the end of December, over 100 million deutsche marks were donated to the aid-to-Armenia fund by West German individuals and companies alone.

Austria's aid totalled some 40 million schillings (about 2 million rubles). Just a few days after the disaster it sent to Armenia 236

rescuers with dogs trained to search for people under the ruins, and special equipment.

The money gained at a large art auction in Vienna (3.8 million schillings plus 250,000 schillings from the auction directorate) were handed over to the Soviet Embassy.

The Japanese government passed a decision to render urgent assistance to the earthquake victims and allocated 1,230 million yen (about \$10 million) for the purpose. A group of 10 experts in seismology and antiseismic construction was sent to the USSR. Political parties, trade unions and various organisations launched a large fund-raising campaign which was widely supported by the population. In December, the Soviet offices in Japan received over 100 million yen of donations from organisations and individuals.

I recall a moving episode in this connection. A Japanese woman came to our embassy in Tokyo and brought a small sum of money with her. Somebody asked her name. "What difference does it make? It is help that matters," she answered.

The Chinese Red Cross Society sent to Armenia about 35 tons of goods costing 200,000 yuan. It took five planes to carry the cargo.

Chinese organisations and individuals donated over 3,000 yuan including 1,000 yuan offered by the editorial staff of the *Bridge* magazine.

The aid provided by friendly India was big and prompt. Many million rupees' worth of medicines and medical equipment were delivered by Indian military aircraft and reached Armenian hospitals and outpatient clinics immediately.

These are the data on only some countries. All helped as they were able to. Sometimes aid was symbolic, but this by no means makes it less valuable. Among the donors were countries with poor economies, like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Kampuchea, or Bangladesh, and countries with which the USSR has no diplomatic relations, such as Israel, Chile, and South Africa. And among the people who sent their money were those who were not well off, and there were multimillionaires, groups of workers and owners of concerns, people holding various political and religious views. That is a new social, political and psychological phenomenon, an invaluable precedent for active international cooperation today and in future.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the tragedy in Armenia showed what new relations in the world could be. This is precisely what foreign journalists wrote about. An American CBS observer said that the reports coming from Armenia reflected the human tragedy, and also the new spirit in human relations. Doctors from Denver went to Armenia. Firemen from Washington suburbs flew there, too. A construction worker from Maryland raised money for building prefabricated houses in Armenia. All these Americans helped Soviet people, helped those people from the "evil empire", the "Reds", and the "villains", the observer said. We have changed, the whole West has changed, he went on, and we have changed because they have changed. Speaking in New York, Mikhail Gorbachev called upon the world to solve its problems through joint efforts. This time has come, the observer said, and though peace did not emerge immediately on the ruins of Armenia, we saw their pain and responded to their call. The evil forces will find it hard to divide us after that, he concluded.

According to the information provided by Soviet embassies, this view was shared in the political quarters of various countries. For instance, Bjorn Elmquist, Chairman of the foreign policy commission at the Danish *Folketing*, told a spokesman of our embassy that "the Armenian tragedy enabled the Danes to better understand and feel for the Soviet people", "to believe the thesis advanced by the Soviet leaders about the

priority of general human values, and to promote the growth of confidence in it and our support for it". The Soviet Embassy in Britain arrived at a general conclusion that the participation of British people in aiding Armenia helped to "discard the old views about relations between the two countries". In a talk with an official of our embassy, a spokesman for the US State Department backed up the idea that it is necessary to pool international efforts in overcoming large-scale disasters and said that a wealth of experience in this had been accumulated in the United States, and that there exist special services to combat natural disasters and, in principle, this could become an object of long-term cooperation between the USA and the USSR. I. Sbokos, director of the Greek organisation on planning and rendering aid in the event of an earthquake, told a spokesman of our embassy in Athens that he hoped our ties in this sphere would be expanding.

We have sent messages of gratitude to all countries on an appropriate level. The messages were not just general phrases or words similar for all, as had often been the case in the past, but individual replies.

We have changed, indeed. There was so much unexpected and unusual last December. Mikhail Gorbachev interrupted his foreign visit to fly to Armenia. Many Soviet government members hastened to Yerevan. The TV broadcast daily reports from the disaster regions.

There was one more thing which amazed people abroad. The whole world found itself connected with our country by one destiny, and state and also political frontiers were torn down overnight. As Eduard Shevardnadze put it in a speech at a Conference of Consular Officers of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the earthquake in Armenia "shook and razed the wall of inhuman isolation from the outside world".

HALF A YEAR LATER

SIX MONTHS have elapsed since the earthquake, but public attention is still focused on Armenia. Today, restoration work is in full swing, the wounds of the earthquake are being healed, and life is gradually coming back to normal. But a good deal of work still lies ahead.

We are helped by other states in this work. The scope and forms of their assistance have no precedent. As many as 111 countries and 7 international organisations are taking part in this work to a varying degree.

The character of international assistance has notably changed with time. Urgency, the emotional strain, occasional instances of competition and advertising, have all receded into the background. The proposals made these days concern to a greater extent long-term cooperation in restoring what was destroyed, arranging joint research in medicine, forecasting earthquakes, conducting antiseismic construction, and promoting the contacts established with the Armenian republic.

Several countries have proposed the construction of kindergartens, schools, hospitals, out-patient clinics, apartment houses, and whole blocks of buildings. The construction would be free, and would be conducted according to their own projects. Our partners are also interested in restoring the ruined and building new community and service facilities and industrial projects on a commercial basis. Many of the projects are already being negotiated.

Thus, right after the earthquake the influential Austrian paper *Kurier* called upon the population to raise money for building a new residential district in Leninakan. Now it has enough money to build fifty houses. The paper's representatives visited Armenia and discussed the possibility of constructing a house-building factory.

The British government offered to build a school campus with all necessary equipment for 400 children. A relevant memorandum was signed during the recent London visit by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Italian company TTI and the Yugoslav firm Dunavbrod offered to deliver small houses. A few national societies which are members of the League of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies decided to build an orthopaedic factory and a rehabilitation centre for invalids in Armenia.

The Norwegian Red Cross society offered to build a 250-bed hospital in Spitak. Odd Grann, general secretary of the society, said on his return from Armenia. "I have seen a good deal in my life, but I have never seen destruction more horrible than in Spitak." Norwegians were among the first foreigners to establish and equip a tent hospital in that totally ruined city. Incidentally, the hospital is still in operation. The next project is a hospital that will be named after Fridtjof Nansen. Nansen was not only an explorer of the Arctic, but also High Commissioner of the League of Nations and contributed greatly to the campaign of aid to the population of the Volga area during the famine in the 1920s.

I should like to describe here yet another episode. Artificial limbs were made in Ottawa for two young Armenians, Marina Otaryan and Aram Azbekyan. That December the girl lost both legs and the young man, one leg. The Ottawa rehabilitation centre made artificial limbs for them and KIWANIS, a union of several clubs, financed their stay in Ottawa. The doctors believe that Aram would be able to walk independently in two months and Marina, in four or five months.

The offers made by various countries are not remote plans, but quite specific agreements and measures which fit into the two-year programme of restoring the housing and industries in the damaged area adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers.

As the work being done in Armenia entered the next phase, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to adjust its activities to the new conditions. So it has gone over from extraordinary urgent measures to steady activities according to plan. Our main efforts have been shifted gradually from the organisational sphere to the political one, because the offers I have just mentioned are of interest in the political context as well, opening up additional opportunities for the promotion of bilateral relations with definite countries.

A task facing our Ministry today is to provide efficient diplomatic backing for carrying out international cooperation plans of aid to Armenia. This task is regarded as most important and urgent by the Ministry personnel and the Soviet offices abroad.

Just like our foreign partners, we, at the Ministry are business people and not only keep record of all proposals and projects, but will analyse them to see what initiatives have been effected, and which have remained on paper.

Now a few words about another serious problem. In the first days following the earthquake close ties were established between our central staff and the embassies in foreign countries. We constantly felt the connection between us. This is very important, because the "feedback" sometimes fails, telegrams sent by our offices abroad are not always answered, and many suggestions and proposals they contain are left unheeded.

In December our ministerial departments and embassies worked as a single mechanism, operating with the highest efficiency. This interaction should not only occur in an emergency situation. It should become common practice.

Now let us look at this interaction from a somewhat different angle. We feel today that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia attaches great importance to the growing international coopera-

tion in assisting the affected population. Considerable work is also being done by the republican Council of Ministers. A headquarters was set up for the purpose, headed by Levon Saakyan, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Armenia, and our embassies maintain direct contacts with it.

Speaking about the republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I think the readers may be interested to know which foreign visitors went to Armenia (the republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged their visits):

- a group of US Congressmen;
- the son and grandson of US President George Bush;
- a delegation of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Yutan Iimuri, head of the Ministry's department;
- a French delegation headed by Gerard Renon, State Secretary on the prevention of major technological and natural disasters (the rank of a minister);
- a group of UNIDO experts;
- a delegation from the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator;
- Armand Hammer, president of Occidental Petroleum;
- Yves Pagniez, Ambassador of France to the USSR;
- M'hamed Yala, Ambassador of Algeria to the USSR;
- Abdul Sattar, Ambassador of Pakistan to the USSR and Akbar Khan, military attaché;
- a delegation from Iran headed by an assistant to the Prime Minister;
- a delegation from the FRG Embassy in the USSR headed by Rudolf Adam, a councillor of the embassy;
- a British delegation led by John Wiggins, Under Secretary of Education and Science;
- over one hundred foreign correspondents accredited with the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- a delegation of the General Armenian Charity Union headed by its vice-president Louis-Simon Manukian.

Anatoli Mkrtchan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, returned recently from Paris where he had discussed the proposal of the UNESCO leadership on building a school in Spitak. Besides, an exhibition of children's drawings was held in the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, displaying drawings by Leninakan children. The money received from the sale of the drawings was used for aid to Armenia.

It is my pleasure to say that a number of Soviet and foreign citizens who displayed courage when rescuing the victims of the earthquake and in eliminating the consequences of the disaster will receive Soviet government awards. Besides, a memorial medal has been instituted to be awarded to Soviet and foreign people who took part in the rescue and in restoration work after the earthquake.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that the international campaign of aid to the earthquake victims symbolises the profound positive changes going on in the world today. It clearly demonstrates that the atmosphere in our world is being determined today by new humane trends, that the process of humanising international relations is gaining momentum and new thinking is steadily making its way, bringing people together, making them aware of being one family living in one common home called Earth.

This unity in the face of a disaster shows that people, whatever the political and social orientation of their states, are capable of coping through joint efforts with other difficult problems, such as hunger, back-

wardness, environmental pollution, and the arms race which jeopardise the very existence of our civilisation.

At the basis of solidarity with our country displayed by the international community in response to the catastrophe in Armenia is doubtlessly the growing trust in the Soviet Union and in its line for wide openness in foreign and domestic affairs. The worldwide aid campaign is, as it were, a vote of confidence in perestroika.

In fact, the course of events is precisely in keeping with the philosophical conception set forth by the Soviet leader in his UN speech. The idea of advancing towards an interrelated and interdependent integral world is being confirmed in practice, which is being done convincingly—something one could not expect recently.

The attitude abroad to the tragedy in Armenia should be regarded in the general context of the preceding positive changes in the world, such as the signing of the INF Treaty, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the settlement of a number of other regional conflicts, and the general improvement of the climate in East-West relations.

Of no smaller importance is the political effect of this campaign. Openness, unprecedented in such cases, has been duly appreciated by public opinion abroad as indisputable proof that in the Soviet Union the words about the need to humanise international relations are backed up by deeds. It is safe to say that cooperation with the international community in eliminating the earthquake consequences was the third major practical result of new political thinking after the start of the destruction of nuclear missiles and the return of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

According to the author's wish his fee for this article will be remitted to the Armenian earthquake relief fund.

DOING AWAY WITH THE COLD WAR

Charles W. MAYNES

IS IT POSSIBLE to end the Cold War? Given the unrelenting nature of that war, few have been willing to answer that question in the affirmative, even during the warmer periods in U.S.-Soviet relations. For the Cold War involved a relationship of controlled but total hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. The hostility was controlled because to allow it to get out of hand might have meant the end of both the Soviet Union and the United States as viable societies. But the hostility remained total because in both countries powerful forces contended that the other side was incapable of evolving into a more normal international partner. According to this argument, it did not matter what the intentions of a particular group of leaders in Moscow or Washington might be; their system itself drove them to take certain actions that made a normal international relationship with the other side impossible.

Another consideration blocked fresh thinking about ways to end the Cold War. From at least one narrow but critical perspective the Cold War had benefits. Despite its enormous costs in military expenditures, political suspicion, and human suffering, it did serve as a firebreak in the superpower relationship. The lines of separation down the center of Europe were so clear and so firm that even the most dim-witted on either side knew the penalty of a major mistake. And so none was made. For more than 40 years the global conflict that so many otherwise intelligent observers of the international scene were certain would soon engulf the two superpowers and their allies never came.

Soviet leaders could have shot down the American aircraft carrying supplies to the inhabitants of West Berlin during the 1948 airlift. At any time in the postwar period, the Soviet government could have gone beyond harassment to squeeze West Berlin so tightly that the existing arrangements would no longer have been tenable. Soviet leaders might have ordered Soviet troops to fight the American soldiers in Korea or Vietnam. But any one of these steps carried the danger of major conflict with the United States. So the fateful step was never taken.

Similarly, leaders in the West always opted against any decision that threatened to trigger the military avalanche all were determined to avoid. When events in Poland approached the flash point in 1956, the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—well known as an implacable anticommunist—publicly declared that the United States would not send armed forces into any East European country because that “would precipitate a full scale world war.” When Soviet troops invaded Hungary in 1956 and the U.S. government came under enormous pressure at home to react militarily, Dulles publicly proclaimed such calls for a U.S. military response as “madness” because of the danger of nuclear war. President Lyndon B. Johnson took the same position during the Czechoslo-

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vakian crisis of 1968. The United States refrained from military involvement because, in the president's words, "such involvement could inflame the situation and engulf the United States in a war with the Soviet Union." (See Jiri Valenta, "The Explosive Soviet Periphery", FOREIGN POLICY, #51).

Although Nikita Khrushchev's rash decision to place Soviet missiles surreptitiously in Cuba was the precipitating cause of the Cuban Missile Crisis, once both countries were engaged, the leadership in both Moscow and Washington showed restraint. The United States did not invade Cuba. The Soviet Union was willing to pull back from its earlier decision to deploy ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Cuba.

In light of this record, some American analysts—and I suspect some Soviet analysts as well—express reservations, usually in private, about early steps to dismantle the security structures erected as a result of the Cold War. This point of view is reflected in the American saying: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." In other words, if the current security structures have given us more than 40 years of peace, why change them?

But this narrow view ignores both the fragility and the costs of the current arrangement. After all, even if each side can express relief that in past crises leaders in Moscow and Washington have repeatedly behaved rationally, there is danger in complacently assuming that U.S. and Soviet leaders will *always* be capable of rationality in periods of enormous international tension and thus personal stress.

And the costs of the Cold War, though less than the price in treasure or lives of a global conflict, have nonetheless been enormous. The U.S. and Soviet military establishments consume hundreds of billions of dollars a year. Unable to fight in Europe, the leaders of East and West for much of the postwar period have channelled their mutual hostility and fear to the Third World where proxy wars literally have killed millions. In addition, in Europe itself families have been divided; countries have been isolated; and fruitful economic and scientific cooperation has been blocked.

Regrettably, however, these costs probably cannot be cut significantly simply through an improvement in relations. To achieve major savings, it probably will be necessary to end the Cold War itself; for without a dramatic change in the relationship, it is likely that leaders on both sides will continue to conclude that they simply cannot take the risk of any sizeable reduction in the military establishment of either side. The Soviet decision to reduce unilaterally its conventional forces in Europe was a major political gesture, whose importance and impact it is hard to underestimate. Nevertheless, the core strength of the two alliance systems remains essentially untouched. The Treaty eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons of intermediate range was also an extremely significant step. Never in history had two major powers agreed to destroy modern weapons only recently produced and deployed. Yet in the end it remained true that the weapons destroyed represented less than 5 percent of the nuclear arsenals on both sides.

Even if the 50 percent cut in strategic weapons now being negotiated is achieved, the military predicament of the two sides will not change all that much. Each side will have enough weapons to destroy the other many times over. And the agreement may not even save much money. Leaders on both sides probably will soon be pressured to channel most of the funds released into new and more promising weapons systems. For so long as the image of the other side remains that of the "supreme enemy", each side probably will continue to worry that increased communication and contact will bestow too many benefits on the other side, that political shifts in the most obscure parts of the globe will still have geopolitical significance, and that it is risky to cooperate too closely with

an opponent who one day may decide to seize a unilateral advantage or even launch a devastating surprise attack.

To say this is not to denigrate the advantages of a more relaxed relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the absence of any alternative, leaders on both sides should press for relaxation. Even if they find that because of conflicting national interests or mutually exclusive alliance obligations they cannot end the Cold War and thus reduce defense expenditures significantly, it is still desirable to shave costs at the margin. Lives of ordinary people in both the United States and the Soviet Union will be much richer if such steps are taken. And the two superpowers, even in the context of continuing suspicion and hostility, clearly ought to work to limit the human costs of carrying the Cold War to developing countries.

Nevertheless, detente is not enough if American and Soviet leaders are to succeed in redirecting the massive sums they now spend on defense into domestic programs that can help deal with the very serious economic and social problems facing both countries. So the question is, what might cause this to happen? Here it is important to note a sharp difference in the termination characteristics of hot and cold wars. Hot wars usually end because, through conflict, a victor emerges. Cold wars, which avoid conflict, have no natural end. They can continue year after year long after most have forgotten why they first started.

Can the Cold War between East and West end if American and Soviet leaders simply proclaim that it is over? The record thus far suggests that this approach is unrealistic. Officials in Moscow or Washington may decide to soften the war's character—and recently both sides have taken steps in this direction—but for the reasons already mentioned they will hesitate to enter into a reciprocal process of de-escalation that over time can bring the Cold War to an end. Initial steps may be taken but against a backdrop of suspicion any one of a number of unexpected developments will threaten to bring the process to a halt.

Nor will the rest of the world press the two superpowers to end the Cold War. For other countries are ambivalent about that war. They fear the consequences both of its continuation and its cessation. They fear its continuation because they are uncomfortable with the unknown.

The Cold War could end, however, if both sides simultaneously arrived at a point where neither could afford its continuation. How realistic is that possibility?

In the Soviet Union, it is possible that the government has concluded that the Cold War is too costly to continue. All influential groups, including even the more conservative, apparently recognize that the country is in urgent need of major domestic reforms. Prominent figures speak openly of the need to channel funds from the defense budget into the domestic economy. Admittedly, there still appears to be a troubling gap between rhetoric and defense procurement cycles. The Soviet Union apparently continues a military buildup that is alarming to Western countries. On October 14, in a major speech, Robert Gates, then Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and now Deputy National Security Adviser to President Bush stated that "at this point we [in the U.S. intelligence community] see no slackening of Soviet weapons production or programs" and contended that whereas the U.S. rate of growth in the defense budget is declining, the Soviet rate "continues to grow, albeit slowly." Gates' concern notwithstanding, the candor with which Soviet leaders openly discuss the problems their society faces does open up the possibility that domestic pressure inside the Soviet Union may force Soviet leaders to consider seriously what can be done to place their relationship with the United States permanently on a less hostile footing.

If so, they are more likely to be audacious if they believe that the Americans are also facing pressures to think the unthinkable. Otherwise, they may fear that the American tendency will continue to be to wait cautiously on events. Soviet leaders at some point might themselves be tempted to return to a much more cautious approach. In that event, the likelihood of a major transformation in the relationship could again recede.

Are there pressures then that will cause a growing number of American officials to think the unthinkable? On the basis of the rhetoric in the recent presidential campaign, most observers might conclude that the answer is no. Both candidates apparently concluded that it was electorally disadvantageous to talk openly about any need for major domestic reforms or a significant shift in budget priorities.

In fact, the situation in the United States is too complicated to summarize easily. The country enjoys a significantly larger per capita income than the Soviet Union and it benefits from an economic and technological advantage over its great rival. Since so much in life is relative, there is an understandable, if shortsighted tendency among American commentators to concentrate on Soviet shortcomings rather than on any that might exist in their own country.

But there are many signs of trouble in the United States that it seems unlikely political figures can long ignore. The most sensitive one concerns the issue of race.

OF COURSE, it can be argued that both the United States and the Soviet Union are quite capable of financing a continuation of the Cold War while undertaking whatever domestic reforms are necessary. At the level of theory, this point of view is certainly correct for the United States. As then Secretary of State George Shultz pointed out in April 1988, Americans enjoyed their highest economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s precisely "when our military expenditures averaged 9.2 % of GNP, a much higher proportion than the 6.7 % we spend today." But this point of view does not take into account the difficulty all policymakers have in any political system in shifting resources from one sector to another in any major way unless there is a supreme national crisis. In the 1950s Americans felt that they confronted that kind of crisis following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, which they interpreted as the first step in a global communist offensive. Today few Americans feel the international scene is so threatening.

Moreover, in every society there may be a margin—call it the disposable margin—that that society permits its political authorities to shift among sectors in order to run the society efficiently. Barring a war, it seems to be hard to move that margin dramatically, however laudable the new programs are that the political leaders wish to pursue. If this is the case, 21 leaders will find that they face some very hard choices: If they want fundamental reforms, they will have to pay for them within the existing budget. But which existing programs can be cut significantly without a negative effect on societal peace and progress? Defense expenditures appear to be the prime candidate. They produce little of enduring value; and if the foreign threat has indeed receded, they represent an unnecessary charge on the society. Yet the military in any country is a powerful force that resists cuts in its budgets. In addition, U.S. and Soviet leaders face a special obstacle: the legacy of the Cold War.

Suppose, however, that resource constraints do force American and Soviet leaders to take a searching look at the possibility of ending the Cold War. The irony is that progress will then be easier than expected.

For what is curious about the Cold War is how few real reasons either side has for its continuation. The United States and the Soviet Union have no border disputes. Each has products or materials that would be helpful to the other side's growth but as continental powers, neither finds its own path to development seriously blocked because of lack of cooperation from the other side. This statement might seem somewhat controversial in light of American efforts to limit Western economic cooperations with the Soviet Union. But the largest impediment to expanded East-West trade has always been the Soviet inability thus far to produce products the West wishes to buy rather than politically imposed restrictions. If the Soviet Union were ever to produce such products, the United States would find it much more difficult to persuade its allies to maintain the restrictions.

The United States does have an enormous economic stake in the Third World, the scene of so many East-West conflicts. More than 40 per cent of U.S. foreign trade is with Third World countries. In addition, the United States and its allies are currently or potentially dependent on the Third World for certain key raw materials like oil. But the Soviet Union is not threatening the West's access to global markets. Nor, because it would be a *casus belli*, is it likely to. Moreover, the Third World may even be receding in importance as a source of great power tension rooted in economic causes. The very path of economic development seems to be shifting, at least for the most developed countries. In the past it depended very directly on access to raw materials. All of the great industrial states had large deposits of iron and coal and hard-working populations willing to exploit them. But today the economic future of the most advanced countries appears to depend on the development of its information and communications industries. The most important raw material for development appears to be found in the minds of young people in the classroom rather than the minerals of the mine shaft.

The military importance of the Third World may also be shifting. For a considerable period in the postwar period, Third World states played a key but inadequately appreciated role in superpower defense. Missiles and bombers were not intercontinental in range. Consequently, bases in Third World states offered special attractions to the superpowers, particularly the United States as the globe's pre-eminent naval and air power. But as the ranges of rockets and submarines have increased to 6,000 miles or more, the United States has responded by closing down foreign bases from Ethiopia to Scotland.

Some military locations remain indisputably important. The United States has struggled with mixed success for some years to acquire basing rights near the Middle East oil fields; it has bargained hard to retain them in such countries as the Philippines. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has recently established important bases in such countries as Ethiopia and Vietnam. But none of these bases is as vital to the security of either superpower as U.S. bases in various parts of the world were to U.S. security a few decades earlier. And several developments seem likely to make them increasingly dysfunctional for either superpower.

First, as Third World states continue to develop their military powers, the bases will become decreasingly useful to either superpower for the purpose of projecting force into the Third World. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have learned to their separate dismay the military price that Third World peoples armed with modern weapons can exact even from the most powerful countries. Meanwhile, Third World countries in which foreign bases are located are placing a growing number of restrictions on their use. Already such countries as Turkey and the Philippines place limitations on the missions of U.S. forces stationed on their territory. One suspects that the Soviet Union will soon face or

perhaps already does face limitations. Second, as technology steadily increases the accuracy of long-range rockets, bases close to the shores of the chief adversary will continue to decline in military importance. Third, as both American and Soviet societies become increasingly permeable to satellite technology and even permit foreign military inspectors on their territory as part of new arms control agreements, the utility of superpower intelligence facilities in Third World countries close to the borders of the other superpower—whether Soviet facilities in Cuba or U.S. facilities in China—may also decline in value. For all these reasons, superpower sensitivity in certain Third World areas may decline in the coming decades.

What else fuels the Cold War? Historical memories might be one source but these memories are mixed. Imperial Russia was the only great power to support the North in the American Civil War in the middle of the 19th century. The United States did send troops to Siberia in 1918 to try to stamp out Bolshevik rule. But fiercely anticommunist America also helped save the Revolution with the massive food shipments it sent in the early 1920s under the leadership of future President Herbert Hoover to feed the Soviet people suffering from famine. The two great nations were rivals after World War II but critically important allies during it.

One major source of tension in the relationship has been concern about the respective spheres of influence of the two superpowers. Indeed, a glance over the past 40 years reveals that although foreign affairs specialists often warn that it is Third World conflicts that are most likely to draw the superpowers into a nuclear exchange—the 1973 Middle East crisis is often cited as an example—tension between Moscow and Washington usually has reached its most dangerous point when one of the superpowers concluded that the other was threatening its position in its own sphere of influence. Examples from the past would be the various crises in Eastern Europe or the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is why unfolding events in Eastern Europe and Central America today remain a cause for concern even in an atmosphere of improved superpower relations.

Yet the security threat posed to the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe or the United States from Cuba or the Caribbean may also be declining. After World War II, perhaps a Soviet leader could fear a Western attack through Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union. It was then not clear how the West German regime would evolve. Moreover, deposed leaders from Eastern Europe lived in the West and many were still active and burning with resentment. But few in Moscow today can find that kind of martial spirit in any significant section of Western opinion. And West Germany has proved to be the Western country most open to a policy of accommodation with the East. Similarly in the late 1940s, with Western Europe prostrate, the Americans inclined to return across the Atlantic, and the Soviet army without rival anywhere on the Continent or in the world, it was perhaps understandable that Western leaders might conclude that a Soviet attack was a real possibility. But no responsible voice in Western Europe now fears that the Soviet Union is likely to attack. It is the very size of the Soviet military establishment in Central Europe that is now the primary source of Western fear. Yet the large military machines on both sides in Europe probably remain in place largely because of inertia: Since a security system of enormous forces armed to the teeth and ready to strike has worked, no one has wanted to change it. But that does not mean that it should not be changed if the nature of the military threat has changed.

One can make similar points about Central America or the Caribbean. No sane American official has ever feared a Soviet land attack through Central America. Feared has been the establishment of Soviet nuclear

facilities in the hemisphere that could threaten U.S. security. The United States was convinced that the Soviet Union was seeking such a capability during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union then had few missiles of intercontinental range. The installation of medium-range missiles on Cuban soil would have shortened warning time dramatically and augmented the Soviet military threat considerably. But as part of the resolution of the 1962 crisis the Soviet Union pledged never to deploy nuclear missiles on Cuban soil and there is no evidence of any intention to violate that agreement. Meanwhile, the world has changed. Even though most American observers cite as the main danger in the Soviet relationship with Nicaragua the possibility that the Soviet Union might establish nuclear bases there, the rapid development of the Soviet submarine fleet is creating a new security threat to the United States as severe as anything that might emanate from a Soviet land base in Latin America. Again, in brief, the nature of the military threat is changing even when the perceptions and the reactions of policymakers do not.

These facts of life do not mean that leaders in the Kremlin or the White House do not have and should not have legitimate concerns over political developments in both Eastern Europe and Central America. In these regions the Soviet Union and the United States respectively are facing major international challenges. But the challenges are primarily local in nature, even if each superpower contends publicly that its region of concern would be peaceful except for the unhelpful activities of the other side. The main threat in Eastern Europe and in Central America is domestic implosion—a collapse of the social order because the system, as currently designed cannot cope with the problems these countries are facing. In many of the countries in Central America and the Caribbean there is no known answer to the problems of rapid population growth, limited development opportunities, and mounting civil strife. Throughout Eastern Europe there is a growing sense that fundamental changes must be attempted if the existing system is to avoid a political and economic collapse sometime in the future.

There are a few hopeful signs that the superpowers are beginning slowly to come to grips with the realities of these two regions. In the past the Soviet government was strongly opposed to political and economic reform in Eastern Europe while important political and social forces in East Europe were pressing for sweeping change. It repeatedly intervened militarily to cut down reform efforts. Today the reformist winds blow in the other direction; and Soviet spokesmen have hinted that some of the reforms Soviet generals worked to crush yesterday Soviet officials would like to reconsider today.

In the past, the United States repeatedly used direct military force to choke off revolutionary movements south of its borders. But more recently the U.S. has reluctantly agreed to accept a Marxist-Leninist Cuba; and the efforts of the Reagan administration to overthrow the Sandinista government in Managua have always stopped short of direct U.S. military action. Were it not for the close ties of each of these states with the Soviet Union, Washington probably would have been able long ago to move toward a formal accommodation with Havana and Managua. And here the vicious circle begins: Were it not for the Cold War, perhaps Cuba and Nicaragua would not feel the need for these ties.

SO BY THE PROCESS of elimination we arrive at the final and perhaps most important explanation for the Cold War—the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism or Wilsonianism and Leninism. Is that struggle likely to recede in intensity?

In one fundamental respect it is unlikely to cease completely. Neither American nor Soviet leaders are ever likely to agree that their own system of government is no longer a model for the rest of the world. To ask for such agreement is unrealistic. But it might not be unrealistic to work toward an understanding of ideological struggle that would enjoin leaders in both countries to seek converts through example, not force. In the United States the classic expression of this more benign approach to ideological struggle is found in the famous 1821 Fourth of July address by John Quincy Adams, a future president. "Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled", Adams said, "there will [America's] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will command the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from *liberty* to *force*... She might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."

Nothing would be more helpful to an effort to end the Cold War than an authoritative, modern reformulation of Adams' approach from both Moscow and Washington. And here an initiative from Moscow would be in order. For anticommunism, as the word suggests, has always been a reactive policy. Communism came first, then anticommunism. Since the latter has followed the former, if the former changes, so should the latter. Following this logic, if the way that the leaders of communist countries refer to international politics changes, then in time there should be a change in the way that the leaders of noncommunist countries refer to international politics. In fact, this kind of benign point-counterpoint is already taking place. The shifting views of President Ronald Reagan toward the Soviet Union offer eloquent proof of such a transformation. No more implacable anticommunist ever sat in the White House, but no figure in the White House ever witnessed such constructive developments in the Soviet Union; and Reagan, despite his seemingly unmovable convictions, changed and responded accordingly.

What else can be done? Both a short range and a long range strategy seem in order. In the short run priority must be given to efforts to reduce fears on both sides that result from the excessive militarization of the relationship. As the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev suggest, Soviet leaders in the 1950s genuinely feared an imminent American attack. As the American reaction to the North Korean invasion of South Korea suggested American officials at the time really expected communist forces to surge forward at almost any weak point along the East-West line. In light of such fears, it is not surprising that both sides embarked on a vigorous armaments program. But neither side operates in such an atmosphere of paranoia today. It should therefore be possible to undo some of what was understandably but unnecessarily done.

Soviet leaders should move quickly to dispel American concerns recently expressed in Gates's important speech about an alleged gap between Soviet pronouncements of new thinking and a continued military build-up. The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in its annual survey recently called attention to this alleged gap as well. Soviet officials should either release data that prove Western fears to be unfounded or they should take urgent action first to level off and then

to reduce the rate of Soviet military procurement. Both sides should give the highest urgency to joint discussions among experts designed to assist both sides in recognizing the features of a military force that has moved from an offensive strategy to a defensive strategy. And both sides should approach the pending conventional arms reduction talks in Europe constructively and creatively. Proposals from the other side should not be dismissed reflexively but studied sympathetically, if carefully.

Glasnost has already done much to reduce Western fears. It should be pursued vigorously with special attention given to those aspects of Soviet policy that seem to arouse the greatest concern in the West. The Soviet Union should also use glasnost in the West to call attention more vigorously to Western actions that arouse concern in the Soviet Union. Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev during his visit to the United States was able to discuss with the American public aspects of Western military exercises in Europe that have aroused fears among Soviet military officials that the West might be planning an offensive operation against the Warsaw Pact.

The evolution of America's relationship with China may also offer some lessons for those hoping to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. Through intensive consultations and a vigorous exchange program involving many sectors of American and Chinese societies, the two sides succeeded in convincing one another that neither side had a policy that threatened the other. Both the U.S. and Soviet side should press ahead with large scale exchange programs permitting individuals of influence in both countries to learn more about the other side.

The relationship could benefit from some great enterprise that would capture the imagination of the American and Soviet people. A joint venture in space seems the logical choice. More ambitiously, the two sides, in recognition both of the fact that technological progress will continue and of the reality that some technologies may create special dangers, could explore the advantages and the disadvantages of a joint Soviet-American research effort in the area of space defense. Only a joint effort would block the possibility of a destabilizing technological breakthrough by one side or the other. President Reagan once proposed sharing technological advances in this area. Joint research would seem to be the only safe way to accomplish this task.

There are steps the United States might take. If events continue on their present course, it could accept Soviet offers to enter into expert discussions between the Congress and the Supreme Soviet on human rights obligations of both countries. The United States could agree to a serious discussion of its obligations under international accords in the field of economic rights while the Soviet Union could make a similar commitment in the field of political rights, including emigration. The United States could announce that if glasnost continues to expand in the Soviet Union, it will move unilaterally to close down Radio Liberty. Finally, the United States could examine systematically steps it might take to assist communist governments to improve the quality of consumer goods and food products delivered to their populations. The U.S. government could encourage U.S. banks to participate actively in the extension of credit on normal commercial terms to the Soviet Union to upgrade its consumer industries. And it could support an examination of Western controls on exports to members of the Warsaw Pact with the overall objective of significant relaxation in areas that do not have direct military application.

But there must also be a longer run strategy that deals with the core fears of the two sides in their areas of historic sensitivity—Central America and Eastern Europe. Events in either region retain the power to destroy much of what has been accomplished in East-West relations in

recent years. Consider Central America—a region of great preoccupation to the United States for decades. During the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the United States moved formally from unilateral enforcement of hemispheric security to a multilateral approach. In 1934 at the Pan American Conference in Montevideo, Roosevelt signed a declaration that accepted the principle of nonintervention. Then, within a few years, Roosevelt abrogated the Platt Amendment establishing an American protectorate over Cuba, liberalized the Panama Canal treaty and withdrew the last U.S. occupation forces from the Caribbean. (See Charles Maechling, "Monroe Go Home," *Foreign Service Journal*, June 1988) The United States accepted the obligations of the Organization of American States, the Charter of which formally outlaws intervention in the internal affairs of member states. But Roosevelt's courageous and farsighted shift in U.S. policy did not end American sensitivity regarding Latin America. Indeed, Americans today divide into two camps with respect to the policies of the Reagan administration in Central America: those who, the actions of Roosevelt notwithstanding, maintain that the Monroe Doctrine still guides U.S. policy in Central America; and those who, occasional lapses like the invasion of Grenada notwithstanding, maintain that U.S. policy in the area should accord with America's international obligations under international law and the OAS Charter.

In this highly sensitive situation, Soviet military involvement in or close military ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, or any other country in Central America or the Caribbean carry the risk of triggering a major confrontation with the United States. What makes such Soviet activity all the more controversial is that in the case of Cuba or Nicaragua the Soviet Union is supporting states that at least in the past have openly admitted their political and military support for subversive activities carried out against states that are members of the OAS.

Eastern Europe, the traditional invasion route into the Soviet Union, is obviously a region of legitimate sensitivity to any government in Moscow. (And it is an area of concern to Americans. Millions of Americans trace their roots to Eastern Europe. Indeed, there are more Polish Americans in Chicago than Poles in Warsaw.) No political authority in Moscow could look with indifference on the establishment of alliance or military ties between a country in Eastern Europe and the United States. But in this regard as well history has taught the West lessons and Moscow should recognize this. American administrations, as noted earlier, have understood Soviet sensitivities even at the height of the Cold War. Nationalists in Eastern Europe also now understand. American observers were quick to notice that unlike the Hungarian reformers in 1956, the leaders of Solidarity in Poland in 1980 made it clear that in pressing for reforms in Poland they did not intend to leave the Warsaw Pact.

The question that faces both Moscow and Washington is what reasonable steps each could take over the longer run to reassure the other regarding activities in the region of concern to the other superpower. Following are some suggestions in this regard:

—The United States could reaffirm publicly that its principal concern in the Caribbean and Central America is national security, not the internal order of states in the area. The Soviet Union should make a similar statement regarding Eastern Europe.

—The United States could renew its international commitments under the OAS and U.N. Charters regarding the use of American troops against another state in the Western hemisphere. The Soviet Union ought to state that it accepts a similar commitment under the U.N. Charter and Helsinki Accords regarding Eastern Europe.

—Each superpower could pledge publicly that it will not seek nor ever accept military facilities or special privileges of any sort in the zone of concern to the other side. Consistent with that pledge, the Soviet Union could pledge that it will withdraw all military personnel except military attaches from Cuban soil once an administration in Washington has succeeded in establishing normal diplomatic relations with Cuba.

These are far-reaching steps that many will dismiss as utopian or even as a form of provocation. But the international system will always be subject to severe shock as long as events in either Eastern Europe or Central America and the Caribbean can trigger a major East-West confrontation. Political change will inevitably occur in both regions. It is necessary to search for ways to disassociate that change from the East-West conflict itself. That disassociation might occur if each superpower became convinced through a series of mutual commitments that its great rival would not exploit such change to gain some important advantage in the global struggle. Once divorced from the global struggle, the smaller states in Eastern Europe and Central America, even during periods of political change, could be depended on to establish a relationship of reassurance with its powerful superpower neighbor.

AS THIS ANALYSIS suggests, an effort to end the Cold War will not be easy. There are powerful vested interests that support the current structure. It will take painful compromises and difficult decisions on both sides to reverse the course set by more than seventy years of hostility. But the effort should be made. The stakes are enormous. If American and Soviet leaders show vision and courage, they may be able to establish an enduring structure of peace that can release the energies of their peoples to attack the real problems facing American and Soviet society.

Intelligence and Foreign Policy

Oleg KALUGIN

HARDLY HAD THE ECHOES of gun volleys over the tomb of the "outstanding statesman of our times" on a cold November day in Moscow grown silent than a just-published work by American Sovietologists under the title *After Brezhnev* already appeared in a glossy jacket on Washington bookstands. This work was the result of a year and a half of efforts by 35 prominent historians, political scientists, and sociologists who having gathered under the auspices of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, and observing the death throes of the aging Soviet leader, analysed and compared press data, intelligence and official materials in a bid to find the hidden main-springs guiding Soviet behaviour in the coming decade and to forecast what the "evil empire" would look like after the death of its leaders.

How did American Kremlinologists view the future of the USA's rival, of the superpower capable of destroying any potential aggressor many times over but bogged down in social lethargy and economic stagnation?

Their analysis of the state of affairs obviously showed that the country was slowly but surely lapsing into the abyss of an economic and social crisis, that it was increasingly injecting an element of instability into international affairs, and that policy-making at the top was becoming more and more unpredictable.

Prof. Robert F. Byrnes, the research programme supervisor, formulated the conclusions of his colleagues: "All of us agree that there is no likelihood whatsoever that the Soviet Union will become a political democracy... and very little likelihood that it will become a congenial, peaceful member of the international community for as far ahead as one can see. It will remain instead an inherently destabilizing element of the international political system."¹ Seweryn Bialer, a Soviet affairs expert, was more laconic: "I am drawn inescapably to the conclusion that we will witness the external expansion of an internally declining power."²

Today one can make ironical statements about the shortsightedness of the American sovietologists, but at that time hardly anyone, including in the Soviet Union, would venture to predict the coming radical changes which we today link with the notion of perestroika. Especially when, after a dim ray of hope there came to power the infirm Chernenko, who plunged society into another wave of dejection and apathy.

The persistent stereotype of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian, aggressive and unreliable power hampered then, and hampers now, Western politicians from seeing that a new generation of leaders is emerging at the forefront today and that a new public consciousness is taking shape with an enormous potential and a preparedness for sweeping changes that had long matured in the depths of threadbare dogmas and doctrinaire perversions imposed from above.

Major General Oleg Kalugin was involved in diplomatic activity for many years.

Launched at the initiative of the party, perestroika implies a revolutionary breakdown of old notions of the world and ourselves, presupposes unprecedented openness of socialism and adds a fresh dimension to the conception of peaceful coexistence.

We have begun unravelling the inconceivably tight knots of blind enmity and confrontation that seemed to have been tied hard for endless years, and today the dialogue between the two superpowers has taken on unprecedented scope and intensity.

In the USA itself, public sentiments are also markedly changing in favour of the Soviet Union, people there having started to talk about the end of the postwar era and about new horizons in Soviet-American relations.

All the same, let us not delude ourselves. There still are forces capable of hindering mankind's incipient departure from the edge of the chasm, of again dragging the world into the long night of intolerance and enmity, and into a nuclear deadlock. And if we were to continue drawing on the old approaches, on the propaganda cliches of the past, buttressed by the well-known postulates of the classics, we would almost automatically point an accusing finger at the "US ruling quarters, the military industrial complex, the militarists from the Pentagon, the agents and provocateurs from the CIA who are safeguarding the money bags of the overlords of imperialist bourgeoisie", etc.

The revamping of international relations and the affirmation of the new thinking require a fresh view of the many factors which exert an influence on relations among states, including such as the activity of special services.

A great deal has been written in this country about the activity of American intelligence. However, propaganda cliches have invariably dominated in all the literature on this subject accessible to the man in the street, and they were invariably painted one colour—black. Less has been written about our own intelligence, and that in bright tones.

IN THE LATE 1970s, in the wake of the CIA exposures resulting from the Watergate scandal, the Soviet press wrote of the "repulsive bared teeth of the monster fed on the money of unsuspecting taxpayers, a monster which trampled underfoot all norms of morality and insulted the dignity of an entire nation". It was then that it was said of CIA activity that these were political intrigues and conspiracies, corruption of foreign figures, from police chiefs to heads of state, tacit financing of election campaigns together with dirty methods of fighting opposition candidates, use of trade unions, student and charitable organisations and the church in covert operations, manipulation of the press, links with the criminal world and drug abuse, false propaganda, economic sabotage, suoterfuge, abductions, and, lastly, paramilitary operations and cloak-and-dagger murders using the most sophisticated means.

Brought up for decades on sensational exposures of provocations orchestrated by the imperialist special services, Soviet readers would hardly concur with a different characterisation of the American espionage agency. And evidently they would be right. But the specifics of the moment lie precisely in the fact that unlike the past, we can now view many seemingly established notions not in a programmed dimension but in the broad spectrum of different approaches, in the light of fuller knowledge, in development.

In any event, when I see in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* a letter from a reader who complains that the showing of the Japanese film "The Legend

of Narayama" in the Soviet Union adds grist to the CIA's mill. I feel embarrassment for our press which has worked hard to impress upon our people that this country's economic and social problems are associated with the intrigues of the special services. But not only the press is at fault for this. Just a few years ago those at the Augustrostrum would have us believe that the reasons for the different distortions in our life lay not in the defects of the system but in hostile encirclement, in the intensifying pressure being brought to bear on socialism by the forces of imperialism, and that the antisocial activity of individuals and the crimes against the state they committed were a consequence of hostile propaganda and CIA provocations.

Unquestionably, stereotypes of imperialist agents who assumed, depending on the needs of the moment or the whims of the leaders, the identity of Trotskyites, kulaks, cosmopolitans, Titovites, Masons and, generally speaking, "enemies of the people"—legions of ordinary people who by dint of circumstances, or more often than not, of arbitrariness, were caught in the meat grinder prepared for them, are still strong in our everyday consciousness. Many from this unseemly contingent have disappeared, but they have been replaced by others: ideological saboteurs and omnipresent agents 007 hunting for dissidents and duffers, not balking about using criminals and bums and prepared to do anything to corrupt our society from within. There is some truth to this. But is it the whole truth? Has it always been, and will it always be, this way?

Few people in this country know that until the Second World War the USA had virtually no intelligence service. That is, there were national heroes, intelligence officers of the period of the war for independence like Nathan Hale, or the scholarly Benjamin Franklin, who engaged in gathering information about the British in Europe. Even President George Washington himself was not averse to instructing scouts before they were infiltrated behind the frontline. But there was no intelligence service. There existed intelligence-gathering units in the troop armed services which handled purely applied, specialised tasks, and agents of the FBI, which was founded in 1908, who executed some intelligence functions in Latin America. In 1929 a deciphering service appeared in the Armed Forces.

Whatever we may write about the aggressiveness of the US ruling quarters, isolationism and a reluctance to interfere in European developments were the prevailing sentiments during the prewar years. Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State during the Roosevelt administration, stated at the time: We recognise the right of all nations to decide their affairs as they see fit, irrespectively of whether their path may differ from our path or even be incompatible with our ideas.³ Even though one could find examples when USA did not always act according to this principle, in the prewar period, particularly during the Roosevelt administration, it generally paid more attention to its domestic problems.

The war that broke out in Europe forced Roosevelt to give serious consideration to setting up an apparatus capable of timely providing the government with current and long-term intelligence. However, it was only after Pearl Harbor, in mid-1942, that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was formed on the basis of the information coordination department. The former became the main organiser of intelligence-gathering and subversive activity against the Axis powers and the prototype of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The OSS was disbanded in October 1945 and its 8,000 staff members went to work in closely related agencies—military intelligence, the State Department and the FBI. Until 1947 complete disorder reigned in the US intelligence community, if it could be called that at the time. Attempts

to recreate something like an independent organisation encountered resistance from FBI director Herbert Hoover, who had become powerful. The State Department was not favourably disposed to this either.

The cold war galvanised the projects to recreate a strong intelligence organisation adapted to the new realities in the world. In the atmosphere of fear and suspicion with regard to Soviet intentions in Europe and Asia, the Truman administration veered sharply towards countering "Soviet expansion" by any means.

Harry Rositzke, an American intelligence expert, described the sentiments of that period: "The Communist threat was ever present in one form or another: insurrectionary and electoral challenges in France and Italy; an armed insurgency in Greece; an increasingly powerful Communist Party in Iran; the first wars of national liberation in Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines; the ousting of the Nationalists from the mainland in China. Revolution was in the air throughout Eurasia. All these actions were read as part of a worldwide conspiracy engineered from Moscow."⁴

It was in this situation that President Truman ordered a programme of psychological warfare, covert operations and intelligence gathering aimed against the USSR and its satellites. It is clear from recently declassified documents that in 1948 Truman approved a multi-million-dollar programme to finance and arm "underground resistance movements, partisans and liberation groups of refugees against hostile foreign states", meaning the USSR and its East European allies.

The political framework of the US covert operations against the Soviet Union, including the use of Nazi accomplices, was mapped out in directive No 20 of the US National Security Council. It recommended encouraging any split and crisis within the USSR and the Soviet camp that could lead to the collapse of the USSR, while maintaining an official stand of non-interference in its internal affairs.

With the arrival of Allen Dulles as intelligence chief, this political task became the mainspring of CIA global operations, substantially elbowing out information-gathering and other functions devolving on intelligence. At the height of the cold war the US government sanctioned unlimited use of the US military might by the intelligence and colossal outlays for covert operations. Under Richard Helms the outlays quadrupled. It was at this time that the powerful and dangerous cult of intelligence, began to be formed in the USA.

Then came the Watergate scandal, one public exposure following another. Surmounting all barriers and legal squabbles, the memoirs of former CIA staff members who revealed not only carefully protected secrets but also the amorality in the CIA and its cultivation of force hit the bookshops.

The US Congress and committees especially appointed by it were forced to examine the unseemly affairs of American intelligence. Many prominent public figures in the USA demanded that the activities of the CIA be monitored more closely and that it not be used for political purposes.

As a result of the disclosure of numerous facts of CIA involvement in the internal affairs of other states and its unconstitutional practice in the USA itself, the CIA's activities were scaled down considerably. According to expert data, the number of secret operations declined to between 20 and 30 a year on average, while in the 1950s and 1960s the mean figure approached 300.⁵

The Soviet Union and the socialist community accounted for the lion's share of the covert operations that remained. In psychological warfare, which became the main province of CIA activities against the USSR, the slogan of struggle for human rights was held aloft.

One of the men who opposed the politicisation of the CIA and favoured it being returned to the framework of the traditional intelligence service was Admiral Stansfield Turner. When he took the oath in early 1977, he began his directorship of the CIA by dismissing almost 1,000 staff members from the covert operations department. In 1986, already retired, he recommended that the government narrow the CIA's scope in interfering in the internal affairs of other states and called for a fight against excessive secrecy. According to Turner, the fewer secrets in the country the more seriously people will be about protecting real secrets. Turner believed that America should be more open, for "openness is the main advantage which democracy has over totalitarianism".

Turner's advice was not destined to be followed. The power politics that predominated in the 1980s injected its inherent bellicosity into the US foreign policy doctrine. Galvanisation of the intelligence-gathering activities of the CIA, then headed by the OSS veteran William Casey, logically blended with it.

In different years Ronald Reagan signed a number of directives regulating the conduct of covert operations abroad. One of these directives was the creation of a 19-million-dollar fund for CIA secret operations in Nicaragua and the formation of a 500-man special unit to which at least 1,000 Nicacontras were to be attached.

In 1985 the conduct of similar operations by other governmental institutions aside from the CIA was sanctioned. And this happened after the Bowland amendments, which prohibited any military aid to the Nicaraguan contras by the US intelligence agencies, had been in effect for some time. During the Reagan administration the invasion of Grenada was carried out, weapons supplies to Afghan counterrevolutionary bands were stepped up, and restrictions on subversive operations in Angola and military aid to the Pol Pot "partisans" in Kampuchea were lifted. During his term of office a real war against Libya and Nicaragua was organised and, lastly, there was the UN involvement in the conflict with Iran and then a hassle with the American Congress over arms deliveries to the Nicaraguan contras.

Unlike the situation in the past, when presidents easily took decisions on using the CIA and the Pentagon in foreign affairs, Ronald Reagan repeatedly came up against a reluctance on the part of Congress to toe the White House line.

In 1984, when the CIA mined Nicaraguan ports without the knowledge of Congress, the prominent conservative Barry Goldwater, who chaired the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at the time, expressed his indignation in a letter to William Casey, calling the CIA's actions an "act of war which is hard to explain". It was then that the Senate condemned this CIA action by a vote of 84 to 12.

In 1988 the Senate passed by a majority vote a bill binding the government to inform the congress on all covert operations being carried out within 48 hours after they have been begun.

Today the public at large realises the threat to peace and civil freedoms that is posed by the special services, which are not controlled by legislative bodies and the public.

Whereas in the 1970s, when the first disclosures of the CIA's unseemly actions appeared, their authors, bold people working individually, were accused of betraying the American flag and all but being secret agents of the Kremlin, in the late 1980s there are different groups functioning in the USA that are demanding greater supervision over the special services' activities. Public attention was drawn by the initiative of former staff members of the American intelligence service who announced this past January the establishment of a new public organisation opposed to secret operations as an instrument of foreign policy.

Explaining the reasons for the formation of the national security services veterans' association, its head, Colonel (Ret.) Rottinger, stated that the Iran-Contras scandal was still another foreign policy failure of the US caused by the use of clandestine operations. Our association, he said, advocates a more open foreign policy and will attempt to limit the possibilities of secret wars and to exert an influence on the drafting of legislature in the national security sphere.

The role and place of the intelligence service in the power structure and in the pursuit of the foreign policy course is being analysed more and more critically. The appeal for a new political thinking coming from Moscow, the practical actions of Soviet diplomacy, the numerous international accords and the favourable prospects for other important agreements have unquestionably been powerful catalysts in this process.

The eminent American sociologist R. Mills once wrote that coercion was and remains the foundation of American policy. The antipathy to "foreign" ideas typical of the American way of life and the importunate advocacy of the USA's "exclusiveness" that is all but bestowed by God are a logical upshot of the presumptuousness and feelings of superiority which the famous US politician William Fulbright called the "arrogance of power".

Today we are on the threshold of a new era in international relations. Are we still going to hold on to the old principles of coercion and intolerance of one another?

WE HAVE OFTEN been reproached, and rightly so—true, to a lesser extent now than in the past—for our intolerance of the views of others which do not coincide with the official line. The absurd lengths we have gone to in protecting like-mindedness are best attested by the mass repressions of the 1930s—early 1950s. Today we honestly admit that in the following years as well our prisons, camps and mental hospitals were not empty, that hundreds of talented but differently-thinking people were expelled from the country or left it voluntarily, and not at all because they were in pursuit of riches. In our day we cannot hush up any longer the little-known remark of Lenin's in a letter to Felix Dzerzhinsky of November 23, 1920: the reason for the arrest is criticism of Soviet power. It is an absurd reason. Nor is the fact likely to be overlooked that articles should disappear from the new criminal legislation that enabled the authorities to interpret rather arbitrarily critical statements by citizens against one institution or another regarding one outrage or another.

In all fairness, we cannot overlook either some aspects of the international activities of our special services, for example, how tensions mounted in spring and summer of 1968 over the alleged intervention against Czechoslovakia being prepared by the NATO countries. The Afghan saga, in which, as can be guessed, the intelligence service was assigned far from the best role, still has to be told honestly. We are demonstrating an enormous amount of goodwill in the international arena today. Life has made adjustments in the long-standing image of the enemy and to our approach to cliches that set the teeth on edge. It is not fortuitous that "The Big Game", a TV series based on a novel by Yulian Semyonov, was dubbed the Big Boring Game by the Soviet press. Political detective novels of this type are losing their former attractiveness. The widespread stereotypes are disappearing from people's consciousness.

Agreeing with pluralism of views in our own country, we have the moral right today to ask how the situation stands in this sphere in the North American continent. How tolerant are American laws of views that do not jell with the ideology predominating there? How fair are

local authorities to the bearers of these views, including foreigners who wish to visit the USA? The point at issue is not so much legislative acts similar to the notorious laws on internal security and control over communist activity as extending non-acceptance of dissidence to international affairs and elevating to the level of state policy denial of the right of other nations to live according to their own laws and proceeding along their own road.

Is dissidence to be further uprooted by force? Should marines and subversive groups be landed, unsubmitive politicians be killed and naval squadrons sent to the shores of heretical governments and people? Perhaps there is good cause to check oneself against the thinkers of the Christian church, to whose aid American presidents have turned on occasion. For example, against the great reformer Martin Luther, who censured sovereigns for forcibly imposing the faith: It is absurd and impossible to impel by commands someone to believe one way and not another. Heresies can never be stopped by force. A heresy is a spiritual thing... and it has to be conquered by treatises... If art consisted in destroying heretics by fire, hangmen would be the most learned doctors in the world.

The record of history has shown that even if power politics yields an effect it is usually illusory and of short duration. In reality it has unforeseen costly consequences that are often opposite to the original plan. One illustration is Iran, where in the 1950s the CIA toppled the Mossadegh government, while today the USA is reaping the fruits in the form of a storm of hostility and hatred. Or Chile, where the Pinochet junta that seized power with the CIA's aid is disdained not only by its own people but almost everywhere in the world. Or the murder by CIA agents of Che Guevara, whose name has become a symbol and banner of the struggle against imperialism.

On the eve of the US 1988 presidential elections, CIA deputy director Robert Gates, evidently in a desire to preempt a "softening" of political firmness in the White House, publicly recommended that caution be displayed with regard to a new policy vis-a-vis the USSR.

Conservative quarters in the person of the National Strategy Information Center were quick to state their support for Gates's tough line. The Center called upon the government to restore as a legal instrument for pursuing foreign policy secret operations in the form of undeclared financial, political and military aid to foreign organisations and individuals. At the same time a patently coordinated campaign of information leaks on the part of intelligence agency employees began in Washington to discredit the Soviet Union's foreign policy initiatives. There was an information leak regarding a 600-page CIA report dealing with the difficulties involved in verifying the strategic arms reductions treaty being proposed. As political analysts in the American capital noted, the intelligence agencies, which were alarmed over the storm of the public's reaction to the Soviet leader's UN address and by assumptions that the cold war was over, tried to cool the general optimism and urge the West to be more cautious.

However, unlike the past, their efforts failed to win broad-based support. The then US Secretary of State George Shultz, who believed that important internal developments were taking place in the USSR and that it was high time to revamp the US approach to the USSR, criticised the statement of Gates and his supporters.

In his first statement after George Bush announced that Webster was again being appointed to the post of CIA director, the latter also expressed a much more optimistic view on the reforms under way in the USSR than Gates did. Meaning, among other things, the declared reduction of Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 effectives, Webster noted

that Gorbachev had shown in word and deed that he wanted to see the USSR a more active and effective participant in events in the international arena and that this committed the American intelligence service to "exceptionally difficult tasks". Webster characterised the Soviet leader as "an extremely skilful politician" who "has injected new life and dynamism into Soviet politics by insisting on a whole series of reforms which none of them could have foreseen five years ago."

Here it is appropriate to dwell on the figure of Webster. Before he became Federal Attorney and judge in his native state of Missouri, then director of the FBI and, lastly, head of the CIA, the 65-year-old Southerner with a doctoral degree in law was for many years an activist of the Big Brothers of America, a religious and charitable organisation that works with children from poor families and selects from their midst the most capable for receiving an education. As FBI director, Webster acquired a reputation as a selfless fighter against organised crime and corruption in the government apparatus. Curiously, Webster was not even ashamed to sour relations with the White House when he felt he was defending a just cause. Thus, in 1982 he refused to "cover" President Reagan in the story concerning Reagan's personal friend Raymond Donovan, the former Labour Secretary who had been charged with embezzlement and was connected with the Mafia. A year before, he had come out against the presidential directive aimed at broadening the powers of the FBI and the CIA on US territory and at restricting the role of the Department of Justice in supervising their work. It was then that he personally ridiculed the White House's campaign regarding terrorists who had allegedly been infiltrated into the USA to kill President Reagan.

In the opinion of American observers, such "inflexibility" on the part of the FBI director should have cost him his career. However, the administration was unable to find a pretext acceptable to Congress for requesting the stubborn man to resign.

A certain role here was also played by the fact that under Webster's directorship the FBI realised a number of espionage cases in which, alongside the usual Soviet "agents", figured Israelis who had stolen American secrets.

According to the *U.S. News & World Report*, "a major decision awaiting Bush is whether to tone down U.S. intelligence operations in the Soviet bloc, as Secretary of State George Shultz has quietly urged"⁶.

Soon after his election George Bush himself stated, that under the new distribution of duties in national security the CIA is to play the role of an intelligence agency that has no political functions with the exception of those which are provided for in the law for executing certain secret operations financed according to all the rules.

The American press is interpreting this and other statements by Bush as a sign that the CIA is duty-bound to provide the political leadership with intelligence but should not take part in the policy-making process. Brent Scowcroft, the new presidential national security adviser, has spoken out in the same vein. Washington press corps veteran Henry Brandon notes in a report from the American capital, that: "As to covert operations, his view of the CIA, in contrast to Reagan's is that it should be an adjunct to foreign policy, not an instrument on its own."⁷

IT IS A KNOWN FACT that national security is ensured above all by a prospering economy and the well-being and moral health of the nation, not by a big army or a strong police force. However, since time immemorial humanity has used the services of intelligence agencies; it

has reconciled itself to this inevitable evil because a society divided into states and classes cannot do without it. It is an open secret that the years of the cold war and confrontation led to an unprecedented ballooning of the special services and to an increase in expenditures for their maintenance and for clandestine operations which are not always justified from the standpoint of the present-day demands and the nature of the current stage in the development of international relations.

Today every government needs a compact, well organised information service, for it is capable of functioning effectively only when it has an opportunity to see, know, weigh, judge and change.

The danger arises when this apparatus begins for various reasons to lose its original meaning and goals and gets out of control. This occurs in a society with an insufficiently developed system of democratic procedures where this system has not become fixed and where group and departmental interests take the upper hand. Largely determining the qualitative level of providing government instances with information, the intelligence service gravitates towards monopolising information and creating curtains of secrecy behind which "policies are made". The instinct for self-preservation impells it to perpetuate bugbears, prejudices and fears.

An exaggerated sense of its own importance and infallibility, especially if work is successful, ultimately leads to a narrowing of horizons and develops an attitude towards its own goals as ends in themselves.

The deeper the intelligence apparatus becomes involved in the shaping and pursuit of foreign policy, the more confidently it makes inroads into the sphere of general policy, domestic policy included, and the more dangerous it becomes to the constitutional foundations of any state.

Today, as a number of foreign policy priorities are being revised, it seems also that it is high time to take a fresh look at the role of the intelligence service in the modern world, revive its original purpose, and rid it of tasks not endemic to it. It is high time to refrain from self-righteous indignation every time some unsuccessful spy (a scout after all) is caught by counterintelligence. The Soviet side has already set an example of restraint in these matters a number of times. With rare exceptions Soviet press publications regarding "actions incompatible..." by one diplomat or another have only been reactions to propaganda ballyhoos in the West bordering on a hysteria that end in mass expulsions of Soviet representatives without any concrete accusations made against them or in a hasty decision to tear down an embassy building in Moscow.

A more civilised approach to such problems is necessary. What is needed is a greater sense of responsibility and objectivity in assessing events, as well as restraint in working out possible measures and counter-measures, and a realisation of the growing interdependence and vulnerability of all the participants in secret clashes.

In a democratic society the intelligence service serves the people, but it is also a servant of the truth.

To suit the ruling elite and contrary to the truth American intelligence has been lulling the people with cock-and-bull stories about the "light at the end of the tunnel", with which it prolonged the death throes of the Vietnam war for many years. Oriented more at the needs of the Pentagon than to a search for truth, US military intelligence has with its biased appraisals and forecasts done much to prop up the myth of a Soviet threat and of violations of disarmament accords. Paradoxical as it may seem, the CIA and the State Department have often corrected their colleagues from the Department of Defense, surmounting opposition from above.

It is high time to revise the canons that took shape in the context of the bellicose rivalry between the two systems. Greater openness is needed in what pertains to the official activities of the special services as government bodies. No one should be shocked by the election of former special service officials to top government posts or by the appointment of retired intelligence officers to diplomatic or other positions.

In the context of the scientific and technological revolution and reciprocal on-site inspections obtaining from INF agreements, the absurdity of numerous restrictions, closed areas and stringent secrecy regimes, which are at odds with common sense, is obvious.

In an interview granted to the magazine *New Times* recently the French historian Alain Guérin noted that "the obsession with secrecy is not in any secret service's interests. A lot of information can be disclosed without detracting anything from a nation's security. The preoccupation with secrecy smacks of paranoia." While giving credit to the competence and high qualification of intelligence officers, Alain Guérin nevertheless notes that "while having more information than others they seek to keep it from the public eye.... This may prevent them from taking a sober view of the world around them."

Lastly, public control is imperative. Without even wanting to, the CIA is far ahead of us as far as openness is concerned. Its activities are monitored by several congressional committees and almost 200 journalists specialising in covering the intelligence theme.

One more point. It makes sense to stop just blackwashing one another and try to communicate with one another, as our military people have already begun to do, and not secretly but openly, to solve problems of mutual interest.

On quite a few occasions I have had a chance to meet with CIA staff members, although they did not introduce themselves as such. They were highly refined and educated interlocutors who avoided extremes in their judgements. Although I did not delude myself over their friendly smiles, I was nevertheless inclined to perceive them as individuals who were not necessarily burdened by class hatred for everything Soviet.

In 1968, at a cocktail party given in the home of Joseph Harsch, a prominent political observer for *The Christian Science Monitor*, I met former CIA chief Allen Dulles. He was already gravely ill at the time, but he kept a stiff upper lip and even joked. Evidently the host had warned Dulles that a Soviet diplomat was among the guests, and he looked expectantly in my direction. I declined Harsch's offer to talk to Dulles. My apprehensions that something bad might come of it took the upper hand. Today I probably would have acted differently.

A certain shift has definitely taken place in communication of late. For many years we kept reminding the Americans that Nazi war criminals were in hiding on their territory. Deathly silence would be the reply. But now the ice has been broken.

The US Department of Justice has initiated court proceedings against 12 war criminals to revoke their American citizenship and deport them from the country. Another 600 persons suspected of war crimes in the Second World War are under investigation as well. Frank talks are in progress with USIA top officials on the need to tackle the disinformation problem.

Some positive experience has been amassed in cooperation with the customs and law-enforcement agencies of Canada and Britain in the fight against narcotics. Recently, a Soviet-American memorandum was signed on this issue in Paris which lays the legal foundation for collaboration between the analogous bodies of the USSR and the USA. This document provides for an exchange of information on criminals proceeding through the territory of one country into the other and on methods

of detecting dangerous cargoes. Evidently, it would be logical for the Soviet Union to join other international and regional organisations fighting crime in all its manifestations.

The Soviet government has recognised that the principle of reasonable sufficiency should be the guide in the efforts to ensure security.

Applying glasnost to diplomacy, lowering the secrecy threshold and renouncing propagandistic whipping up of the image of the enemy, it seeks to remove unfounded suspicions and do away with the lack of trust in relations with the West.

At the UN we have declared the de-ideologisation of interstate relations. Ahead are years of hard work to affirm the new principles in international affairs with due account for the interests of the USSR as well as the US, and those of all other states and peoples.

¹ *After Brezhnev*, Indiana University Press, 1983, p. XVII

² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³ *Collected Speeches and Statements of US Secretary of State Cordell Hull*. US Government Publishers, Washington, 1937.

⁴ H. Rositzke. *The CIA's Secret Operations*, New York 1977, p. 85.

⁵ *U.S. News & World Report*, June 1, 1981.

⁶ *U.S. News & World Report*, Dec. 12, 1988

⁷ *Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 16, 1988

Forty Years in the Diplomatic Service

Lev MENDELEVICH

International Affairs: A new institution—Ambassador at Large—has been in existence in the Soviet diplomatic service for some time now. In what respects does it differ from that of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, who is appointed to a specific country? You served as Ambassador at Large for long, as well as Ambassador to a country.

Mendelevich: This question is quite understandable. If you open a Soviet diplomatic dictionary or encyclopaedia, you indeed won't find an explanation to what an Ambassador at Large is or even mention of such a post. The reason most likely lies in a poor knowledge of the structure and workings of the diplomatic service.

The notion "ambassador at large" emerged a long time ago, even long before the traditional ambassadorial diplomacy appeared and ambassadors began being appointed "for a permanent period", i. e., for several years, to other countries. The services of ambassadors at large—they may have been called differently, but their essence was unchanged—were used back in Ancient Egypt and all the centuries that followed. This institution became particularly developed after the Second World War. The first Ambassador at Large in that period was the prominent American diplomat and public figure Averell Harriman (during the Kennedy administration). In the USSR, a group of ambassadors at large was formed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970.

Ambassador at Large is an official representative of the head of state or government and minister of foreign affairs, and is vested with special powers for executing a one-time especially important assignment or short- or medium-term task, or for handling one important matter. In this way he is different from an Ambassador who is appointed to a foreign country for a term, i. e., is accredited under the head of another state and represents the leadership of his own country in this state for a certain period, usually several years.

An experienced highly qualified diplomat or other suitable person is appointed for the mission of Ambassador at Large.

Ambassadors at large perform different functions. Some of them head delegations at talks. Thus, until recently the head of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space-based weapons was Ambassador at Large Alexei Obukhov (recently he received another important appointment). The Soviet delegation at the Vienna talks on reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and on the new set of confidence-building measures on the European continent is led by Ambassador at Large Oleg Grinevsky. Ambassador at Large Nikolai Kozyrev is enga-

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ged in Afghan affairs. Ambassador at Large Viacheslav Ustinov handles African affairs, especially with regard to the settlement process under way now in Southwest Africa.

I, too, have worked as Ambassador at Large, performing a wide range of functions. I took part in the European process, headed a Soviet expert group at the stage of the preparation and coordination of the final documents of the Political Consultative Committee and Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and carried out certain assignments in Soviet-American relations and the United Nations, to name a few.

Rather frequently of late, the Soviet Union and other countries have been in the practice of dispatching ambassadors at large to world capitals with the special assignment of informing the governments on the stand of this country's leadership on a particular issue, on some major foreign policy step or important domestic political event.

The work of an Ambassador at Large has its own specifics. It is linked with frequent travelling around the world, sometimes with just as frequent alternations of subjects of work. As Ambassador at Large I have met heads of state and foreign ministers, but mostly I have dealt with people on my own, expert, level.

Association with highly qualified experts from many countries enables one to hone one's own professional diplomatic skills and learn from others interesting methods of diplomatic work, especially the logic of expounding argumentation. This work has also given me an opportunity to see the world better and have a deeper understanding of international processes.

Although the functions of ambassadors at large are different, they have one thing in common—the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR, i. e., they have been awarded the highest diplomatic rank recognised throughout the world.

I can confidently say that the current Soviet ambassadors at large—each individually and all together—make a considerable contribution to the work of the Soviet diplomatic service. And it is high time the editors of dictionaries and encyclopaedias take note of this important diplomatic institution.

As to the work of an Ambassador permanently accredited in a country, this type of diplomatic work is rather well known. As Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze aptly put it, "diplomatic work is not an occupation, it is a profession". This is particularly true of ambassadors, of course.

International Affairs: As analysis has shown, during the years of stagnation, though the country's leadership devoted great attention to foreign policy actions, perhaps more than to domestic policy problems, we suffered quite a few failures in foreign policy. Is this a result of the poor functioning of the diplomatic and negotiating mechanism? Were there few ideas? Were they erroneous? Were they worked out poorly? Or did they fail to pave a way for themselves?

Mendelevich: All these shortcomings you are talking about did take place, of course. It cannot be said, however, that each of us has fully rid himself of them yet. The process of acquiring fresh experience is apace, and this means that the old weaknesses and miscalculations are falling by the wayside, one by one. I would not like to talk about the specific failures of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, all the more so since at that period there were not only failures but also major achievements in foreign policy. This was also the time of the Helsinki Final Act, the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, the SALT-1 and SALT-2 treaties and many other important agreements.

However, it must be confidently said, of course, especially today, in hindsight, that more could have been done, and this was felt in our country back then, too. There are probably many factors—national, structural, human—in play here. I want to single out one, if you will, internal reason.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time was headed by quite prominent, competent people. However, there was little collective evaluation and

analysis at the Ministry back then. The atmosphere is more executive, and the record has shown that in any sphere, the less people think and work on tasks, the less these tasks are practicable. We had very few free discussions and debates at the high ministerial level, where people could say what they really felt. When a competent person speaks openly interesting and worthwhile ideas are born.

This atmosphere was almost non-existent. The top officials were not very interested in the staff's views.

I think that this reflected the general work style of the times in the state, and this could not but affect foreign affairs. Nor was it difficult to maintain this style within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the mentality being that foreign policy matters were so classified and so delicate that the fewer people talked about them the better.

I would like to state firmly that one of the main elements, if not the most important element, of perestroika in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the complete change in the creative atmosphere. Now discussions are apace daily, all but hourly, on all matters in the work of the ministry and its subdivisions that require analysis and assessment. And not only in our directorate but throughout the Ministry.

Discussions are held on the level of the departments and directorates chiefs, the deputy minister level, and—I hope you won't accuse me of a desire to say something complimentary about the leadership; I am simply telling the truth—at the level of the Minister. For all his hectic schedule Minister Shevardnadze organises from time to time businesslike and heated discussions of political issues which require expert analysis.

The role of expert analysis in the Ministry has increased considerably. Each expert knows, of course that the ideas he expresses will not necessarily be accepted because hardly all of them meet requirements. And yet he knows that all the useful elements of his idea will be heard and taken into account.

For this reason people today are not afraid to speak out, to express completely unorthodox ideas, and either we or our superiors sometimes manage to draw something useful for work, for policy. Our foreign policy work can now be said to be drawing on the collective efforts of many experts.

I will not delve into the especially great importance this has for our Department, which is designed to look not only around but also ahead, to future developments.

Secondly, we are collaborating much more closely with Soviet science, with institutes and individual scientists. During the years of stagnation little was heard of them. Now, however, they, too, have received "freedom of speech" and possibilities to prove themselves and their potentialities which probably existed in the past, too.

It is not with scientists alone that we have discussions. Here is one example. Our directorate held two Soviet-French colloquiums, in December 1988 and March 1989 (the first was in Paris and the second, in Moscow) on the topic "Europe in the Year 2000". These colloquiums were attended, on both sides, by diplomats, the military, scholars and writers on social issues.

Since these colloquiums were held behind closed doors (generally speaking, in foreign policy one should not seek to do absolutely everything openly, as the level of candidness may suffer), they were useful for us in that they gave us a better understanding not only of each other's views, which are well-known as it is, but of many subtleties, detailed aspects and fresh arguments. And the French side was of the same opinion. All this helps deepen our own conceptions of a number of issues. We will probably continue such measures with other countries, and perhaps we will organise something else in conjunction with the French.

These channels of diplomatic intercourse, which are interesting in and of themselves, are also threads in the common fabric of relations between states, and of Soviet-French relations in this instance.

International Affairs: It is a known fact that even some members of the leadership learned of the decision to commit Soviet troops in Afghanistan when the first detachments were already there. Was there at least some preliminary study of the Afghan issue at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Mendelevich: No, there wasn't. In any event, not with the participation of experts.

International Affairs: It was in foreign policy that the first results of perestroika were the most palpable. What is the reason for this—the international situation had come to a head and the world was only waiting for when we would change our foreign policy approaches, or, on the contrary, the impact of our restructuring effort had exerted a positive influence on the world situation and made it possible to bring closer the solution of a number of problems and effect a breakthrough in a number of international deadlocks?

Mendelevich: I think that the second point on the positive influence of our perestroika is the more correct. It is obvious. However, there is also a rational element in the first idea, in the fact that the soil was prepared for good seeds. I have been working in the foreign policy sphere for a long time, so I'll venture to say that the potentialities for sweeping positive actions existed in the world both in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of them have materialised. I have mentioned them, from the Helsinki Final Act to SALT-1 and SALT-2. However, others did not materialise, although the potential was there. Certain major possibilities were not taken advantage of. I am certain, for example, that action on the question of intermediate-range missiles could have been taken in the late 1970s by setting about serious talks soon after the NATO "double track decision". But this was not done.

If we take the earlier period, I can state with confidence that in the middle of the 1960s three or four years were lost for deciding a foremost world issue—the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was a period when even mention of non-proliferation in this country was considered taboo, and we broke off talks with the Americans. True, we later returned to the negotiating table with the Americans. This took a great deal of effort, because sentiment at the very top was against this for a number of reasons. In fact, the talks did not have to be broken off, and a non-proliferation treaty would have been concluded three or four years earlier. Who knows, perhaps some countries which are not party to it today and are thereby posing a danger to the non-proliferation regime would have acceded to the treaty at that early junction. Time lost in history can never be regained.

As far as I visualise the mechanism for considering and deciding our state issues at present, such mistakes and omissions in policy are, fortunately, impossible in our country today. We have to make sure this situation is maintained.

International Affairs: Our successes in the international arena will be temporary, they will be stifled if they are not buttressed by an overhaul of our economy and domestic policies.

Mendelevich: I always viewed this interconnection as being entirely indissoluble, and I do so today. Each success we score in perestroika at home consolidates our potential on the world scene and our capacity for positive actions in the international arena. And conversely, each domestic failure is capable of creating new problems globally. However, all this is totally elementary.

Probably just as elementary is the fact that world developments have led us to a situation where the influence of a state in the international arena whether positive or negative, and it is our hope that our influence is positive, depends to a lesser extent on its military might. Of course, it still hinges on military might, but there is also a rise in the role of the factor of economic power, i. e., a state's capacity to take part in global economic exchange as

an independent strong force possessing the potential to promote the solution of major world problems through its economic possibilities.

This is the power we have to become, and when we become it—we have yet to do so, as perestroika is still at its initial stage—peace on Earth will become immeasurably more lasting than it is at present. We will be respected much more. Our standing in the eyes of other countries will be determined precisely by this, by the positive facet of human life and activity, not by our capacity to destroy.

Of course, foreign policy itself—efforts to solve disarmament problems—has its own role to play here. This is the prerogative of foreign policy which is pursued conjointly by statesmen, diplomats and the military. But there is another facet of the issue at play here—the stronger we are economically, the more influential we are, including in the matter of deciding disarmament issues.

I would like this time to arrive as soon as possible. Of course, several thousand diplomats cannot speed up perestroika alone. But let engineers and workers, foreman and enterprise directors, collective farm chairmen and lessees know full well, and not as propaganda but as a reflection of the actual state of affairs, that a very great deal in foreign policy, in world stability, hinges on their contribution to the reforms, on the country's economic advance, and on our emergence to the forefront in technology. Let this be present deep down in the consciousness of each working person and be an additional factor for creativity on the job.

International Affairs: Today people have begun saying that peace has to be paid for. What does this mean?

Mendelevich: This means a great many things. Take, for example, the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. We energetically support these operations as an international instrument for guaranteeing peace in the most dangerous and vulnerable places on the globe, where conflicts just were and where they have now been settled or are at the settlement stage. However, UN peace-keeping operations (dispatch of military contingents, military observers, civilian personnel and civilian observers, and use of the modern equipment) are costly. An example is the operation in Namibia, which should lead to the elimination of the last colonial regime in Africa and the provision and ensuring of independence for the Namibian people. The UN peace-keeping operation in connection with this action will require outlays, as the UN General Assembly has already determined, to the tune of 416 million dollars. And don't think this sum was taken out of a hat. The best book-keepers and computer programmers arrived at this figure. It cannot be one dollar lower. This is remuneration to the operation's military and civilian participants and outlays for communications, patrol services, equipment, and much, much more.

Another example is disarmament. When you think about this topic it seems that any disarmament action yields only income, that it involves no expenditures. If it were only this way! To be absolutely safe for the population, the scuttling of Soviet SS-20s and American Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles—the actual scrapping process—in fact costs as much as the production of these missiles. This does not mean, of course, that things will always be like this, because the scope of disarmament should broaden, and when the scope of an effort widens the same operations become less expensive. Also, after money is spent on the elimination of missiles and they are scrapped, this will yield profit, because no new weapons of this type will be built, and there will be a saving. Thus the benefits lie ahead.

Generally speaking, it seems to me that the idea that peace has to be paid for should not frighten politically conscious citizens. If there is something that has to be paid for honestly, it is peace. Of course, as little as possible but as much as necessary. Ensuring peace is in and of itself more valuable

than the many millions and billions of rubles and dollars being spent for military purposes.

International Affairs: At time claims are heard to the effect that our initiative or initiatives have caught the West unawares. Are these ill-considered, poorly planned or prognosticated initiatives or deliberately maximalist steps and proposals unacceptable for the West and therefore impracticable, and designed solely for the propaganda effect?

Mendelevich: More often that not, neither one. The reality is that with its initiatives our current dynamic and creative foreign policy often places our counterparts—the Americans and their allies and other countries—before issues the solutions to which require serious and constructive steps on their part. And our counterparts are far from always prepared for this. This is also a law of history. Dynamics are on our side, not theirs.

If we repudiate these dynamics this would spell the end for the new political thinking. We will not do this. Our counterparts are lagging behind with a positive reaction; at times they cannot cope with the imperatives of their own old thinking, which has a tendency to reject any new idea. Frequently they cannot quickly reach agreement among themselves either. This was the case, for example, with the famous Soviet proposals set forth in New York on December 7, 1988. No cogent response has been given yet to all the elements of these proposals. Much is still being thrashed out in the West on the group and alliance level.

We can say: Let them think it over some more and consult one another and their own experts, but we will not let up with our dynamism. The cause of peace has to be moved forward; we cannot mark time.

I will make one reservation, however. We are displaying dynamism in foreign policy hardly to catch anyone awares or to force anyone into a corner. Such ideas are totally alien to us. Our ideas are creative; we want to do something useful together with our counterparts. But sometimes they indeed fail to keep up with our pace. But the times are such that they should try to.

International Affairs: Today, as in the past, in the statements by spokesmen of the USSR Ministries of Defence and of Foreign Affairs the point is invariably made and reiterated that there is complete understanding between diplomats and the military in this country and that no problems arise in their interrelations. Such statements evoke doubt in many people.

Mendelevich: I think I can confidently say that there are no grounds for such doubt. Of course, when any proposal on military or disarmament issues appear it immediately becomes an object of discussion, debate and joint analysis, including at the interdepartmental level; there are disputes, too. Nor does harmony necessarily reign immediately. But this is quite natural. I simply could not imagine it otherwise.

But then, when all the arguments are studied in detail and mutual understanding is reached, the diplomats and generals act in the same vein, and very often together. Suffice it to say that diplomats and generals or senior officers are members of all the Soviet delegations conducting talks in different areas of disarmament, and again debates arise between them only over the details, but the consensus is always based on the instructions which the respective delegations have. If, however, additional investigation of some point is required, the work is done both in the delegations and in Moscow. Over the past few years many worthwhile methods have been evolved to reach true mutual understanding. That is why I reiterate that there is no conflict between the military and us. And, if I may say so on behalf of the Evaluation and Planning Directorate, we don't foresee such conflicts.

As far as job placement for people released from the Armed Forces is concerned, such problems exist and there will probably be more of them if disarmament continues. All these problems, including social and cultural ones, should be tackled, and they are. These problems should even possibly have priority. On what basis? On the basis of the conversion of munitions factories,

on the basis of utilisation of former officers in industry and agriculture at jobs worthy of their knowledge and abilities. This is a nationwide undertaking.

International Affairs: One of the tenets of the new thinking is that "the truth must be told" both in this country and abroad. This was not the case in the past. For too long, for example, we kept under wraps that we have chemical weapons; we refuted Western assertions that we have a tank superiority in Europe. Even diplomats—heads of delegations at talks, experts, advisers and disarmament specialists did not always know the truth. Of late we have been talking about the plight this put our negotiators in (*International Affairs*, 1989, No. 1, pp. 79-82).

Mendelevich: There were, in fact, instances of this sort. Generally speaking, they happened to me to a certain extent, too. All the same, I personally was somewhat luckier than others. Usually, during negotiations I knew not less than what I needed to know to conduct them. For example, in 1977-1978 I was entrusted to head the Soviet delegation at Soviet-American talks on limiting and subsequently reducing military activity in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy at the time, informed me in detail about our forces in the Indian Ocean, their personnel, main combat characteristics, their combat activity, their use of coastal facilities—in short, more or less everything I needed to know, and to discuss with my American counterparts, who were headed by Paul Warnke, a prominent American expert in this sphere. I was also briefed by our Navy people about American naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

I sensed that Mr. Warnke knew approximately as much about these matters as I did, as he had been informed by the US Navy about them. In some aspects he perhaps knew a bit more than I did, and in others, a bit less. Naturally, we were unable to compare each other's knowledge. But both of us knew the main things.

I think that this facilitated our work, and we made considerable progress at these talks. There was a real chance to reach agreement on turning the huge Indian Ocean together with coastal states into a zone of detente. Regrettably, there was a strong group in the US ruling quarters at the time that was headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's special national security aide, who was categorically against an agreement on the Indian Ocean. And they managed to convince the President to halt these promising talks. I thus failed to conclude this agreement. I still regret it and think that many do, not only in this country but in the USA as well. If that agreement had been concluded—and it well could have been somewhere around 1980, there probably would not have been the concentration of American and other navies in the Persian Gulf that is still posing a threat to the security of many countries there.

As far as the ignorance of delegation heads concerning the most important parameters of the talks goes, I think this state of affairs has receded far into the past.

International Affairs: How do you assess the current development of relations between the USSR and the USA? How stable is it? Can we rule out the possibility of the emergence of a relapse here, as was repeatedly the case in the past?

Mendelevich: There is now a real opportunity for a normal and more stable development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Evidently this is the greatest achievement of the new political thinking in the foreign policy sphere.

However, even though this is a substantial possibility, results are not guaranteed. In the early 1970s there were people in our country, some of whom occupied important posts, who believed that Soviet-American detente had reached the stage of irreversibility. They were mistaken.

Generally speaking, politics is the result of such complex, multifaceted interaction of resources and people that its development cannot be predicted

in absolute terms. I do think, however, that today we can talk about more than simply the possibility for the continued stable and controlled development of Soviet-American relations.

Today we can say that there is not only an opportunity but also hope, not a shaky dream, not a rosy perception of events, but hope, a word which is valued very highly in politics.

However, if this hope is to become reality, an enormous amount of work is required on the part of both sides. Work by the top leaders, work by the officials of foreign policy services, experts on all levels, work by scholars and by absolutely everyone who is more or less involved in foreign policy activity, Soviet-American—and not only Soviet-American—relations, and in all world issues. And this should be purposeful and precisely planned and well-organised work. I think that this is how the Soviet side is acting.

There is another aspect of the problem, of course. For all the signal importance of the state of and prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations, world problems do not confine themselves to them. There is, for example, the problem of Soviet-Chinese relations. We all know what a significant snift has taken place in this area. Is this more important or less important? In politics you can't compare things on a point system. In any event, it is clear that the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations is a matter of enormous importance. Enormous for us and for China, for Asia and for the whole world. This is the attitude we must take towards this. If someone asks whether this is more important than Soviet-American affairs, he is missing the point. Nor will anyone venture to answer such a question.

Another way people are putting the question is as follows: Soviet-Chinese relations are normalising. What is your attitude in this connection to the fact that Sino-American relations are at a comparatively higher level of development? We take a realistic attitude to this. We proceed from the belief that we have no grounds to descry in advance an orientation of these relations against us. However, we are closely observing all the tendencies of these relations, all their aims and areas of development. This is also normal and natural. Probably the Chinese, too, are keeping a watch on Soviet-American relations and their goals and development trends.

The more Soviet-American, Soviet-Chinese and Sino-American relations strengthen and stabilise, the more lasting peace will be. Not because this is some triangle of the great powers but because these are three extremely mighty powers, and not only militarily. A very great deal depends on them. Consequently, all of us, these three states and all other countries, must do whatever we can to keep these relations positive. This is our duty. We must further this process, not giving up anything of ours but not hampering the normal development of Soviet-Chinese and other relations either.

International Affairs: What is the point of work to plan and forecast foreign policy? What are its possibilities?

Mendelevich: The planning and forecasting unit (then it was called the Department for Planning Foreign Policy Measures) was formed at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs almost three decades ago. Regrettably, its functions at that time and for a long span afterwards were not mapped out clearly. It was not specified how this Department blended into the general system and structure of the Ministry, how it interacted with the other subdivisions, and what work this Department was supposed to be doing that other subdivisions could not.

In recent years, as the overhaul of the Foreign Ministry got underway, decisions were taken on the basic matters pertaining to the functions of our subdivision, which is now called the Evaluations and Planning Directorate. It was decided that the overriding task of the department is to work out conceptual and practical considerations on major foreign policy issues, considerations linked with the formation and development of this country's actions in the international arena.

Naturally, the first step in practical work of this kind can and should be a profound analysis of the international situation and the state of affairs in individual major regions and in the foreign policies of other nations, above all the biggest and strongest of them, and of the world map as a whole. The point at issue, of course, is not passive analysis, not study for study's sake, but determining fresh elements and trends that are revealing themselves in world developments but have yet to be clarified and taken into account in our policies. This is the first stage. The effort does not end here, of course.

The second stage of planning and forecasting is to arrive at short-term and, if possible, long-term prospects for development in major foreign policy and international issues and the situation in individual regions. The following is but one example. Today there has been progress towards the settlement of a number of international conflict situations. This is an extremely important component of the campaign to improve the world. But some things can already be said not only with regard to what already exists but also to what can be expected after settlement; we can give consideration to the questions which future developments will pose to our policy-makers.

The same applies to talks on military-political issues. Take Vienna, for example. What can be expected in the next, say, six months or year there? What changes are in the offing? What conclusions need to be drawn from this in advance? This is the third element of our work. The point is to give, with due account for such forecasts, and objective, precise and unbiased assessment of our current actions not only from the standpoint of the present but also in the light of the future. Will these stands be required in the future? Will they meet the needs which international developments in the respective issues and the respective regions pose before us?

We report the findings of all this work to the Minister, and if he deems it necessary, he turns them over to the top state leadership.

International Affairs: How long have you been heading the Evaluations and Planning Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Mendelevich: Since April 1986.

International Affairs: What are the specifics of the consultations which are conducted through the channels of the Evaluations and Planning Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the respective departments of other countries?

Mendelevich: Generally speaking, the foreign ministries hold very many consultations at the working level, i. e., at the level of department chiefs or other officials. These consultations almost always deal with specific matters, pertaining to Central America or the Middle East, Western Europe or Northern Africa, Southern Africa or Oceania, or individual issues of disarmament or international economic or ecological cooperation. All these consultations are useful, as they enrich both sides.

Our consultations are a bit different from others. They cover, on the basis of abundant factual information, of course, not only individual questions or details, but the world situation as a whole, the entire range of international problems, and not in a static state but from the standpoint of the perspective. Views are exchanged not only and not so much on the present as on what can be expected in the future and on development trends. This exchange of views, assessments and perceptions of the world situation is interesting, of course. And, we hope, not only for us but for our counterparts as well. It enables us to give deeper consideration to our own views and juxtapose them to those of others who are no less intelligent than we but who view things somewhat differently. This is a very important process which both during and after the consultations given food for thought that should be used to the utmost. Then perhaps we will see something better in the future.

Over the past few months we have held such consultations, say, with the People's Republic of China, Finland, France, Britain and Mongolian People's

Republic, and they are soon to take place with the FRG and many other countries.

Similar consultations with a number of big Asian countries are planned as well.

International Affairs: You have already marked your 40th anniversary in the diplomatic service. Can you recall the most interesting moments or periods in your career?

Mendelevich: This is a difficult question. To answer it, I would have to write memoirs. Perhaps someday I'll have the time to do this, but for now I have not been able to, with the exception of small fragments. All the same, I will merely list moments in my career that were memorable for me and that I feel may be of some importance to our work.

For example, I took part in talks to settle the Caribbean crisis in 1962 and in the formulation and coordination of some key wordings in the treaties on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water and on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. I played a certain role in the formation of the main parameters of UN peace-keeping operations. In 1969 I was instructed to push through the UN General Assembly the decision to repeal the South African mandate for Southwest Africa (Namibia). Work that I found interesting and important was my participation in the three-year-long talks on the collective draft by the delegations of 35 countries of the Helsinki Final Act (as a member of the Soviet delegation I was responsible for political, legal and military matters). This was extremely interesting and at times dramatic. I have already mentioned one delegation which I headed at talks with the Americans, on the Indian Ocean. I also led another delegation at talks—on restrictions on weapons trade; regrettably, the Americans broke off these talks, too.

I did much work in the UN on searching for a settlement in the Middle East (in the late 1960s there were some chances for this, but they were not used, and only now are they reemerging). However, I still feel an involvement in Middle East affairs and I have a great desire to make some sort of contribution.

In the UN I have assisted in coordinating two major documents which are valid and important today, too. They are the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. They were prepared over several years' time, and they were passed together in 1970.

I have spent a large part of my diplomatic career at international conferences, at the UN and at talks. I have worked in specific countries, too. My last job of this type was Ambassador to Denmark, and I have warm feelings for this country and its people.

Several years ago I considered myself a pessimist. It seemed to me that that there were nuclear dangers that could not be surmounted. Today I'm not sure either that we have a guaranteed future. I do believe, however, that civilisation will not perish. We should not understate the threat, nor should be understate the forces capable of overcoming this threat if these forces are set in motion.

FOREIGN POLICY: LESSONS OF THE PAST

OUR COUNTRY is going through a period of agonising yet necessary analysis of its past mistakes as it seeks to restore common sense. We have come a considerable way as far as our internal affairs are concerned. In our foreign affairs, too, there are notable changes but we are only just beginning a serious appraisal of the past. We have still said little about what we mean by old political thinking, which must have existed since there is new thinking, about our view of the world and our place in it—a view evolved by the command system. This situation is further proof of the correctness of Lenin's thesis that he who has failed to answer general questions will inevitably be confounded by particular problems as he comes up against those unanswered questions.

Our leadership repeatedly stressed that the tasks and aims of Soviet foreign policy must be in keeping with the requirements of our social development. It is hard to see how these purposes could have been served by our preferring for decades to speak to the world about the exclusiveness of our achievements and our superiority in the ideological, moral and other spheres: in the economy, human rights, prosperity, health care services, social security, and so on. While keeping up this fanfare, we were sinking into the quagmire of stagnation and falling behind other countries in standards determining the level of contemporary civilisation. What we excelled in was the build-up of military power and making a huge number of sacrifices to the detriment of development. Meanwhile the world showed a trend toward growing interdependence and mutual enrichment economically, technologically and in the area of information. As for us, we were sceptical even of the term "interdependence" as we opposed all that was different from what we had, refusing to admit that the other system had made tangible gains and that there are common concerns and interests and common standards of political and human morality.

Since April 1985 we have done a good deal to integrate into the contemporary world, complying with an imperative of the development of our society. Credit for this is due to both the home and foreign policy of our party. The world now takes a different view of us; there is a markedly sympathetic attitude to our country and the processes under way here, and the most diverse quarters abroad show a fair degree of willingness to extend relations with us. An improved international climate has already produced tangible results in the form of an arms limitation, an easing of regional crises and advances in the economic and other spheres of cooperation. The changes coming about in our country, the new image of our state, our new approach to foreign political problems, which is characterised by realism, courage and self-critical analysis, and the unquestionably positive response of the outside world to all these developments have helped in substantially reducing mutual hostility and incomprehension and in setting out to plan the future to be built by joint efforts. Even so, humanity is still far from

really ending the split in the world and from eliminating distrust, putting arms reductions on a durable basis and going in for full-fledged cooperation.

Foreign policy is inseparable from home policy and is largely an extension of it, hence the deformations of socialism which occurred in our country were also bound to tell on the former. One of Stalinism's crimes, whose effects were not properly removed in subsequent years, was the formation in the world of a distorted image of socialism in general and our country in particular. The Soviet Union was seen as a state which refused to heed the realities of the world around, respond adequately to its evolution, fully reckon with the interests and rights of other countries and always to consider itself bound by standards of international law and universal moral principles.

The tragic distortions of the humanist ideas of socialism by the command system demanded adapting people's idea of the outside world as well as the philosophy and practice of foreign policy to the requirements of party, economic and military bureaucrats. Just as our people's indisputable achievements closely intertwined in the history of our socialist construction as a whole with activities objectively running counter to their interests, so foreign policy steps needed to advance our society and provide peaceful external conditions for the country were taken in an atmosphere of dogmatism and excessive taboos. These ultimately operated against society.

The complicated international situation of the Soviet state and the existence of a real external threat combined with the Stalinist bureaucracy's drive to turn the whole country into a besieged camp, make an absolute of the hostility of the world around and analyse every phenomenon from the angle of uncompromising class confrontation. This approach logically leads to unfolding an excessive military build-up, militarising all spheres of society, restricting civil rights and citizens' contacts with the outside world, imposing a regime of secrecy and all-pervasive suspicion and looking on every dissenter as a spy or traitor. At the same time, this approach makes it difficult to cooperate with other countries, to seek compromise, and forces people to oversimplify the intricate panorama of the world, take a one-sided view of events in developing countries and strive to "export" their own model to these countries, with all its shortcomings.

With the passage of time the world changed, yet some of the foreign policy postulates evolved under Stalin were preserved, if in a slightly modified form. This applies primarily to the idea that the struggle between capitalism and socialism is the dominant factor of world development and that peaceful coexistence is a form of the class struggle.

In today's West there are many who actively oppose the socialist idea itself; a considerably greater number of people are frightened by the image of deformed socialism, and still more of them refuse, largely for this reason, to believe in the efficiency and advantages of such system. However, there are also many who openly subscribe to socialist or even communist ideals. They are treated variously in Western countries but practically in all of them socialist and communist parties exist legally, some of them are millions strong, and their members are not treated as outcasts on account of their convictions. By and large, the West today is getting on with socialist ideas quite well and even applies many of them in one way or another. Any unbiased observer sees that Western society has changed greatly against both 1917 and 1945. It has evolved lasting democratic traditions, in particular under the influence of socialist ideas, and present-day Western governments can hardly subordinate their entire foreign policy to the interests of any one class, let alone a section of it betraying particular aggressiveness.

Contemporary international relations are mainly relations between societies, between nations. When, after October 1917, Western governments tried, in compliance with the will of the bourgeoisie, to counteract Russia's socialist choice by force, their freedom of action was substantially handicapped by vigorous resistance from the working class and other broad strata of population. As for the intensified confrontation between our state and Western governments in recent years, it never caused any serious discord between them and their society. Criticism of our country was shared or supported to one degree or another by the most diverse social sectors. The early eighties saw, due in particular to certain of our foreign policy moves, a deterioration of our official relations with the West and a visible decline in our country's prestige and appeal. Many intellectuals turned their backs upon us; the largest socialist and communist parties distanced themselves from us, and mass anti-war movements came to look on us as a force at least as responsible for the arms race as the other side.

The thesis about inevitable confrontation with the capitalist world is not borne out by practice, nor was it borne out in the past years. After all, the useful results achieved in those years were the fruits of efforts by both sides and confirmed the ability of the West as well to compromise. On seeing our country assume a more civilised character and come to base its foreign policy on reality and common sense, the world showed that there were tremendous opportunities for constructive co-operation on all issues from military political to humanitarian ones. Guiding itself by the principles of freedom of choice, deideologisation of interstate relations and a balance of interests, our foreign policy learnt to come to terms with representatives of the quarters and states which we had earlier classed as aggressive by nature and "untouchable" according to our stereotypes of the time. The experience of recent years suggests that how far we succeed in using the opportunities now offering for the isolation of aggressive and reactionary forces will depend on ourselves, on what we are like at home and how we comport ourselves abroad.

It is a particularly important fact that perestroika and new thinking have made it possible to transform the concept of confidence from a fairly abstract category of a chiefly propagandistic nature into an increasingly powerful factor in every sphere of world politics. We have recognised what we would not hear of before, namely, that confidence is a criterion of the level of relations between states, primarily those belonging to different systems and blocs.

These radical changes were made possible largely by our moving on from criticism of the policies of others, mostly Western countries, to an honest assessment of our own activities to begin with. Criticism should begin at home. This universal moral principle is a rule binding on politicians who trust in their people and want to be trusted by them.

Self-purification is neither a whim nor a concession to anyone, nor yet an act of self-flagellation. It is an inner necessity with us, a highly important indication of the predominance of healthy forces in our society, of the vitality of socialist ideals, which have stood their ground against everything that they had to go through. The new moral and psychological situation in society, democracy, glasnost, a critical view of things, an exacting attitude to home and foreign policy add up to a strategic result of perestroika. In the course of these processes, we must get to the root of what prevented our normal development under Stalin and later, in the years of stagnation.

It is not a question of occasional mistakes, tactical miscalculations or gains on the international scene. All these things did occur and are certain to recur. We believe the problem goes much deeper, for we must

fully make up for the departure from Lenin's idea and methods of analysing reality. This explains why we are now reverting to his conception of home and foreign policy tasks, to the early experience of accomplishing them, so as to work out up-to-date concepts of our place in the world community. Incidentally, the very phrase "world community" was for years sternly crossed out of all official draft documents.

Of course, it is painful to think that our foreign policy for many long years did not fully reflect our people's peace-loving mentality. But Leninism demands that we should now make the most rigorous self-analysis if we want to pass the test of the present and the future.

To a sizable section of our diplomatic corps and to all *bona fide* experts in international affairs, perestroika and new political thinking brought long-awaited moral and political relief. Deformation had held in check the expertise and diplomatic skill acquired by them, their desire to serve the people's real interests. The professional achievements of the Soviet diplomatic school are acknowledged all over the world. Many Soviet envoys won deep respect by showing a high degree of proficiency, by conducting negotiations as a search for mutual understanding and mutually beneficial compromises and not as a dialogue between deaf people, and by bringing about agreements in the military political and other spheres raising our security and international security as a whole to a higher plane, to the level of international co-operation. Soviet diplomats and experts in international affairs, whose high professionalism, coupled with devotion to duty, prompted them to seek innovative solutions, had long felt a growing need for renewal.

Noted Soviet diplomats now recall the peculiar difficulties of work. But we must also realise that the country's goals were deformed for decades while the highest interests of the state, treated as an abstraction, ignored those whom policy is made for, and that this was bound to put its imprint on professionals. It was hardly accidental that our whole foreign policy department came to be known as "Mr. Nyet". And whereas dissolving one's individuality in a fallacious function is a personal drama, casting off its shackles is one's duty to society.

Looking back, we must draw lessons for the future. We have barely begun doing away with crisis phenomena; certain negative processes have yet to be reversed. This is what makes it so important to realise that we cannot go on living and working in the old way now that our society, which is undergoing a radical internal transformation, is changing just as radically with regard to its relations with the outside world. In foreign policy as in other areas, perestroika is not a face-lift nor an attempt to maintain old content while using new terminology. Far-reaching changes are needed if our people's will for peace and the humanist essence of socialism are to translate from declarations into simple and open measures understood by all and leading in reality to a further lessening of the war menace and to the promotion of normal, civilised relations with Western and other parties to international intercourse.

What legacy do we want to renounce to this end?

First of all, our years-long vision of the world as two hostile monoliths and the resultant isolationism perpetuating confrontational trends. Dogmatism in appraising developments and the habit of blaming everything on the external enemy (a product of the command system) coincided with the effort of bureaucrats serving the system to shroud their activity in a veil of secrecy so as to exempt themselves from public control. Methods typical of this system—declarations of allegiance to democratic principles in words and authoritarianism in deeds, protestations of respect for public opinion and science ringing out from various rostrums and voluntarism and subjectivism in actual fact plus a shortage

of criticism and openness—did not spare the foreign policy sphere. At home, all this often led to the adoption of major decisions by a narrow group, without exhaustive collective discussion and analysis, and evoked on many occasions an inadequate response to international events and the policies of other countries and to misguided decisions. Abroad, it added to distrust of us and virtually made the concept of the “Soviet threat” central to our relations with the West. We were accused and suspected; nothing we said was given credence.

We often forgot the need to work on improving our own system. Yet this is one of the tasks of foreign policy and diplomacy, all the more since socialism as a newly-established social system is behind developed capitalist countries in many respects. What we mean is not only scientific and technological achievements but many forms of organising public life and solving social problems. This is also true of certain aspects of parliamentary democracy and procedures of foreign policy debate. Generally speaking, the skills in the democratic management of society evolved over the millennia are achievements of humanity as a whole and are particularly consonant with the humanist ideals of socialism. Lenin stressed that consistent democracy developed into socialism and, on the other hand, required socialism.

To shake off the fetters of old thinking, which basically rejected the idea of borrowing political skill from the “class and ideological enemy”, is particularly important today, when the shaping of a constitutionally competent mechanism of working out and adopting strategic foreign policy decisions according to a democratic procedure of choosing the best course is moving on from the realm of theory to that of practice. There should be the maximum openness in the deputies’ discussion of military budgets, the use of troops outside the country, innovations in military construction, ways of safeguarding national security and appropriations for the purpose. The task is to provide reliable guarantees for the people’s interests and will for peace to be invariably present in whatever is related to our international activity and for all government departments involved in it to be under the control of society.

We are no longer spellbound by the notion that credit for arms limitation proposals and accords is due primarily to us. Common sense has made us recognise that no amount of talk about the need to end the arms race and eradicate militarism will make any difference without action proceeding from the fact that both politically and morally, solution of the problem hinges on mutual confidence. And confidence is out of the question in the absence of openness, effective control, a knowledge of the other sides’ motives and decision-making procedures. Both are prerequisites for real action in the sphere of disarmament.

Yet Soviet representatives to the UN were compelled for a long time to dispute the view shared by the majority of Western and non-aligned countries that “the diffusion of objective information on military potentials could help create an atmosphere of confidence”. Nor did they show any enthusiasm, to put it mildly, for concrete ideas regarding confidence-building measures in the military sphere. We often claimed that calls of this nature were prompted by a bid for espionage and therefore did not serve to build confidence but undermined it. We refused to even discuss any measures in favour of openness or for on-site inspections before agreements were reached on disarmament. In other words, while denying others the least confidence, we insisted on their trusting us. The trouble was not that we made strenuous propaganda and diplomatic efforts to this end but that this approach virtually doomed countries to inaction in the matter of both real disarmament and confidence-building.

The complex problem of confidence, openness and control is also closely linked with the need to eliminate a legacy of the past, the discrepancy between declared and actual positions, between words and deeds. What this discrepancy means in practice was exemplified by the talks on banning chemical weapons, which marked time for years. It was not until perestroika set in that the situation began to change for the better, thanks primarily to the evolution of our position from the manufacture of chemical weapons coupled with the refusal to admit its existence on our soil to the complete renunciation of their manufacture; from withholding figures for our stockpile to releasing them; from the effort to keep foreigners out of our plants and storage facilities to the acceptance of the concept of comprehensive control and an invitation to foreign observers to attend procedures for destroying chemical weapons. By frankly admitting that the above measures came later than necessary, we are helping reestablish the good reputation of Soviet diplomacy both abroad and at home.

The stockpiling of chemical weapons we were engaged in until recently was an indication that we often were thinking and acting according to a double standard, rejecting in words alone the outdated proposition that the more weapons there are, the more dependably security is guaranteed. The steps to reduce their armed forces which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are now taking and the new defence doctrine adopted by them are evidence of growing confidence that security depends increasingly on non-military measures. All this is primarily a reflection of the new approach to estimating the likelihood and extent of the military threat presented by the West, something which is inseparable from overcoming the "enemy image" and stereotypes of the class struggle in interstate relations.

We clung to obsolete notions of the national interest steeped in the ideas of "great-power" prestige and confrontation backed by military power and covered up by slogans of the "anti-imperialist struggle". This was largely why, after meeting the challenge of nuclear monopoly and dangerous strategic superiority posed by the United States, we failed to respond effectively to the strategy of wearing us out in the arms race, to propose alternative guarantees of security and bring the inertia of confrontation and spending under control. Indeed, we took the initiative in some sectors of military rivalry. While the former can hardly be dispensed with, the latter simply must. This category included the decision to produce RSD-10s (known as SS-20s in the West) which we adopted in the mid-seventies, when the strategic situation did not really necessitate their deployment on a large scale.

This time it was not influential Western leaders that ignored our proposal to refrain from stationing new missiles in Europe but we who disregarded their call. We did so even though those who made the decision ought to have realised that the short fly-to time required by intermediate range missiles made the strategic situation in Europe still more unpredictable and tempted the US to deploy their own missiles of the same class, primarily in Europe. In short, we tended to provoke the formation of a second strategic front against us, which the INF Treaty abolished with the two sides' return to common sense. The deployment of those missiles admittedly went a long way towards complicating our relations with the West in every field and restricting the possibilities of seeking disarmament agreements.

The only achievement in forty years of the postwar arms race is some accords merely slowing down this race in certain sectors, and this can hardly be considered satisfactory. They were listed again and again in article after article, monograph after monograph, speech after speech. We all know them well but currently most important is to admit the

deplorable fact that for all their importance, these accords are mere islets in a sea of confrontation, distrust and military preparations.

The chief lesson confirmed by the agreements of the sixties and seventies is that we cannot seek security to the detriment of the other side, by ignoring the interests of our Western partners, but must work for it together with them, on the basis of a fair balance of interests. Yet we failed to learn this properly, to introduce it into our military construction and pursuing our aims on the world scene.

This reminds us of the serial production of intermediate-range missiles. There can be no ignoring the sad fact that the NATO countries set out to deploy similar US missiles in Europe much later than we, in the autumn of 1983, after first proposing a "zero option". At that time we declared that "on carefully weighing every aspect of the situation", the Soviet Union did not see its way to continuing the Geneva talks on nuclear armaments in Europe and was even compelled to adopt some further military measures. It's anybody's guess who weighed the situation at the time and how. But we know very well that for a long time the Soviet people, while spending billions on developing intermediate-range missiles, only knew them by their foreign names. They had no inkling of their quantity or quality nor of what weapons of the other side they were intended to counter. Not until perestroika came and the treaty on the elimination of Soviet and US missiles of this class was ratified, not until glasnost began gaining ground, did it become clear that our security—and international security generally—is more durable without those missiles. Had legislators and the press discussed the problem as the decision to deploy the missiles was being adopted or at least in 1983 when the parliaments of NATO countries proceeded to debate the issue, the effects of the move and its material, moral and political price could apparently have been estimated more accurately.

This also goes for our war in Afghanistan, which not only resulted in the deaths of Soviet people and entailed huge expenditures that have evidently not been calculated as yet but led to a telling decline in our international prestige and placed us in a situation close to isolation even at the UN, such as we had not experienced for a long time. Yet had the question of sending troops been discussed openly instead of behind closed doors, we could have come to the conclusion right then that the Afghan problem did not lend itself to a military solution.

This issue is still highly relevant. Having proclaimed glasnost and new political thinking, we must stop making a sealed book of our military spending, the strength of our armed forces, the quantity of and certain tactical and technical data on key weapons which our country has or plans to have. It is important to know, in particular, the power balance within whose framework debates on modernising NATO's tactical missiles in Europe are now going on, above all in order to effectively counter relevant plans. Our people are also entitled to know who is getting economic and military aid from us and on what scale as well as how policy towards various regions is planned. After all, our involvement in their affairs is a substantial burden on our economy and may also have a considerable impact on the international situation in general and our standing in the world in particular. We need to restore a truthful picture of what is going on in the Third World that has been distorted by looking at it through ideological spectacles, and to adopt the principle of reasonable sufficiency in this respect as well.

We have reason to be proud of our diplomatic school but we must take into account the problems that have accumulated. It is now clear that no matter how much our diplomats may improve their professional skill, they can no longer manage with the moral equipment of the past. "How encouraged we all were by

starting to talk to the world frankly, in a universal language and not in our jargon with its crying reticences alternating with abuse!" wrote Sergei Zalygin in the monthly *Novy mir*. Speaking that jargon, we juggled with others' statements, distorted our opponent's position, evaded substantive discussion and refused to seek solutions, accusing the other side of "smearing" our foreign policy, and soon. The habit of using it and the tendency to limit glasnost in foreign policy, said to be too special a sphere, are still repeated in certain press comments on foreigners and our own people, particularly in reply to criticism. Civilised discussion and the tenor and trend of objections are not merely a question of form.

For years we steered clear of many humanitarian themes, putting the very phrase "human rights" in inverted commas and shifting concrete questions raised by the West to the area of political and ideological confrontation. But real problems bearing on civil rights were not solved. It is true that, fortunately for us, that notorious formula, "He is right who has more rights", did not catch on. The advantages of international cooperation in the legal and humanitarian spheres were not made use of contrary to the interests of furthering socialism. In this sector we are now compelled to make up for lost time, paying the price of inaction in the period of stagnation. We have already made appreciable headway although the road to a normal situation is still quite long: our legislative acts and departmental regulations now in force but above all the spirit and letter of our everyday practice still have to be raised to the level of our international commitments and declared positions. Besides, our representatives must get rid of the syndrome of feeling uneasy on certain occasions when a draft resolution on human rights is put to the vote.

Intolerance of dissent at home expressed itself in intolerance of whatever was different, even in the case of socialist community countries. It is only now that we are learning to look with equanimity on what was noted by the 26th CPSU Congress: that "capitalist relations have become established" in many developing countries and that developments in socialist community countries are following dissimilar lines. We are learning to respect the diversity of the world and freedom of choice—not necessarily in our favour—and to do so in deeds, not words.

We are passing through a difficult period of self-purification and self-criticism, which are necessary primarily to ourselves. This is not to say that the other side shall be granted a permanent indulgence or that its behaviour shall be exempt from critical analysis. But this analysis must be objective, must be based on comparison, not with our whim, but with universally accepted standards, common sense and the need to reach a balance of interests. The important thing, however, is that whatever we do to effect perestroika benefits ourselves. In this respect we are independent of the response of the other side even though our standing in the world is to a large extent conditioned by such response. We would not like that response to be slow. But it is obvious even now that we can strengthen the security of our country through glasnost, new political thinking and a policy of reasonable sufficiency rather than by building up armaments or waging an ideological struggle. Renewing socialism—a policy serving the humanist goals of pluralism—is a major factor in reshaping international relations.

This is why the lingering tendency to exonerate our earlier practices and to substitute references to the achievements of our foreign policy for discussion on ways of restoring and strengthening confidence raises the most serious doubts and objections. We must never forget the consequences of confrontation, of dogmatic approaches, and overrideologisa-

tion of international relations, the "struggle for peace and against imperialism". It is only now, for the first time in postwar years and probably in our entire history, except for the early gains of the Leninist policy of the NEP period, that the "enemy image" stubbornly cultivated on a "reciprocal" basis by both Western and our own propaganda is giving way to a more impartial and serious view of each other. What we need to strengthen our national security is not greater military power nor more defence spending, which is enormous already. It was defensive spirit that enabled us to set about revising our military doctrine. We have started to considerably reduce our armed forces and armaments, cut military spending and partly convert the defence industry to civilian production. We are paving the way for more extensive economic cooperation with the outside world, for a large-scale involvement of our country in world economic ties and for access to the moral and legal values accumulated by humanity. To lend these processes a permanent character and have all that they can produce, we must proceed more boldly in the matter of self-purification and innovation, in closing the gap between words and deeds and using the constitutionally competent mechanisms of directing and supervising the functioning of government departments through the highest authorities of state power on the principles of glasnost. In short, deep-going changes in the life of Soviet society are inseparable, as the CPSU stated in its electoral platform, from revolutionary changes in our foreign policy as well.

FROM MOSCOW TO NEW YORK BY BOEING 747

Thomas PLASKETT

RECENTLY, a renewed spirit of mutual respect between the U.S. and Soviet governments has made this a hopeful and exciting period for relations of every kind between our two countries, particularly in the field of aviation. As the head of a major U.S. international airline whose name and reputation have become quite well known to Soviet citizens, I am pleased to have this opportunity to offer my personal view of the background and current status of U.S.-Soviet joint air service ventures.

All too often in the past, aviation relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been clouded by political issues that have directly affected all forms of commerce between the two countries, including air service. However, recent attempts to foster an atmosphere of better mutual understanding and to create broad areas of interdependence between our countries as the surest basis for future good relations have been reflected in the establishment of joint air service between New York and Moscow, provided by Pan Am and the Soviet national airline, Aeroflot. The story of how that service came into being and how some of the early problems were resolved can provide, I believe, a useful and encouraging model for future U.S.-Soviet cooperative ventures.

Normally, bilateral treaties between governments determine aviation relations between countries, covering such matters as the traffic rights to be enjoyed by the respective airlines and specifying the details of service frequency, pricing and other marketing practices. The general objective of these agreements, particularly when drawn up between Western countries, is usually to provide an exchange of roughly equivalent opportunities for each country's carriers to compete with each other in the marketplace.

Under such bilateral agreements between the United States and other countries, according to U.S. law as well as established practice, it is Pan Am's principal imperative, and that of every other private enterprise functioning within the U.S. economic system, to compete vigorously. Under most circumstances, except within rigidly prescribed guidelines, we are expressly forbidden to enter into cooperative arrangements with its counterparts both in our own country and in foreign countries with other carriers, either at home or abroad.

However, in order to make available to American and Soviet citizens the benefits of nonstop service between New York and Moscow—which Pan Am and Aeroflot have been jointly providing since May 14 of 1988—it was necessary for the two carriers, with the concurrence of their respective governmental authorities, to enter into an arrangement having unprecedented cooperative provisions.

Thomas G. Plaskett is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Pan American World Airways Corporation.

A pioneer with a record of more than 60 years in international aviation, Pan Am has long been accustomed to doing business in a diversity of political environments, languages and customs, and coping with limited supplies of facilities and equipment that we regard as basic necessities. However, our experience in serving the Soviet Union has been unique.

We have had to rely on the assistance and cooperation of not only the host country but also the national carrier against which we would normally compete. To meet our requirements, we had to negotiate very detailed agreements in which each airline in its own country guaranteed to provide the other partner a host of facilities and services on a reciprocal basis: housing, workshops, office and counter space, telephones, secretaries, office and technical supplies, aircraft fuel, servicing and so on.

The first negotiations leading to such an agreement actually began as long ago as 1961. As one measure of how far we had to come from those days, the translators we used in the opening talks were U.S. Government interpreters—expatriates who, though fluent in their native language, had been out of touch with the mother country for about forty years; consequently, their vocabularies were somewhat dated. As a result, our draft of the agreement to supply each other with jet fuel was reproduced in Russian as a commitment to provide “lamp oil,” and “changing the cabin linen” appeared as “changing the passengers’ underwear.”

These negotiations and those that followed through the years were often quite spirited, but even during periods of strained relations between our governments, there was always present in the relationship between air carriers an atmosphere of civility and an underlying warmth. Both sides, I believe, were conscious of the fact that we were building bridges for the future, and consequently I believe neither party is really surprised to be engaged now in cooperative efforts that only a few years ago might have seemed unattainable.

Recently, in an improving political climate, Pan Am and Aeroflot have been able to expand our areas of cooperation and interdependence significantly: we are currently jointly operating nonslop services on a Boeing 747 aircraft between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we have entered into a partnership designed to promote tourism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and we have commenced discussions involving expanded joint venture activities within the Soviet Union, focused initially on the construction of a new hotel in the center of Moscow.

JOINT AIR SERVICE

AT THE END of World War II, the service patterns for U.S. international airlines envisioned by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board provided for service to the Soviet Union, but under the political conditions then prevailing, it was not possible for the two countries to enter into a bilateral agreement. Pan Am, the authorized American carrier under the CAB certificate, was therefore unable to inaugurate regular service; however, it did enter into an early agreement with Aeroflot, providing for interline sales of transportation on each other's services, and this arrangement continued to function without objection by either government, even during periods of diplomatic strain.

By the summer of 1961, improved relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union made it seem feasible to provide for air transport services between New York and Moscow. High-level delegations met in Washington to negotiate a bilateral governmental agreement, while Pan Am and Aeroflot met in parallel sessions to work out an interline agreement. The

text of the resulting interline agreement was initiated as an agreed draft; but even though it had been formally signed, it could become effective only if and when the two governments reached a final bilateral agreement.

When aviation negotiations resumed in the fall of 1966, final agreements were concluded rather promptly, utilizing the earlier documents as a base. Although technical and operational problems delayed the actual commencement of services, Pan Am and Aeroflot each finally inaugurated flights in July of 1968. In the years since, however, service between the United States and the Soviet Union has for several reasons been subject to periodic interruptions.

Historically, the level of service has been dependent on a very small amount of traffic, originally consisting mainly of U.S. citizens, specialists in various areas, who were invited to visit the Soviet Union, and the flow of traffic in the other direction was similarly limited.

One factor that greatly discouraged Pan Am was that Soviet citizens in the USSR are expected to fly on Aeroflot whenever possible; only when Aeroflot is unable to accommodate them can they be ticketed, through Aeroflot, on other carriers. For that reason, most Western carriers operating between the Soviet Union and their own national capitals have pooling arrangements with Aeroflot whereby passengers are shared and schedules are coordinated; however, this kind of pooling arrangement has always been viewed as contrary to U.S. public policy.

As a result of these revenue-limiting economic factors—the relatively thin U.S.-originating market and its inability to sell tickets in the Soviet Union—Pan Am decided to suspend its service to the Soviet Union in 1978; Aeroflot, however, continued to provide service until 1981, when the U.S. Government suspended Aeroflot's right to operate to the U.S. in response to concern about the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

In 1985, with the political climate once more improving, the United States and the Soviet Governments agreed to re-establish aviation relationships. This time, however, recognizing the existing economic problems, it was agreed that the two designated carriers, Pan Am and Aeroflot, should enter into direct commercial arrangements concerning the level of service, pricing activities and such other factors as would make the operation commercially viable for both parties. All arrangements were to be submitted to the "appropriate authorities of the Contracting Parties" for approval.

In the agreement negotiated by the two parties, Pan Am requested a provision specifying that the carrier which obtained the greater share of the market would compensate the other, pursuant to a specified formula. The purpose of this provision was to achieve a more equitable balance in a thin market, alleviating the economic burden for Pan Am of not being able to sell its tickets in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in view of the insufficient size of the market, Pan Am agreed to serve the Soviet Union on only a limited basis, operating narrowbody 727 aircraft via Frankfurt.

The new agreement between the two carriers was approved by the respective Governments, and scheduled service between the USSR and the U.S. resumed in April of 1986.

However, their relatively inadequate level of service prevented either Pan Am or Aeroflot from establishing a significant presence in the market; by all reports, the combined number of passengers they carried was less than 13 percent of the total traffic between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

One problem they faced was the fact that the recurring interruptions in the continuity of their service had permitted foreign carriers to achieve

ve dominance in the limited tourist market that traveled between the USSR and the United States. The largest share of traffic was being carried by so-called third-country carriers—primarily Finnair, Lufthansa, Scandinavian Airlines, British Airways and JAT (the national carrier of Yugoslavia).

These carriers were able to connect Moscow not only with New York, but with many other U.S. gateway cities as well, via daily nonstop flights to and from their own national capitals. The result was that, even in the seasonal peak period of direct New York-Moscow service provided by Pan Am and Aeroflot, foreign carriers enjoyed a distinct competitive advantage. Over time, they also established strong links with tour operators in both the Soviet Union and the U.S., and their level of frequency made their services more attractive to the relatively thin business market.

In 1987, therefore, concurrent with further improved commercial and political relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and with the consequent development of a growing travel market between the two countries, the two national carriers decided that it would be appropriate for them to undertake a joint service that would enable them to participate more effectively in that market.

Accordingly, on September 23, 1987, Pan Am and Aeroflot signed a Joint Services Agreement with the following key provisions:

- The two carriers would share equally the cost of operating non-stop service between New York and Moscow

- The aircraft used would be Pan Am 747 widebodies, currently the only passenger plane in either fleet with nonstop New York-Moscow capability.

- Each carrier would be allocated 50 percent of the seats on the aircraft and would sell its capacity independently, but if either carrier filled its share of the seats, it could then "interline" passengers on the other carrier's seats.

- In accordance with FAA regulations, the aircraft would be operated by Pan Am pilots

- In addition, because of provisions in labor contracts between Pan Am and its unions, both carriers agreed that the flight would be staffed with Pan Am cabin attendants, although Aeroflot would have the option of placing up to three of its own flight attendants on board

The agreement also addressed what had long been a major impediment to increasing the level of traffic from the U.S. to the Soviet Union: the scarcity of hotel accommodations in the USSR.

OVERCOMING THE DIFFICULTIES

Historically, most travel to and within the country has been in large tour groups, and the overwhelming majority of Soviet hotel accommodations available to foreigners were under the control of Intourist, the government agency which coordinates travel to, from and within the Soviet Union. In allocating the scarce hotel space, Intourist has to balance the Soviet Union's need to satisfy demand by all foreign countries for those limited facilities, thus maximizing its foreign-currency earnings, against the travel needs of its own citizens. Having achieved this objective, with the accommodations allocated and producing the desired hard-currency revenue, Intourist would have no particular incentive to make rooms available specifically for the joint air service.

However, both Pan Am and Aeroflot recognized that the success of a joint operation involving a 400-seat aircraft would be in serious jeopardy unless it could guarantee its passengers sufficient hotel capacity and other ground support services in Moscow. Accordingly, the two carriers

entered into an undertaking (Annex C to the Joint Services Agreement) which requires that dedicated hotel space—including 50 rooms for business travelers in addition to those set aside for tourists—be guaranteed as an integral part of the agreement.

With this basic understanding in place, it then remained for operational representatives of the two carriers to work out more specific details.

The task of dividing the aircraft's available seating capacity equally between the carriers was far more complex than it would appear at first. No simple method, such as splitting the seating down the middle or allocating each carrier every other seat or every other row, would do. The seat maps and computer inventories for these aircraft now show a precise allocation of seats, by seat number—even the fact that an extra seat is designated as Pan Am's in one direction of each roundtrip and Aeroflot's headed the other way.

Among the other provisions which had to be worked out was compatibility of the two carriers' reservations systems and departure control systems, so that information concerning the actual use of seats on board each flight could be forwarded to Pan Am's European operational headquarters at Frankfurt to determine the proper distribution and balance of fuel and cargo when preparing the plane for departure.

A further complication is that a 747 aircraft requires unique ground handling equipment—which, naturally, was not available in sufficient quantity at Aeroflot's facilities in Moscow. With the start-up date of service approaching rapidly, and to expedite acquisition of the necessary items, Pan Am undertook to act, in effect, as Aeroflot's purchasing agent in obtaining the necessary trucks, loaders and other items, for which Aeroflot later reimbursed Pan Am.

A key Soviet objective in the joint operation is Aeroflot's ability to generate and retain foreign-currency revenues needed for Soviet purchases abroad. The joint agreement, therefore, contains provisions that maximize opportunities to provide credits to Aeroflot against its share of the service's operating costs, which are payable to Pan Am in U.S. dollars. Whenever possible, for example, Soviet sources are used for provisioning; such national specialties as caviar and smoked sturgeon are important features of the service's menu. Aeroflot undertakes the payment, for subsequent crediting, of such operating fees as landing and overflight charges, and fuel, a significant cost item, is the subject of an agreement involving Pan Am's use of Soviet-controlled fuel at Shannon, Ireland, producing a further dollar credit to Aeroflot.

With its operational elements in place, the Joint Services Agreement, in accordance with the bilateral arrangements between the two governments, was then submitted to the appropriate authorities of the two nations. After review, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued an order approving the agreement and granting it anti-trust immunity.* The Department retains oversight authority and requires that the two carriers submit for approval any amendments to the agreement, including any further arrangements it contemplates.

Conforming amendments to the U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreement were signed in Washington in November of 1987 by the American Secretary of State Mr. Shultz, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Shevardnadze, and on May 14, 1988, the two carriers inaugurated joint scheduled service, which consisted of three nonstop flights per week during the first

* A number of acts (including Sherman Antitrust Act, Clayton Antitrust Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, etc.) passed in the United States in order to limit the more crude methods of activities by the trusts, cartels and other monopoly groupings. — *Ed.*

summer months, with service levels adjusted during the off-peak period to reflect the decrease in demand.

Ironically, the new spirit of openness and the resultant favorable changes it has produced in the internal USSR political climate have inadvertently created unforeseen economic difficulties for our Soviet partners in this venture.

With the virtual removal of previous limitations to normal Soviet-originating travel to the West, for purposes such as visiting friends and relatives in the United States as well as for traditional tourism, there has been a considerable increase within the Soviet Union in the demand for space aboard the joint-venture flights. Soviet citizens taking advantage of this greater opportunity to travel abroad currently account for more than 60 percent of the service's passenger volume.

These Soviet passengers, naturally, pay Aeroflot for their tickets in rubles, and since under the terms of the bilateral between the countries Aeroflot remits to Pan Am in dollars when Pan Am carries the passengers, the effect of this increased Soviet-originating travel has been to increase Aeroflot's dollar outflow while diminishing the space available to it for sale abroad to passengers paying in hard currencies. As a consequence, Aeroflot is prevented from achieving its hard-currency objectives, because it is carrying Soviet rather than U.S.-originating passengers.

Nevertheless, by any normal measure, the joint service must be regarded as an enormous success. The positive results of this endeavor have, in fact, encouraged the airlines to increase the level of service this year and to investigate additional service opportunities. One currently under investigation would be a mirror image of the passenger service: joint operation of freighter service between the United States and the Soviet Union, using Aeroflot freighters and Aeroflot crews as the passenger operation uses Pan Am aircraft and crews, and with Pan Am reimbursing Aeroflot in dollars for its share of the service's operating costs.

SPATE: A MARKETING PARTNERSHIP

AS NOTED, the Joint Services Agreement was launched in a travel climate characterized by heavy airline competition in a thin market, with a sharply limited availability of hotels and other accommodations. Successful operation of the Pan Am-Aeroflot 747 service would, by itself, require 300 to 400 rooms each night in Moscow; moreover, depending on the length of the passengers' stay, the requirement would increase exponentially with the arrival of each new flight.

In addition, the travel distribution system within the Soviet Union, managed by Intourist, differs greatly from the travel distribution system within the U.S. The U.S. system comprises more than 30,000 computerized travel agencies and tour operators, all of whom sell not only a Soviet tour product but also a host of widely diverse competing products. Pan Am and Aeroflot recognized from the start that in order to expand the size of the market traveling to the Soviet Union, it would be essential for their joint service to ensure that these independent U.S. travel agents and tour operators could accommodate their customers with a minimum of inconvenience. This would require a significant change from the way travel to the Soviet Union had previously been marketed.

With this in mind, Pan Am and Aeroflot entered into a formal partnership agreement under the laws of the United States, primarily for the purpose of promoting travel between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This partnership, known as the Soviet-Pan Am-Aeroflot Travel Effort (SPATE), was designed as a non-profit distribution entity, whose pur-

pose was to make available to the U.S. traveling public hotel and ground facilities called for in the Joint Services Agreement—primarily by making tour programs and tourist accommodations directly available to the largest possible number of tour operators, including travel agents, and individual rooms available to business travelers.

Prior to the formation of SPATE, Pan Am, given the unique circumstances under which hotel rooms and ground facilities are administered within the Soviet Union, had on behalf of the airline entered into a series of contracts, commonly known as "Protocols," with Intourist guaranteeing the supply of such rooms and accommodations. This system was unknown to the Soviet Union (and would, in fact, be equally new to the U.S. distribution system).

For the most part, these protocols reflected the terms and conditions under which Intourist has traditionally done business with foreign tour operators, rather than the unique situation created by a joint service operated by the national carriers. The protocols envisioned that Pan Am and Aeroflot would subsequently assign the agreements to a third entity (SPATE) which would be in charge of administering the product, under terms and conditions agreed upon by Pan Am and Intourist. SPATE would, in turn, enter into arrangements with various tour operators who would underwrite each of the various tour products. Additionally, both carriers would independently provide access to the business hotel room facilities in their computerized reservations systems as administered by SPATE. SPATE would also assist travelers in obtaining visas as well as directly booking hotel and other travel arrangements.

Pan Am filed the Agreement with the U.S. Department of Transportation, as required under the terms of the government order approving the Joint Services Agreement, and requested immediate approval and anti-trust immunity under section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act. During the period provided for public comment, Pan Am's application was opposed by the Tour Operators Association, ASTA (the American Society of Travel Agents) and a few individual tour operators. The U.S. Justice Department did not oppose approval of the venture, but did oppose Pan Am's request for anti-trust immunity on the basis that Pan Am had not submitted sufficient justification for immunity for an agreement that the Department of Justice determined is not anti-competitive.

Pan Am answered the various objections, providing the Justice Department with a detailed description of the SPATE operation and arguing that anti-trust immunity was needed, not because the Agreement was anti-competitive—it was, if anything, pro-competitive, since it would expand distribution opportunities in the U.S. but to avoid potential litigation and harassment by interests inclined to oppose on principle joint U.S.-Soviet partnerships of any kind.

Pan Am observed that aviation relations with the Soviet Union are unique and already governed by an established set of rules that require direct governmental oversight by the Department of Transportation.

In response to the concern of ASTA, Pan Am stressed the pro-competitive nature of the arrangements. For example, the new arrangement provides access to the Soviet tour product by all 30,000 U.S. travel agents, in contrast to the 60 Intourist appointed agents. While that reply apparently satisfied the Justice Department, several tour operators and travel agents continue to oppose SPATE. As of this date, the U.S. Department of Transportation has not issued a formal order deciding this important issue.

During the course of the negotiations involving the Joint Services Agreement and SPATE venture, Pan Am and Aeroflot also discussed other areas of potential cooperation that might be mutually beneficial. These cooperative efforts generally involved projects which could readily

be accommodated under the new Soviet Joint Venture law, enacted pursuant to a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers.

In view of the difficulty the two carriers had experienced in obtaining hotel accommodations, they decided that the most promising joint opportunity would involve the construction of a new international-standard hotel in Moscow. A draft Joint Venture Agreement was prepared between the two carriers covering the essential terms and conditions of such an arrangement.

The two carriers then concluded an agreement on August 4, 1988, including Mossoviet, representing the City of Moscow as one of the joint venture partners, specifying the site for a new first-class, 500-room hotel in the center of Moscow and within walking distance of the Kremlin, and authorizing Pan Am to approach specific major hotel corporations for the purpose of soliciting their participation in the joint venture. As a result of these contacts, a major U.S. hotel operator has expressed a strong interest in joining Pan Am and its Soviet joint venture partners in this project. In addition, a major American car rental firm has joined Pan Am and Aeroflot in exploring joint venture possibilities, and negotiations toward that end are expected to be concluded in the near future.

THE FUTURE

WE BELIEVE the present ongoing commercial relationship between Pan Am and Aeroflot is an excellent example of what can be accomplished by cooperative efforts between U.S. and Soviet companies, given support from our two governments.

The enthusiastic public response to this New York-Moscow joint service venture in both countries, given our vigorous and extensive advertising and promotional support, and the more conducive atmosphere created by the enlightened, innovative Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev, promises even greater future success.

With the eventual introduction into the market of new Soviet aircraft with nonstop capability, we may see inevitable changes in the current arrangement and the emergence of new and expanded opportunities for both carriers on an independent, more traditionally competitive basis. However, we are proud and pleased at the heartening success of the current cooperative service.

The new U.S. administration headed by George Bush has indicated it will continue and build further upon the cooperative spirit that developed under the Reagan administration, and we anticipate further meaningful progress toward creating interdependent enterprises involving U.S. and Soviet partners that can function as a sound durable basis for a secure climate of mutual respect and friendship.

We at Pan Am foresee the opening of bright new horizons for further commercial ventures beneficial to the peoples of both our nations, founded on a continuing, stable relationship of peace, harmony, and understanding.

This article was written exclusively for *International Affairs*.

DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISM

Alexei PANKIN

I HAVE BEFORE ME the verbalim report of the scientific and practical conference on "Diplomacy and International Journalism in the Context of Perestroika" held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 3 last. The rate is very important here because what was said at the conference is seen in a different light now. At that time, the election campaign was only just gathering momentum, and so nobody could foresee either the dramatic developments of the final month or the results of voting. But by now, with the situation in the country changed, the records of the conference debate have become something of a general survey of the state of affairs in the area of foreign political glasnost made by noted Soviet diplomats and prominent journalists—experts in international problems.

It is from this angle that I propose to attempt an analysis of the verbalim report in the light of the experience of these past months and the outlook for the period ahead.

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A MAJOR PROBLEM discussed at the conference was the general principles of relations between the media and government agencies.

The tone was set by deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky.

"We hope the time will come," he said, "when international journalism wins real sovereignty at long last and becomes more self-confident and less inhibited. The ideal we should strive for is to ensure that the press is part of civic society and not a component of the state apparatus, which it often is in actual fact.... The Foreign Ministry lays no claim to a monopoly of the truth and renounces the role of censor but the important thing is to remember that the principle of glasnost rests on national interests, which should not, of course, clash with universal interests."

Understandably, this call for a certain demarcation of the functions of the state and the press met with general approval at the conference. "...Strictly speaking," Vsevolod Ovchinnikov commented, "the words we heard today should have come from ourselves—we should have spoken them and not knocked at the door of a government department.... It appears that the door is open." However, he also pointed to a really complicated problem, stating it as follows: "Any diversity or pluralism of opinion may come up against a blank wall if every uncommon view is interpreted as causing damage to our foreign policy interests...."

Indeed, who is to formulate and express the national interest and how should this be done? Prior to perestroika, the problem was solved very

simply. Foreign policy decisions were made by a fairly narrow group, whereupon the policy approved by it was declared to be consonant with our national interests. In these years of perestroika, certain changes are taking place as the processes of intradepartmental drafting of decisions and interdepartmental analysis by experts are democratised and foreign policy changes in content, being pursued far more innovatively and flexibly. Generally speaking, however, discussion has yet to go beyond the bounds of "restricted" material.

It is true that there is a widespread consensus in society today on foreign policy aims and means. But this implies neither complete unity on every point nor an identical depth of analysis of every single line of action. Inevitably, the question arises: Is responsibility to policy-making government departments invariably identical with responsibility to national interests?

There is evidently another important thing at the moment as well. We have a new legislative body in our country. It includes new and very different people who apparently have their own concepts of the country's foreign policy requirements. The new composition of our parliament makes it possible to examine and modify this or that policy line. We should use this opportunity to take stock of our international affairs. But what if the departments concerned turn out to be the only sources of information? Could this mean taking into the future what we are now in a position to renounce?

I think our people and state will stand to gain if the Supreme Soviet and the media begin a broad and truly free discussion on a permanent basis. We need not listen too attentively to the echo evoked abroad by this or that statement of ours. There are many examples to show that in discussing foreign policy, journalists or even legislators in other countries do not worry much about what people abroad will say, and as for self-respecting politicians, it never occurs to them to indicate that they are offended at personal opinions.



WHAT RESTRICTIONS on international information do we have? The problem certainly does not come down to making sure that no state secrets are divulged. "...All is not permitted that is not forbidden," as Melor Sturua put it at the conference.

It is interesting to note that until recently public complaints from journalists specialising in international relations were directed against no one in particular. The areas closed to glasnost were specified in no uncertain terms as some facts of history, our relations with allies, cases of rectifying mistakes in such a way as not to lose face and, lastly, a vast amount of factual information concerning primarily defence. But the mechanism of imposing these restrictions was hardly ever disclosed. Speakers at the conference brought up this point.

Characteristically, there were very few complaints against the Foreign Ministry's central apparatus. Journalists made useful suggestions prompted by the occasionally ineffective forms in which the Information Directorate supplies them with information (they were accused in reply of being lazy and uninquisitive). By and large, however, they recognised that the Ministry is opening its doors and is willing to cooperate with them on diverse levels. No complaints were raised against Glavlit—I wonder why.

Where do restrictions come from, then? Those mentioned included restrictions from abroad. When displeased at a publication or broadcast, our friends protest, with the result that we drop the disputed subject. The effect is roughly the same in the event of our own embassies protesting against a publication or broadcast they consider damaging to our rela-

tions with the country where they are accredited. This is an example of how we have added external to internal censors.

Other sources of restrictions. I shall quote Melor Sturua, who said: "While you (the Foreign Ministry.—*A. P.*) no longer initial our commentaries, it's done elsewhere. It would be perfectly quixotic to put the Central Committee with its echelons in charge of foreign political activity outside this equation." Lastly, mention was made of the military department.

Thus we have a whole number of entities enjoying the right of veto in international journalism. This compels journalists to resort diplomacy so as to strike a balance between the dictates of professional duty and official directives.

The present situation is unique. Many editors and journalists have been elected people's deputies, and besides, I suppose every legislator has a right to insist on unhampered access to the press. Every one of them is free to express his opinion as a representative of the highest authority. I cannot conceive of anybody censoring a publication signed by a chief editor who is also a people's deputy or a speech delivered by another deputy. Attempts of this nature would cause a constitutional conflict, and if successful, they would make expression of the people's will meaningless.

I think the solution lies in completely renouncing the principle of prior censorship in favour of punitive censorship, that is, trial in court for divulging secret information, which should be exhaustively defined by law. This is the direction in which international agreements on human rights, the documents of the Vienna Meeting and world democratic practice clearly point. The implication is not that the press would be free to do as it pleased. Government bodies have a vast array of means of influencing it. Besides I see no similarity whatever between our journalists and irresponsible scribblers. Still, journalists and editors must have at least a theoretical right to resist pressure when their sense of duty bids them do so.

Vladimir Petrovsky expressed this idea aptly by saying: "We must try to ensure that the political leadership of the state criticises the press, argues, issues denials, and so on, but never bans information whose publication isn't explicitly banned by law."

"WE NEED AN ALTERNATIVE PRESS." This was not said by some member of an informal association who had made his way into the Foreign Ministry Press Centre to attend the conference—but by V. Perfilov, deputy Chief of the Ministry's Information Directorate. "Our economy," he said, "is admittedly paralysed by the producer's monopoly. But then this phenomenon is also in evidence in the information sphere, for TASS and Gosteleradio have a virtual monopoly of foreign political information. Shouldn't we have several competing news agencies in our country, including agencies specialising in different problems? This would only benefit the recipient of information." Diplomats and journalists alike identified themselves with him in one way or another.

Indeed, whether we like it or not, it looks as if *Pravda* and *Izvestia* articles will for a long time to come be seen both at home and abroad as expressing the official view, with all ensuing consequences. This places journalists in a very definite situation with regard to the readership.

At the same time, their situation is just as definite in respect of their own media. As Vladimir Pozner said: "...I get my pay from the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Television and Radio Broadcasting. And so to tell me that I'm free to criticise government po-

licy if I think I must would be nonsense, for if I did the government might say: 'Look here, Comrade Pozner, we pay you money, so you must either earn it or look for another job.' But I couldn't find another job because there is no second TV network in the Soviet Union."

The reason for this state of affairs is that the main principles of running the media, evolved in our country as far back as the personality cult period, have survived practically unchanged. But how can what met requirements of the thirties as they were conceived at the time be acceptable today?

Now that we are integrating actively into the international community and the dividing line between domestic and foreign affairs is becoming less and less distinct, working and personal contacts with the outside world are becoming a routine matter for individual citizens, institutions, organisations, enterprises, cooperatives, Union Republics. In these circumstances, demand for international information is bound to grow and become more and more dynamic and differentiated. It is hard to imagine how the existing media structure could meet this demand. With us, the general line of information work still consists in improving the present system.

Generally, a fundamental shortcoming of our process of renewal is apparently the fact that we are enthusiastically retooling much of what has no *raison d'être*. Surely it would be more reasonable to make the huge organisations having a monopoly of information compete among themselves and to devote greater attention to setting up alternative information agencies unburdened by the inertia of past stagnation and functioning on principles guaranteeing that their position will be conditioned and controlled by demand.

The advertisements published in the press are indicative of the rapid proliferation of cooperatives whose business is scientific information, science and technology, the introduction of inventions, expert advice. Against the background of stagnation in this sphere of the state economy associated with scientific and technological progress, a boom and the market have induced considerable intellectual forces to move into cooperatives, in which they find an effective application for their talents. Why, then, do we still imagine that the State Committee for Publishing Houses and Gosteleradio are the only agencies equal to solving all problems of publishing and broadcasting, respectively?

Things are happening, however. We know from the press about the television studio of the Saburovo Youth Housing Cooperative; cable television in Volgograd; the non-governmental NIKA TV Company, which plans to establish a television centre in due course and to broadcast through a satellite; Post Factum, the newly established first cooperative teletype information agency. The Moscow Bureau of Information Exchange (Moskva BIO) says that stored in its data bank are data on 360 autonomous Russian-language private publications (not to mention those published in other languages). To be sure, this figure is negligible in comparison with what other countries have. Hungary, for one, had 20 cable TV studios in 1987 broadcasting for a million viewers, and in the next few years the network will spread all over the country. In the United States there are about 10,000 student publications with a daily circulation totalling 10.5 million copies. Their budget amounts to 63 million dollars. But even this is a new reality for us. And while we may not like it, we cannot expect it to disappear.

Hence it may be worth bringing our legislative practice into line with existing realities and requirements and with the optimum road to the solution of problems chartered in the course of perestroika, to say nothing of our commitments under the documents of the Vienna Meeting. The

state would not have to put up a single kopeck. All that is needed is to keep out of the way and let the consumer decide on the rest.

"...We diplomats," said V. Perfilov, "mustn't make any choice or establish any exceptions here. We should cooperate with all those media that are seeking to reach as many Soviet people as possible." This idea can now be tested in practice.

THE CONGRESS of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet will have an enormous amount of urgent business to attend to. The time has come to grapple with the economic reform in good earnest, solve problems of constitutional law, settle nation-to-nation relations and see to many other things. This writer realises that he risks looking overly biased because he is suggesting that the information sphere be treated as a priority, but there you are.

The outcome of the elections shows that the deputies were given a mandate against bureaucracy. But the command system cannot be shouted down nor defeated by means of facts exposing it.

Let us recall the experience of Jimmy Carter. In 1976, this little-known Georgia politician carried out a brilliant presidential election campaign under populist slogans, taking advantage of dissatisfaction with the Washington Establishment among ordinary people. Installed in Washington, he went on behaving like an outsider and actually found himself in the plight of a stranger in the corridors of power. As a result, the administrative activity of this president, possibly the most intelligent since Roosevelt's days and the most honest since Lincoln's, turned out to be one of the most absurd in American history.

Memento Carter!

The command system is viable and strong, nor should we underestimate its instinct of self-preservation. It has information on the state of affairs in the country, and information is power. It would not have much difficulty in making sincere but unsophisticated people its puppets either by supplying incomplete and distorted information and classifying it or by supplying it in such profusion that nobody would be able to make head or tail of it. Yet decisions cannot wait. You have only to swallow the bait to get caught.

This is why we must act to end the information monopoly of government departments. Information is the key to sound decisions. The task is to draw as many people as possible into obtaining, diffusing and evaluating information which should be analysed by an appropriate agency of the Supreme Soviet and by non-governmental experts. This in turn requires a policy aimed at providing favourable conditions for the circulation of information in society. Let us forget dogmas. The stakes are too high for us to drag our feet or make mistakes.

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS NEED A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

Victor KREMENYUK

COMPLAINTS about the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the area of international talks are common today. While acknowledging the importance of the agreements reached, most of those involved in talks or their study justly note that the negotiating process is too cumbersome and difficult, that it generally lags behind the development trend of the problems to be solved and that many agreements are regarded as unbalanced or unlikely to last. After a time some agreements are criticised or questioned by one or several signatories, as in the case of the ABM Treaty. Some other agreements are not ratified or are terminated unilaterally.

Negotiations and the agreements they lead to are part of the sharp political struggle going on at international and national level between advocates and opponents of cooperation. This underlines the relevance of the problem and the need to study it carefully. On the other hand, it impedes progress towards establishing a durable, reliable mechanism of settling differences and disputes. The idea of such a mechanism has long claimed the attention of countries and social organisations but in recent years the introduction of new thinking into foreign policy has lent urgency to the task of putting it into practice and making a scientific analysis of it.

POLITICAL WILL AND NEGOTIATIONS

WHAT IS NEEDED PRIMARILY to make talks more effective is undoubtedly political will, for it enables the parties to negotiate more or less successfully, with the result that the agreements signed by them become milestones on the road to closer cooperation. There have to be bold political decisions at top level stimulating current and future negotiations and offering them a programme. Such decisions understandably play a role as highly important components of the process of normalising international relations, negotiations included.

Since 1985, the Soviet leadership has repeatedly shown boldness and resolve in both proposing talks and searching for a short cut to the solution of the problems involved. The Soviet-US summits in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow and Mikhail Gorbachev's UN address on December 7, 1988, were cases in point. Our negotiating partners cannot be said to underestimate the significance of political will and political factors.

"...There are difficulties of a technical nature," former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing noted, speaking of the prospects of Soviet-

US talks, in particular the outlook for a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons. "They aren't insurmountable. But I think there's a need for political will. Unless the talks go beyond technicalities they may drag on for a long time. Hence the need for a strong political incentive, and I would like the new administration and the Soviet leadership to come to terms on giving such an incentive."¹

An outstanding exponent of the traditional European school of diplomacy, Giscard d'Estaing aptly formulated the existing interdependence of the "technical" and "political" levels of negotiations. Indeed, it still often takes bold political decisions to overcome barriers resulting from the piling up of technical snags at negotiations, an approach which generally proved its worth until recently. Conversely, where negotiations were carried on for a long time at the level of experts there came an inevitable delay and the political incentive lost in effectiveness as the negotiations dragged.

Negotiations require a political incentive. But it is obviously necessary to think how to combine it with the technical aspect. Heads of state cannot be expected to assume the role of Caesars shouldering the burden of "coming, seeing and conquering" every time talks between experts are deadlocked.

In "Glasnost, Talks, Disarmament", an article published in *Pravda*, Academician Georgi Arbatov put forward a definite model of combining political decisions with consultations and talks between experts. Among other things, he proposed breaking up negotiations into three stages. After a period of consultations between experts, fundamental agreement should be reached on a particular question or group of questions at the top or a very high level. At this high level, specific directives could be issued to those who are to translate the agreement into juridically complete accords at an early date. "Where fundamental agreement is lacking there should be no talks at all."²

It is becoming more and more evident, however, that along with political will, a "political climate" and other components of the negotiating process, a conceptual theoretical background is needed to make talks effective and lend them the character of a durable everyday process of intercourse between states.

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

THERE IS STILL no generalised and harmonious theory of international negotiations even though the West has been studying the problem for a long time, as I will show later. The absence of such a theory was long compensated for by the vast experience gained in diplomatic talks over the centuries. This spontaneous empirical approach had the following characteristics among others: negotiations were a special foreign policy process performing an auxiliary function with regard to the aims and interests of the negotiating state; they were a covert form of struggle in which each participant strove primarily for "victory", to be achieved either by signing an agreement on his terms or by demonstrating that the opponent's stance was "uncompromising" and "unreasonable"; negotiations were directly conditioned by the balance of power between the partners and were therefore considered worth while only if the balance was suitable, otherwise they were to be avoided. Furthermore, the parties to political negotiations took account primarily of the balance of military power.

Negotiations were seen as something of a supplement to unilateral steps to obtain one's own external objectives. They were therefore entrusted solely to people enjoying special confidence thanks to years of exemplary service and proficiency in the art of diplomacy. Skill in con-

ducting negotiations was handed down from generation to generation, becoming universal in a sense like any other art while at the same time retaining a strong cultural and ideological element of the national diplomacy that had given rise to this art.

This spontaneous approach met the exigencies of the period of universal confrontation on the international scene. At that time, the interplay of countries, including those belonging to differing social systems, centred on military political and military technological competition. Against this backdrop, talks were merely a sporadic, "atypical" form of interaction supplementing the main, military form and therefore bore the imprint of a confrontational approach and a corresponding way of thinking.

Accordingly, an unwieldy bureaucratic system was set up to ensure the conduct of negotiations and to hold as well as to control them. This mechanism, whose operation in the inner political sphere was based on a bureaucratic interdepartmental compromise, spent the greater part of the working day and resources on internal coordination and clearance instead of actually carrying on talks.

Various attempts have been undertaken to substantiate the international negotiating process in terms of theory and in the light of new thinking. In our country, this was recently done by our specialists, including this writer.³ But further efforts are needed if the process is to be put on theoretical foundations at long last.

What should be done to begin with? It would apparently be useful to recall the vast academic discipline of "settling a conflict."

Regrettably, the problem of settling conflicts—both theoretically and practically—received scant attention in our country for years. We imagined that we had only to "mobilise world public opinion", to advance a tempting idea, for the conditions needed to settle a conflict to shape up of themselves. As regards the technique of settlement, the question what to begin with, how to proceed and how to bring about a solution, we relied entirely on spontaneous decisions that might emerge during talks, for we practically lacked experience of settling conflicts. The situation is somewhat different now that we have signed agreements on Afghanistan and other accords on settling regional conflicts.

The search for new approaches to foreign policy problems necessitated a serious revision of the traditional attitude. Incidentally, "settling a conflict" is a subject which in the United States, for one, is dealt with by a score of research and academic centres and discussed in dozens of monographs and hundreds or possibly thousands of articles. In Soviet science, however, this discipline is only just taking shape and is largely behind practice.

A major component of it is study of the problem of negotiations, their course and evolution, the positions of the parties. Americans consider this very important. When, in the early 1970s, the "Nixon Doctrine" announced the advent of an "era of negotiations", the US administration, Congress and scientific community set about preparing carefully for negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Congressional Research Service launched a series of studies under the general title "Soviet Negotiating Behaviour". The series looked into historical cases, the influence of ideology, the Soviet position on various issues, and much else. By the late seventies there was enough material to bring out a special work on "Soviet negotiating behavior". After Volume I had come out (1979)⁴, research went on, and last year Volume II was published.⁵

The task of providing negotiations with a theoretical basis is now coming to the fore. New political thinking implies an entirely different approach and recognition of the role of negotiations as virtually the only mechanism of settling international disputes, a mechanism operating on the principles of equal benefit, reciprocal regard to the legitimate

interests of the other side and glasnost. In the new situation, negotiations must establish a balance of interests, for without it no equitable and lasting agreement can be reached.

First of all, negotiations are transforming from an accidental, single action into permanent, everyday work aimed at restructuring the whole mechanism of international relations. It is essential not only to negotiate the solution of serious, wideranging problems of disarmament and environmental protection as well as of settling current conflicts and preventing new ones but to create a standing mechanism of international intercourse. This mechanism should help evolve and adopt standards of cooperation between countries, rules of life in the context of interdependence and modalities for controlling this interdependence. An instance of such talks is the European process started in Helsinki and followed up in Belgrade, Madrid, Stockholm and Vienna. There have also been negative cases, such as the "North-South dialogue" in 1977, which failed for a variety of reasons.

Second, talks bear the brunt of settling disputes and establishing a just democratic world order. War, above all nuclear war, is unacceptable. This has been declared by Soviet and US leaders. Leaders of most other countries are of the same opinion. The arms race and nuclear deterrence, rather than adding to security (as some political leaders expected in the past and still occasionally do), have pushed the world to the brink of economic and military catastrophe. Nor does armed force help settle regional conflicts. The only way out of the impasse is negotiating, which should not serve as a supplement to the two systems' military and economic competition but assume the key function of restructuring their relations and the international system as a whole. Much greater responsibility is being placed on negotiations as a process and on the parties to them. Failures, delays and "slamming the door" are out of the question now, for the stakes are too high.

Third, we must all realise that negotiations are gaining in bulk and number owing to the logic of the evolution of the principal acute problems of security, political relations, the economy and the humanitarian sphere. Coming into existence is a system of negotiations which tends by virtue of the interdependence and integrity of the world to cover practically all the problems dividing countries. The formation of an integrated system of negotiations is bound to produce serious changes not only in the behaviour of the sides but primarily in the organisation and control of negotiations.

We are also faced with the acute problem of unifying national approaches to talks to form a single, common negotiating "culture" that would make it possible to offset distinctions and ensure a common conception of the role and significance of the negotiating process in solving problems of today's world. Otherwise it would evidently be hard to hope for success, since every country would go on using its own criteria and stereotypes and its own national and cultural traditions in negotiations, so that this process, rather than solving current problems, would degenerate into interminable haggling and propaganda warfare.

Now is the time for a systems approach to the solution of all the problems that have already become or are likely to become the object of negotiations. The 27th CPSU Congress formulated the Programme for Establishing a Comprehensive System of International Security. Thereby our country proposed a basis for planning and preparing to hold a whole set of talks for decades to come. They must be coordinated as to terms of reference, time limits, participants and the mechanism in charge, including the decision-making echelon. As the top leadership of the Soviet Union, the United States or any other country cannot address these problems to the exclusion of everything else, the process

must be so planned and talks so patterned as to serve their purpose.

Negotiations have some other very important aspects which science has only just come close to tackling. Researchers will gain access to the archives sooner or later, and this will enable them to make a proper appraisal of so complicated a sphere as internal talks, that is, talks between a nation's various agencies on the attitude to be adopted towards a foreign negotiating partner. The complexity and demanding nature of the security, economic, financial and environmental problems being solved today make this an extremely difficult and sensitive matter. Occasionally the agencies concerned take months to agree their positions on a particular round of negotiations.

Training professional negotiators poses a further important problem. The diplomatic service of any country has a cadre of competent negotiators. But the volume of talks which has been growing fast and will increase still further in a few years if current trends persist will require hundreds or even thousands of professional negotiators. At present it is only some countries, including the United States, France and Switzerland, that train such specialists. Attempts to organise training are being made by the UN. The point is, however, that instruction in the conduct of negotiations as a discipline is still in the making. Here, we must use both our own and foreign experience. This is one of the channels through which negotiating behaviours can be unified if talks are not to be a "dialogue" between deaf people.

The diversity of negotiating procedures was mentioned in *Izoestia* by a Finnish businessman. "Very often," he said, giving his impressions of talks with Soviet partners, "the discussion of matters of secondary importance, pettifoggery, details of protocol, the formulation of various technical problems are put first while the important thing profit, the need to think how to make money trails behind" ⁶

THE PRINCIPLE OF "SOLVING PROBLEMS"

THEORETICALLY, there exist two basic approaches to working out a negotiating strategy. One of them, which dominated both theory and practice until recently, is the principle of optimising a unilateral gain based on the method of games starting with a non-zero sum or, in other words, the method of settling a conflict with mixed motives (cooperation-cum-rivalry). Where this principle is at work the very negotiating process is understandably seen as continuing the conflict by diplomatic means: first the working out of initial positions by the sides, then a period of bargaining during which positions draw close together through a compromise, and lastly, the formation of final positions according to this compromise. On the face of it, this looks a very fortunate approach but it is precisely this method that brings about many shortlived agreements because the effort to reach a compromise is influenced by many factors, including situational ones. The impact of these factors is forgotten in time; the resultant agreement comes to be regarded as unbalanced and unfair and therefore as giving the other side an advantage, and leads in the end to a tendency to ignore the agreement.

Talks on the principle of "solving problems" may be called an abstract alternative for the time being but they certainly hold a big promise. This principle appears in system research, which makes it possible to build -by evolving formalised criteria or parameters of the process- a model of solving the problem concerned with due regard to quantitative indices and hence the more easily to convince the parties to a collective decision under discussion of its being the optimum solution.

This approach may replace bargaining. But to adopt it, nations must first carry out solid international scientific tests that can produce models of solving security, economic, ecological and other problems. This principle has yet to assert itself in diplomacy. It is believed likely, however, that after methods based on "solving problems" have been tested dozens of times, they will win proper recognition and then we will get a real alternative to the existing approach.

Practice has already furnished some remarkable instances of this. The Soviet-US IRM-SRM Treaty is, in effect, a result of applying the principle of "solving problems", for its substance consists in eliminating all Soviet and American missiles of a definite class. What preceded it was not bargaining but a solution of the problem, which made the treaty durable and applicable.

The principle of "solving problems" allows modelling by means of computers to be used more actively for evolving a negotiating strategy. To give an example, the model of an optimum solution to the problem of contemporary maritime law worked out by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology underlies the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. There have been developed models of solving the problems of acid rains, pollution control of international rivers and ocean basins; to all intents and purposes these models become items on the agenda of relevant talks. The principle of "solving problems" is implicit in the Soviet proposals for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons before the year 2000 and for settling individual conflicts. Its elaboration in scientific models plus the process of achieving a solution could make an important theoretical contribution to the provision of a universally accessible and acceptable conceptual basis for negotiations.

NEGOTIATING SYSTEM

WORK ON A NEGOTIATION theory should include the development of provisions regarding the stabilising function of talks in respect of the existing international system. Talks under this system must clearly serve as a means of peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts and as a real alternative to force. But it is not enough just to state this. There has also to be a clear, precise definition of how negotiations interact as both a process and a mechanism with the broader sphere of relations between states and other subjects of international law.

Recognising the fact that a system of international negotiations has taken shape calls for an exhaustive rethinking of the traditional approach to talks, for a study of the structure of the system, of how balanced and adequate it is for settling all current and potential disputes.

Negotiations, like any other aspect of international relations determined by members of the international community, should be put under joint control. To this end nations need to study not so much the functioning of particular components of the system or particular negotiating mechanisms as the pattern of negotiations, their interconnections and whatever else has to do with talks. The process of settling the problem of Afghanistan, for example, necessitated talks not only between Afghanistan and Pakistan but between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States, Pakistan and some other countries plus participation by the UN.

Needless to say, solving a certain range of problems would call for an elaborate complex of negotiations which no national diplomacy can cope with by itself. Nations have therefore to be clear about the amount of effort needed for the solution of each particular problem and about the "subsystem of talks" suitable for the purpose. They must try to

visualise the potentialities of the negotiating and decision-making mechanisms at national level with a view to setting practicable targets for a definite period.

The goal of making each negotiating situation more effective is coming to be the most important aspect of negotiation theory in the conditions obtaining today. It is a question of something more than working out a set of rules and procedures to facilitate talks as far as possible. To reach the general goal of raising effectiveness of negotiations and creating a mechanism of settling disputes and differences, the international community needs radical changes in its very approach to talks. It must establish a hierarchy of talks and consultations according to their responsibilities and competence. Experts of various countries must collectively devise models of possible solutions to problems. Steps must be taken to bring about a transition in the negotiating process from a state of conflict to a joint search for an optimum settlement with due regard to the actual possibilities of the parties to the agreement and with help from the international community.

Professor Roger Fisher of Harvard, a US authority on negotiations, has proposed two different models for the negotiating process: T (traditional) and A (alternative). He considers that with development of contemporary negotiations as a system, their exclusiveness (holding talks for the solution of an only problem) and finality are undergoing a transformation. Talks tend to gradually merge into a single whole in which an endless search is going on for optimum interdependent solutions, a search both yielding concrete results in the form of agreements and spurring the attainment of further agreements arising from interconnection between disputed issues.⁷

Of course, no theory of international negotiations can be developed on other, non-traditional principles unless new political thinking becomes part of the worldview of those participating in them.

Joint efforts by an international team of scientists would be the optimum way of evolving a new theoretical approach to international negotiations.

A basis for working out a general negotiation theory could be provided by the results of the international negotiation research project which has been going on ever since 1984 at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) in collaboration with specialists from the Soviet Union, the United States, France, the FRG, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Japan, Poland, Hungary, the Netherlands and some other countries—19 in all. The main purpose of the project is to offer methodological recommendations concerning possible lines of research into the process of international negotiations in the participating states and to carry on intensive interchanges of experience and knowledge. Interest in the project is shown by many international organisations.

In the contemporary Western science of international relations, the problem of negotiations is among those given the greatest attention. It has been studied for decades in the United States (under the inter-university Negotiation Program at Harvard, the Negotiation Project at the Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State) and Western Europe, where there are negotiation research centres in Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Britain and other countries. Talks are seen as an important scientific problem which is also political, of course, and whose study will largely condition the settlement of international and domestic problems.

With perestroika in our country going on, we are only just arriving at a stage where our economic reform and our effort to lay the legal groundwork for social relations and strengthen it must make negotiations part and parcel of business relations, of relations between citi-

zens and government agencies, and many other spheres dominated earlier by command methods.

All this is coupled with a restructuring of our diplomatic mechanism, which is rising to a qualitatively new plane as we introduce new thinking and renounce many time-worn dogmas. Socialist diplomacy now shows greater dynamism, initiative and boldness in bringing up disputed issues and proposing solutions to them, and this calls for a serious review of the ways and means at its disposal.

¹ *Izvestia*, Dec 30, 1988

² *Pravda*, Oct. 17, 1988

³ See A. Kokoshin, V. Kremenyuk, V. Sergeev, "Problems of Studying International Negotiations", *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* No 10, 1988, pp 23-33 (in Russian)

⁴ See *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy* Vol 1 Study Prepared by the Senior Specialists Division Congressional Research Service Library of Congress Washington, 1979

⁵ See *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior 1979-1988 New Tests for US Diplomacy* Vol II Study Prepared by the Senior Specialists Section Office of Research Coordination Congressional Research Service Library of Congress Washington 1988

⁶ *Izvestia*, Dec 28, 1988

⁷ See *Negotiation Journal* Vol 2 No 3, 1986, pp 233-236

DOING BUSINESS WITH SOUTH KOREA—A BIT TOO LATE?

Yuri OGNEV

THE 38TH PARALLEL which temporarily divided Korea after its liberation in 1945 from Japanese colonial rule was replaced eight years later, as a result of the so-called Korean War of 1950-1953, by a military demarcation line, which was expected to exist temporarily as well. But the expectations of the Koreans on both sides of the line were not fulfilled: for over four decades now the country has been divided into North and South, into two parts with opposite social and economic systems.

There is no legally formalised peace on the Korean Peninsula, only an armistice, and this makes the situation even worse, provoking an arms race on the peninsula. South and North Koreans look at each other through a palisade of over a million bayonets. A powerful US force, 43,000 strong and armed with nuclear weapons has firmly entrenched itself in South Korea.

It would be wrong, however, to say that normalisation in Korea is at a deadlock. Peace negotiations between the South and the North are gradually gaining momentum, though with stoppages and temporary setbacks. Compared with the situation in the 1960s or 1970s, there is obvious progress in the Korean dialogue. Pyongyang and Seoul are conducting talks at the parliamentary level, they have agreed that a joint athletic team will take part in the 1990 Asian Games, their positions on convening a summit meeting and holding military-political talks and on signing a non-aggression declaration are coming closer to each other. To be sure, peace can be guaranteed only where there are no weapons, and no mutual suspicions and antagonisms, which is not the case on the Korean Peninsula. Yet, it is evident that the threat of an armed conflict in Korea is now smaller than ever before.

These positive changes give us reason to say that the situation on the peninsula is being gradually normalised. This is clearly a result of the new political and economic climate being created today in the entire Asian and Pacific region due to the efforts of the Soviet Union and other states which have come out to turn the region into an arena of constructive international cooperation under conditions of peace and security for all the countries there.

The statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk last autumn, in which he said that "the improvement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula may open up opportunities for establishing economic ties with South Korea", is a reflection of the positive changes.

A decision was taken in the Soviet Union in late 1988 to work to establish trade and economic relations with South Korea. Previously we had indirect commercial operations and paid 20 per cent to a third party for mediation, whereas now there will be direct ties with South Korean firms. Such ties will be effected only on a non-governmental level and do not signify establishment of diplomatic or interstate relations in any form. Economic contacts will be coordinated by non-governmental public organisations—the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA)—which agreed on establishing their missions in Seoul and Moscow.

Why did the Soviet Union decide to establish economic ties with South Korea? In the first place, it should be mentioned that this should have been done somewhat earlier. China has long increased the level of trade with that country. It approaches the \$3 billion mark, which is fifteen times as much as the volume of indirect Soviet-South Korean ties. In 1988, China was visited by over 30 South Korean business delegations. Mutually beneficial economic contacts with South Korea are already maintained by Yugoslavia, Hungary, Vietnam, Poland, Bulgaria and the GDR. This is a sign of the natural process of the internationalisation of economic relations in our indivisible and interdependent world. A point to note here is that, as economic, cultural and some other contacts are being established between the socialist countries and South Korea, Seoul has become less unyielding in matters of Korean settlement and more readily responds to Pyongyang's proposals on promoting the dialogue.

South Korea is an important partner in international economic affairs; it has an impressive economic potential and its technological level is high in many areas. In the past 25 years its GNP (the 17th in the world) has been growing on an average by 8.5 per cent annually. Its heavy industry, machine building, electronics, construction industry, and nuclear power engineering have been built there according to modern scientific and technological standards. The country is tenth in the world in steel output (18.5 million tons in 1987) and has reached the level of Japan in building big-tonnage sea-going ships.

South Korea exports nearly half of its GNP and is the 11th in the world in the volume of trade (\$88,300 million in 1987). Its foreign debt is large (\$32,000 million in 1988), but the country is being gradually changed from a debtor into a creditor, and grants loans and technical assistance to developing countries. South Koreans expect to completely eliminate their net debt by 1991, when their foreign debt will equal the sum of their assets abroad.

Special stress is on the development and introduction of high-technology production processes, materials and manufactured goods. Its spending on research and development, which amounts to 2 per cent of the GNP, will be increased to 5 per cent by the year 2000, thus enabling the country to be among the ten countries with the highest technological level. According to ambitious forecasts of South Koreans, by the end of this century the country will be able to compete with Japan not only in production, but also in developing new technologies.

It would be wrong, however, to say that the economic vistas before South Korea are all cloudless. Its economy is confronted with difficulties, both external and internal. The United States, Japan, and Western Europe are building up pressure to compel South Korea to open its market for their manufactured goods. Meanwhile it is becoming ever more difficult for South Korean goods to be sold in the USA, which intends to cancel favourable trade and financial terms for Seoul (in 1987 the negative balance of the USA in trade with South Korea reached about \$10,000 million).

The South Korean economy feels the growing negative effect of "three increases": the rising rate of the won, its national monetary unit, the increase of the prices of imported raw materials, and a notable rise of wages achieved through strikes. All this lowers the competitiveness of South Korean export, and the government intends to improve the situation by expanding consumption at home.

South Korean business people are dissatisfied ever more with the narrow orientation on the major capitalist powers—the USA and Japan—and see a way out of the deteriorating trade situation in expanding the geographic area of their foreign economic ties by using the markets of capitalist, as well as socialist and developing, countries.

The last year saw dramatic political events in South Korea and a notable consolidation there of the forces demanding that the rudiments of the military dictatorships that had ruled the country for decades be removed. That was only natural, since the rapid quantitative and qualitative growth of the economic potential and the increase in the population's material well-being required abandonment of the authoritarian form of government.

On June 29, 1987, the cabinet of the "sixth republic" announced very important reforms to be effected in various areas—political, economic and cultural. The first important event in this context was the referendum on the draft of a new constitution. That was the ninth revision of the fundamental law since the formation of the republic in 1948, but the demands of the opposition were taken into account for the first time. Then, in February 1988, the president, the supreme head of executive power, was for the first time elected democratically. The new president is Roh Tae Woo, leader of the Democratic Justice Party. The elections to the National Assembly were held in April that year, and for the first time in 30 years the opposition received the majority of the seats in parliament. So, the opposition, comprising the Reunification Democratic Party (led by Kim Yong Sam), the Party for Peace and Democracy (led by Kim Dae Jung) and the New Democratic Republican Party (led by Kim Jong Pil), received an opportunity to influence the activities of the one-party administration under Roh Tae Woo.

Parallel with the changes in the structure and functions of legislative, executive and juridical power, a number of other positive measures have been taken: a part of the political prisoners have been released, greater freedom of the press has been ensured, the organising of trade unions and strikes have been allowed, and student and other public organisations have been granted greater autonomy.

The dramatic events of 1987 and 1988 have changed the alignment of political forces in South Korean society. The ruling Democratic Justice Party has never before been in such a difficult situation, having lost the absolute majority of votes in parliament. Today, it has to pay for the abuses of Chun Doo Hwan, former president of the "fifth republic", who led the party for seven years and was charged with corruption and power abuses.

At the same time there is every indication that the present leader of the Democratic Justice Party, Roh Tae Woo, is confident in his strength though he refused to hold a national referendum, proposed earlier, concerning a vote of confidence. The party enjoys the support of the greater part of the big bourgeoisie and army commanders, as well as farmers who gained tangible benefits from the implementation of the government programme called "The Drive for a New Countryside". And, last but not least, among the political means of struggle, it has the chance to join hands with the most conservative New Democratic Republican Party, which would immediately tip the balance

in favour of the DJP. Therefore the NDRP is seen by many observers as a "trojan horse" in the opposition.

Though the opposition criticises the Roh Tae Woo government for copying some methods used by the former regime, for insufficient measures to combat corruption, and for inadequate social policy, it nonetheless agrees with the government's course of stabilising the situation in the country and with its main line in its foreign policy. There is consensus, in fact, on what regards the improvement of relations with the United States, continued US military presence in South Korea, and an active policy regarding the DPRK and other socialist countries.

The students are a real public force in the country. It was precisely they, it will be recalled, who played the main role in toppling the first dictator, Syngman Rhee, in 1960. In recent time there has been a decline in the student movement because part of the students are evidently satisfied with the governments reforms, while others are disillusioned by the opposition parties which for ambitious motives do not wish to act jointly against the Roh Tae Woo administration which is looked upon by many South Koreans as a successor of the Chun Doo Hwan regime. There are few radical-minded groups of the youth but they enjoy the support of the population.

As bourgeois democratic reforms are being carried out, the working class, which until recently had no influence on the domestic political situation, has grown notably more active. Labour conflicts extended to most industries in 1987, which came as a total surprise to the administration and the business circles. Practically all the demands of the strikers were economic. Pressed by the government, the employers were compelled to agree to a certain wage increase, but this did not discontinue the workers' struggle.

So, two years ago a gradual process of bourgeois democratic reforms began in South Korea and will evidently continue. The national bourgeoisie which has grown stronger and forms the backbone, in fact, of all political parties in South Korea, as well as the new "middle class" nourished by the economic boom, obviously do not wish a return to the former methods of military dictatorial rule used by Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. In the army sentiment has increased in favour of its non-interference in the country's political activities and non-repetition of military coups which are still fresh in the memory of each Korean.

Today, the "new industrial country", as South Korea is called, seeks to show its worth in the political arena as well. In his speech at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly Roh Tae Woo proposed the convocation of a consultative conference on problems of peace and development in Northeast Asia to be attended by delegates from the USA, the USSR, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. Last year Seoul formulated its so-called "northern policy" (which can be compared to Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik") envisaging promotion of relations with North Korea, as well as with the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries. South Korea has positively responded to the Soviet proposals on safeguarding peace and security and promoting cooperation in the Asian and Pacific region.

Evidently, by revising the country's foreign economic line, Seoul would like to diversify, to some extent, its foreign policy as well and decrease the excessive pro-American bias. This wish is accounted for by the objective growth of national awareness among the South Korean population.

I visited South Korea during the 24th Olympics and I saw the great interest with which the people of Seoul became acquainted with

all that had been inaccessible to them before—Soviet sports, and Soviet artistes. Our country, its people, and the word “perestroika” which had not been translated into Korean, were topic number one in the press and TV. Fans on the stands cheered Soviet athletes. The Americans who saw this lost patience. Official US representatives in Seoul addressed the local authorities with an unambiguous rhetorical question: aren't the South Koreans going too far in expressing their feelings towards the USSR?

There is no doubt that in the foreseeable future the United States will be the first among South Korea's priorities as a military and political ally and an economic partner. At the same time, considering the above-mentioned changes on and around the Korean Peninsula, the tendency to alter and reduce US military presence in Korea is gradually gaining ground under the impact of spreading anti-American sentiments among the South Korean population and new ideas among progressive minded Americans. A complete pullout of US troops together with nuclear arms from the south of the Korean Peninsula would best serve Korean North-South dialogue and therefore, the cause of peace and security in Korea and in the Far East as a whole.

THE DEMARCATION LINE in Korea, this symbol of the country's division, is not going to remain forever. It is good that the current developments on the peninsula are conducive to providing favourable conditions for replacing confrontation by cooperation, armistice by peace, and the division of Korea by its reunification. Perhaps no one can say when all this will become a reality. So far, the reality on the peninsula is that alongside the socialist DPRK exists capitalist South Korea which is drawing increased attention in the world community.

FOREIGN POLICY THOUGHT—THE BEGINNINGS

Alexander GAVRYUSHKIN

THE NEW is the long-forgotten old. This is, perhaps, too general a conclusion. However, it is commonly known that there occurs a striking repetition of ideas, especially in the history of the foreign policy thought.

Some ideas underlying currently popular theories of international relations were formulated one way or another by philosophers in the distant past. And sometimes direct, "genetic" continuity may be traced between the most ancient and the newest conceptions.

Foreign policy thought is as old as social thought in general. It has long been remaining out of sight, hidden away in philosophical, general political, legal, military and other theories. Nonetheless, it has invariably influenced practical policies. This influence was at times obvious, at times latent, but it has always been significant.

The knowledge of what the diplomats of the past thought about politics in general makes it easier to understand their actions in definite situations. But the history of foreign policy doctrines is not merely a useful supplement to the history of events. The experience of its records is valuable. The aphorism cited at the beginning of this article may be paraphrased as follows: it is impossible to create something really new unless one well remembers the old. All the more so since the history of foreign policy thinking is extremely rich and diverse and can offer much food for thought, suiting any political taste. A good deal emerged already at the outset, and the origins of this thought are, in a sense, of special interest today.

Political thinkers in the ancient past had one quality that made them different from the theorists of the subsequent epochs. They concentrated more often on the profound philosophical principles underlying their views. Man at that time greatly depended on politics. The chief problem which was in the focus of the foreign policy thought of the ancient world was war. When an ancient sage spoke of war, he normally viewed it on the basis of the same main ethic categories that underlied his views on the life of an individual.

Today, more often than not we speak about the problem of mankind's survival, about the threat of a nuclear and environmental catastrophe, which means that we are increasingly aware not only of the fundamental unity of mankind, but also of the close dependence of life and well-being of an individual on the state of all mankind. So we go back, in fact, to the original questions which ancient thinkers tried to decide many centuries ago.

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ANCIENT INDIA

IN THE ANCIENT Indian epic *Mahābhārata* there is a dictum which says that a ruler should never kill an ambassador from a foreign land, otherwise the ruler would fall down into hell together with all his ministers. This and other similar dicta prompted historians to the conclusion that way back at the dawn of Indian civilisation intensive diplomatic relations were maintained between the states in the region, that the foundations of ambassadorial law were laid there, and so on. Incidentally, philosophers in ancient India could themselves generalise the experience of foreign policy interaction fairly well. This is illustrated in *Mahābhārata*.

In the sixth book of that epic there is a wonderful poetic piece called "Bhagavadgita". Wilhelm von Humboldt called it "the most beautiful and, possibly, the only truly philosophical song existing in any of the languages known to us". For all its depth and diversity of content, the main reason why "Bhagavadgita" interests us in this case is that, perhaps, for the first time in the history of human culture detailed arguments were set forth in it to determine man's attitude to war.

The story in "Bhagavadgita" is simple - it is a conversation between young Kshatriya * Ardjuna and God Krishna before the start of a great battle.

Ardjuna is at a loss. As fate willed, he had to fight against his friends and kinsmen. The thought that the blood of his nearest and dearest ones would be spilled is unbearable to him. He looks for a way of avoiding a battle and shares his doubts with Krishna, his teacher. The latter tries to make his pupil change his mind. Krishna's main argument, so typical of him, is worthy of special attention. True life, he says, is when one observes law voluntarily and unswervingly. And law demands that man should perform his social duties. Ardjuna is a Kshatriya, and the main occupation of a Kshatriya is war. This is not only his right but also his duty which is to be accepted without thinking twice. To evade this duty is to commit a crime, even if one has to kill his nearest and dearest:

*...there is nothing better for a Kshatriya than a fair battle.
A Kshatriya briskly engages in a fair battle.
As though he comes through Partha, the door to paradise.
But if you don't accept a fair battle,
You'll sin by betraying your duty and honour.*

However, Ardjuna does not give in and God has to produce more and more arguments, plunging into the abstract spheres of philosophy and theology. Bellicosity, Krishna says, is inherent in man. Thrilled by the excitement of struggle, Ardjuna will yield to the temptation of testing the strength of his weapon. But is it right to spill one's blood in general? Yes, Krishna says. He refers to a divine predestination - the time of each man is predetermined by God, man is only a tool in his hands.

The Krishna tells him his idea of reincarnation which was later elaborated on by Buddhism. Only man's body can be destroyed, but not his soul. Soul is eternal and indestructible. Therefore killing is impossible in the full sense of the word. Then Krishna preaches a kind of ethical nihilism, saying that all moral values are relative except

* Kshatriya is a person from one of the two upper castes of ancient India, formed from among the military tribal aristocracy.

one—the caste duty. Failure to fulfil it is always a sin. In the end convinced by his teacher, Ardjuna engages in the battle and wins.

The “divine” arguments in favour of war expressed by Krishna for the first time are later repeated in the foreign policy thought of various nations and in different epochs. For centuries attempts have been made, and are still made by many, to prove that aggressiveness is inherent in man. The latest version of this idea was produced by Konrad Lorenz, a present-day Austrian scholar. The idea that war is God’s punishment for man’s sins was most fully and consistently developed last century by Joseph de Maistre. But let’s go back to ancient India.

In 327 B. C. a formidable conqueror appeared in the north-eastern part of the country. The Army of Alexander the Great, the conqueror of Persia, marched from Bactria and headed for the rich Indian lands. Alexander crossed the Punjab rivers, seized the town of Taxila and, confronted with the army of King Poros, he inflicted a crushing defeat on it. But soon Alexander’s soldiers refused to continue the campaign, and he was compelled to return, though he left his garrison in Taxila. At that time poor exiled Kshatriya Chandragupta and Brahman Kautilya, his friend and teacher, appeared in the seized territory. In 318 B. C., after Alexander’s death, Chandragupta launched an uprising against the invaders, seized vast territories, and established a powerful state. The first minister in his court was Brahman Kautilya who is believed to be the author of *Arthasâstra*, a masterpiece of ancient Indian culture.

Viewed in the context of the foreign policy thought, *Arthasâstra* is distinctive in many respects. It is hard to find any other work in world literature where the pragmatic conception of foreign policy is set forth so consistently and so competently. *Arthasâstra* is often compared with *Il Principe* (the prince) written by Niccolo Machiavelli. In American universities, the study of the theory of international relations in its historical aspect usually begins with Kautilya. At any rate, for the present-day advocates of “political realism” this ancient treatise is evidently sound proof that their views are primordial and therefore correct.

Kautilya, as he himself put it, wrote his treatise “on the basis of due consideration of all sciences and their practical use”, believing that it would become a manual for sovereigns wishing to achieve success in domestic and foreign policies. In other words, he tried to produce an applied theory of international relations—something that few people have managed to do. In present-day research in this subject the methodological aspect is doubtlessly the strongest: detailed methods of research are developed, a systems and factor analysis is used, and so on. However, this research is often poorly related with practice.

The Brahman of the ancient times managed, to some extent, to overcome this defect. In practical terms his treatise worked. In any case, the foreign policy pursued by Chandragupta proved quite effective. As for methods, Kautilya was again up to mark. He suggested a kind of an ancient Indian method of analysing foreign policy “factors”.

His method is based on the assumption that any sovereign wants to conquer other lands, and therefore his neighbours must always be enemies. Such a monarch finds himself in a ring of enemies who, for their part, are encircled by a ring of his allies as by a “rim of a wheel”. Besides there are “medium” and “indifferent” sovereign potential enemies who may be won over when opportunity offers. The balance of forces is assessed with the help of “factors”. Among them Kautilya singled out three main factors: the sovereign, his ally, and the ally of his ally. Each of the main factors is associated with another five “factors”: ministers, rural areas, fortified towns, the treasury, and the army. Besides, the “factors” of the enemies, their allies, etc. are also

taken into account—all in all, 72 factors. Only that sovereign can start practical activities, Kautilya warns, who can count the "factors" well and understands the system of "rings".

Kautilya makes a detailed analysis of the foreign policy methods and ways of maintaining friendly alliances and divisions in hostile coalitions. He pays great attention to the technique of diplomatic relations. But why do wars have such a great role to play in the foreign policy of states? There is no simple answer to this question in *Arthashastra*. On the one hand, war is good because in case of a victory it makes the sovereign stronger and richer. On the other hand, war can cause his ruin and destruction. Therefore one should avoid excessive cruelty and greed. To Kautilya war was a natural state of relations between countries and therefore was to be taken for granted.

With the efficient help of his minister Chandragupta started the unification of northern India. His son Bindusara also turned out to be a clever and pragmatic politician. Having won several wars, he gained control over almost all of India. For some brief period relative calm settled on the country. Soldiers whiled away the time, but diplomats and merchants had their hands full, and there was an opportunity to take a closer look at the culture and customs of other nations.

The rapid expansion of India's foreign ties required appropriate international laws and efficient diplomatic service. Already Kautilya placed very high demands on ambassadors, as he considered their diplomatic missions all too important. Apart from purely diplomatic activities, the ambassadors were instructed to conduct espionage and sabotage. "The duties of the ambassador," Kautilya writes, "are performance of his mission, observance of the concluded agreements, maintenance of prestige, winning over of new friends, incitement of quarrels among the allies, secret transfer of troops, kidnapping of the enemy's relatives and stealing his treasures, collection of information from spies, bravery, annulment of agreements, and the use of secret means". To neutralise the espionage of foreign ambassadors Kautilya proposes the use of counter-intelligence. "Let the king order... that the ambassadors of the enemies be watched by other ambassadors and spies and with the help of covert and overt observers." During the rule of the Maurya dynasty the technique of foreign policy relations was developing most rapidly. Even a department performing the functions of modern consular service was set up. The job of those who served in the department was to provide lodging for arriving foreigners, give them medical aid and protect them from their time of arrival to the moment they crossed the border on their way home. A foreigner caught spying lost the right of protection.

The new political situation was conducive to the development of philosophical, religious and, consequently, diplomatic thought, which, in turn, provided conditions for a radical change in practical policies.

In 268 B. C. Bindusara was succeeded by his son Asoka. The new ruler dreamed about uniting the whole of India and so he launched a campaign of conquest, leading his troops to the southeast against the kingdom of Calinga. His troops, as legend has it, cruelly suppressed the resistance of the local population, killing or taking prisoner about 250,000 people. Asoka observed Buddhism and when he learned about the cruelties he, tormented by remorse, felt revulsion against war as an instrument of foreign policy. Though the small states in southern India which remained independent could easily be conquered, Asoka discontinued the campaign and declared that from then on he would effect conquest only through love and piety.

The new foreign policy conception was reflected in his numerous decrees cut on stone slabs. One of them says: "If anyone harms him,

his Holy Majesty would resign himself to this as much as possible. His Holy Majesty looks with kindness at the forest dwellers in his domains and wishes to impress the right thought onto them, because, if his Holy Majesty fails to do this, he will be possessed with remorse, for his Holy Majesty so wishes that all living beings would acquire security, self-restraint, tranquility, and joy."

Asoka devoted his foreign policy mainly to spreading Buddhism. Due to his religious zeal Buddhism was rapidly winning over ever more adherents in the whole of Asia, and Asoka himself was sanctified by Buddhists. He told his sons and grandsons "not to plan new conquests by sword, but to conquer through kindness and gentleness". How consistently Asoka applied his principles in practice may be arguable. But it is certain that he was the first to try and submit foreign policy to an ethic principle based on a personal moral choice.

ANCIENT CHINA

EARLY IN THE 19TH century British industrialists looked into the possibility of selling their goods in China. Their efforts showed slow progress, and after one of a series of attempts by energetic businessmen to penetrate into the Chinese market British King George III received an angry message from the emperor of China. The emperor wrote: Strange and expensive articles do not interest Us, and the goods of your country are useless to Us. You, King, should respect Our favour and in future express still greater loyalty and submission, so that by boundless faithfulness to Our throne you could earn peace and security for your country in future. In our Heavenly Empire We have everything in increasing abundance and there are no goods that are not to be found within its bounds. Therefore there is no need bringing the goods of barbarians in exchange for our goods. We do not forget about the solitary remoteness of your island, cut off from the whole world by the menacing seas, and understand your forgivable ignorance of the customs in Our Heavenly Empire... Obey with trepidation and do not show disrespect.

George III, as may well be supposed, received the message with scepticism, whereas for the authors of the message any attitude different from theirs would have seemed strange and unacceptable. All that the emperor wanted to tell the ruler of a "remote island" followed from a streamlined and thoroughly elaborated foreign concept that had originated way back in very ancient times.

A specific quality of culture in ancient China was the rare capability of preserving spiritual traditions and adapting them to the changing circumstances. All this proved decisive for the development of foreign policy thought and yielded a result which is not to be observed in any other civilisation of the ancient world.

Confucius (551-479 B. C.) is regarded as the most authoritative among the philosophers of ancient China. He and his followers developed a vast ethico-political system based on the demand for strict social regulation and proper fulfilment by people of their duties with regard to each other. Confucius singled out five main types of relations among people: "father-son", "husband-wife", "elder brother-junior brother" and other relations. The junior, lower ones had to obey their elders implicitly. The subordination system developed into a hierarchy with the monarch and deity at the top of it. The Confucian "types of relations" were applied not only to individuals but also to relations between the king, *wang*, and the vassal princes, and also to relations between the latter and other states.

There was a period in the history of ancient China when the Confucian model of the world was pushed into the background. In the 8th-5th centuries B. C. the power of the *wang* was gradually waning, and China split into a number of smaller states conflicting with one another. In the 5th to 3rd centuries B. C. wars became so frequent that that period is known in Chinese history as the period of Fighting Kingdoms.

A new foreign policy situation gave rise to new ideas. On the one hand, there emerged political philosophers denouncing war and calling for establishing universal peace. For instance, philosopher Meng-tse (Mencius) (479-381 B. C.) attacked Confucianism and worked on his own ethical doctrine based on the idea of "universal love". On the other hand, the philosophical schools advocating ideas consonant with the pragmatic ideas of *Arthasâstra* grew stronger in China. Those schools were normally joined by people of action—dignitaries and military commanders who combined theoretical speculation with practical policy.

One of such people, military commander Sun-tseu, who lived at the end of the 6th century and early in the 5th century B. C., commanded in the principality U and became famous for his treatise on the art of warfare and for demonstrating his military art by staging a battle between two detachments that consisted of the King's concubines. Sun-tseu believed that "war is a great undertaking for the state; it is the groundwork for life and death, a path of existence and ruin". The earnest of success in a war, he said, is intelligence, prudence and the ability to deceive the enemy.

In the 3rd century the Qin principality gained strength and ultimately subordinated all the neighbouring principalities. Thus the single and centralised state was restored, largely owing to Shang Yang, an outstanding dignitary and political theorist who worked for the Qin prince. Shang Yang's role in the history of China is almost the same as that of Kautilya in India and, like his counterpart on the other side of Tibet, he maintained that foreign policy should be based on strength. To strengthen his principality, Shang Yang effected large-scale political and economic reforms, paying most of his attention to farming. The Chinese theorist believed that the ruler's subjects had to have only two occupations—farming and warfare. Without farming there is no food, without food there are no people, and without people there are no soldiers. The peasant can become a good soldier, he stressed, only if his conditions are made as hard as possible. Then even a war will be a pleasure to him.

The Qin empire did not last long. In 206 B. C. a peasant uprising erupted in China, and the peasants proved to be good soldiers, just as Shang Yang had foreseen. Imperial power was swept away and Liu Bang, who led the uprising, founded the Han dynasty. Confucianism was being revived and soon it became a state religion and regained the dominating positions in the foreign policy thought.

At that time Chinese theorists were elaborating principles of relations with "barbarians". For instance, the policy of territorial aggrandizement with the subsequent assimilation of the local population is called *qian-shu* in Chinese literature, meaning gradual "eating off" of the land of neighbours, just like a silkworm eats leaves. This kind of foreign policy was practised when superiority in strength was achieved, as, for instance, in Indochina. As regards stronger neighbours, such as Huns, the *zimi* policy was pursued, that is, a policy of binding or containing. A dangerous enemy was "bound" by generous gifts.

The Confucian model of the world turned out to be surprisingly stable. In fact, China gives us the first, but not the only, example of complete dependence of foreign policy theory on a general ideological concept. As a result, foreign policy thought, and social thought as a whole, found itself in ideological trap and failed to escape from it. The views of Chinese

political theorists remained unchanged even when they were in glaring disagreement with reality. Those views made it impossible to effect even certain minor changes, for this would shake the whole enormous system of views. Britain, Russia, France and Holland and some other countries were regarded as tributaries of the Chinese emperor right until the start of this century

ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME

THE EARLIEST foreign policy conception of ancient Greece was formulated at the start of the first millennium B. C. According to that conception, major world events were a result of the conscious activity of a small group of "intriguers" who gathered regularly on a hill in Thessaly. In any case, both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* begin with reports on the meetings of gods in the palace of Zeus on the Olympus mountain.

Greeks, however, were ironical about their gods and allowed themselves to openly ignore their opinions. Zeus, for instance, though he himself sanctioned some military operations, spoke, in principle, against wars. Once he even had to reprimand rigorously Arès, the God of war. But the ideas of the early Greek philosophers who tried to comprehend the problem of war were all too different.

The first attempt to grasp the theoretical aspect of war was made, evidently, by Heraclitus, a philosopher born in 544 B. C. in the city of Ephesus in Asia Minor. Heraclitus was an outstanding person in many respects. In the history of philosophy he is known as the brightest representative of materialism and dialectics. His contemporaries regarded him as an arrogant and melancholic man. In his view, even Homer, "the wisest of all Hellenes", deserved to be birched together with Archilochus. In his last years Heraclitus turned to hate people and retired to the mountains where he lived, feeding solely on herbs. But before he went there, he had been able to profoundly understand the political life of his time, which was reflected in his philosophical conception.

At that time the eastern shore of the Aegean Sea, including Ephesus, was conquered by Persian King Darius I. During the lifetime of Heraclitus the Greeks launched an unsuccessful uprising against the conquerors. In Ephesus, where the Persians had granted the Greeks the right to self-government, an incessant struggle was going on between the democratic and aristocratic parties. It was possibly under the influence of those events that Heraclitus made "war" and "struggle" the main notions in his philosophy.

He wrote a book, *On Nature*, which has not survived. Some ancient authors mention a different title of the book, and one of them even asserted that it was not about nature but about the state, that the author had used nature just as an example. War was given much attention in the book, though we can judge about it only by a few extracts that have been preserved.

"War is the father of all and the king of everything; it ruled that some would be gods and others would be people; that some would be slaves and others would be free.

"One should know that war is universal and that the truth is struggle, that everything happens through struggle and by necessity."

Yet another utterance by Heraclitus on this subject says: "Those who have fallen in wars are respected by gods and by people." Therefore war is not just an abstract law in nature or politics, but a highly moral undertaking.

The Greeks' struggle against the Persians continued about forty years after Heraclitus' death and ultimately ended in the defeat of the Persians. After the Graeco-Persian wars major foreign policy changes oc-

curred in Hellas. Athens, which grew stronger after the wars, was spreading its influence ever wider. The Delos Union set up under its influence soon became an effective instrument used by Athens in the struggle for hegemony. Athens was counterbalanced in the west of the country by the Peloponnese Union headed by Sparta. The close allied ties established between cities (polises) and the expansion of trade gave rise to the spread of new forms for solving foreign policy problems. On the basis of the ancient law of hospitality there emerged *proxenia* resembling modern consular service in its functions. Arbitration began to be used more often in settling disputes. The conclusions of interstate agreements on a broad range of questions—war and peace, trade, property rights, citizenship, etc.—became a widespread practice.

Peace did not last long in Hellas. The Greeks soon started an internecine war, known as the Peloponnese War. But in the history of that long war one episode is most interesting for us.

In 424 B. C. an Athenian naval squadron commanded by Thukydides, a strategist, was cruising along the shores of Thrace. Once the strategist was ordered to urgently help a detachment that defended Amphipolis. He came, a bit too late, and the city was seized by the enemy—the Spartans. So Thukydides let Athens down but advanced the foreign policy thought in a way: for his blunder he was banished from Athens and, having nothing else to do, began to write a history of the Peloponnese War.

Thukydides made a purely historical record, but, as distinct from his great predecessor Herodotus, the “father of history”, he was interested not only in facts and events, but also in their interrelationships and regularities. As a result, he formulated his own approach to history containing a concept of international relations.

What is behind people's actions? For a man thinking about the history of war the answer was obvious. In their actions people are guided by their natural, inborn qualities which are, unfortunately, not the best ones. “Most people,” wrote the disgraced strategist, “prefer to have the reputation of a crafty villain than of a virtuous simpleton: they are ashamed of being the latter and are proud of being the former. The reason for all this is power sought for mercenary and ambitious motives; hence the great passions of rivalry among people.”

The essence of foreign policy is the struggle for power, and strength is the main argument in this struggle. Thukydides puts the following words in the mouths of the Athenian ambassadors conducting negotiations with the population of the Melos island: “Things are done among people by right when people are equals, and they are done by force when the strong stands his ground and the weak gives in.” Or: “We see the law which is probably divine and is certainly human in all its natural incontestability: one rules where one is strong. It is not we who established it and we were not the first to apply it; we received it as it is and will preserve it for ever. We observe this law, knowing that you and others having our strength would do the same.”

If man's qualities are such, then, naturally, wars will be a usual thing. In history, though, there are periods of peace and relative lull. But this is only natural, because, Thukydides explains, apart from the lust for power, man has fear. When fear is mutual, the enemies do not venture to engage in an open conflict and conclude peace.

It is easy to explain away all political conflicts by human nature, and sometimes such explanations sound convincing. The strength of this argument is in that it is irrefutable, and its weak point is that it is unprovable. Even if we assume that man has some inborn evil inclinations, it is hard to see direct dependence between them and such complex a social phenomenon as war. These are phenomena of different categories.

Nonetheless, owing to Thukydides' *History*, we can arrive at the following generalisation: a pragmatic approach to foreign policy was used in ancient civilisations. Though the thinking of the ancient people was "primitive", the statesmen of that time could appraise the balance of forces remarkably well and, on the whole, were consistently rational in politics. However, the pragmatic approach did not become prevalent either in Greece, in India, or in China. Why? This question is partly answered by Thukydides.

Struggle among people, the Greek philosopher believed, has always been and will ever be, but it is evil. Man is compelled, obeying a "divine law", to take up arms, though he understands at the moment that he is committing a crime. So, there is a vast gap between the "law" of war and morals. Yet, if a political concept contradicts ethical norms, if it runs counter to what is good and just, it is doomed in the long run. But only in the long run, because a moral situation in society and specific foreign policy events may provide conditions in which such a concept will exist for a long time.

Plato, one of the greatest philosophers of ancient times, was born into a family of an Athenian who had settled on the Aegina island when the Peloponnese War was in its third year. Soon the island was seized by Sparta and the family had to go back to Athens. So, in his childhood the future philosopher already knew the hardships of war.

Plato was not occupied with international problems as such. Like other Greek philosophers, he did not single out foreign policy from politics in general. But he analysed the war problem in detail mainly in his dialogue the *Republic* and later in *Laws*. Though Plato is regarded as a major idealist, in that question he reasoned, in fact, as an ordinary materialist.

Wars were not needed for a rationally arranged state, he believed. The requirements of its citizens were limited and they could provide themselves with all that was needed for a sound life. But in actual fact things are different. Some people are not satisfied with a simple way of life. "They insist on having good couches and tables and all kinds of utensils, food, ointments and incense, and also hetæras, tasty pies, and they want to have much of all that. Will it not become necessary to expand such a state? The sound state is no longer enough, it should be filled by a host of people whose presence in the state is not caused by some need: such are, for instance, various hunters, and also imitators: there are many of them as regards drawings and paints. And the country, once sufficient for feeding the population, will now become small. So we shall have to cut out a part of neighbouring country, if we want to have enough pastures and ploughland, but our neighbours, for their part, will want to seize a part of our country, if they, too, take the path of incessant grabbing, exceeding the limits of what is necessary. As a result we shall be at war."

One should do credit to the breadth of Plato's views. He did not judge politics by his own standard. Though he himself is said to have devoted passionate verses to hetæra Archainassa, and in his young years he dabbled in what he calls "drawings and paints." But let us consider the train of thought of the great philosopher.

War is the "chief source of private and public misfortunes". One could draw a conclusion that war is, in principle, evil. Plato is inclined to adhere to this view, but with one reservation. The point is that there exist two types of wars: war as such and discord. War was considered to be struggle between Hellenes and barbarians (non-Greeks), and what he calls discord was the internecine war in Hellas. The struggle against barbarians was irreconcilable. They were "foreigners and strangers" and "enemies by nature". Greeks (or Hellenes), on the other hand, were

"people close to each other and related in kinship", while enmity among them was wrong, for in this case they ruined Hellas, their "mother and nourisher". Therefore to reduce internecine conflicts Plato proposed that the winner confine himself to imposing an indemnity on the defeated and never turn Hellenes into slaves. Thus, Plato became a major advocate of Greek nationalism which spread after the Persian wars.

There were many influential persons who shared his views. One of them, Isocrates, his friend and a famous orator, urged the Greeks to unite and start a war against Persia, because internecine wars in Greece would not stop "so long as we find a common enemy and a common source of enrichment". They did witness a unification of the Greek states, though not the way they had wanted.

While the Greek cities quarrelled with one another, a new force emerged in northern Hellas—Macedonia. King Philip II acted not so much by force than by diplomatic intrigue and bribing, gradually placing one city after another under control. Philip is alleged to have said that a donkey loaded with gold can take any fortress. When Greeks realised what was going on, it was too late.

On September 1, 338 B. C., the picked units of the Greek troops were routed in the battle near Chaeronea by the Macedonian cavalry commanded by Alexander, an 18-years-old son of King Philip. That spelled the end of Greece's independence and at the same time marked the beginning of its unity. After Chaeronea Philip urgently called an all-Greek congress in Corinth which decided to start war against Persia. Thus the ancient dream of Hellas—revenge for the Persian invasion—was coming true.

Those vast changes in Greece's political life inevitably influenced foreign policy thought. However, they did not bring anything entirely new but merely strengthened the tendencies that had already existed. The main theorist at the new stage in political thinking was Aristotle, one of the best known ancient philosophers.

In Aristotle's political views there is an obvious wish to fulfil a social order of a kind. That was not surprising. His father was a doctor at the court of the Macedonian king, and Aristotle himself was a tutor of Alexander. It was asserted that later Alexander financed the scientific studies of his teacher. In any case, Aristotle openly backed up wars of aggression, whether he wished it or not.

Though war, the philosopher considered, was not the ultimate goal of the state, it was among its practical virtues. Moreover, it was "distinguished among other [virtues] in beauty and grandeur". The state would not have to fight if it had been isolated from its neighbours by a miracle. But in practice a politician had always to take into account the possibility of a war.

Aristotle had interesting ideas of how a person who would be regarded as a diplomat, that is, a man who decided to occupy himself with foreign policy activities, was to be prepared for that service. According to the philosopher, such a person should "know the strength of the state—how great this strength is at present and how great it was before, what it consists of now and in what respect it can be built up. Besides, he should know which wars the state waged and how—all this concerns not only his own state but also neighbouring ones. He should also know from which neighbour a war could be probably expected, so that peace be preserved with a stronger neighbour and, as for the weaker ones, the start of a war should depend on ourselves." Aristotle says further that a "diplomat" should understand military tactics, foreign trade, legislation, and so on.

Plato called foreigners "enemies by nature". Aristotle called them natural slaves. "Power," he asserted, "would be a terrible absurdity, if nature itself had not divided people into those capable and incapable of

submission. And if so, one should not seek to extend his rule over all, but only over those capable of submission." That was the idea which, according to Plutarch, Aristotle tried to impose on his pupil as he was persuading him to regard barbarians as animals.

Alexander turned out to be a self-willed pupil. As a result of his conquests, a number of peoples of Europe, North Africa and almost half of Asia were united under one political power. That unity of the empire, which was exceedingly diverse in all respects, could not have been maintained by practising genocide and cultivating among the Greeks the feeling of their exclusiveness, as prescribed by Aristotle. Alexander, evidently, realised that and sought, parallel with the spread of Greek culture, its earliest fusion with the customs and beliefs of the conquered peoples. He ordered that 30,000 Bactrians be taught the Greek language and, at the same time, he replenished his army with Persian warriors and ordered the commanders in his army to marry Persian women, ignoring the dissatisfaction of his veterans.

In the opinion of Plutarch, Alexander was possessed of the most noble plans. He intended not to "march across Asia and ravage it", but to make it so that there would be one law, peace and justice in the whole world and that people would no longer be divided into Greeks and barbarians. Only half of his dreams came true. After his death the vast empire disintegrated into independent monarchies, and the relations among them were those of enmity and unstable balance. The only thing Alexander achieved was that he put an end to Hellenic nationalism. Moreover, the revolution that occurred in Greeks' thinking after his campaigns gave rise to a new world outlook and a new attitude to relations among the peoples.

The ideology of cosmopolitanism, which spread in that period, had originated due to many causes, an important one being that the conquest of Asia extended before the Greeks the boundaries of the *oecumene* (the populated world), enabling them to learn new morals, customs and beliefs which were sometimes in striking contrast with the Greek way of life. Having renounced the belief in their moral and cultural superiority, the Greek philosophers were compelled to admit the relativity of any morals and, therefore, the equality of all people, at least in that respect. So, one of the main ideological grounds for wars of aggression was being removed. The term "cosmopolitanism" was coined by Diogenes, a Cynic philosopher who called himself a "citizen of the world". He was echoed by other adherents of that philosophy, such as Cratetus who wrote in a tragedy:

*My country is not a fortress, and is not a home to me,
To me the whole world is an abode and shelter.*

This point of view could be found in Greek philosophy even earlier. Democritus, for instance, said: "The whole land is open to a wise man. Because the whole world is a homeland for a good soul". However, Democritus, and later the Cynics, believed that the majority of people in the world were hopelessly stupid, and therefore only wise philosophers could be real cosmopolites.

The idea cosmopolitanism was vigorously promoted by the Stoics. They did not renounce their duties before the state and were prepared to serve it when necessary. At the same time the Stoics believed that man had an inborn sense of relationship with other people, which was growing and would ultimately embrace all mankind. The community of people would therefore form one state ruled by one Heavenly Father.

At first the Stoics expressed these ideas with regard to only a limited number of the chosen ones. They visualised a world state as a kind of

an international alliance of sages preaching virtues and having everything in common, from ideology to wives. But later they had to renounce those extreme views. Owing to the Stoics the idea of cosmopolitanism became widespread in the Greek world and was later adopted by the architects of a new power—the Roman Empire.

In foreign policy Rome is famous above all by its immense conquests. But the attempts of Romans to analyse those stunning successes looked strikingly mediocre. In political theory the Romans gravitated towards naturalism, so their only big contribution to the evolution of the foreign policy thought was their development of the fundamentals of international law. Explaining the sources of the might of Rome, its philosophers normally confined themselves to references to the simplest causes—fate, the timely intervention of gods, the natural capability of Romans to rule, and so on.

The Roman Stoics were not original in foreign policy and mainly followed the ideas formulated by their Greek predecessors. While the stern legionaries flooded Europe, Africa and Asia in blood and the Roman rulers indulged in lechery, the philosophers watched with revulsion what was going on, not finding justification of what was the foundation of the greatness of their immense empire. Seneca wrote: "It was not reason and valour that made Gnaeus Pompeius wage wars, internecine and internal, but the turbulent desire for false grandeur. He attacked now Sertorius' troops in Spain, now pirates to establish peace on the seas; but all that was a pretext he used to prolong his own power. What led him to Africa, to the north, against Mithridates, to Armenia, and to every part of Asia? Of course the boundless desire to rise even higher, though his greatness seemed small to him only..."

Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the last adherent of Roman Stoicism, was a mild man, preoccupied mainly with retaining a peace of mind. But the disturbing situation in the empire forced him to be constantly at war, now with Parthia, now with Marcomans, now with insurgents in Northern Egypt. Trying to reconcile his civil duties with the ideals of Stoicism, the emperor invented this formula for himself: "For me, for Antoninus, my city and homeland is Rome, as is the world for man. And only what is useful for these two cities is good for me." It is hard to say how the emperor managed to reconcile the interests of both "cities". However, he gave his life for the former, when the epidemic of plague broke out in the Roman army, killing him.

THIS REVIEW of the foreign policy thought of the ancient world, brief as it is, reveals a definite tendency and internal logic. It is most clearly pronounced in the views of the philosophers of ancient India and Greece. The starting point in philosophical reasoning there was always the same: war is an inseparable element of life. For the heroes of Homer and *Mahabharata* it was natural to take up arms on any occasion and kill the defeated enemy with ecstatic joy. Military valour was the supreme virtue to them.

Still, there came a time when the political thought, too, rose to a new level. War is an evil, though it is inevitable, an evil imposed on man by insuperable outside forces—the natural order of things in the writings by Kautilya, the state interest according to Shang Yang, or a "divine law" in the philosophy of Thukydides. To back up this idea, ancient philosophers declared all other peoples "barbarians" and "natural slaves". Politics is placed above morals, but even that approach turned out to be

A FEW MONTHS BEFORE AUGUST 23, 1939

Vilnis SIPOLS

THE YEAR 1938 has gone down in history as that of Munich and the year 1939, as the year when World War II broke out. We know much about prewar development but not everything. *International Affairs* has published documentary surveys of preparations for the Munich deal and of the Soviet-Anglo-French talks in 1939 as well as the verbatim reports of the meetings of Soviet, British and French military delegates in August 1939. But the contacts and talks that preceded the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939, have received no adequate coverage so far. The following documentary survey is intended to make up for this deficiency. It is based on Soviet documents practically never published before.

A DIRECTIVE issued in Germany on April 3, 1939 said that German troops must stand by to attack Poland by September 1, 1939. The plan for the operation, code-named Weiss, was approved on April 11.

To stave off war, the Soviet government on April 17, 1939, proposed that the Soviet Union, Britain and France should sign a mutual assistance treaty against aggression and on assisting East European countries in the event of aggression against them. There began Soviet-Anglo-French talks.

The Soviet Union attached special importance to preventing a German attack on Poland and the Baltic states, for should they be seized by German troops, these would reach Soviet western frontier.

Under these circumstances Germany began to take an interest in easing tensions with the Soviet Union. Peter Kleist, adviser to German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop for East European affairs, received relevant instructions from his chief on April 7.¹ Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels ordered the German press to change its tone towards the Soviet Union, with the result that less space was given to typical anti Soviet items.

German diplomats began by calling for an extension of trade and economic relations between the two countries. On April 17, 1939, Ernst von Weizsäcker, Secretary of State at the German Foreign Ministry, said in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, Alexei Merekalov: "Germany has political differences of principle with the USSR. Still, it wants to develop economic relations with your country."²

On May 5 Julius Schnurre, Head of the East European Section of the German Foreign Ministry Department of Economic Policy, informed the Soviet charge d'affaires in Germany Georgi Astakhov,³ that the German side was agreeable to the Skoda Works filling Soviet orders⁴ placed prior to the liquidation of the Czechoslovak state by Germany.

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This was a symptom, all the more since the orders were for military supplies.

Astakhov summarised in a letter to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (PCFA) dated May 12 his observations of the trends towards the Soviet Union in evidence in Berlin. *"The Germans,"* he wrote, *"are at pains to create the impression that German-Soviet relations are improving or even have improved. Dismissing all the absurd rumours being spread here by the Germans or by idle foreign correspondents, I can for the moment state only one indisputable fact, namely, a visible change of tone towards us in the German press. Gross abuse is gone; Soviet leaders are called by their real names and their official posts are stated as they should be, without insulting epithets."*

*"But while putting these circumstances on record, we certainly cannot shut our eyes to their exceedingly superficial, noncommittal character. The press may reverse its tone at any moment because it has shown no fundamental departure from its earlier line; it has merely become more restrained and civil towards us... The motives for the Germans' change of tone towards us are too obvious to warrant taking it seriously enough at this stage."*⁵

What the German government was uneasy about at the time, was, among other things, the start of Soviet-Anglo-French talks. Berlin had a stake in obstructing their successful completion. German agents in London kept it fully posted on the talks. Berlin also knew of both the Soviet government's desire to bring about a three-power agreement as speedily as possible and the evasive stance of London and Paris.

Much depended in those talks on Poland. Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potyonikin, who arrived in Warsaw on May 10, proposed signing a Soviet-Polish treaty of mutual assistance. The following day, however, the Polish government replied that the initiative taken by France at the Soviet-Anglo-French talks "on guaranteeing Poland is at variance with the point of view of the Polish government" and that "Poland does not see its way clear to concluding a mutual assistance pact with the USSR".⁶ Warsaw based its policy on the hope that it would succeed somehow in coming to terms with Germany.

The German government stepped up its exploration of the chances of normalising relations with the Soviet Union. At the close of a conversation with Astakhov on current trade affairs held on May 15, Schnurre again brought up the "topic of how to improve Soviet-German relations", as the record of the conversation put it. In line with instructions from Berlin, German Ambassador to Moscow Friedrich von Schulenburg on May 20 paid a visit to People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. Speaking of German-Soviet economic relations, the Ambassador said that his government planned to send Schnurre to Moscow for talks on the matter. The stand taken by the People's Commissar was recorded as follows:

"I told the Ambassador that it was not the first time we heard about Schnurre's trip to Moscow. Schnurre had been about to leave for Moscow but his trip had been put off. Lately economic talks with Germany had often ended in failure. I went on to say that we had a feeling that the German government was playing a sort of game instead of conducting businesslike economic negotiations, and that for a game of that kind, it should have looked for a partner in a different country and not in the Soviet Union. The USSR was not going to join in such a game."

"The Ambassador assured me that there was no game and that the German government definitely wanted to settle economic relations with the Soviet Union... I answered that we had come to the conclusion that

*if economic talks were to be a success, it was necessary to provide an appropriate political basis."*⁷

The German Foreign Ministry set out to work on new variants of approaching the Soviet Union in an attempt to complicate the Soviet-Anglo-French talks. But Weizsäcker feared that a new appeal to the Soviet Union would run the "risk of a repeated refusal".⁸

To ascertain the Soviet position, the Germans decided with Hitler's approval to put out new feelers in Berlin. On May 30 Weizsäcker began his conversation with Astakhov by discussing the question of opening a Prague office of the Soviet Trade Mission in Germany and then went on to political matters. Speaking of German-Soviet relations, he said that the German "shop" was well stocked. He was offering no commodity such as national socialism. "But besides this commodity, we have a number of others: growing trade, the further normalisation of relations, and so on, and it is up to the Soviet Union to choose."⁹ That day Weizsäcker wrote down in his diary that the German government took the initiative by making proposals but the Russians were as "distrustful" as before.¹⁰

Further feelers were put out in a conversation with Astakhov on June 17, 1939, by Schulenburg, who arrived in Berlin. He, too, began with economic questions. "*Moving on to political relations,*" the chargé d'affaires wired to the PCFA, "*Schulenburg said that the whole Foreign Ministry, including Ribbentrop, was waiting for an answer to the question raised by Weizsäcker in his conversation with me, and expected me to inform it of the answer. Schulenburg assured me that Weizsäcker's conversation with me should be seen as the German government's first attempt at an exchange of opinions on improving relations. The German government could not yet bring itself to go any further on this point because it feared a negative response from us. Confidentially referring to his conversation with Ribbentrop, Schulenburg assured that the atmosphere was ripe for better relations... He stressed again and again that the Foreign Ministry wanted to have our answer before taking any further steps.*"¹¹

On June 26, the PCFA received a dispatch from the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Italy about his conversation with Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano. The latter had mentioned the existence of a "Schulenburg Plan." He had said that while in Berlin, Schulenburg had proposed "setting out to radically improve German-Soviet relations, to which end

1. Germany should help in settling Japanese-Soviet relations and ending border conflicts.

"2. There should be discussion of the possibility of proposing that we should either sign a non-aggression pact or perhaps join together in guaranteeing the independence of the Baltic states.

"3. A wide-ranging trade agreement should be signed."¹²

On returning to Moscow two days later, Schulenburg visited the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The record of the ensuing conversation says: "*The German government wanted not only normal but improved relations with the Soviet Union. He added that this statement which he made on instructions from Ribbentrop, had Hitler's approval. Schulenburg said that Germany had already furnished proof of its desire to normalise relations with us.*"

The Ambassador cited as an example the restraint shown by the German press towards the Soviet Union, the non-aggression treaties signed by Germany with Latvia and Estonia in June 1939 and Germany's readiness to meet the Soviet Union halfway on economic relations.

Answering him, the People's Commissar mentioned "the non-aggression treaty between Germany and Poland which existed until recently

and became ineffective so unexpectedly". This was a hint at the fact that Germany had annulled the treaty late in April 1939.

*"Asked about his idea of the possibility of improving German-Soviet relations," the record of the conversation says, "Schulenburg answered that every opportunity should be used to remove difficulties hindering better relations. I said that if the Ambassador was offering nothing new even now, after a trip to Berlin, he probably considered that everything was all right in German-Soviet relations, which meant that he was a great optimist. At that point Schulenburg said that the Soviet Union and Germany were bound by the Berlin Neutrality Treaty signed in 1926 and extended by Hitler in 1933. I remarked ironically that it was nice of the Ambassador to remember the existence of that treaty, and asked whether he did not think the treaties signed by Germany in recent years, such as Anti-Comintern Pact and the military-political alliance with Italy, ran counter to the German-Soviet Treaty of 1926. Schulenburg argued that one should not return to the past."*¹³

Schnurre noted in an aide-mémoire prepared by him on June 30 that the main reason for the reservations of the Soviet side must be reluctance to hold talks with Germany along with the Moscow talks with the British and French.

For a whole month the German government hesitated to approach the Soviet government on any discussion of political issues.

On July 7, 1939, the German Embassy in Moscow was instructed to make proposals on economic matters. Berlin expressed readiness to grant the Soviet Union a credit to the tune of 200 million reichsmarks for Soviet orders to be placed with German firms.¹⁴ Three days later Gustav Hilger, Councillor to the Embassy in Moscow, forwarded the offer to Anastas Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.¹⁵ Talks on this matter were entrusted to Yevgeni Babarin, Deputy Trade Representative of the USSR in Germany (we had neither a trade representative nor an ambassador in Berlin at the time). Documents of the German Foreign Ministry show that the German government planned to negotiate in an explicitly forthcoming spirit because it wanted an early agreement.¹⁶

The Soviet Union had a stake in obtaining the credit, which would enable it to purchase industrial equipment and other German goods, including supplies needed for defence purposes. Besides, the credit would only have to be paid off in five to seven years' time.

Late in July German diplomacy showed fresh activity. In July 24, Schnurre again spoke to Astakhov about improving political relations with the Soviet Union. *"He stressed," the record of the conversation says, "that he considered himself entitled to speak about that because he not only concerned himself with the economy but was close to Ribbentrop and knew his point of view. As the government saw it, a successful completion of trade and credit talks should only be the first stage on the road to normal relations. The second stage should consist in normalising relations in the area of the press and cultural ties, in raising the level of mutual respect, and so on. Thereupon the two sides could move on to the third stage by discussing closer political relations. Unfortunately, repeated attempts by the German side to bring up this subject had brought no response. Nor had Molotov told Schulenburg anything specific on the matter. Yet everything necessary for such a rapprochement was there..."*¹⁷ Schnurre realised, of course, that such a change of policy would take time but something had to be done. *If the Soviet side did not take German intentions seriously let it say what proof it needed. There were no contradictions between the Soviet Union and Germany. In the Baltic region and Romania, Germany had no intention of doing anything that would affect Soviet interests"*¹⁸

On July 26, Schnurre invited Astakhov and Babarin to dinner. In that atmosphere he went still further in proposing improved relations. "Schnurre said that the leaders of German policy," recorded Astakhov, "had the most earnest intention of normalising and improving these relations. Weizsäcker's phrase about a 'well-stocked shop' implied that Germany was willing to offer the Soviet Union a choice of anything it wanted, from a political rapprochement and friendship to open hostility... Unfortunately, the Soviet Union refused to respond. Weizsäcker was given no answer, nor did Schulenburg receive any definite answer from Molotov when speaking to him. Yet he put the question in specific terms, proposing, for instance, an extension or updating of the Soviet-German political treaty, which offered great opportunities for a rapprochement if studied carefully."

Astakhov asked Schnurre whether he was quite sure the foregoing was not merely his personal opinion but reflected the sentiments of the upper ranks. Schnurre replied, that he wouldn't have told all that without explicit instructions from higher up. He stressed that "this was precisely the view held by Ribbentrop, who knew exactly what the Führer thought".

When the Soviet chargé d'affaires mentioned Germany's expansion in the Baltic region and Romania Schnurre said: "Our activity in these countries doesn't infringe your interests in any way. However, should there be a serious discussion, I can tell you that we would meet the Soviet Union halfway on all these issues. We believe the Baltic should be a common sea. As regards the Baltic countries specifically, we are prepared to treat them in the same way as the Ukraine. We've completely renounced any encroachment on the Ukraine."

In conclusion Astakhov said that he would send a detailed report on the conversation to Moscow. But he warned that all the ideas set out by Schnurre were so novel and unusual coming as they did from a German official that he could not "say with certainty that Moscow will take them quite seriously".¹⁹

On July 27, Astakhov sent Polyomkin records of the two conversations as well as a letter. With reference to the Germans' stubborn effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union, he expressed some considerations regarding it, adding, however, that he had no knowledge of the outlook for the Soviet-Anglo-French talks.

*"I have no doubt," he wrote, "that we could involve the Germans in far-reaching talks if we chose to and would receive certain assurances on questions of interest to us. What good those assurances would be and for how long they would be valid is another matter, of course... Be that as it may, we should take into account the Germans' readiness to discuss better relations, and perhaps we ought to egg them on a little so as to keep a trump card that we could use if necessary. From this point of view, it might be useful to tell them something, to ask them some questions, in order not to lose the thread which they are offering us and which could hardly do us any harm if we handled it carefully."*²⁰

The next day, Molotov sent Astakhov the following dispatch. "You did the right thing by confining yourself to hearing out Schnurre's statements and promising him to convey them to Moscow."²¹ The dispatch was obviously both an opinion of Astakhov's stance during the conversations with Schnurre cited above and a guideline for the future. Generally speaking, it was the first political instruction from the People's Commissar to the chargé d'affaires in Germany in the summer of 1939.

On July 29, Molotov sent Astakhov another dispatch with some concrete comments on Soviet German relations.

"Political relations between the Soviet Union and Germany," the dispatch said, "may improve for their part in case of course, there is an improvement in economic relations. Schnurre is right on this, gene-

*rally speaking. But it is only for the Germans to say in what sense, specifically, political relations should improve. Until recently, the Germans did nothing but curse the Soviet Union, rejecting any improvement in political relations with it and refusing to participate in any conferences attended by the Soviet Union. If the Germans are now sincere in revising their position and really want to improve political relations with the Soviet Union, they must tell us just how they visualise that improvement. Schulenburg came recently to see me and spoke for his part about the desirability of better relations but refused to propose anything specific or comprehensible. In this respect, the matter depends entirely on the Germans. Needless to say, we would welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries."*²²

Just then Moscow was preparing for the start of talks between military delegates of the Soviet Union, Britain and France. But information coming from London and Paris raised doubts about Britain and France really having a stake in effective cooperation with the Soviet Union. More and more new facts indicated that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was still seeking agreement with Germany and a new Munich, this time at the expense of Poland. This was confirmed by the far-reaching proposals which the British presented to the German government in the second half of July. The news leaked to the British press and became known as a result to the Soviet government.

The unwillingness of Britain, France and Poland to cooperate with the Soviet Union in resisting aggression was making the preservation of peace in Europe impossible. But it so happened that Germany, while planning to start war, had a stake in the Soviet Union keeping out of that war. This offered our foreign policy some opportunities.

On August 2, Schnurre informed Schulenburg that "the problem of Russia is being examined here in political terms with exceptional urgency". Over the past ten days, he wrote, he had daily talked to Ribbentrop and "I know that he also constantly exchanges views with the Führer". Ribbentrop considered it necessary "to bring the problem of Russia to some result not only in a negative sense (introducing complications into the Soviet-British talks) but in a positive sense as well (mutual understanding with us)".²³

The same day, Astakhov was invited to Ribbentrop, who spent an hour setting out his views on the evolution of German-Soviet relations. He remarked that completion of the ongoing credit talks "could mark the beginning of better political relations". The German Minister said, "*We consider that there are no contradictions between our countries anywhere from the Black to the Baltic Sea. We could reach agreement on all these questions if the Soviet government shares these prerequisites we could exchange views in more specific terms.*" Ribbentrop asked Astakhov to convey what he had said to the Soviet government and to inform him whether it considered a more detailed discussion of the subject desirable. Should the answer be yes, "*we could talk in more specific terms*".²⁴

On instructions from Ribbentrop, Schnurre invited Astakhov to his office the following day because he wanted to "specify and supplement" the conversation that had taken place. He said that the German government would like to know Moscow's view on the following points:

"(1) Does Moscow consider it desirable to exchange views on improving relations, and if so,

"(2) can the Soviet government specify the range of questions it would like to be dealt with? If it does, the German government is prepared to state its own considerations on that score."

Talks should preferably be held in Berlin, Schnurre said, because "Ribbentrop and Hitler take a direct interest in them".²⁵

During that conversation, the questions which Weizsäcker had raised as far back as May 30 but to which the German government had no answer although two months had passed, were put with the utmost clarity.

Simultaneously, on August 3, Schulenburg saw Molotov on instructions from Berlin. He confirmed in accordance with these instructions what Schnurre had said to Astakhov. He declared that the German government wished to have better relations with the Soviet Union, which could begin with signing an economic agreement, improving relations in the sphere of the press and promoting cultural ties. This should also provide the prerequisites for improving "political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union by updating existing political agreements or bringing about new ones".

Schulenburg said that the German government had empowered him "to state that, in its opinion, there are no political contradictions between the Soviet Union and Germany". The Anti-Comintern Pact was not directed against the Soviet Union at all but against Britain. Germany "is not seeking to encourage Japan in regard to its plans against the Soviet Union", that is, its position in the East was not hostile to the Soviet Union.

"As for the West," the German Ambassador continued, "there are no points here, either, such as could cause friction between Germany and the Soviet Union anywhere between the Baltic and Black seas." He mentioned Germany's non-aggression treaties with the Baltic states. "As regards Poland," says the record of the conversation, "Germany's demands did not contradict Soviet interests in this case, either. These demands had been set out in Hitler's speech. And as for Romania, Germany was seeking to develop good relations with it and had no intention of infringing Soviet interests in the process. The Ambassador had come to the conclusion that, in view of the foregoing, there was every opportunity to reconcile the interests of the two sides."

Answering the Ambassador, the People's Commissar touched on the Anti-Comintern Pact. He said that it had led to a "lot of talk and fuss such as the Soviet Union cannot but see as having a negative meaning. Besides, it was known that the Anti-Comintern Pact and German-Japanese relations have encouraged Japan to commit outright aggression against the Soviet Union." The People's Commissar asked the Ambassador how this squared with his statements. The Ambassador replied that he had no intention of justifying Germany's past policy but "wants to find ways of improving relations in the future".

The People's Commissar answered that as follows: "The Soviet government takes a positive view of the German government's desire for better relations. In any case, the Soviet Union has always stood and still stands for normalising and improving relations with Germany and other countries."

The German Ambassador fell back on some more concrete questions. "Germany," he said, "intends to respect Soviet interests in the Baltic Sea, and it has no intentions which run counter to Soviet interests in the Baltic countries. Germany is not going to cause any hindrance to vital interests of the Soviet Union in the Baltic countries. As regards the German position on Poland, Germany does not plan to undertake anything contradicting Soviet interests."

However, the Ambassador remarked, alluding to the Soviet-Anglo-French talks, that "Soviet entry into a new combination of powers in Europe may create difficulties in improving German-Soviet relations". The People's Commissar answered: "The Soviet Union, remaining loyal to its consistently peaceful policy, would accept only a purely defensive agreement against aggression. Such an agreement would only become

operative in the event of attack by an aggressor against the Soviet Union or countries to whose fate the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent. The case of Germany is different. Germany has the Anti-Comintern Pact, which Japan has used repeatedly and is using now in support of its direct aggression against the Soviet Union. Germany has concluded a military-political treaty with Italy not only for defensive purposes but for offensive ones as well."²⁶

In reporting to Berlin on this conversation, Schulenberg wrote that Moscow still refused to trust Germany and that the Soviet government was "determined to come to terms with Britain and France... Every word and every step betrays strong distrust of us. We have long known this to be so. The trouble is that with such people, distrust arises very easily but can only be overcome with difficulty and with the passage of time."²⁷

On August 4, Molotov sent Astakhov a dispatch giving the following answers to the questions put to him the day before by Schnurre: "(1) *On the first point, we consider it desirable to continue the exchange of views on improving relations, as I told Schulenburg on August 3;* (2) *as regards other points, much will depend on the outcome of the current trade and credit talks in Berlin.*"²⁸ The next day, Astakhov answered that he had talked to Schnurre "in the spirit of your instructions".²⁹

In a letter to the PCFA dated August 8, Astakhov stated his suppositions about the objects of possible political talks which the Germans had in mind. "I base these suppositions," he wrote, "both on explicit statements by my interlocutors and on more or less hazy hints that are indicative in a way, nonetheless."

Astakhov pointed out that, judging by all signs, the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement was not far off "barring, of course, surprises of some sort which the Germans are so skilful at springing". He believed that what the Germans had in mind besides economic objects was "the question of 'updating' the Rapallo Treaty and other political treaties either by replacing them with new treaties or by mentioning them in some protocol"; the question of "non-aggression" in the sphere of the press; the question of radio propaganda; deportation of arrested Germans from the Soviet Union; the reopening of at least some of the German consulates closed in the Soviet Union; a "cultural agreement" in some form (exchange of books, musical compositions, and so on).

On ascertaining by means of these questions the Soviet Union's readiness to seek agreement, the letter went on to say, the Germans would not be averse—judging by their hints—to "involving us in more far-reaching discussions and a survey of all territorial policy problems likely to arise between us. In view of this, the words about the absence of contradictions 'anywhere from the Black to the Baltic Seas may be interpreted as a desire to reach agreement on all issues relating to the countries situated in this area.'"

The final paragraph of the letter read: "*In setting out these impressions created by conversations with the Germans and by other facts, I certainly cannot claim at all that by dropping such hints, the Germans suggest that they would be willing to meet possible relevant commitments seriously or for long. I merely feel that in the short term they consider it thinkable to reach a measure of agreement in the spirit of the foregoing in order to neutralise us at such a price should they go to war against Poland. As regards subsequent developments, they would certainly not depend on those commitments but on the new situation which would result and which I cannot foresee at the moment.*"³⁰

Molotov answered the chargé d'affaires' letter on August 11. "We are interested in the subjects listed in your letter of August 8", he wired.

*"Their discussion requires preparations and certain stages of transition from a trade and credit agreement to other issues. We prefer Moscow as the venue for talks on these questions."*³¹

On August 12, Astakhov told Schnurre during a further conversation that the Soviet side was interested in a "number of specific subjects (cultural ties, the press, updating the treaty, Poland)" outlined on various occasions by Ribbentrop and Weizsäcker but that it would be "preferable to talk about them in Moscow, moving 'from stage to stage' rather than beginning with the most complicated of them".

In regard to the overall situation, Astakhov reported to Moscow that the Germans *"are plainly worried about our talks with the British and French military, and they do not stint arguments or promises of the most far-reaching nature to head off final military agreement. To this end they are now willing, I believe, to make declarations and gestures which would have seemed entirely out of the question six months ago. Renunciation of the Baltic region, Bessarabia, Eastern Poland (to say nothing of the Ukraine) is at the moment the minimum which the Germans would agree to without too much talk if we promised them not to intervene in a conflict with Poland"*.³²

On August 13, Schnurre told Astakhov that the German government would like to start talks "as early as possible" and was ready to hold them in Moscow. It would like to "entrust the conduct of the negotiations to one of Hitler's closest aides".³³

Meanwhile it was not long before the talks started by the military delegates of the Soviet Union, Britain and France in Moscow on August 12 began to mark time. It transpired that the British and French representatives were not empowered to sign any military convention. They had no concrete plans for effective military cooperation with the Soviet Union against aggression, which meant that they were seeking no such cooperation. It turned out that no progress in the talks could be made also because of Poland's refusal to receive military aid from the Soviet Union. "I think our mission is finished," Admiral Drax, head of the British military delegation, said on August 14 at the close of a regular meeting.³⁴

The Soviet government had to draw a similar conclusion. Thus there is every reason to consider that after that meeting it was compelled to abandon all hope of reaching agreement with Britain and France. It had to think of other means of strengthening national security.

On August 15 Schulenburg, who persistently asked to see Molotov, read out instructions he received from Berlin. The German government declared that there were no real contradictions between German and Soviet interests. *"Germany has no aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union. The German government is of the opinion that there is not a single problem between the Baltic and Black Seas that cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both sides. They include questions relating to the Baltic Sea, the Baltic states, Poland, the South-East and so on."*

The declaration added that worsened German-Polish relations made it "necessary to clear up German-Soviet relations before long". The German Ambassador said that Ribbentrop was prepared to come to Moscow in order to state the German position. This would make it possible "to lay the groundwork for definitively putting German-Soviet relations in order".

The People's Commissar welcomed Berlin's desire, announced in the statement, to improve relations with the Soviet Union. He told the Ambassador that late in June the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Italy had reported with reference to a conversation with Ciano the existence of the "Schulenburg Plan". The People's Commissar asked how true that

was. He said that it was "important to ascertain the opinion of the German government on the issue of a non-aggression pact". Prior to Ribbentrop's arrival, he said, it was "necessary to prepare definite questions so as to make decisions and not merely to hold talks."³⁵

Coming to see Molotov again on August 17, Schulenburg read out a statement saying that "Germany is prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR, and this for a term of 25 years without denunciation, if the Soviet government is willing. Furthermore, the German government is prepared to guarantee the Baltic states in conjunction with the USSR. Lastly, Germany signifies its readiness in accordance with the position to which it definitely adheres to bear its influence in the interest of improving and consolidating Soviet-Japanese relations...

"The Führer," the statement said, "is of the opinion that in view of the present situation and the likelihood of serious events occurring at any moment (Germany has no intention of tolerating Polish provocations any longer), it is desirable to clear up German-Soviet relations and the attitude of the two sides to current issues, doing so in terms of principle and at an early date. For this reason the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, von Ribbentrop, signifies his readiness to arrive in Moscow by airplane at any time from August 18 onwards in order to conduct with the Führer's authorisation negotiations on the whole range of German-Soviet questions and to sign relevant treaties if occasion arises (gegebenenfalls)."

The People's Commissar handed the Ambassador a memorandum answering the German statement of August 15. *"Until recently the Soviet government," it said, in view of official statements by individual spokesmen for the German government many of which were unfriendly or even hostile to the USSR has proceeded from the assumption that the German government was seeking a pretext for clashes with the USSR, was preparing for these clashes and often argued that its growing armaments were necessitated by the inevitability of such clashes. We are leaving out the fact that the German government, using the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact, has sought to set up and has been setting a united front of a number of states against the USSR, showing particular persistence in involving Japan in this...*

"If, however, the German government is now reversing its earlier policy in favour of seriously improving political relations with the USSR, the Soviet government can only welcome this reversal and is willing, for its part, to reshape its policy in the spirit of seriously improving it with regard to Germany."

In conclusion the Soviet answer said. *"The government of the USSR considers that a first step towards thus improving relations between the USSR and Germany could be taken by concluding a trade and credit agreement. The government of the USSR considers that a second step could be taken in a short time by concluding a non-aggression pact or confirming the 1926 neutrality treaty while at the same time adopting a special protocol on the interest of the contracting parties in particular questions of foreign policy in order that the protocol might form an inseparable part of the treaty."*

The People's Commissar pointed out that "for the time being, he was setting out no details of the question of a protocol. In the course of its drafting, both the German and the Soviet side would give consideration to, among other things, the questions raised in the German statement of August 15. The initiative of drafting the protocol should come not only from the Soviet side but from the German side as well. It stands to reason that all the questions raised in the German statement of August 15 cannot be included in the treaty and would have to

be included in the protocol. The German government should think this over." Molotov said again that "appropriate preparations will be needed prior to Ribbentrop's arrival".³⁶

Coming to see Molotov again on August 19, Schulenburg began by apologising for his insistence on being received. He said that there was a danger of conflict between Germany and Poland. *"The situation has deteriorated to such a degree,"* he said, *"that a small incident would be enough to lead to serious consequences. Ribbentrop believes that even before a conflict breaks out, it is necessary to clear up relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, for this would be hard to do during the conflict."*

Ribbentrop therefore had an interest in coming to Moscow as speedily as possible and "would have unqualified authorisation from Hitler to conclude any agreement which the Soviet government might wish". "Ribbentrop," the Ambassador said, "could sign a protocol covering all the questions mentioned earlier and new questions that might arise."

Answering the Ambassador, the People's Commissar showed an interest primarily in the prospect of signing a non-aggression treaty. Thereupon he said: "The question of a protocol which should be an inseparable part of the pact is serious. What questions should be included in the protocol is for the German government to think about. We are thinking about it for our part. The Soviet government reckons with the German government's opinion that the questions we are discussing must not be put off for long. But before Ribbentrop's arrival there must be certainty that the talks will ensure the achievement of definite solutions."

Schulenburg again insisted on Ribbentrop's arrival "to achieve definite results even before a conflict breaks out". He expressed confidence that "no difficulties would be encountered in drafting the protocol, either". Schulenburg stressed that his government was ready "to meet the Soviet government halfway on all its wishes". In conclusion he said: "Time is running out in Berlin."³⁷

A few hours later, the People's Commissar told the Ambassador that "Ribbentrop could arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27, after the trade and credit agreement had been published". He handed Schulenburg a draft non-aggression treaty.³⁸

On August 19, or the night of August 20 to be exact, a Soviet-German credit agreement was signed in Berlin. It provided that Germany should grant the Soviet Union a credit of up to 200 million reichsmarks for a seven-year term, to be spent on purchasing German goods over a period of two years from the day the agreement was signed. There was a relevant press release.³⁹

On August 20, Hitler sent Stalin a telegram saying that he hailed the signing of a new trade agreement "as the first step towards transforming German-Soviet relations". The telegram announced acceptance of the Soviet draft non-aggression treaty but stressed the need to discuss the questions involved at an early date. "The essence of the supplementary protocol sought by the Soviet government," Hitler wrote, "could be agreed very soon, I am sure, provided that a senior German statesman was enabled to hold in person talks on it in Moscow. Otherwise the German government does not see how a supplementary protocol could be discussed and agreed in a short time."

The telegram next said that the tension between Germany and Poland had become "intolerable", so that "a crisis may break out any day". Hitler therefore proposed again that his Foreign Minister should be received on Tuesday, August 22, or on Wednesday, August 23, at the latest. The Minister, he specified, had "the most wide-ranging general

authorisation to draft and sign a non-aggression pact as well as a protocol".⁴⁰

On August 21 the Soviet, British and French military delegates held their last meeting in Moscow. It ended inconclusively. On the evening of that day, the Soviet government announced that it consented to Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow on August 23.⁴¹ On August 22, the Soviet press carried a report on Ribbentrop's coming visit to Moscow for talks on signing a non-aggression pact.⁴²

At the same time, foreign news agencies in Moscow were informed that Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow for the signing of a non-aggression treaty was not incompatible with continued Soviet-Anglo-French talks on organising resistance to aggression. Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact supplemented by a military agreement would be aimed at curbing Germany should it persist in its acts of aggression. As for a Soviet-German non-aggression pact it would ease the existing tension between the two countries.⁴³ It was through German news agencies that the Soviet communique also reached Ribbentrop.⁴⁴

The German Foreign Minister arrived in Moscow on August 23, and the same night saw the signing of a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. It seems that no records were kept of the drafting of either the treaty or the supplementary protocol. There are no such records in either Soviet or German archives. Hilger (Councillor of the German Embassy in Moscow), who took part in the talks as an interpreter, notes in his memoirs that Ribbentrop brought no new proposals. His statements were restricted to what Schulenburg had already told Molotov on instructions from Berlin.⁴⁵

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was published on August 24 in *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and other Soviet newspapers. It provided that the Soviet Union and Germany should "commit themselves to refrain from all violence, all aggressive action and all attack with regard to each other either separately or in conjunction with other powers" (Art. I). In the event of one of the contracting parties becoming the object of military operations by a third power, "the other contracting party shall not support that power in any form" (Art. II). The two parties were to "inform each other on issues affecting their common interests" (Art. III). The Soviet Union and Germany undertook not to join "any alignment of powers spearheaded directly or indirectly against the other side" (Art. IV). Disputes and conflicts were to be settled exclusively by peaceful means (Art. V). The treaty was concluded for a 10-year term.

In the archives of the West German Foreign Ministry there is a film which includes, among other documents, the German and Russian texts of the Soviet-German secret supplementary protocol of August 23. These texts are considered authentic in the FRG. They have repeatedly been reproduced in books and collections of documents published in the West. On December 20, 1988, they appeared in *Tiesa*, newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania. No original of such a protocol has been found in either Soviet or German archives. The Soviet leadership does not see how it can recognise the adequacy of the copies of the protocol that are circulating in the West.⁴⁶

I have no incontrovertible evidence to confirm or refute the authenticity of the text of the secret supplementary protocol published in *Tiesa*. But all available data show that in signing the treaty, Germany was ready to take into account the security interests of the Soviet Union and assumed certain unilateral additional obligations which it had offered during the talks described in this survey.

Their gist was that in the event of war, which might break out as a consequence of the German-Polish conflict, German troops would

refrain from invading Latvia, Estonia, Finland or Bessarabia and that in Poland they would not advance beyond the line of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers. In the situation obtaining at the time, these obligations were of fundamental importance to the Soviet Union. They also determined in large measure the significance of the non-aggression treaty with Germany to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet Union, failing in its efforts to reach agreement with Britain and France on signing a mutual assistance treaty against aggression, concluded a non-aggression treaty with Germany after prevailing on it to commit itself to reckon with Soviet security interests in areas adjoining the country's western frontiers.

The Soviet German Non Aggression Pact is still the object of unabating controversy and is assessed in the most diverse ways. Final conclusions can only be drawn with due regard to the extremely tense international situation of the time and on the strength of the necessary documents.

¹ See P. Kleist *Die europäische Tragödie* Pr. Oldendorf 1971 pp. 22-23.

² Foreign Policy Archives (FPA) of the USSR f 059 i 1 d 2036 pp. 61-62 (in Russian).

³ Ambassador Alexei Merkulov left Berlin in April 1939 and the Embassy was headed for a long time by chargé d'affaires Georgi Astikhov.

⁴ See *Alten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945 (ADAP)* Ser. D Vol. 6 Baden-Baden 1956 p. 355.

⁵ FPA f 082 i 22 d 7 pp. 211-215.

⁶ *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace on the Eve of World War II (September 1938-August 1939) Documents and Materials* Moscow 1971 pp. 389-393 (in Russian).

⁷ FPA f 06 i 1 d 2 pp. 24-26.

⁸ ADAP Vol. 6 p. 497.

⁹ FPA f 011 i 1 d 59 pp. 105-110.

¹⁰ *Die Weimarer Papiere 1933-1950* Frankfurt on the Main 1974 p. 131.

¹¹ FPA f 059 i 1 d 2036 pp. 115-116.

¹² *Ibid.* d 2103 pp. 74-75.

¹³ *Ibid.* i 06 i 1a d 1 pp. 1-6.

¹⁴ ADAP Vol. 6 pp. 729-730.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 745-787.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 803.

¹⁷ Dots in the document.

¹⁸ FPA f 082 i 22 d 8 pp. 115-117.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* i 011 i 4 d 59 pp. 191-195.

²⁰ *Ibid.* f 082 i 22 d 8 pp. 122-123.

²¹ *Ibid.* i 059 i 1 d 2038 p. 93.

²² *Ibid.* pp. 91-96.

²³ ADAP Vol. 6 p. 882.

²⁴ FPA i 059 i 1 d 2036 pp. 162-165.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 167.

²⁶ *Ibid.* i 06 i 1 i d 1 pp. 7-12.

²⁷ ADAP Vol. 6 pp. 894-905.

²⁸ FPA i 059 i 1 d 2038 p. 101.

²⁹ *Ibid.* d 036 p. 169.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 011 i 4 d 61 pp. 126-129.

³¹ *Ibid.* 059 i 1 d 2038 p. 101.

³² *Ibid.* f 06 i 1 d 70 pp. 1-2.

³³ *Ibid.* f 059 i 1 d 2036 pp. 118-119.

³⁴ S. Aster 1939 *The Making of the Second World War* New York 1973 p. 303.

³⁵ FPA i 074 i 15 d 8 pp. 12-128.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 19 d 4 pp. 122-128.

³⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 129-131.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 132.

³⁹ See *L'estia* Aug. 21 1939.

⁴⁰ ADAP Vol. 7 p. 131.

⁴¹ FPA f 0745 i 15 d 8 p. 149.

⁴² See *L'estia* Aug. 22 1939.

⁴³ See ADAP Vol. 7 p. 175 *L'Ocean* Aug. 23, 1939.

⁴⁴ Zentrals Staatsarchiv (Dresden) Film 10520.

⁴⁵ G. Hilfer *Wir und der Kreml* Frankfurt on the Main 1964 p. 288.

⁴⁶ See *The Intelligentsia in the Face of New Problems of Socialism Meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Polish Intellectuals* Moscow 1988 p. 75 (in Russian).

WHAT ARE WE TAKING INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY?

A GREAT POWER whose foreign trade has an almost colonial structure—this is one of the paradoxes inherited by us from the time when our economy was based on anti-economic principles. While our economic management followed autarkic lines, the majority of other countries were vigorously building up their foreign economic ties, with integrational processes going on at a brisk pace.

In today's interdependent world, the USSR has practically no choice but to integrate into world economic relations, for participation in the international division of labour has become a necessity facing every big or small power. But this is no easy task, for we have fallen far behind. The subject was discussed by our guests:

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Mikhail PANKIN, Cand. Ec., Group Leader, International Department, CPSU CC;

Anatoly SLYUSAR, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Greece;

Professor Valentin SHCHETININ, D. Ec., Moscow State Institute of International Relations;

Tadeush TEODOROVICH, Cand. Ec., Chief, General Department of Foreign Economic Policy, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR.

International Affairs. Before discussion proper begins, we would like to make some general remarks that we consider important.

Economy and politics are inseparable, as everybody knows. This truth is all the more relevant now that we are restructuring our foreign economic relations on a new basis. The ideas and proposals put forward by the Soviet leadership at the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly remain sound political guidelines. It would be in vain to expect that we can substantially advance perestroika in our foreign economic relations without taking full account of these initiatives and putting them into practice in a creative spirit.

It is becoming an urgent necessity for political bodies to directly join in this restructuring. The Soviet Foreign Ministry has been making

fruitful efforts in this sense. Credit is due to our diplomacy for working to bring about the establishment of relations between the CMEA and the Common Market, with the European community. This also applies to the changes coming about in our approach to the International Monetary Fund and GATT. Many of our embassies are studying economic issues. Some of them now have Ministers-Councillors for economic affairs, and good progress is being made where there is competent staff exercising initiative.

We would do well to look at the experience of other countries. At the US Department of State, for one, at least half the staff concerns itself to one degree or another with problems of trade and technological ties. In France and certain other countries there is one ministry in charge of both foreign policy and trade.

In short, the economy is inseparable from politics, and the political options in the foreign economic sphere are obvious.

Pankin. The foreign economic positions inherited by the Soviet Union from the previous period are at variance with its standing as a great world power. In 1985, the UN estimated our share in world exports, for instance, at 4.5 per cent, and we held a modest seventh place among commercial powers. Yet it's clear that we cannot modernise our economy on revolutionary lines without participating intensively in the international division of labour.

Regrettably, we've been unable to improve our foreign economic positions even in recent years. It so happened that the beginning of our perestroika coincided with a drastic worsening of the situation on world market in which the Soviet Union is active as both exporter and importer. The fall in prices for our main exports led to a drop in export earnings, thus compelling us to cut imports accordingly. As a result, foreign trade turnover decreased whereas world trade went on growing. Our contribution to international trade comes to not more than four per cent (sad as it is for us), or roughly as much as tsarist Russia did before World War I.

We are particularly vulnerable as regards economic ties with developed capitalist countries. As exporters, we've been playing the unenviable role of suppliers of raw materials to the West. Our imports reflect dependence on the West for technology and foodstuffs, and now the situation has been aggravated by increasing financial dependence.

This is the starting point from which we'll have to effect the breakthrough envisaged by the strategy of furthering foreign economic relations. The task set by this strategy is to increase our foreign trade turnover by 120 to 140 per cent towards the year 2000 against 1985, thoroughly restructuring our exports in the process by rapidly augmenting the export of finished products, primarily machines and equipment.

Success in increasing exports depends, as we all know, both on our offer of competitive items meeting the highest world standards and on our ability to sell them on the world market. On the former point, we've worked out wide-ranging measures to create the export base needed for the fulfilment of the strategic tasks in question. As regards the coming drive for markets, I don't think we are preparing for it in proper fashion yet.

Last year the Party Central Committee sent a team of Soviet economists on an uncommon mission to Sweden. The task was to study that country's experience of solving social and economic problems. On that occasion I acquainted myself with the Swedish experience of administration of foreign economic ties. Let me give you an idea of our main impressions.

I must say to begin with that in a country where there is no state monopoly of foreign trade, the state does all it can to promote exports.

Indeed, this is the chief task in managing the foreign economic complex and one of the main functions of the central department called the Foreign Trade Department, which is a component of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. To this end the Swedes have set up a streamlined infrastructure: organisational, financial, foreign, and so on. Twenty years ago they were faced with practically the same task as we have before us today. Their share of finished products exports was roughly the same as ours now (raw materials predominated). At that time they set out to restructure their export envisaging roughly the same targets as we plan to reach by the year 2000. They did it in 20 years. We want to achieve the same result in 12 years.

The Swedes established for the purpose a government agency independent of the ministry in charge of foreign economic relations. It's known as the Export Council, and working hand-in-hand with it are five or six other organisations. Their activity is greatly diversified—they help new exporters to enter the market, teach them to operate, offer them advice and assistance in other forms, including financial aid, to promote their products.

The experience of Sweden and, indeed, international experience as a whole show that we cannot accomplish the tasks we're setting to ourselves for the nineties without a long-term national programme for increased exports. After all, exports from any country today encounter obstacles in the market which cannot be overcome without help from the state. I believe we need major decisions intended, not to offer exporters small handouts, but to provide permanent and dependable incentive "dragging" every producer of commodities to the foreign market, with the state helping him in every way under a national programme for the promotion of exports.

Now the question is: Why worry? Cannot the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations cope with all that? I don't think the Ministry can do it just yet. This agency will find it difficult or even impossible to concentrate on this national task for as long as it's burdened with current trading operations, having to control its 25 combines.

We ought to think about setting up an autonomous national agency for the promotion of exports, to be funded partly out of the state budget and partly out of contributions by the economic entities concerned and functioning on the principle of paid services.

Teodorovich. I feel that we are now back to the question of the monopoly of foreign trade and whether or not to regulate exports and imports. Our performance since the time when producers began to have direct access to the foreign market strikes me as far from the best. The important thing isn't their 30 per cent share of trade turnover in 1988 but what this 30 per cent stands for. We had wanted producers to enter the foreign market with their own goods, that is, to sell and not to buy. But what have we got? They share in exports with a mere 24 per cent whereas in imports their share is 12 per cent. Besides, the experience of 1988 revealed many negative things, primarily too much middlemanship and predominance of selfish interests, often to the detriment of the economy. In many cases, the effect is the exact opposite of what we seek. Hence it's perfectly right to call for regulation, for state monopoly, or for the protection of the interests of the whole nation if you will. Nobody can say where "liberal monopoly" ends and tough measures to protect national interests begin. By and large, virtually all civilised countries today use some form of state monopoly, of state regulation of foreign economic relations. Whatever the form, there is no complete liberalism. This regulation is very rigorous in many foreign countries. And we must admit that our monopoly is by no means the strictest even in comparison with the monopoly exercised by those developed capita-

list countries that advocate full freedom of enterprise. As regards state intervention to promote export, it will yet take us quite some time to learn to apply state regulation as a means of ensuring more active and effective entry into the world market, to intensify and not to relax it.

Speaking of the need to prevent abuses by certain cooperative and joint ventures acting as go-betweens, we may say that the measures provided for by decisions and other normative documents adopted in December 1988 and March 1989 are exhaustive.

Loginov. The very presentation of the reasons for the discrepancy between the Soviet Union's economic potential and its role in the international division of labour does not sound right to me. What could we expect? Our role as a supplier of raw materials to the world market was predetermined. After all, under the latest five-year plans, roughly 40 per cent of industrial investments went into developing the extractive and power complexes. From the late sixties on, we deliberately kept up this trend although our planning agencies were largely wrong in this respect. They held that we stood to gain by selling raw materials because they were cheap in our country. Well, they *were* cheap in the sixties but we all know that raw materials production is steadily becoming costlier. With oilfields shifting to the north of Siberia, production costs increased five-to ten-fold; mean while world prices plummeted. And now the time has come for us to pay for our miscalculations.

Machine-building and manufacturing industries catered for the closed market of our subsistence economy and therefore have found themselves utterly unfit to compete on the world market.

To be sure, we can criticise the present state of affairs as much as we please. But the main question we must answer is how to end it. The tasks are clear in principle, they were defined by the 27th CPSU Congress. The trouble is, however, that we aren't fulfilling them. In 1986 and 1987, we made very little progress in the area of resource-saving and as for export restructuring, there has been practically no headway, except in machine building.

I suggest that resource-saving be done both in our country and other CMEA countries. We don't supply ourselves alone but meet the requirements of other CMEA members. Yet they, with the exception perhaps of the GDR, have not registered any gains in resource saving in recent years. Our role is therefore largely passive and forced in the sense that we continue producing raw materials for our CMEA partners.

There is also the problem of imports, which is becoming more acute from year to year. I am referring to imports of consumer goods and household appliances needed to meet the population's requirements, raise the standard of living, make homes more comfortable, and so on. The population's cash savings are enormous, and consumer demand is so high that I don't believe any amount of import can fully meet it.

There's a way out but we must use it as speedily as possible. It consists in gearing the defence complex more vigorously to producing consumer goods. This means harnessing the intellectual potential of the complex with its research centres and design offices which earlier were engaged in developing missiles and exploring outer space to developing, designing and manufacturing video tape recorders, TV sets, refrigerators, radio equipment, and so on. This could greatly improve the situation on the home market.

My last point has to do with raising the technological standard of our output so as to make it more competitive on the world market. Here, too, we are up against many problems which certainly cannot be solved overnight. I consider one of them particularly important. It's the need to maintain ties with firms helping us build plants and use technological

facilities. Last year I attended a symposium in Turin as a guest of Fiat. "Twenty years ago", said the company's Vice-President, addressing the symposium, "we built a plant for you on the Volga. In these past twenty years you've fallen a hundred years behind us." Is there a solution? Why, we shouldn't have cut off our ties with the Italians right away. It is my conviction that you mustn't sever contacts after a plant has been built. We should have kept up ties with the company to exchange technological documents, contacts between specialists, in particular with the aim of training our specialists, ties needed for a constant re-tooling, all the more since a considerable part of the equipment has broken down as a result of incompetent handling. Besides, equipment becomes morally and physically obsolete fairly fast. The Kama Automobile Plant is facing the same predicament. While its output still rates high on the world market, two or three years from now it will be so obsolete as not to sell even in underdeveloped countries. It follows that we must maintain permanent contacts with the firms concerned. This may be more valuable than many other forms of foreign economic ties, especially since many firms seek it.

Shchetinin. In appraising the state of affairs and describing the problems that have already cropped up in practice, it's important for us not to lose our bearings. One certainly doesn't turn to theory for latest instructions but let us remember what Lenin called the materialist theory of politics.

As I see it the problem goes beyond the negligible scale of our participation in sales of finished products, in their export. The main thing is that the world market brings no confirmation of our national outlays on production; this is the primary result of our entering the world market, above all with the aim of earning hard currency so as to reduce a permanent deficit and then to close the gaps in our commodity balances. These gaps comprise not only machines and technologies but many everyday necessities, grain and even toothpaste. What kind of division of labour is this? It is not a division of labour but often urgent, stop-gap purchases.

Now for the contemplated restructuring. We must move on in a very short time from today's "non-division" to a commodity-by-commodity division of labour, which is, in fact, a reality of yesteryear in the world economy, and from this, to an operation-by-operation division, now the dominant and decisive form. The latter is embodied primarily in transnationals. There is no simple answer to the question how this can be done in so short a time. We need a new economic structure enabling us, in particular, to join the world economy. But this requires such colossal resources that I cannot imagine how we are to get them without taking some further steps, such as giving up certain habits and theoretical notions. Let us recall that, according to Marx, a theory must be radical to become a material force.

Teodorovich. More and more persistently, life makes us stop to think how effective our world economic ties are. It is often said that in late years we've lost a lot in our foreign economic relations for reasons beyond our control. The assertion that they are beyond our control is arguable. If we sustain losses it must be because somebody has made a mistake and because we didn't act in time to bring the situation under control. Indeed, the resources in kind we set aside for export in 1988 exceeded by 15 per cent the amount exported in 1985, yet we earned eight per cent less in hard currency. In other words, there was a virtual increase in our export costs. In the case of imports, a shortage of foreign exchange compelled us to buy less, with the result that the overall economic effect of participation in the international division of labour diminished considerably. Right now our economy lacks reserves which it

could use for promptly neutralising a situation unfavourable to us in the world economy.

The fundamental lines of solving this problem are defined in the foreign economic strategy that has been evolved, with a comprehensive programme for expanding our country's export base in the next five-year plan period and the longer term as an important part of this strategy.

What I wish to stress above all else is that we should take more careful account of economic effectiveness. Our participation in the international division of labour should be both active and effective, and we should evaluate it according to both quantitative indicators, or volume, and qualitative ones, that is, effectiveness. We can really start to gain a convincing economic score after we've carried out a price reform. In the process we will have to rethink many earlier proportions and many of our conclusions about the positive effect of exporting or importing a particular commodity, which connotes reconsidering all our relations with industry on this new price basis. It will be very hard for us to effectively stimulate industry until we provide such a basis, and this should take another two or three years. I mean stimulating primarily by means of the domestic ruble and not hard currency. We somehow talk more and more about hard currency while it's very important to look into how much industry earns by exporting its output and how much it pays for imports. In the context of complete *khozraschet* and self-financing, we must under no circumstances shunt aside the share of rubles.

Shchetinin. I would like to go back to the role of the Foreign Ministry. We have every reason to state that there is no other country, let alone great power, in the world whose foreign policy rests from the economic point of view on so amorphous, indeterminate a basis in terms of division of labour as ours. On the other hand, we cannot but admire in these circumstances the diplomatic skill of people on the Foreign Ministry staff who uphold our vastly varied and far-reaching international interests, operating on this basis and using economic means among others. I'm not going to make any comparison with other countries (there is no time) and am far from idealising others' experience—there are numerous interesting facts revealed by Western diplomats, who say that high-handed meddling by business in political processes creates many problems and difficulties for them. But where many billions are invested and there are active trade ties, foreign policy and diplomacy have greater opportunities. This is a fact.

After its April 1985 Plenary Meeting, the party Central Committee embarked on a deep-going economic reform. It specified the main parameters of the new economic mechanism. Turning to Lenin's legacy for guidance again and again, we often see that as far as our priority tasks are concerned, we are still where we were in 1918, or 70 years ago, judging by what Lenin said at the time I quote: "Keep regular and honest accounts of money, manage economically, do not be lazy, do not steal, observe the strictest labour discipline ..." It is slogans like these that are now the order of the day and the main slogans of the moment. Yet this "moment" has lasted for 70 years in our country.

These requirements apply in equal measure to operations on the home and foreign market. There are in principle two ways in which we can join in the international division of labour. One of them is to find a place for ourselves in the niches now existing in the international division of labour. By using these niches only, we cannot increase our exports of finished articles to 50 per cent. Somebody may know about reserve niches. I know nothing about reserves of such dimensions. The other way is

investment, that is, the creation of new niches. Investments must also be made in the international division of labour, and we must amend our national policy accordingly.

What potentialities for extending our participation in the international division of labour can the Foreign Ministry have? After all, it is no economic entity. But perestroika is a revolutionary process and so can't succeed without active and decisive measures of a political nature.

I think it would be useful to include in our political, legal and economic priorities the task of defining and exploring what is needed to set up an economic platform for guaranteeing the international interests of our country. I believe it's only the Foreign Ministry that can provide an unbiased assessment of our international economic mechanism in a way, for it isn't shackled by economic routine or departmental interests that sometimes run counter to the national interest. The Foreign Ministry is the only agency which can state with authority that certain activities at home are of no use or are even harmful to our international interests. It can both say so with a full sense of responsibility and prove its point.

Slyusar. We are talking about the Soviet Union joining in the international division of labour and about economic growth. Up to this moment we've been discussing this in a way suggesting that our participation in the international division of labour is an end in itself. It seems to me that we've so far failed to link our discussion directly with the actual situation, the atmosphere of the 19th Party Conference and the tasks it set. One of the most acute problems is that of food supply. Another highly acute problem is that of social policy, that is, the problems of light industry, housing, and so on. We must bear these problems in mind here because unless they are solved perestroika may slow down and many of our calculations and plans may be frustrated.

I would like to offer you some observations on our foreign economic activity. Greece is a small country which has joined the Common Market and is now being remoulded on a West European pattern. What processes taking place there are likely to be of significance to us?

The fact that the role of the state sector, our main traditional contractor, is changing is most important. There is a trend toward liberalising banking and the insurance and credit system. Subsequently it may be harder and harder for us to shape our economic relations with that country in the same way as we've done for years. We must carefully study and try to foresee the consequences which the creation of a single internal market of the EEC countries may have for us.

To judge by our trade with Greece, we invest in industries of yesteryear. Where are we "present"? In the construction of thermoelectric plants, in deliveries of raw materials for the power industry, and so forth. I believe that in regard to other countries, too, we are only active in industries of yesteryear. We have yet to tackle advanced industries. There is talk of investing abroad. But we must think how we should go about it, must specify the areas of investment.

In trade with Greece our exports have substantially exceeded imports for years. I'm told that we have nothing to buy there. What about other countries as buyers? In 1986, the FRG bought 122 million rubles' worth of textile articles in Greece plus clothing and footwear worth 633 million rubles. The same year saw Italy buy textile articles worth 122 million rubles. As for us, our purchases in 1986 were clothing and footwear worth a mere 7.5 million rubles and textile articles worth 300,000 rubles.

Why must we reinvest in the permafrost region all the money we get for our raw materials? You know that our hard currency earnings go mainly into industries producing power resources and raw materials. And we supply these industries with pipes bought in, say, the FRG. Why can't we buy more foodstuffs to improve the food situation at home in

accordance with the tasks set by the 19th Party Conference? Why can't we buy clothing and textiles to ease the tension on our market? This would be a shortsighted policy, we are told. I'm not sure it would. What is a shortsighted policy is persistence in pouring money into fuel and raw material production for other countries.

I think we should look into the performance of certain Soviet missions abroad. Take, for example, the Athens office of Sovexportfilm, closed a short time ago. The man in charge of it spoke no language but Russian and could not drive a car. He rented a large mansion and had a chauffeur, a gardener and somebody else on the payroll. And he used to say that the Greek moviegoer wasn't mature enough to appreciate Soviet films and that perestroika had made his job more difficult. He was very proud of "earning" enough by selling films to pay his expenses. Quite an "achievement", wasn't it?

There is also an office of Intourist, which has no right to engage in commercial activity. The agency itself has become essentially a hotel manager responsible for distributing hotel rooms. Why not promote tourism on the basis of money-free exchange? Some 10 million tourists visit Greece every year. The Soviet Union accounts for 1,000 of them or thereabout although it is much closer to Greece geographically, historically and spiritually than many other countries.

Novosti Press Agency. Time was when we had to pay money to arouse interest in information on our country. At present information about the Soviet Union is in high demand but Novosti continues producing and distributing publications free of charge. How can anyone do business like that? The explanation offered is that Novosti is a social organisation. But where does the money come from? Isn't it ours?

We should also look into the performance of other missions connected with the foreign economic sphere in one way or another.

Obmynsky. The process of "fitting" the Soviet Union in with the world economy has numerous aspects relating to both the economy itself (its branch structure in general and its export sector in particular, the degree of competitiveness, development trends, and so on) and economic policy, including harmonisation of the internal economic mechanism with world economic activity.

In the context of the latter problem, the question of the Soviet attitude to GATT, the IMF and IBRD as regulators of international trade and monetary and credit relations is particularly relevant. It involves not only formal organisational measures (although they are important) but primarily the need to overcome the inertia of "bloc thinking" in the international economic sphere.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly signified its intention to join GATT and stated that it takes a positive view of establishing contacts with the IMF and IBRD. Reaction to our intention has varied. The United States and some other Western countries are opposed to our joining GATT. They allege, first, that the Soviet economic system is incompatible with that organisation's principles, for they are based on a market economy, and second, that Soviet membership of GATT would introduce an undesirable confrontational element into its activity.

By contrast, most of the GATT countries, including its socialist members as well as developing and some developed capitalist countries, come out for the early admission of the Soviet Union to GATT, which is encountering serious difficulties over the application of its own principles as a consequence of mounting protectionism, a growing number of complaints against breaches of export regulations, various sanctions, and so on.

In our country it is steadfastly emphasised, in particular at the top level, that we have no intention of undermining established world eco-

economic relations and want to participate constructively in the advancement of the international economic system. In light of new thinking, however, we don't restrict ourselves to analysing the contradictory stance of the West but consider it necessary to effect definite changes in our own home.

The decision adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers on December 2, 1988, "On the Further Development of the Foreign Economic Activity of State, Cooperative and Other Public Enterprises, Amalgamations and Organisations" granted them all the right to engage directly in export and import operations as of April 1, 1989. It is stipulated even now that the new rules of state regulation of foreign economic ties shall not clash with GATT standards and rules. The Soviet Union is drafting new customs tariffs and tax legislation which are to be the main economic instruments of regulating imports and an important means of pricing as well as of regulating demand and offer on the home market. There are also plans for the phased adoption of a whole number of measures conforming to the principles of GATT.

While acknowledging the difficulty of bringing our economic regulation into line with that organisation's standards and rules, we can hardly agree to the opinion currently expressed in the West that before deciding on Soviet membership of GATT, it is necessary to wait for perestroika in the Soviet Union to be "completed". I don't think this approach benefits either perestroika or GATT itself. The process of joining GATT takes years. This is shown by the experience of Hungary and Poland and by the consultations still going on with Bulgaria. It would be much more reasonable to start consultations between the Soviet Union and GATT as soon as possible.

The situation regarding our approach to the IMF and IBRD is different. It may be appropriate to recall that in 1944 the Soviet Union took an active part in the Bretton Woods Conference, which discussed the functioning of the monetary and financial system in the postwar world and established the IMF and IBRD. The prospects for Soviet membership in those specialised agencies of the UN system seemed attractive enough at the time. Our country was entitled to a 1.2 billion dollar quota, or 12.37 per cent of the vote, which assured it third place after the United States and Britain. The Conference made provisions for exceptions in the statute of both institutions to ensure that in the event of our joining them account was taken of the peculiarities of a "non-market" economy. Regrettably, Moscow decided at the time against joining the Fund and the Bank.

Now the situation has been reversed, so to speak. Although the Soviet Union had made no declaration about intending to join the IMF and IBRD, official spokesmen for the former US administration stated that it would take a negative stand should such a declaration be made. My feeling is that we should take our time over this matter. Many things still divide the Bretton Woods monetary and financial institutions and the Soviet Union. But proceeding from its general concept of the need to end confrontation and political tension in any form or manifestation, the Soviet Union sees no insurmountable obstacle to establishing useful working contacts with them, exchanging information, holding meetings at the level of experts, and so on. The membership of both institutions now includes socialist countries, in particular Hungary, Poland, Romania, China and Vietnam, and this is evidence that very complicated problems can be solved where there is reciprocal goodwill.

Ovchinnikov. We've already adopted formal normative guidelines that are plainly coming into conflict with the country's concept of foreign policy. Let me explain. We know that the growing trend towards interdependence of the world community is a reality. This was also stated at the 27th CPSU Congress. Yet in 1987, or a year later, we had in the Law

on the State Enterprises Amalgamation Article 10 on "Planning", which says that the state shall place orders with enterprises for commodities needed, among other things, to guarantee the economic independence of the country. Against whom? And independence in what?

We occasionally hear talk about the need to guarantee technological independence against capitalist countries. Is that right or possible today, when it's an axiom that no country is equal to developing on its own all the costly and science-intensive lines of scientific and technological progress? That attitude may be one of the reasons why our country is falling farther and farther behind world science and technology. The strengthening of ties with the world scientific community should be one of our major tasks.

The objectively existing interdependence of international and national economic security as well as its interests call for steps to develop and ensure the functioning of an interaction mechanism making interdependence controllable. Whereas international efforts in the military and humanitarian spheres are yielding impressive results, the situation in international economic relations is hardly changing. Is this only because it's harder to reach agreement in the economy than in the political, military or humanitarian sphere?

Yes, it is, to a degree. There is the experience of numerous international economic organisations. But the same experience shows that for all the importance of the effort to coordinate the economic policies of countries in GATT, the IMF, IBRD, OECD, OPEC and organisations of the UN system, this activity is limited to either individual spheres—say, trade and finance—or individual countries or groups of countries. This patchwork policy cannot succeed at the global level. Also, it's unrealistic to expect to succeed by trying to solve severally the well-known global problems of power supply, food, the environment, finance, and so on.

It follows that the only way to set up a mechanism of controlled interdependence is to accomplish the extremely difficult task of forming a system of joint orientation of economic policy according to a definite set of quantitative parameters involving production (structural policy), trade, currency and finance.

Bugrov. It is of fundamental importance for us to recognise that the Soviet Union cannot win advanced positions in the world economy and science without becoming involved in the world market more and more and competing within the latter's framework. Realism in assessing things and new thinking have enabled us to see and accept the world economy as it really is and to set course in our international economic affairs accordingly. However, it is too early to say that in recent years we have brought about a marked change in the situation.

Another important achievement on our part is an increasingly sober and balanced concept of our own foreign economic interests. Paradoxically, we proceeded in our foreign economic relations with developing countries from the idea of exporting our social system but actually tended to isolate ourselves from the main stream of the world economy. Our wide-ranging initiatives in favour of international economic cooperation were made ineffective by our narrow conception of Soviet economic interests. Hence the stereotype of our initiatives being seen in the world as both declarative and decorative campaigns.

All this predetermined the low efficacy of Soviet action—I also mean diplomatic action—in the foreign economic sphere. An exacting analyst will detect in it both outright damage and missed opportunities.

Certain external forces understandably seek to perpetuate this situation. The important thing, however, depends on ourselves, on our ability to find fundamentally new foreign political and foreign economic approaches. We need a radical reform of both our economy and the whole

mechanism of our foreign economic relations (introducing effective tariffs, a set of non-tariff measures, restructuring our statistics, and so forth). The earlier policy of "working for export" and attempts to make our way into the world economy as an export enclave proved ineffective, as we also know from the experience of other socialist countries. Characteristically, we've renounced in public statements the "remnant" method of shaping exports and now stress the technological aspect of the international division of labour. As regards concrete decision, however, we still cannot bring ourselves to give up old postulates. Indeed, isn't the principle of the self-sufficiency of joint ventures in terms of foreign exchange virtually an export enclave at the microlevel unconnected with the rest of the economy by real economic relations and interests?

Ovchinnikov. I think we should make up our minds to do at least the following:

- Discard economic romanticism in planning export and import growth rates. Stop considering that by keeping the growth rate of foreign trade ahead of that of the national income, we can draw the country more deeply into the international division of labour and improve its economy. The present approach leads to unrealistic plans for the extension of foreign economic ties or to their stepped-up development to the detriment of economic and political efficiency. It's easy to prove that such plans are unrealistic

- Get rid of the mistaken idea that the larger the share of trade between the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries in the country's overall trade turnover (with the commodity pattern being what it is), the more this attests to gains in socialist economic integration and to the consolidation of economic and political processes.

- Assess the economic, scientific and technological potential of the country accurately, comprehensively and objectively. This will help prove the fallacy of the opinion widely expressed in our country that the modest place held by us in international trade doesn't reflect our economic, scientific and technological potential. The economy is a sphere in which no miracles occur. Taking sober stock of this potential against the background of the world economy and the situation in other countries, we cannot but come to the conclusion that our place is a reflection of our economic, scientific and technological potential

- Use existing theoretical and practical criteria in appraising the capacity of the Soviet home market. This will help both Soviet and foreign parties to international economic agreements take their bearings. Unless we estimate the capacity of our market according to extra-economic categories as we now do, that is, according to the number of consumers (280 million), pockets filled with money depreciated by years-long inflation, the tens of thousands of enterprises thirsty for imported products ("We will take anything") but unable through their own fault or for reasons beyond their control to earn hard currency by exporting their output, we will have no reason to describe the capacity of our home market as "immense". Let us look at things realistically. In terms of value, our exports and imports of many basic commodities of international trade are behind Switzerland's. Nor can we dismiss this as an economic misunderstanding. We will yet have to do much to make our market really capacious

The effort to produce better goods for export than for the domestic consumer is economically immoral. Besides, it can neither lead to lasting success nor yield adequate economic results, for higher quality entails higher costs. In world practice, it has long been known that success is only achieved by enterprises which supply the home and foreign market with products of equally high quality. It is not a question of economic

incentives, but of the need to assure exports normal effectiveness without spending more than now, let alone injecting subsidies.

I also wish to point out that it's dangerous to pin excessive hopes on our defence industry's conversion to civilian production, including production for export. Conversion will undoubtedly release high-grade raw and other materials and highly competent personnel. But we mustn't forget that we can only use first-class equipment for a time because it will become physically and morally obsolete in a few years and find itself in the same state as in all other industries.

Mordasov. Active and deep-going participation by the national economies of many countries in the international division of labour has demonstrated and goes on demonstrating its beneficial economic effect. I'm sure that in practice, the road to such participation for Soviet economic organisations lies through meaningful efforts on world commodity markets, that is, through a long-term foreign trade strategy. It is ultimately on world commodity markets that business carries out its decisive transactions. There are numerous markets: so many commodities, so many markets.

What world markets do first of all is to estimate the world average of socially necessary expenditures of labour and international values serving as the basis for the formation of world foreign trade prices. Estimating the world level involves not only the value of a commodity but its quality, technological characteristics, the organisation of service, and so on. Victor Loginov, who spoke before me, quoted a Fiat leader as having said that in the twenty years since the Volga Automobile Plant (VAZ) was built, it had fallen 100 years behind that firm in technology. That was a hyperbole, of course. But there is a lag. This is confirmed by figures reflecting the positions of the manufacturers and indicating who's who on the world car market. By the way, according to Fiat, the labour intensity of making the engine of the UNO car, the most popular in 1985, varies from one and a half to two man-hours, and as for the labour intensity of the whole car, it ranges depending on modifications between 20 and 30 man-hours. This is the level of the socially necessary expenditure of labour which we cannot reach as yet (even allowing for the difference in pay).

Monopolisation is typical of the vast majority of world commodity markets. Each of them has its own legislators of fashion and order. As a rule, this is the privilege of several transnationals or powerful national companies which gain control through tough competition of a sizable and relatively durable share of a specific world market. Ninety per cent of frezes' compressors market is controlled by six manufacturers while seven transnationals control the communication equipment market about 100 billion dollars a year. Four Japanese makers of motorcycles control 85 per cent of sales. Incidentally, this state of affairs answers the question of whether we should do business with transnationals.

The paths leading us to the world commodity market are primarily new forms of cooperation: production cooperation with leading capitalist firms and the setting up of joint ventures with them both at home and abroad. We need a Western partner to enter the world commodity market and learn to operate there. But do Western partners need us? What economic or other advantages could we sacrifice to cooperation to attract partners?

There is, to begin with, the immense capacity of our home market (although it was disputed here), and hence the possibility of organising large-lot production at low cost. More often than not, we prove unable to benefit from the large-lot character and stability of our production.

Our other "trump card" is the essential difference in pay between our country and the West. A skilled worker in Kiev earns one ruble per hour

much.

The Soviet Union has up-to-date scientific and technological facilities. Our achievements in science and technology are a further advantage attracting Western partners. True, we aren't skilful enough at using this strong point of ours.

At the Le Bourget air show in May 1985, our Ministry of the Aircraft Industry displayed a new helicopter, Mi-26, which can carry a commercial payload of 20 tons. Purchase offers came at once from Britain and the United States. There arose a world commodity market of heavy helicopters of the 20-ton class, with the Ministry of the Aircraft Industry as a monopolist. But while the market did arise it didn't begin functioning because the Ministry adopted a wait-and-see, debating attitude instead of an active policy of supplying the new market (patent protection of original technological solutions, certification of the craft according to international standards and requirements, estimation of likely sales, and so on). The situation changed visibly when, in 1988, the Ministry of the Aircraft Industry was authorised to enter the world market directly and economic steps were taken to encourage more active operations there.

The decisions permitting our economic organisations to engage in direct export and import operations enable them to implement a long-term and effective commodity strategy on world markets and substantially increase our country's role in world economic ties.

MORATORIUM ON GIANTS?

THE MODEST RESULTS achieved by our economy stand out particularly sharply against the background of the dynamic progress in political reform. The effort to adjust old economic management methods to the proclaimed qualitatively new political objectives is getting nowhere. It is only through radical, revolutionary measures that our poorly organised, extremely complex and cumbersome economic mechanism can be made to work.

What if we announce a moratorium on large-scale construction in heavy industry for a couple of five-year plan periods? How about minimising this kind of construction if not stopping it altogether?

This idea occurs to me every time I think of the industrial giants that grow technologically old almost before they are born, of unfinished building projects of horrifying proportions that swallow our national wealth of people without reasonably decent homes and of stores without goods.

The pause could be only beneficial. First, we could spend the money to be released on feeding and clothing people. Second, we could concentrate on high technology. If we succeeded in introducing an energy-saving technology of the Japanese type into metallurgy in five to ten years' time it would yield a saving equalling 12 per cent of all the power generated in the Soviet Union. This is more than the balance provided by our atomic power plants. It follows that energy-saving in metallurgy alone would enable us to do without atomic power plants, whose time has plainly not come yet.

This is only one of numerous examples. It is based on calculations made by reputable foreign business people, who are no longer surprised at our megalomania. We could exist for a couple of five-year plan periods without new "flagships" of power engineering or other industries and without water distribution systems leading to ecological graveyards. But we would hardly be able to lead a decent existence without a breakthrough in technology, without homes and foodstuffs, without service.

Further, the impossible pyramid of ministries and departments puts so heavy a burden on perestroika that it cannot but slow down.

Still how is our huge economic system to be managed? Not only from Moscow or not so much from Moscow as from elsewhere? In America, anybody who tried to manage the whole of the nation's business from one centre would be taken for a freak. Over there, logic and considerations of economic expediency have dictated the division of the country's territory into the California, Southeast, Northeast and other regional groups. These are operating efficiently, managing in the main with their own manpower and material resources. We need something similar.

At this point I recall the experience of our Regional Economic Councils. I am certain that the idea of centring the economy on regions is beneficial provided that we do it properly and in the right conditions. We are bound to arrive at it sooner or later.

One other thing. It was not for nothing that Lenin insisted on the importance of foreign concessions. The case of Armand Hammer, whom Lenin watchfully defended against the new bureaucracy that had already sprung up, is enough to show how useful this form of cooperation is as a means of achieving a qualitative breakthrough. We must thoroughly revise our attitude to concessions. Our disjointed economy is badly in need of a sharp eye, a firm hand and a calculating mind, no matter whose they are. We could seek agreement both on setting up joint ventures and on granting reputable business people concessions for the operation of existing plants and possibly for the management of whole economic sectors.

Destiny has given perestroika a certain time. Nobody knows how long it is but some of it has clearly run out already. Haven't we had enough of opportunism? Shouldn't we take a well-considered, carefully weighed risk?

Boris PIADYSHEV

FOREIGN POLICY THOUGHTS — THE BEGINNINGS

(Continued from page 123)

shortlived.

In political terms what is common in the doctrines of Buddhists and Stoics is that the social standard for them is the moral choice of the individual. The Buddhist, if he wishes to leave the *samsara* (a cycle of repeated transformations of the individual, according to Buddhism), should behave properly, that is, cause no harm to a living being. The Stoic, if he wishes to achieve happiness, should practise virtues and care for all people. Has a man a right to take up a sword, sow death and endanger his own life? If so, why and when? Each man should answer this question for himself and be guided by his own ideas of good and evil. This is, perhaps, the main outcome of the development of the foreign policy thought in the ancient world.

NATIONAL SECURITY: REAL AND ILLUSORY

Nikolai SPASSKY

ONE OF THE MOST serious distortions of the times of Stalinism and stagnation in the foreign policy sphere was the devaluation of the role of political means in ensuring the nation's security. Stereotype gradually established itself, one which prescribed viewing all our ties and dealings with states of the other socio-political system above all through the prism of potential military confrontation and through the correlation of military potentials. A state's military potential was interpreted rather simplistically, being all but equated with its armed forces. The domination of the military component over all others was the most patently manifest in Soviet-American relations.

Today, when the processes of democratisation and humanisation of interstate relations sparked by the Soviet perestroika are gaining momentum, ensuring national security is increasingly shifting from the sphere of military development to that of political cooperation among states. The scenario in which the military element, in any event, in its current understanding, will gradually disappear from Soviet-American relations against the background of the rather definite trend towards a demilitarisation of relations between the two seems quite realistic. But this is a relatively distant prospect.

Humanity's entry into the peaceful period will be preceded by a long transitional span, whose hallmark will be a transition from a balance of force, from the very moment of the formation of states underlying the world order, to a balance of interests. Obviously this will be a multi-stage process characterised by a gradual decline in the importance of the military component of national strength and, accordingly, a growth of the importance of its other components with a parallel erosion of the power-politics mentality altogether. We believe that before arriving at a guaranteed peaceful, self-regulating state based on a balance of interests, world politics will have to pass through an intermediary concept of a balance of force in which the foremost role in it will be played by non-military components—economic, scientific, informational.

The pace of this process and the degree to which it is protected against a possible slowdown, as well as temporary stoppages and backtracking will largely hinge on our own ability to effectively blend our national interests in with universal ones. We believe that on this path we need to keep a certain distance ahead of our opponent-partners: ahead, in order to impart dynamism and provide guidelines to the entire process yet only at a strictly defined, precisely calculated distance so as at no point the national security be jeopardised.

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the problem of a correlation between the military and civilian parameters of national might has not only an external dimension but also a precisely outlined internal one. After all, closely linked with it are the volume of the resources

used for the country's socio-economic development as well as the moral and psychological atmosphere in it.

At this turning point in the development of Soviet society it is vital to make the national potential work to the utmost for perestroika. We have too long interpreted the "guns or butter" dilemma in favour of the former and unnoticeably exhausted the people's patience. Today the fate of the restructuring drive, ensuring of decent living conditions, and the volume of defence outlays are inextricably interwoven in people's minds. This mood is precisely conveyed by a line from a letter to the newspaper *Izvestia*: "We want peace and friendship and for the shops to be full of food and goods."¹

"BOUND BY ONE CHAIN..."

THE REPORT of President Reagan to Congress "National Security Strategy of the United States" of January 1988 reads: "The means available (for attaining the USA's national security goals—N. S.) are the elements of national power that the United States possesses—diplomatic and informational, economic and military—and which we employ to influence the behavior of other nations. Power, it is often said, is the quintessence of strategy. Unfortunately, America's national power is sometimes thought of only in coercive or military terms."² The latter reservation is extremely symptomatic, although at present it attests more to the process apace in the American establishment of reassessing foreign policy priorities than to a realistic rearrangement of priorities in the US national security strategy. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, American ruling quarters still proceed from the priority of power politics.

However, we too—sometimes actively, but more often than not passively, as a reaction—have frequently played up to Washington's penchant for switching the relations between the two states along the lines of military might. By individual actions on our part we have involuntarily played into the hands of the conservative right wing of the American politics which, getting hold, not without our "help", of the reigns of power, subordinated to an even greater degree the approach to relations with the Soviet Union to the orientation for military might. It is quite logical that such a policy has met a rebuff on our part, a rebuff that has at times been inadequate. There was an increasing tendency on both sides to take preventive measures designed to preempt not only probable steps by the opponent but also any possible one. Thus the military-force aspect entrenched itself in Soviet-American relations. The most unfavourable consequence of these developments for us was that, as was pointed out at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, we let ourselves be drawn into the arms race.

It is important to try and understand whether the formation of precisely such a model of Soviet-American relations was inevitable, where we did not do enough, and where we overdid it.

PARITY: FETISH OR PANACEA!

WE BELIEVE that during the first postwar years, when both power centres of the capitalist world at the time, the USA and Britain, consciously opted for the cold war, when the United States was drafting and endorsing specific plans for massive nuclear strikes at the USSR (today the relevant documents have been made public)³, and when the stake was made on eliminating socialism in the USSR militarily, within deadlines measured not in decades but in years, we simply had no other

choice than to respond to the challenge and to create a potential to contain the aggression. True, a reservation should be made here to the effect that the Stalinist ways, which projected abroad the image of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state in the Orwellian style, an image which ruled out the possibility of normal contact with it, were not the least of the reasons for the choice made by the West. What is more, we still have to find for ourselves the answer to the following question: What was really first and foremost behind the cold war—a clash of ideologies or interests in the context of the drastically changed alignment of forces in the world?

Later on, the situation developed even more ambiguously. Of late, various opinions have been voiced in the Soviet press regarding the importance of strategic parity from the standpoint of ensuring the stability of Soviet-American relations. The need to maintain parity with the USA for preventing war is being called into question. As proof reference is frequently made to the Caribbean crisis of 1962. The line of reasoning is approximately as follows: while, according to the then US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, the United States had 5,000 nuclear warheads, or a 17-fold advantage, even this proportion was sufficient for preventing war. Hence the conclusion that today we could unilaterally reduce our strategic forces to approximately analogous proportions without endangering our own security.

The situation shaped up differently, however. Indeed, war did not break out in 1962. But it was rather an exception, one of the type which confirms the general rule. The rule which says that at the present-day stage an approximate nuclear strategic balance between the USSR and the USA is a necessary, albeit insufficient, prerequisite for preserving peace. It is clear from the reminiscences of the participants in the decision-making process from the American side that President John F. Kennedy gave the nod to restraint largely contrary to the sentiments predominating among his advisers, especially among the military, at the time.

As we know, the specificity of the nuclear deterrence doctrine which perhaps sets it apart from all the military doctrines and concepts that preceded it is that it is implemented not through the use of weapons, for the practical use of military might in general, not to mention nuclear force, is the collapse of deterrence. It should have a sort of psychological effect in the minds of the military-political leadership of the opposite side. For this reason, in determining the concrete parameters of the potential for deterrence one should not in the least abstract oneself from the psychological factor, from the specifics of the strategic thinking of the people who draft the foreign and military policies of the opposing country. Account should be taken not only of the sentiments of the "sober-minded", pragmatic factions of the bourgeoisie, but also of the conservative forces and even of extremist circles if they have access to the levers of power. Given this posing of the issue, the conclusion, one evidently drawn by the then Soviet leadership from the Caribbean crisis, about the need for the USSR to attain strategic parity with the United States, is quite justified.

What evokes doubt is the realism of the planned pace for achieving this goal, as I think that the sword of Damocles of a nuclear attack was not hanging over our heads and there was no need to reach parity in so short a span at virtually all cost. Also dubious is the effectiveness of our military-industrial potential (even in the absence of any specific figures on this score the following conclusion involuntarily suggests itself by analogy: since our economy even in the relatively prosperous 1960s, let alone the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, was not especially effective, then the returns on investment in munitions production were not

especially high either) and, lastly and most importantly, the legitimacy of the chosen interpretation of the notion of equality.

Approximate equality in central strategic systems established itself in the military balance between the USSR and the USA in the late 1960s-early 1970s. This situation was acknowledged by the fact of the start of Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks and was codified in the SALT-I agreement. However, by all indications an expansive understanding of parity—virtually useless militarily, counterproductive politically, and exhausting economically—had already entrenched itself in our military-political mentality by then. The established course for ensuring “approximate equality of military forces between East and West” and of “equality in nuclear and other weapons” in effect meant an orientation to the fact that the socialist community had to possess approximately the same military potential as the USA plus their NATO partners, plus all the countries with which they had military agreements. In the 1970s China was added to the list of possible enemies. And since none of our allied states is comparable, say, in armed forces, to the nuclear powers (Britain and France) or in gross national product to such economic giants as Japan and West Germany, we had to bear the brunt of maintaining this equality.

We, in effect, thus doomed ourselves to boxing against our own shadow, to ensuring alone the potential to counter any theoretically conceivable coalition of states. Furthermore, parity rather quickly came to be measured not only in strategic offensive weapons but in other categories of weapons—conventional as well as nuclear. And in all instances, which, incidentally, there were plenty of, when we knew that we were doing poorly where quality was concerned, we tried, with the thoroughness typical of Russians (what if something were to happen...), to make up for this by boosting quantity. We viewed possession of strategic nuclear forces built on the principle “the more and newer the better” to be a matter of national pride; they were directly associated with the status of a superpower and regarded as its natural attribute.

The consequences this policy had are so self-evident that no comment is required. According to Soviet economists, the USSR's national income stands at 55 per cent of that of the USA, while productivity of social labour in this country is no more than one-third of the American level. It will be noted that here the comparison is confined to an equation, or rather, an inequality, between the USSR and the USA. If, however, we project to an economic dimension the task of maintaining the USSR's “safe” military balance with external encirclement in the shape in which it crystallised in the 1970s, the actual picture would look still less favourable. Be that as it may, when Frank Carlucci, speaking at the General Headquarters Military Academy during his visit to the USSR, affectedly complained that the Soviet Union's military expenditures comprise (of course, according to American estimates; it has become commonplace to state that there are unfortunately no Soviet figures on this matter, so we are unable to judge responsibly about the degree of reliability of the Western data) between 15 and 17 per cent of the gross national product, while the USA's arms outlays are only 5.7 per cent, one could not have but got the opinion that the American defence secretary was really feeling great inner satisfaction at this asymmetry.

If, however, we take the purely military facet of the matter, here, too, the line based on *a priori* acknowledgement of the priority of military hardware did not give, and could not have given, our nation a comfortable external atmosphere in which to raise the standard of living, and tranquillity and self-confidence.

True, in all fairness, it is obvious that our frequently exaggerated perception of an external threat is deeply rooted in the history of our

state, which knows of numerous examples of devastating invasions, from the Pechenegs and Polovtsy to Hitler, and lengthy period of real, not imagined, hostility from foreign encirclement. This circumstance has not been overlooked abroad either. Specifically, objective proponents of the school of "realpolitik" in the USA point to it. And in the relatively recent practice of prerevolutionary Russia, for that matter, there existed a persistent tradition, including at the level of the mass consciousness, of overusing category of "external enemy"—invariably coupled with that of "internal enemy". Incidentally, the experience of Stalinism, too, attests to the limitedness and, evidently, the inevitability of this tandem.

However, that today's aberrations, which were not yet such in the recent past, are rooted in history does not make things any easier for the people. By ascribing to many countries immanent hostile intentions towards us, we have made a contribution to the formation in the consciousness of the ruling elite, and in the minds of these countries' ordinary citizens, of the stereotype of ours as an enemy and to the entrenchment of the appropriate role functions associated with it. The fundamental maxim for survival, namely, that security is ensured above all not through the acquisition of the capacity to deliver a strike but by removing the threat making for such a need, including a potential threat,—a maxim equally relevant in the Stone Age and in our nuclear-space era—has been consigned to oblivion.

The orientation to maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces at a level that would rule out strategic superiority of the forces of imperialism⁴ contained in the new edition of the CPSU Programme, enables our military development to be rather flexible. Our practical embodiment of the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" is also evolving under the impact of positive changes in the international situation which in turn is transforming largely due to our perestroika and our reassessment of our own defence needs. Today we are injecting into this notion a different content from, say, three years ago.

Evidence to that effect is the INF Treaty, which stipulates the asymmetric cuts in armed forces, and unilateral Soviet reductions announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the United Nations.

PARITY IN EVERY RESPECT

LET US, HOWEVER, return to the distortions in our understanding of parity which gradually amassed in the 1970s. If a broad interpretation of parity were confined to the purely military sphere things would not be so bad. Such a nuance as claims to equality with the United States in everything, to possessing all the attributes which are peculiar to its status as a superpower unnoticeably began appearing in our perception of parity. The essence of such attitudes can be conveyed by the obvious conclusion that since we are their equals everything that they may do we may do, too.

The point at issue, of course, is not that these goals, which are alien to the nature of our system and our ideology, were built into our official foreign policy course. This was not so. However, the molecules of such views were present in the air of stagnation which rather broad strata of the population which showed an interest in foreign policy breathed. They could not but have affected, even subconsciously, the judgements of the people directly involved in taking major foreign policy decisions at that time.

Relapses of this "mirror" logic are encountered to this day. This is evidenced, among other things, by an analysis of the questions being asked by a good number of people. Why can the USA deploy missiles in the European NATO countries but the USSR cannot emplace them in

Cuba? How is it that Washington occupies the sovereign state of Grenada, and no one becomes indignant, but we commit troops in Afghanistan at the request of the legitimate government, and sanctions are imposed against us? Why is it that the Americans shoot down an Iranian civil plane, and nothing happens, but when we downed the South Korean plane, which had indubitably been sent into our air space on an espionage mission, quite possibly in hopes of provoking us to terminate its flight, the West raised an uproar?

The confusion surrounding these seeming paradoxes is readily explicable. For too long we proceeded, often unconsciously, on the presumption that an inherently progressive end, even in the longterm, "global" perspective, imparts a progressive nature to the means employed to reach it. In the dualistic unity of ends and means the priority was unconditionally given to the former. Essentially this was the renaissance of the canonical Loyolan formula that became deeply entrenched, albeit with reservations, in our consciousness, namely, that a noble and fair goal justifies very many, if not all, means. That is why, alongside the fact that we have used our country's increased might and prestige to impel the imperialists to scuttle instruments of military force, we have failed to resist the temptation to borrow some methods that are generally alien to us.

We are annoyed when our opponents in the West, discoursing upon the flaws of our system, take Stalinism, not socialism as it exists today, as a point of departure. However, until just recently, we, too, in our perception of capitalism and consequently in our attitude to it frequently proceeded from the model of it which existed at the beginning of the century, failing to notice the structural changes that have taken place in it over the more than eight decades that have elapsed. Meanwhile even in the era of wars for recarving colonies, the orientation of the imperialist states for military might was hardly unequivocal. It was not fortuitous that Lenin placed military force after economic and financial might as the basis for dividing up spheres of influence under capitalism.⁶ Imperialism exhibits an inherent attachment to force as such, its specific preferences in this sphere being determined under the impact of the concrete conditions of the day. As we can see, the imperialists are in principle indifferent to the form in which force is used.

MIGHT IS THE ABILITY TO CHANGE

EVEN IF WE TAKE as a point of departure not the beginning of the century but the first postwar decade, when our notions of the nature of relations between the two social systems in the nuclear age were taking shape, we cannot fail to notice that the world had changed fundamentally. Today we know full well how things stood with scientific analysis in this country during the times of social stagnation. Only today, drawing on neatly framed universal scholarly thought as a point of departure, and having formulated the basic parameters of the new political thinking, whose principal feature is that it contains built-in mechanisms of self-development, we receive the requisite methodological tools for analysing the processes taking place in the world.

The West noticed earlier than we did that the world is losing its accustomed outlines, that the signs of the erosion of its bipolar structure are appearing and the transition to a multipolar one is beginning. Earlier, attention was called to the mounting tendency to a relative devaluation of the military component of national strength and certain practical lessons were drawn. Starting from the 1960s heated debates are being held in Western countries, not only among the intellectual and ruling elite but also in the academic and political communities at large

concerning ways of ensuring security and prosperity in the rapidly changing and interdependent world. Revealingly, back in 1965 the then secretary of state, Dean Rusk, wrote in a report to President Lyndon Johnson: "No nation, including the United States, can guarantee its security, its prosperity or its tranquillity by pursuing narrow policies of nationalism. Our task is to find ways of working together which respect the dignity and the abiding national interests of each nation, while respecting also the inescapable *interdependence* (my italics—N. S.) of us all in a world of modern weapons, communications and close economic linkages."⁶

Of course, one can readily brush aside such statements, by attaching the all-purpose lable of propaganda to them. But the whole point is that certain corrections, albeit not so sweeping, were introduced into practical policies, too. It is a fact that whereas in 1960 45 per cent of the US federal budget went for military purposes, in 1988, after many years of massive hikes in arms outlays the figure plummeted to 27 per cent during the Reagan administration.

We, however, continued to trod the well-beaten path with regard to military development, the drastically changed conditions notwithstanding. The world was changing rapidly. Naturally, it was becoming more complex and contradictory. But we at times viewed global innovations not so much as new possibilities as new threats against which we had to protect ourselves more reliably. We had got into the habit of regarding the country's strategic nuclear forces as an all-round "insurance policy" in the event of unpredictable shifts in the world alignment of forces. It is a downright pity that our foreign policy was allowed to lag behind the fundamental changes in the world, all the more so since the prerequisites that made them possible had been created by the October 1917 Revolution, that such milestones in the world arena as socialism's extension beyond the bounds of one country, the collapse of the colonial system, the creation of the United Nations, which is the world government of the future in an embryonic state, took place owing to another key event of the century—our victory over fascism, and that all the international arms reduction agreements were reached with the most active participation of Soviet diplomacy.

Or late, the Soviet media have rightly noted that alongside the dogged reluctance of the American side to desist in its attempts to outdo and elbow out the Soviet Union, our excessive lack of compromise and stubbornness in implementing extensive arms production programmes, and the chiefly military orientation of our assistance to the Third World was a contributing cause for the short lifespan of the detente of the 1970s. It seems that another point is more essential, namely, unpreparedness of both superpowers for new bilateral relations at that stage that would broaden the sphere of mutually beneficial cooperation. The USSR and the USA must be ready to change domestically with due account for the role of the dialogue between the two countries in international intercourse and with consideration for revamping their mutual relations.

Our widespread authoritarian system proved incapable of timely desecring long-evolving metamorphoses in world politics and the economy. It would seem to be self evident that in order to exist in the midst of other states, a state should want and know how to adapt to the external environment and in parallel try to adapt it in accordance with a realistic understanding of its interests while reckoning with the legitimate interests of others. But in order to be able to change under the impact of external factors and be able to exert an adjusting influence outside, it is imperative above all to possess a functioning internal potential for self-change. And the bottom line is that in any event one should be capable of at least noticing changes in the surrounding world.

"In the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States," the prominent American political scientist, Marshall Shulman, rightly points out, "the decisive question is likely to be which country can most effectively adapt its institutions and its policies to the new requirements of international life as we approach the 21st century."⁷ I think that today it is fair to regard society's capacity for domestic changes and self-renewal as the central component of the national might of any state, irrespective of ideological and geopolitical specifics.

THE ART OF DENIAL

THE REPUDIATION of detente by Western ruling quarters was largely due to what they believe to be the unsuccessful record of the USSR in the peace effort. If, however, we speak of the reorientation of the "Eastern" policies of Britain, the USA and the FRG towards tough rivalry based on strength, a reorientation which occurred in the late 1970s-early 1980s with the arrival of right-wing conservatives in power in these countries, which we assessed, and with good reason, as the resurrection of the course for social revanchism, the reasons here were different.

The policies of Reaganism, which matured in the midst of the US ruling class and was drafted at its "think tanks" and sanctioned by it, and whose centre-piece was the programme for America's accelerated rearmament, were in any event based not so much on concern over the Soviet military buildup as a desire to take advantage of the opportunity offered by stagnation in the USSR. We must admit that whereas prior to April 1985 the possession of any full and objective information about ourselves was the exception rather than the rule, the American foreign policy-making community in those years had a fairly good knowledge of the actual state of affairs in the Soviet Union. It was this knowledge that accounted for the seemingly strange coincidence of Washington's transition to a frontal attack on the USSR's foreign and military-political stands with Soviet society's accelerating lapse into a crisis in all areas.

The real truth about the "Reagan revolution" sometimes peeped through in public statements by American officials. The Soviet mass media bent every effort to "advertise" Reagan's speech in British Parliament in which he proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism. And yet, what would be far more instructive—above all from the standpoint of our own development, for all our conviction of the futility of any attempts to consign us to the "dustbin of history", a conviction based on the experience of the 70 years of Soviet government—would be to try to understand what fueled the American leader's hopes for the success of this undertaking. Then we would see that he did not base them on thin air.

"In an ironic sense, Karl Marx was right," Reagan explained. "We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union." Then, to prove his point, the president adduced some economic facts. It is worthwhile to cite them here. He said that the growth rate of the USSR's gross national product had declined by more than 50 per cent since the 1950s, that the country, one-fifth of whose population was engaged in agriculture, was unable to feed itself, and that privately tilled plots, which comprise only three per cent of the nation's farmland, produced almost one-fourth of its produce, including about one-third of its meat and vegetables.⁸

Were we to take a closer look at the computations of the CIA we would probably think once again about the justice of Lenin's formula concerning the connection between foreign and domestic policies. Regrettably, in past years we paid lip service to it, as we did to many other of his ideas, for that matter. The enormous foreign policy returns from seemingly purely internal perestroika measures have brought out this aspect in a positive light, just as it has confirmed the urgent need to return to Leninist words and deeds in practical everyday work.

I would like to examine this issue from a different angle as well. It has to be stated that we do not have a tradition of truly constructive—dialectical—analysis of the past. In this matter, which is extremely delicate and vital to the formation of the people's historical memory, we are in the habit of rushing from one extreme to the other. We have not shaped solid skills of such an approach to analysing the experience of the past in which negation of what is obsolete and outmoded would be mixed with preservation of what is intelligent, good and eternal.

Today the Soviet public at large is reassessing the nature of the external threat to this country. Some people are even claiming that there is no particular threat at all, so we can fearlessly disarm. This is overdoing it, of course. As interstate relations are revamped on the principles of the new thinking, the threat will definitely lessen and, in the context of a nuclear-free and non-violent world ensured by universal political and juridical mechanisms for preventing and settling conflict situations, it will be reduced to naught. It has already declined very substantially. All the same, it is still there, and one cannot but reckon with it. It is quite another matter that its nature is radically changing.

The external peril to this country is increasingly stemming not from the arms race but from rivalry in such fields as economic management, technology, science and especially information science. We believe that the parameters of the external threat is one of the vital topics which need to be urgently discussed with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other departments involved in shaping foreign policy, and also scientists and the public. The Foreign Affairs Commission and the Commission for Defence of the new USSR Supreme Soviet are called upon to be the forum for this discussion, which should be guaranteed provision by the government of absolutely all information pertaining to the matter at hand at open and, at the worst, closed hearings. This discussion should definitely precede the adoption of any specific recommendations on military development.

This is a theme to be widely discussed. It is appropriate here to mention the fact that a large part of the ruling class in the Western countries in reality—and not at all our imagination—still adhere to the strategic goal, one which was worked out in detail and, in the opinion of Westerners, tested successfully during the years of stagnation, namely, of exhausting socialism economically. Escalation of a science- and technology-intensive arms race is viewed as the main instrument of this attrition. The stake is on maximalising the dividends of the West's advantage over us in technology. This is not the negligible machinations of marginal right-wingers; this calculation is incorporated into the officially endorsed policy. To illustrate, let us cite the above-quoted report by the American president on the national security strategy. In it the following point is made without beating around the bush: "...our defense policies stress that the United States and its allies must continue to enjoy technological superiority over the Soviet Union."⁹ It is with an eye to maintaining this edge that the conservative quarters in the West are seeking to cut our country off from the mainstream of scientific and technological progress. What is more, this line is constantly being modernised. The latest proof is the "competition strategy" that has come

into vogue in America. It is aimed at imposing upon us unfavourable "rules" of running the arms race by concentrating efforts on those sectors of military research and development where the United States is ahead, and to force us into disproportionately high and rapidly devaluing investments in defence.

One of the main premises of new thinking is the demilitarisation of relations between the USSR and the USA and between the states of the two social systems in general. It would be self-delusion to assume, however, that progress towards demilitarisation of rivalry will automatically rid us of all our problems. Highly influential quarters in the USA and other Western countries proceed from the belief that the relative redistribution of functions within the scheme of the competition of the two systems between the field of military rivalry *per se* and the spheres of the economy, technology, science and information science in favour of the latter meets the West's interests. The West is not concealing its intentions to try and take advantage of the USSR's economic difficulties to narrow our sphere of influence in the world.

Time magazine reasons: "...if the rivalry evolves from one based on military assertion into one dominated by the force of ideas, the appeal of values and the potency of economic systems, then the U.S. and its allies have much to gain and little to fear."¹⁰

We are guided by the directly opposite conviction, that in the context of demilitarisation of interstate relations socialism will be able to develop its enormous potential and advantages over capitalism as a political, economic and social system. But it is high time we adapted to the fact that until we show with action that socialism today—not tomorrow or the day after tomorrow—is at least as effective—from the socio-economic standpoint and in terms of the everyday life of the ordinary man—as capitalism, the West will not give up its plans for historical revenge.

ONCE AGAIN ON NATIONAL MIGHT

THUS, both the future of the renewal of socialism and the Soviet Union's weight in world affairs today hinge on how successfully we are able to handle the task of drastically modernising the country's aggregate potential to meet the realities of the 21st century. This is hardly being promoted by the fact that the very categories of "national security", "national might" and the "nation's potential" have been elaborated poorly in our political science, which led an underground existence until recently.

One thing is clear: today the potential of any country is determined decisively by the human factor which we wrongly discoursed on abstractly so often in past years. The human factor is a multifarious one. It includes good physical and mental health, modern occupational skills and a high work ethic, a harmonious combination of healthy individualism with a sense of collectivism and public spirit, a solid general-educational level and effective leisure, adaptivity to new information, a clear vision of the meaning of life and the prospects for social development, and much, much more. The structure of successful societies, writes S. Huntington, one of the most prominent American political scientists, encourages "competition, mobility, fluidity, pluralism and openness—all qualities that prevent a society from becoming mired in a network of collusive deals in which everyone benefits to everyone's disadvantage."¹¹ Unfortunately, we are familiar, and not from hearsay, with a situation where everyone was suited by everything, although each person realised that things could not go on that way.

Particular mention should be made of the importance of openness for social renewal and of the function of protecting against stagnation which it performs. The transition from industrial and technological societies to research and information ones, as Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out at a conference in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in summer 1988, is becoming an accepted fact. Information is ever more directly acting as the mainspring of social progress. It can be surmised that in the 21st century the normal functioning of society will simply become impossible without a constant and intensive exchange of information. Accordingly, openness should be regarded as an absolute imperative of national security. Incidentally, in order to augment the national wealth and national might, the USA very skilfully and energetically exploit the orientation of American society—historically a society of immigrants at absorbing from outside everything that can prove beneficial. I will adduce several examples. Thirty-six out of the 114 American citizens who won the Nobel Prize in science and medicine between 1945 and 1984 were born abroad. One out of every five American engineers is a foreigner or was born outside the country. This is also part of the answer to the question about the nature of the phenomenon of the relatively steady development of American capitalism for more than a century.

In the final analysis, a nation's wealth, banal as this may sound, is determined by its economic health. So as not to repeat ourselves, it would be best to cite the basic tenet of Paul Kennedy, which is the leitmotif of his book, namely, that "without a rough balance between competing demands of defense, consumption and investment a great power is unlikely to preserve its status for long".¹²

¹ *Izvestia*, Feb. 24, 1989.

² Report by the President to the U.S. Congress "National Security Strategy of the United States" *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 88, No. 2133, 1988, p. 6

³ See: *International Affairs*, 1989, Nos. 4, 5

⁴ *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p. 53

⁵ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 295.

⁶ L. B. Johnson *The Vantage Point Perspectives of the Presidency*, 1963-1969. New York: Popular Library, 1971, p. 347

⁷ "America and the World." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 3, 1987/88, p. 515

⁸ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 18, No. 23, 1982, p. 766

⁹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 88, No. 2133, 1988, p. 8

¹⁰ *Time*, July 27, 1987, p. 16

¹¹ *Foreign Affairs*, 1988/89, Vol. 67, No. 2, p. 88

¹² P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* London, 1988, p. 416

Neutrality and Good-Neighbourliness

Franz VRANITZKY

ANYONE CONCERNED with the foreign policy of today's free and democratic Austria should take account of the historic changes that have come about in this country in the 20th century if he wants to grasp its role and standing in contemporary Europe. A brief description of this historical background strongly influencing also the present role and orientation of Austria will help one appreciate the significance which the policy of this state has for European peace, stability and security.

The point is that in this century Austria has undergone more marked changes than any other European country. In less than five decades it changed from a European power to a small state, from a small state to the "Eastern Territory" (*Ostmark*) of an empire that had grown ephemerally in size through a war of conquest and violence, and from *Ostmark* to a country composed of four occupation zones until it finally assumed its present state form and life style.

The transition experienced by Austria in this century is particularly obvious in light of the circumstance that what was left of Austrian foreign policy early in this century was hardly worth the name. Unable to really play the expected role of a great power, and losing ever more the conceptual and material instrument for keeping the centre of the continent stable, old Austria became the "sick man of Europe" on which all the crises of the European system seemed to focus. To be sure, it was not only old Austria that failed under the 1914 European system; the latter failed for its part due to the proportions of the Austrian crisis.

The young republic founded on the ruins of the Hapsburg empire in 1918, between the two world wars, found no firm, secure place for itself in Europe. What Hitler's armies seized in 1938 was hardly an independent state. It was a country weakened by a fratricidal civil war and having lost the last remnants of confidence in itself and its last protector, the Italian dictator Mussolini. Nevertheless, it is a fact of history that we owe our new will for independence to precisely the loss of our statehood and the anger aroused by National Socialist despotism.

In April 1945, the liberation of Vienna and Austria began, with the Red Army playing an outstanding role in it. The formation of a provisional government under State Chancellor Renner opened an entirely new chapter in the history of Austrian independence.

The formation of Austria's new foreign policy passed through two distinct phases separated by a memorable date, May 15, 1955. The first

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phase was the struggle for the Austrian State Treaty, for independence and an end to foreign occupation.

From April 1945 on, Austrian governments saw their paramount goal in the conclusion of an international treaty that would enable the country to gain sovereignty. How arduous this path was is illustrated by the number of rounds of talks—over 350. Under the State Treaty, Austria was to be provided with all the necessary foundations for its future political and economic existence. It was to be placed in a new and guaranteed position in Europe and the world. Along with subsequent agreements there arose the task of solving all the problems which had cropped up during and after the war between Austria and other countries, primarily members of the anti-Hitler military alliance. Austria was prepared to pay by way of compensation the purchase price of so-called German property since it was inside the Soviet occupation zone. Its readiness to shoulder this material burden was as great as the burden was heavy. No price is too high when the issue is freedom.

The year 1955 was a year of new powerful incentives to detente throughout Europe. Relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were normalised in close temporal connection with the signing of the State Treaty. The same year, the Soviet Union renounced its right to have a military base in Porkkala, Finland. Thus two more states having no foreign military bases on their soil emerged in Europe simultaneously after 1955. Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's trip to Moscow in September 1955 resulted in establishing diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, a development which also helped normalise the situation in Europe.

Special importance attaches in this connection to Austria's explicit will first stated in the Moscow Memorandum of April 1955— to adopt in future a permanent neutral status "on the Swiss model". The independence of Austria written into the State Treaty was thus consolidated, and on October 26, 1955, when all foreign troops had been withdrawn, the country acquired this status in complete freedom.

Our neutrality has been described by some as the price of the State Treaty, a kind of morning gift from the young republic to the powers that be, and compared to "neutralisation". This is at variance with both the letter and the spirit of neutrality, chosen by Austria of its own free will. Neutrality limits the state not the citizen, as Federal Chancellor Raab worded it one day. Hence it does not even curtail a whole number of important socio-political options, such as the choice of a Western model of economic and social structure. Its roots lie deep in the First Republic. According to Otto Bauer, a major figure in the Austrian social democratic movement, the Social Democrats took this road as far back as the period of the First Republic. Afterwards, in the early years of the Second Republic, the idea of neutrality was first resumed by Federal presidents Renner and Körner. At the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1954, Austrian Foreign Minister Figl made on behalf of the Federal government a statement virtually expressing the nation's will for neutrality.

In addition to the idea of the need to restore Austria's independence, it was often suggested that its neutrality could serve as a model for the solution of the German problem. Some believed that the Soviet Union considered it particularly important to lure Germany away from the North Atlantic alliance by proposing neutrality. The propaganda campaign using arguments of this kind may have been opportune for or even necessary to the Soviet Union at the time. Still, no Soviet politician can be said to have stated anywhere that neutrality could pave the way for German unification. I therefore have no doubt that neutrality was primarily an Austrian solution to one of the main problems after

1945 and that its significance to Europe should be seen above all in regard to Austria.

NEUTRALITY AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT OF DETENTE

ORIGINALLY those responsible for framing a new Austrian foreign policy had two guidelines to go by: one, Swiss neutrality with its constitutional provisions, and the other, Sweden's non-alignment with military alliances and its active role in the UN.

Indeed, between the neutrality of Switzerland, a product of classical European international law, and the neutrality of Sweden equally rich in traditions of non-alignment, recent decades have witnessed the rapid development of a new European form of this institution: permanent Austrian neutrality. The keynote of our neutrality, like the neutrality of other European nations, will invariably be, as in the past, the desire to preserve our own independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Thus we owe it to the voluntary assumption of neutrality obligations based on international law that the independence of the Second Republic, enshrined in the Vienna State Treaty of May 15, 1955, found guarantees consonant with the times, being supplemented by a neutrality policy. There is an inseparable connection in today's world between the independence and neutrality of Austria; had not Austria been neutral, it would have been denied unity and freedom in the same way as other peoples affected by the aftermath of the second world war.

Like any real neutrality policy, that of Austria is primarily a policy for peace. It is aimed, above all territorially, at creating and preserving conflict free zones. Besides, its purpose is not only to prevent a geographical extension of wars and conflicts but to widen the conflict-free area in world politics.

It is typical of the present political situation in our part of Europe that between the Pannonian lowlands and the Franconian Juras there exists a pact-free zone established by two Alpine republics, the Austrian Republic and the Swiss Confederation, with non-aligned Yugoslavia supplementing it in Southern Europe.

However, a neutral state also renders the international community numerous services, such as mediation, negotiations, participation in courts of arbitration, representation of interests of other states, and so on, all of which are ultimately aimed at extending the conflict-free area in world politics and joining in the settlement of crisis situations brought on by major conflicts of our times.

Still, the Austrian Republic's approach to foreign policy is necessarily influenced by socio-political concepts of the values of the Austrian people. While keeping out of blocs in pursuing its foreign policy, Austria firmly abides by its initial concepts of the social, democratic and liberal values of West European pluralistic society to whose spiritual heritage it has made a substantial contribution. It follows that a permanently neutral Austria, like other countries of Europe, holds a place of its own in the community of West European democratic nations and the Western world generally.

There is no doubt that one of the first aims of Austrian foreign policy after 1955 was to normalise relations with neighbours in West and East alike, to settle the conflicts which had led to war and a postwar situation in relations between Austria and some of these countries. For instance, there was a conflict between Austria and Italy over the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol; its roots trailed back to that ill-starred year, 1919, and the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty.

Thanks to the constancy of Austrian foreign policy and the political wisdom shown by Italy, this conflict may now be regarded as settled in

the main, provided that in the near future the parties to it succeed in completing South Tyrol's autonomy, which has grown in 20 years, under a plan of measures at national and international level drawn up in conjunction with the area's elective representatives. Be that as it may, Austria will continue playing the role of defender of South Tyrol, a role now recognised by Italy.

Austrian policy towards neighbours in Eastern Europe was equally important in ensuring that peace prevailed on the continent. In shaping its policy towards countries in the Danubian basin, Austria cannot disregard the fact that the region is inhabited by peoples with whom we have maintained common economic and cultural ties for centuries. By settling out shortly after 1955 to normalise relations with these countries, Austria found a road which other countries soon took in their turn, a road leading to an easing of tensions on the European continent and lending substance to the first phase of the policy of detente in Europe.

As a result of evolution over a long period marked by down-turns and breaks, our relations with East European countries are at a high degree of intensity now, with variations from country to country. We have good-neighbour relations, with all East European neighbours. These improved contacts have led, not only to economic cooperation with East European countries that is very important to us, but to a gratifying intensification of human contacts.

Altogether 300 agreements have been concluded with East European countries since 1955: on legal issues, on economic cooperation, travel, health protection, social security, science and culture. Not long ago we signed an agreement on environmental protection, a step which shows how varied and intensive our ties with these countries are. These good-neighbour relations must now be put to a new and unusual test, which is prompted by the aspiration of all European peoples to conserve the environment by joint efforts as they resist new threats to their life. A few years ago Austria and Czechoslovakia set many countries an example by signing their first treaty which provides for protective measures against the negative effects of the use of atomic energy.

A current theme on the agenda of both bilateral meetings and European forums, such as the CSCE, is also the question of how European nations, especially neighbours tied together for better or for worse, are to counter new threats to the environment, in particular deforestation. People whose destinies have been entrusted to us will also judge the quality of our good-neighbour policy according to how well we succeed in solving these problems by joint efforts.

With regard to countries having a different economic and social system, a system which has lately been set into motion, Austria anticipated the CSCE process very early, finding a basis on which to develop relations with them very similar to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

Thus the Austria policy of good-neighbour relations, as the earlier experience of detente in Europe, shows that the CSCE process rests on sound foundations and that relations of a new type can be built with East European countries with due regard to certain policy principles of neutral and non-aligned as well as other countries.

Of course, Austria was not the only European state to provide in this form the prerequisites for the success achieved at Helsinki. The new Eastern policy of the Federal Republic of Germany launched by Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt created similar prerequisites on a larger scale.

I underline here the European dimensions of Austria's good-neighbour policy, not least with a view to showing through its example that our new foreign policy based on permanent neutrality is equal to influencing European politics in a positive sense, a circumstance which, among other things, adds to our responsibility for framing this policy.

AUSTRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK of Austria's new foreign policy, the relations which shaped up between Vienna and Moscow after 1945 ushered in a period of good-neighbour policy in the broad sense of the term, namely, neighbourly relations on the European continent and joint efforts towards building what the present head of the Soviet state and the General Secretary of the CPSU CC, Mikhail Gorbachev, calls a "common European home".

However, these relations go far beyond mere good-neighbourliness, for it is a question of relations between Austria and one of the main world powers of today which, moreover, holds a special historic place by virtue of its outstanding role in the restoration of independent, democratic and sovereign Austria, an event also symbolised by its signature to the Austrian State Treaty.

While these comments concern primarily Soviet-Austria relations today, these cannot be considered, also Austria's other European ties, in isolation from history, throughout which old Austria and old Russia occasionally met as rivals but often came out as allies and guarantors of European stability—for instance, at the time when order in the world was being restored after the Napoleonic wars.

Thus Austria and Russia accumulated excellent experience in working jointly for peace in Europe. But relations between them were also upset by conflicts which often shook the old European order to the foundations, completely destroying it in the end.

However in the struggle for peace and a new European order as well as for social relations, it was not only representatives of old Austria and old Russia that met, for the Social Democrats of both countries worked together, especially before the First World War, for peace in Europe. Besides Vienna at that time often became a shelter for members of the Russian opposition persecuted by the tsar's police.

After 1917, Austria's Social Democrats consciously took a political road differing from that of the greater part of the Russian working class movement led by Vladimir Lenin. Nevertheless, the Austria working class movement was openly sympathetic to the young Soviet state in spite of the critical distance in the ideological sphere created by Otto Bauer.

A few years after the revolution of 1918 in Austria, the Social Democrats were expelled from the government by a bourgeois bloc regaining strength. But thanks to their influence, the early 1920s saw the establishment of trade relations and then also diplomatic relations between the First Austrian Republic and the Soviet Union. In December 1921, Austria became one of the first European states to sign trade agreements with Soviet Russia. And in February 1924 the two countries formally established diplomatic relations.

Between the two world wars, the Soviet Union was undoubtedly one of the European countries recognising the significance of an independent Austria for the preservation of the power balance in Europe. In the grim days when Austria was losing its independence, the Soviet Union protested along with Mexico and several other members of the League of Nations against the occupation of our country by Hitler's troops.

The liberation of Austria in 1945, in which the Soviet Army played so outstanding a role, opened an entirely new chapter in Austrian-Soviet relations.

At present their main foundations are, along with the State Treaty and permanent neutrality, the two countries' common stake in the preservation and consolidation of a European order where all countries with different economic and social systems can join efforts in the interest of the continent's prosperity and security. Recent years have repeatedly seen

Austria and the Soviet Union working together on this task, not least within the framework of the CSCE.

Trade holds a special place in Austrian-Soviet relations today. On many occasions, Austria played a prominent role in the development of new relations based on mutual interest and geared to using each other's economic potentialities. This often served other European countries as a model. In this way Austria and the Soviet Union demonstrated that the difference in economic and social systems need not become a barrier to mutually beneficial relations. Thanks to this approach, the Soviet Union took up a fairly solid place in Austria's power supply while our country contributed to the development of the industrial infrastructure of the Soviet Union.

We in Austria consider that the economic reforms which the Soviet Union is carrying out and which should lead to a wide-ranging renewal and modernisation of the Soviet economy on entirely new principles, demand the acceleration of this process in our own country, the careful adaptation of it to the new conditions of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union to give new incentives to our economic progress.

In both the Soviet Union and Austria, more and more trade enterprises are establishing direct reciprocal contacts. And in both countries the fact that Soviet small and medium-sized enterprises now pay heed to the laws of a commodity-money economy and to private initiative offers opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Austrian-Soviet cooperation in the social and cultural spheres has been offered further opportunities in recent years. There are plans for more extensive human contacts, such as partnership between cities and provinces and tourism. What Austria appreciates particularly, however, is the new aspects of Soviet life which have started the processes of glasnost and perestroika led by Mikhail Gorbachev. The ample civil rights and freedoms emerging in the Soviet Union and the vigorous activity of meetings and associations also hold the promise of improved contacts and mutual understanding with other countries, including Austria with its liberal and open law and order.

AUSTRIA AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

AFTER 1945, a key problem of Austrian foreign policy was that of participation in the rapidly emerging new process of continental economic integration. Anyone who wants to grasp this process and acquaint himself with some fundamental, decisive provisions of our foreign policy should remember that economic integration as a new form of economic cooperation between independent countries that often cuts across national sovereignty is an important phenomenon in postwar European politics. In recognising and moving on to these new forms of economic cooperation, European countries are convinced that on a continent which has become more crowded and fragile, it is only in common that they can adapt to the changed demands of people, let alone those of society. Consequently, integration means primarily discarding the economic and political mistakes and fallacious strategies of the past that were largely responsible for the outbreak of two world wars.

One purpose of the integration process, as in the case of Federal Germany and France, is to eliminate historical contradictions by using a new form of combining economies. It is beyond question that Austria had to take this road and therefore adopted fundamental decisions at a very early date, precisely when the Marshall Plan was laying the groundwork for the rehabilitation of the war-ravaged economy of Europe and for new forms of economic cooperation between European industrial countries.

Ever since then, or for 40 years past, the principles on which the Austrian policy of integration has been developing have remained the same. This has to be stressed now that a fresh debate has begun on Austria's place in the European integration process, in particular on its place in the European communities.

Special attention should be devoted to two of these principles. Austria has always sought access to every form of continental economic integration, without excluding any region or organisation. On the other hand, it has always given preference to integration forms that are within the reach of the greatest possible number of industrial countries, primarily in Western Europe. In the late fifties, for instance, Austria backed a plan to establish a greater European free trade area advocated at the time by British Chancellor of the Exchequer Maudling. It is these principles, in particular analysis of what we see as developing new lines in the European communities, that also condition Austria's current approach to the Brussels organisations.

After travelling a long and often tortuous path, the European communities have finally moved into the leading position of locomotive of European economic integration. Their vitality and growth trend find expression, not only in the fact that the Common Market already groups 12 West European countries, but in the successful implementation of such innovative projects as the creation by 1992 of an internal market that will have common external boundaries as well as economies and legislations harmoniously coexisting in many respects.

The EC's internal evolution compels Austria to change its attitude to them, and the likelihood of our subsequently joining the Common Market can no longer be ruled out.

In all circumstances, however, the aim of Austria should be active cooperation with other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) founded with its participation for the purpose of creating an internal market so as not to incur heavy loss through isolation from this market of vital importance to us which now accounts for nearly two thirds of our foreign trade.

In seeking closer ties with the EC, Austria should also use multilateral and bilateral instruments as widely as possible. Preservation and protection of its permanent neutrality in so doing should be a major principle and the highest criterion of its foreign policy in case of any bilateral approach to the EC. Austria should insist on any new link with the Common Market, above all membership, of course, being conditional on full preservation of its neutrality and a continued neutrality policy.

The place assigned to a country committed to permanent neutrality will be a sign of change inside the communities, primarily of the degree of political pluralism they achieve.

That inside the communities there are common forces which consider it possible and even desirable to assign Austria to such a place was shown by the declaration approved in West Berlin in November 1988 along with the socialist groups of the EC and EFTA and explicitly confirming the right of all EFTA countries, hence also neutrals, to enter the communities. The statements which EC Commission President Jacques Delors made in the European Parliament in Strasbourg last January were indicative of, among other things, the Common Market's increased sensitivity to suggestions and demands coming from EFTA countries regarding integrational policy. For their part, the latter tried at the Oslo summit last March to bring about a more unified approach to the EC.

Thus the year 1989 is likely to be eventful in terms of European integration. In any case, Austria will decide on its new policy towards European integration before the year is out, after a thorough and exhaustive discussion and analysis of all economic and political details.

AUSTRIA AND THE CSCE PROCESS

THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS regarding the substance and trend of Austrian foreign policy show that we conceive European policy, not only as certain political lines but as all-European one as well. European dimensions of Austria's policy are understood as a set of instruments to be used all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This explains why the European process launched by the Helsinki Meeting in the summer of 1975 is very important to Austria, which devotes a notable part of its foreign policy effort to contributing to the success of this process. The fruitful outcome of the Vienna Meeting of the participating states of the CSCE last January was no exception.

The significance of the meeting to precisely Austrian foreign policy is seen in the appraisal made by the highest authority of the Socialist Party of Austria, the leading government party, which at the end of the Vienna Meeting released the following statement:

"The results of the Vienna Meeting and the far-reaching significance of its decisions will in future determine in every sphere the forms and substance of cooperation between European countries, the United States and Canada. They contain important provisions orientated to the future and bearing on the life of European nations from the issue of basic human rights and freedoms to control over conventional armaments and disarmament.

"The success of the meeting also shows that a correct evaluation of contemporary European politics is behind the demand which the SPA invariably advances and puts into practice as the ruling party by insisting that the highest priority be given to the detente process in Austrian foreign policy on the understanding, however, that every aspect of Austrian participation in the CSCE process has priority over other foreign policy tasks...

"The Vienna Meeting as well as future exigencies of the CSCE process emphasise the important functions which Austrian neutrality is called upon to serve in present-day Europe; they urge devoting special attention to the further development of these functions and doing everything possible to avoid conflicts over goals between the neutrality policy and other foreign policy interests of Austria."

AUSTRIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

BY JOINING the UN, Austria assumed part of the responsibility for developments in world politics. For all that the UN has failed to become the centre of a collective security system, it fulfils important tasks in settling crises of world political significance in the second half of this century. Large and small countries are participating in this on an equal footing.

A permanently neutral state can also assume important functions in the distribution of roles required by a collective security system. Thanks to successful cooperation in the UN Security Council and to the part played by Austrian Armed Forces in the fulfilment of peace-keeping tasks of the UN, Austria's neutrality policy has been gaining in relevance as a factor useful to the international community.

For Austria, the UN is the main forum for upholding its foreign policy principles. Cooperation within the UN and the political principles reflected in our declarations and votings enable our country to demonstrate its policy at world level. This is particularly useful with regard to those countries for which the UN is often the only place of contact with Austria.

Austrian policy at the UN has assumed clear-cut forms in the decades of membership. On the basis of its spiritual and political standing in today's Europe, our country has been participating independently and objectively in political decision-making by the UN.

It was, of course, in the early years of Austria's UN membership that a strong temptation was felt to expect so neutral a country to pursue a policy of "keeping silent on and abstaining from voting on disputed issues", which would have befitted it most, as Karl Zemanek pointed out in his Zurich report several years ago, rightly adding that such an attitude might have been prompted by "inexperience and timidity".

Austria was unquestionably quick to overcome that initial phase. Its first important change of policy at the UN that constituted a turning point was obviously the decision to submit to the UN the conflict between Austria and Italy over the implementation of the Paris Treaty provisions concerning South Tyrol. That this initiative of ours succeeded and that intervention by the UN led at last to talks—true, it was not until years later that they resulted in the current detente process, the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement and a plan for the adoption of appropriate measures—undoubtedly encouraged Austria to devote greater attention to the UN in the foreign policy area.

Austria's intensified cooperation with the UN was undoubtedly prompted in decisive measure by the political, and hence legal, conviction growing in step with organisational experience that Austrian policy at the UN—a policy resting on definite principles—would create no problem for either the legal status of neutrality or the neutrality policy itself.

This is consonant with Austria's concept of freedom, to which it adheres that, in common with other progressive democratic governments of Europe, consistently represents at the UN the idea of the right of nations to self-determination, thereby contributing to the national liberation of the non-European world, to victory over colonialism and imperialism. In line with its humanist tradition, Austria has made it clear that it prefers the path of peaceful reform.

In participating in the establishment of a new world order in economic relations between industrial and developing countries, Austria has been seeking to help narrow the gulf dividing the world into North and South and stave off serious, increasingly brutal clashes between poor and rich nations of the world. As a UN member, our state is one of the most determined advocates of basic human freedoms and rights all over the globe.

Permanent neutrality as a legal and political institution of the community of nations will win worldwide recognition only when it begins functioning in this community as a whole and not merely in one geographical region. As regards Austria's policy of permanent neutrality, the UN provides a very important framework for the performance of such a function.

An important function of today's neutrality policy is our aspiration to propose Austria as a venue for international meetings and a seat for international organisations. It is true that after the IAEA and then UNIDO had installed themselves in Vienna, this provided the prerequisites for performing such functions. Nevertheless, Geneva visibly remained a considerable way off due in particular to the presence of major intergovernmental organisations and numerous non-governmental committees.

But Austria had to close the gap in something more than the presence of international employees and organisations. Events of political international significance which occurred in the first half of this century placed Austria in a geopolitical situation calling its role as a centre of international organisations into question beforehand. Unlike Geneva or

New York, Vienna is a city where none of the main languages of the contemporary world system is spoken. The installation of new international organisations in Vienna is hampered by, for instance, the fact that Austria's ties with more than 100 third world countries, have been developing slowly. Only a few African, Asian and Latin American countries have permanent diplomatic missions in Vienna.

These major shortcomings notwithstanding, and due to sustained, persevering efforts, Vienna is being called the future third seat of the UN. This year our country is going to join the UN in celebrating the tenth anniversary of the inauguration of the Vienna International Centre, now staffed by upwards of 4,000 employees of international organisations.

AUSTRIA AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

WHILE THE RESTORATION of independence and sovereignty after 1955 provided Austria with all prerequisites for promoting new relations with third world countries, this new dimension of our foreign policy developed very slowly.

But even in those years, no major political changes in distant corners of the third world passed unnoticed by Austria. They were particularly marked in the early sixties, when nearly all of Africa found the road to independence in a few years and almost without bloodshed. This development and the will for continental unity which Africa showed clearly, above all in the early years after winning independence, seemed to signal that the continent was about to win a very important place in world politics. Bearing these processes in mind, Austria, too, considered it necessary to extend its ties with countries to the north and south of the Sahara.

The lack of colonial experience often proves to be a shortcoming in dealing with non-European nations. A common colonial and often a cultural past creates bonds in the form of a common language and civilisation, which means that countries like Austria cannot use tried and tested diplomatic methods. Lack of colonial experience also has an adverse effect on the thinking of the country's own political circles, which do not consider that Austria's interest in ties with overseas countries flows logically from history, as in the case of smaller countries such as Holland, Denmark, Belgium or Portugal.

There can be no doubt, however, that the appearance of Austria in third world countries was received favourably. Many countries and their representatives looked on Austria from the first as a trustworthy political and trading partner.

Austria's growing political ties with third world countries involve the problem of its relations with non-aligned states with which Austria maintains good, friendly relations on a bilateral basis. Many of them wish to develop ties on a multilateral basis as well—in areas where they are at one within the framework of the UN or the non-aligned group. In 1970, Austria accepted for the first time an invitation from this group to send a delegation to the Conference of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka (Zambia). In so doing, however, we made it perfectly clear that Austrian membership or an observer status, often seen as a preliminary step toward membership, was out of the question for important political reasons.

The political content of these ties was characterised by the readiness of the non-aligned countries to grant Austria a special status, that of a guest, and hence by their interest in establishing special relations with precisely a Western state adhering to a distinct foreign political orientation.

Thus political ties between Austria and third world countries are definitely at a stage of favourable evolution. Austria and its foreign policy are trusted, not least with due regard to the principles of permanent neutrality and both within and outside the UN. Many countries as well as spokesmen for important political movements in the third world, in particular liberation movements, are more and more confident of the ability of Austria and its leading statesmen to assume special powers in delicate crisis situations.

The role assigned to the head of the Austrian government in Middle East politics and the potentialities of our foreign policy in speeding a peaceful settlement in the Middle East lend that confidence a special character. Frequent contacts between Austria and Arab countries, above all with the PLO, had an educational, mellowing influence on precisely these partners. As a result, the principles of a peaceful Middle East settlement were reinforced, with politics and diplomacy, treaties and agreements gaining the upper hand over a tough policy of force.

Austria's Middle East policy was proved sound above all by the decision which the United States adopted in the closing weeks of the Reagan era in favour of starting a direct dialogue with the PLO after the example of many West European countries. As the first country to have built up the necessary potential for such dialogue, Austria plans to go on contributing its share to the peace process in the Middle East.

But Austria does not intend to stay inactive in other third world seats of crisis should the sides in a conflict ask it to play its role. For instance, it acts as a mediator by chairing the UN International Conference on Kampuchea, and its policy in Central America is aimed at strengthening the resolve of small countries of the region to settle the conflict on their own. It is also taking part in the current UN action for granting Namibia independence.

Lastly, development aid and development policy form an important part of relations between Austria and third world countries. While we do not now meet these international obligations to the extent that we are expected to, a growing section of our public, prompted by the opinion of the movement of solidarity with the peoples of the third world, insists that our country should steadily increase its contribution.

NEUTRALITY IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY

THOSE RESPONSIBLE for the implementation of our foreign policy knew from the outset that the independence of Austria was by no means guaranteed by the mere formal act of members of the international community recognising it. The very interest of the great powers in preserving a vast area of disengagement in the heart of Europe would have been insufficient as a rationale for maintaining Austria's neutrality and independence, and a rudimentary collective security system cannot assure Austria full protection in accordance with the charter and practice of the UN.

It follows that by the turn of this century the independence and neutrality of Austria will be guaranteed (given support from the majority of the international community, of course) only if its foreign policy is assigned permanent functions. The interconnection of the idea of neutrality and the idea of solidarity is an important component of this function. Austrian neutrality, brought into being as an instrument of *detente* in European politics, must also prove its usefulness and efficiency to the world.

Socio-political concepts of the Austrian people's values give the country's foreign policy a direction when the task is to come out in defence of basic human rights and freedoms in every part of the world or to

build bridges between poor and rich nations. But in pursuing these aims, our foreign policy stands guard over peace and progress because economic and political injustice is fraught with conflict more than anything else is. Today's policy of permanent neutrality is a combination of the static and the dynamic, of consistency and change.

Consistency is Austria's will for independence, which is guaranteed by permanent neutrality. Our resolve to preserve our neutrality by every available, primarily military, means is seen by the community of nations as a factor for the stability and predictability of the policy of a state situated in a sensitive area of Europe.

But while Austria seeks more than other countries to preserve and maintain the constancy of its foreign policy, it nonetheless has complete freedom of choice. First of all, it will be free to choose an arena for its foreign policy. It is going to carry on an active foreign policy primarily where service in the cause of the international community is particularly necessary, but it will do so in close connection with its internal concepts of socio-political values.

Introducing elements of disquiet into world politics must under no circumstances become a foreign policy task for countries committed to permanent neutrality. A neutral country must therefore sometimes renounce any function or active role in such a policy. This applies especially to that sphere of politics which involves international organisations, is based on universal principles and is not directed against any group of countries.

Displaying opposition to apartheid or other forms of racial discrimination does not mean violating in any way the obligations imposed by the policy of permanent neutrality, for the whole of civilised and politically organised humanity has declared a boycott of the practice of racial discrimination. To fight for improvement in the economic and social position of the majority of humanity is to lay the foundations now lacking for the organisation of a new world order.

More than any other form of state-to-state behaviour, permanent neutrality makes definite serious demands on every country committed to it, admitting of neither passivity nor indifference. The particularly well-balanced political judgement required of neutral countries in doing their duty must be based on firm convictions. This makes neutrality and lack of principle incompatible. As it is only the state itself that can choose the direction in which to advance and that is expected to spell out its policy, the position of a permanently neutral state in world politics is particularly difficult.

Permanent neutrality, which is of political significance to the whole world, now also concerns the non-aligned movement. To achieve certain objectives in world politics, neutral and non-aligned countries seeking independence can occasionally travel part of the road together not ignoring, nonetheless, the distinct lines dividing them. But ultimately every neutral state must rely on itself in making decisions and acting.

Permanent neutrality as an institution now represented primarily by several European countries will be an indispensable factor for stability in the community of nations at the turn of the century as well.

THE STEREOTYPES WE ABANDON

Vladimir STUPISHIN

RECOGNITION of the priority of common human interests over class, national, state, regional and all other group interests and the awareness that world politics should be determined by the priority of common human values have given statesmen and politicians a far wider scope in their efforts to find a solution to the main problem of our time—the survival of the earth's civilisation.

This postulate is not a mere repetition of Lenin's well-known ideas, since nowadays other, more formidable dangers lie in wait for mankind. Hence the acute need for a new theory of international relations. Without such theory, without a scientifically grounded doctrine, there can be no serious policy—only improvisation incapable of yielding long-term results.

However, no new theory appears from thin air, it is rooted in the past. Of course, criticism of the past is necessary, but this does not in the least mean that all that is criticised should be rejected in advance. Moreover, this allows one to make surprising discoveries confirming the old maxim that the new is often the long forgotten old. Not all that is new is necessarily good. And not all that is old is necessarily bad. Some may say this observation is quite banal. I do not think it is, because even at the present stage of our history, characterised by the striving for common sense, there still are quite a few people who would like to destroy all stereotypes without exception as something allegedly outdated and useless.

Don't they know that complete rejection of any experience of the distant and recent past in the course of pseudo-revolutionary cardinal reforms has brought so many misfortunes to our people over the past seventy years? (Incidentally, rejection of old experience is a kind of stereotype, too). Fortunately, this does not apply either to the history or the present of our foreign policy. And the awareness of the value of the interests that are common for all of mankind is a clear example of a creative approach to the past, to the positive experience of mankind.

As regards the devising of methods for developing a new theory of international relations, let us add to it a proposition which in my view is very important: a critical analysis of the past should necessarily be accompanied by a no less critical assessment of the present. An unctuous attitude to the present-day foreign policy is like Judas's kiss, it is like makeup which may turn out to be poisonous. No politician or statesman can know all, no matter how clever he is.

An intelligent leader relies on a team of advisers. Like all people, they may make mistakes. But in a democratic rule-of-law state the right to make a mistake is balanced by the right to public analysis and critic-

ism of the actions of the powers that be, which should have powerful limiting factors, a public with its own press being most important of these.

OPENNESS IS A BIG STEP towards creating such limiters capable of correcting the malfunctioning of power. But so long as these limiters have not been brought entirely into play (a rule-of-law state is yet to be built), it is reasonable to listen to what others say about us. But we must listen not to extolment, of course—something we liked so much in the period of stagnation and still like, and that is a pity, for extolment is not worth a penny, including the way it is presented to the superiors by conformist bureaucrats, be it diplomats or journalists.

Also of no use are all kinds of concoctions, which are all too numerous in the Western press, despite the obviously positive changes in the perception of our image in the past two or three years. One can hear reasonable and therefore useful criticism of our actions and our order, the criticism we need, from our partners—statesmen, politicians, diplomats, businessmen, journalists, men of culture, political scientists, lawyers, historians, and economists.

Incidentally, no one prevents us from responding in one way or another to the criticism from outside, to argue against the critics, and criticise them. Without such mutual criticism, perhaps no talks, compromises and agreements would be possible at all. By subjecting the policy and regime maintained by the government of one or another country to constructive criticism we can better understand the state of our own society and political activities and, moreover, correct our ideology and our domestic and foreign policies. This is an interesting display of interdependence and "feedback" in the integral organism of the world community of independent nations.

The form of existence of this community is stable and, I should say, conservative, which is one factor guaranteeing mankind's survival. There is no doubt that mankind should discard all that is outdated, all that hampers the advance to a more reasonable and fair arrangement of the world community as a whole and each of its components. On the other hand, there are traditions that obviously must be preserved. Conservatism is not necessarily adherence to what is obsolete; it may be adherence to what is customary and suitable, what has justified itself and does not contradict progress.

This is most characteristic of the diplomatic service, which simply cannot exist without traditions and precedents. International, above all inter-state, relations need smoothly operating mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation, without which stability and security are inconceivable.

The current restructuring of our economic and political system is a substantial factor of the development of the international community, but it can become a source of positive changes in international affairs only if our partners see that Soviet policy, far from harming their interests, meets them to a great extent and is based on common interests and values.

But to reach this state of mind it is not enough to propound even the most attractive ideas and proposals evoking a favourable response among that part of the public abroad which is concerned over the destiny of our world. Painstaking work in the quiet of scientific libraries and conference halls, requiring much time, patience and, the main thing, professionalism, is needed to make good proposals yield good results.

This implies, among all else, a respect for history, the desire to obtain and hand over honest information to decision-making bodies, an

ability to critically assess facts and decisions, including our own, and to reject obsequious lies, conformism and futile illusions.

The demand for a professional approach to foreign policy does not at all contradict people-to-people diplomacy. Forums of scientists, writers, men of art, journalists, as well as peace marches, mutual visits, athletic competitions, youth exchanges, tourism, and simply trips made by people to other countries—this is not only wonderful, but is necessary to the world, to all people.

Political analysts are correct when they say that it is desirable that the public take part in shaping the foreign policy of the state by discussing foreign-policy issues, by proposing and comparing various versions of possible actions in the world arena, and analysing the pros and cons of foreign-policy activities. Such public involvement can only help improve our foreign policy. The public should be able to criticise the decisions that have already been passed and are being implemented, and not only approve them “unanimously”. That would only be useful.

But I am unimpressed by complaints that the public allegedly learns about some or other diplomatic decisions “when they have been adopted”, and it is left no other choice than to “approve” them. What is meant by this is to make public the very decision-making process; in my view, we should hardly accept this view, for all our respect for people-to-people diplomacy. I am for preserving and even promoting a professional attitude to foreign-policy affairs, since this is precisely what we often lack, which is the source of many of our miscalculations occurring not because there is not enough openness, or glasnost, when diplomatic measures are mapped out.

I hope that in future, too, the public will learn about the details of such actions only after they are approved and carried into effect, because to meet the above-mentioned wish concerning these matters is the same as for Garry Kasparov to make public the plan of his next game with Anatoly Karpov before the game starts, since the diplomatic service in accomplishing foreign policy tasks is very much like a game of chess.

“There can be no absolute openness in diplomatic work.” This conclusion by Eduard Shevardnadze is confirmed by the entire history of diplomacy. For all the openness of our foreign-policy strategy, in real life we cannot do without tactics, without predetermined positions and moves, which for some time should better be kept confidential.

Otherwise we would not need diplomacy: it would be enough to exchange public declarations through the mass media. Experience has shown that such “newspaper” diplomacy does not suit our foreign partners. The situation in which negotiations and what is regarded as diplomatic secrets (which—may our opponents forgive us—will remain a prerogative of professionals) should, perhaps, remain as long as the states and corresponding government services are the chief subject of international relations. And even if we wished to act in a different way, our foreign partners would not allow us to do so.

It is right that it is difficult to change tradition. But is it so necessary to change all traditions? Foreign policy and diplomatic practice are precisely the sphere of state and human activity where the traditions respected by all or by many often act as the cementing factor, a foundation of generally acceptable understandings.

A tradition is, in fact, a stereotype of conduct. If confirmed by positive experience, it is a positive stereotype. In biology a dynamic stereotype is what allows a living organism to adapt itself to the environment. A diplomatic stereotype is also a type of adaptation, that of the state to the international environment.

RESPECT FOR TRADITION does not in the least belittle the importance of the critical analysis of the past carried out to clarify the assessments made and to reject the stereotypes which lead to wrong decisions, to reject "absurd stereotypes", as Mikhail Gorbachev put it in a recent speech in Britain. It is important, however, to avoid, whenever possible, producing new clichés which are most immune to criticism because they come not from the retired or the deceased, but from the powers that be, or from those who believe that they are the mouthpiece of those in power and champions of a predominant ideological concept.

New thinking in foreign policy has not escaped such trendy stereotypes, remaining at the same time surprisingly faithful to some old and absolutely unprovable postulates. Priority among the latter belongs to the thesis deduced from the axiom that there is a close relationship between foreign and domestic policies. The axiom has been tested by practice through the millennia, and there is nothing to argue about. But let us see what conclusions are made from it by some of our scholars.

In an article published in the weekly *New Times* G. Batygin, D. Sc. (Philosophy), refers to the idea of Immanuel Kant that the foreign relations of a state are a continuation of its domestic social life, and that despotism in a country will inevitably make it an aggressor, a bully in the world arena. And the author does not say a word of disagreement with that judgement. Another author, A. Kozyrev, writes much in the same way. In his view, "dictatorial, anti-popular regimes are ... inevitably spreading methods of violence beyond their national borders".¹

Meanwhile modern history does not confirm the inevitability both authors have emphasised. Even despot Stalin was not a "bully" in the world arena. He was too busy with other things. Besides, he had no opportunities to pursue such a foreign policy, though, perhaps, he wouldn't have minded doing so. His cousin in the totalitarian family, Adolf Hitler, did "bully", but Stalin didn't, and that is that.

Let us examine more recent dictatorial anti-popular regimes. There were quite a few of them until recently in Latin America and in Africa. But did many of them try to spread their methods of violence outside their countries? It does not look like either the Seoul despots or even Pinochet ever tried to. So where did this conclusion about the inevitable foreign aggressiveness of a tyrannic regime come from? Is it not invented merely to prove the "correctness" of the postulate, which is so far from reality, that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy and even almost completely depends on the character of a political regime and, to carry the logic through to the end, on the personality of the despot himself?

I think this kind of reasoning does not tally with simple facts, because even in the worst periods of our history, before and after the 1917 revolution, Russian, and then Soviet, diplomacy did not only make mistakes. There were achievements, and great ones. I shall name but a few diplomatic actions of recent years which, in my view, are most outstanding, such as the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1975, the Final Document of the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE in 1983, the establishment of the mechanism for the East-West political dialogue which acquired a new quality in the years of perestroika but had originated a long time before that. Drawing on the results of its peace-loving foreign policy, the Soviet Union was in a position to devise subsequently fresh approaches in the spirit of new thinking.

Our diplomacy showed positive results even when they would have been totally impossible, if foreign policy really were a continuation of domestic social activities. But it is not, nor can it be, though the inte-

rests and considerations related with domestic policy do influence the governments' foreign-policy decision-making.

Foreign policy cannot be such by virtue of its nature: as distinct from domestic policy pursued only by a national government, there are at least two partners in inter-state relations, and in our time there are often many partners joining in collective actions. Thus, the European process develops on the political groundwork provided by the Helsinki Final Act, which is a result of the foreign-policy efforts of 35 states, a product of the thoroughly verified balance of their interests. (Incidentally, the Final Act was signed, among others, by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a French bourgeois politician; Carlos Arias Navarro, a Spanish Phalangista; and Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader of what we call the stagnation period.) As we see it, there is no direct connection between foreign and domestic policies.

And one more remark: despotism in the past often turned the country under its power into an aggressor. But now the international community has changed, and so have the morals of international affairs, and the possibilities for aggressive actions have been largely narrowed down. No room has been left even for the policy the West termed the "Brezhnev Doctrine".

The class character of the conduct of one or another state in the world arena, too, is often judged by the alleged connection between its foreign and domestic policies. This approach hardly meets the task of deideologising relations between states. But what if we look at the matter with open eyes, without the blinkers of the class approach? Then we shall most certainly see the national dimension of the foreign policy of a given "bourgeois" state. Moreover, we shall, perhaps, also notice what we refused to see before: in our time the state itself as a subject of that policy is not always a champion of the interests of a single class, say, of the bourgeoisie.

During the joint rule by Socialists and Communists in France in 1981-1984, the French state clearly did not, at least for some time, express the interests of monopoly capital, whose role was largely limited in the national economy. During that period the French state defended to some extent, even though inconsistently and undecidedly, the interests of workers, farmers, employees, and intellectuals.

We observe something of the kind in other industrialised countries of the West, in any case where a regime of democracy, which we often mistakingly call bourgeois democracy, has taken shape. Judge for yourselves: human rights and other aspects of this democracy are neither a gift nor a contrivance of "insidious capitalists"—they have been won by the working people with the active participation of Communists, Social-Democrats, Liberals, intellectuals, trade-union activists, and other social forces; they are the result of the influence of progressive ideas, the needs of economic growth and the technological revolution.

If we abandon the stereotyped view of our Western partners' foreign policy as an expression of the interests of the class of capitalists, this may help deideologise inter-state relations and clear peaceful coexistence of the extraneous features.

We have long ceased to think the way the characters of Russian writer Saltykov-Shchedrin did: "if it were not for us, the Germans would have nothing to warm their houses with". We have realised full well that the desire for independence, political originality, and the national values of other nations should be respected, that differences must not be a factor of alienation from one another but, on the contrary, they should be a factor of mutual enrichment and mutual attraction, and now the possibility exists for them to be such.

OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE now is the task of conducting a more profound analysis of the philosophical aspects of our view of the world today and of the current historical processes seen in the context of including in scientific and political practice the notions that are comparatively new to us, such as the interest of the whole of mankind and common human values. Here, too, we cannot do without taking a close look at the past, without a new approach to some stereotypes, both useful and outdated. But let us not try to do more than is possible. This cannot be done even by academic institutions. Let us confine ourselves to listing some values accumulated by the peoples of Europe and North America.

When John Kenneth Galbraith came up with his theory of convergence of socialism and capitalism, it was treated in the Soviet Union as blasphemy. Common values were not even mentioned until most recently. That we are beginning to ponder over the question of what values are common for both world systems is a veritable revolution in ideology. It meets not some temporary political imperatives, but corresponds to the new stage which mankind is trying to attain after it has objectively assessed the path it has traversed, the experience it has gained, the real possibilities for development, and the existing dangers.

Having remarked on the priority of common human values, we can complete the thought by speaking of the values of another system, which have long since become our own values as well, or may become such as the idea of the integrity and interdependence of the modern world.

The Soviet leadership has pointed out, in particular, that there exist significant preconditions for bringing the all-European integration process into play, where integration will be reciprocal and not one-sided. And, perhaps, the defects of both systems will die away in the process. I should like to make the following reservation in this connection: what we have now is not yet socialism, in my view, but a society at a transitional stage whose development was interrupted by distortions and deviations.

Neither Marx, nor Engels, nor Lenin knew what real socialism would be. We Communists are in fact only beginning to understand what it should be, and the debate on this question is just commencing. For capitalism does not stand still either, and so the big and intriguing question is: with what shall we integrate? But the preconditions for the development of the integration process can and must already be considered. This must be done to realise what we are, where we are, in what direction we are moving, and what we are to do to ensure the triumph of social justice.

The preconditions do exist. Among them, above all, are the common values we are speaking about in this article. I shall not dwell at length on what is generally recognised as the most essential and eternal values. These are, in the first place, what Vasily Klyuchevsky called "the physical conditions" of the historical process; Lev Gumilyov preferred the term "landscape".

Here I prefer the idea of the noosphere (from the Greek word *noos*—mind) advanced by French scientists and philosophers Eduard Le Roy and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and comprehensively developed by great Russian scientist Vladimir Vernadsky. In that idea Man is the child and destroyer of nature. The noosphere is the highest stage in the development of the biosphere connected with mankind which greatly influences it.

This influence should, in principle, be reasonable. And what happens in reality? The unreasonable man has been plundering the natural resources rapaciously until ozone holes appeared in the atmosphere and made a "nuclear winter" quite possible even without a nuclear war.

God gave a common home to all Europeans: "the Europe of geogra-

phy and history", as French President Francois Mitterrand put it. But what have we done to this home? Many of our rivers are dead, the forests are thinning, and the air will soon be too bad to breathe. This home, our common value, can be saved only through joint efforts, by turning the biosphere and the technosphere into a true noosphere.

Another category of common European values is the cultural heritage which is as important to us as it is to our Western neighbours in the European home. From the ancient times through the Renaissance and to our days, architecture, sculpture, drama, music, painting, and literature in the East and the West of Europe have been developing according to common canons in the constant process of cross-fertilisation. These are permanent values worth uniting around, for this is not only the past of Europe. It is its present and future.

Ecology and culture lead us to moral values just as permanent. The striving for survival makes us think about common human values, for they alone bring together most different things and make it possible to preserve the chief value—peace in Europe and the whole world. But the history of ethics which is parallel to history of human society has given us, their heirs and continuers, immense wealth, a capital of moral dictums whose triumph would be the pride of any system, no matter how the question of the existence of classes and the struggle between them is solved.

"Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets" (Matthew, 7:12). This golden law of morals has reached us from the ancient world through the Sermon on the Mount pronounced by Jesus Christ. One may hold different ideological and political views, but ethical dictums like this are a common value. So far, no one has ever said anything more reasonable and moral than the Biblical commandment "Thou shalt not make thee any graven image", or "honour thy father and thy mother", or "thou shalt not steal", "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour", and others.

The famous commandment "Thou shalt not kill" leads logically to the increasing awareness of the value of human life reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted on December 10, 1948. Its Article 3 says that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person".

"Intolerance limits the mind and perpetuates prejudices. Intolerance is always hostile to the truth and only benefits lie. The truth likes criticism and only benefits from it; lie fears criticism, for it looses because of it". This utterance was made by Denis Diderot, who called for tolerance in relations among people and set hopes upon the triumph of the truth.

We have realised the value of this postulate, which is seen, among other things, in the new policy pursued by the Soviet state with regard to the Church, a policy which is not limited to encouraging the restoration of temples and monasteries but goes further to understanding that, say, Christianity is not merely a fact of our history but also a treasury of our moral values needed by the people and the most important and inalienable components of our culture, our civilisation. "We owe our history and therefore enlightenment to the monks," said Alexander Pushkin.

"...Behave so that you would always treat man in your own person and in the person of anybody else as a goal and never merely as a means." This categorical dictum was pronounced by Immanuel Kant, and, in his and in our view, all people should be guided by that pronouncement, no matter what their origin or status may be. An echo of that dictum was also heard in the "human factor" and in the "human dimension", the notion introduced by the Vienna accords in the CSCE process.

Incidentally, it was precisely Kant who introduced the "rule of law" category in scientific parlance, and the notion was elaborated on by a series of German, French and Russian lawyers and philosophers of the 19th century—Stein and Jellinek, Constant and Tocqueville, Novgorodtsev and Kotlyarevsky. They and some other scholars developed Kant's idea into a streamlined theory, according to which the state should be bound by law and the state mechanism must necessarily be limited by legal norms adopted democratically, enabling the sovereign people to freely express their will.

They had forerunners, of course. And they obviously did not ignore the ideas of Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, ideas that had formed the basis of the first constitutional acts adopted by the Great French Revolution in the late 18th century. These ideas were later developed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, in the international human rights covenants adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966, and in the constitutional acts of most states, including the Soviet Union.

Though there are many legal acts, in some countries there are signs of rule of law, in others there are few such signs, and in still others they are absent altogether. The dream of a democratic rule-of-law state is also a common value of Europeans—this can be observed in the history of many European countries and in recent years it has become one of the clearly formulated goals set by the Soviet leadership, which is registered in the decisions passed by the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU.

WE IN THE SOVIET UNION are a long way from the democratic ideal and we are well aware of this. Therefore the best people here carry on the struggle, so that democracy as an indisputable value without which there can be no rule of law in a country would triumph at last in our country as well. It would take time to achieve this goal, but there is no other way.

The Soviet Union is proceeding steadily along the path of ensuring genuine freedom of convictions, pluralism of views and public organisations, freedom of conscience, freedom to leave the country and to return to it, etc. Our state is trying to display tolerance towards the new phenomena in society, phenomena which only recently it would have stamped out. There occur relapses today, too, but this is no longer the rule.

A more sophisticated reader may ask: so, what? There is something extremely important that divides the East and the West of Europe, despite worship of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This "something" is a stereotyped attitude to property which the French revolution had declared an "inviolable and sacred right", and which our 1917 October Revolution rejected. It would seem to be so, all right. But our time sometimes gives all too unexpected answers to some sacramental questions. Such a new answer to the question of property is being born in the process of our perestroika.

Now we are beginning to notice that the state property, belonging to the whole people, actually belongs to nobody, and a large part of it is either misappropriated by the bureaucrats who are in charge of it, is being stolen away, or is just squandered. The idea of cost-effectiveness which in practice leads to the emergence of independent, self-financing and self-managed enterprises, is being revived. But who will own the enterprises? They may be leased by their work collectives, or they may become share capital. This is not merely a theoretical proposition. This is precisely what is already being done in some places. Another important point to note here is: the result of the work done should be the property of the worker, minus the taxes and the lease pay.

The role and significance of the property of the cooperatives are increasing. In the countryside there have emerged real cooperatives and real farmers—by contrast with the state-run and state-controlled farms—which already raise the question of real ownership of the land they cultivate, even without formal denationalisation. The means of production they have are owned by them as property. And the collective farms are beginning to turn into what they should have been from the start—into cooperatives. Handicrafts are developing in the cities—using the right of so-called individual labour activity. The terms are new, but behind them one can see restoration of the property principle.

We are beginning to open our eyes to see the experience of the West. It turns out that private property and capitalism have proved very strong and it is too early to bury them—they possess vast unused reserves of development. This means that private property should not only be reckoned with, but be tolerated, with good use for socialism. One should not, therefore, strive to prove that one system is better than the other. It is the dogmatists who do that. What is needed is East-West cooperation in the search for ways of providing the best conditions for Man's life.

A sound basis for this is not only geographic, historical and cultural, but also spiritual, political and, as it turns out, common economic interests which are yet to reveal themselves more fully. We realise that as yet not all of them operate "at full capacity", but it is important to see that these values are common. We are now at the first stage of this awareness.

Having accomplished the revolution in our country, the proletarians rejected the values which seemed alien to their class consciousness and interests. There are no more proletarians, at any rate in the East and the West of Europe. There are workers, farmers, employees, businessmen, professionals, clergymen, students, servicemen, pensioners, children. Their common interest is to live in peace and survive, and to preserve their common European home. Therefore it would seem time has come the slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!" be withdrawn from our state banners.

IN CONCLUSION, I should like to make a forecast with this conditional proviso: If we, the builders of socialism, are consistent, and if we manage to build a society capable of meeting the reasonable requirements of all in housing, food, clothing, and cultural values; a society where there would be no disinherited, no paupers, and no poor people, where every man would have a job he likes, with a decent wage then no one will need any privileges.

And then, perhaps, there will appear many more new common values with Western democracies. But, of course, this will happen if capitalism goes along the path of building a rule-of-law state and a welfare society which have been much talked about and which do not yet exist anywhere. So far, no state is based on a balance of interests of all members of society and on charity towards the unfortunate, in combination with what are definite economic and technological achievements of capitalism minus its negative aspects such as the unemployment of a considerable part of its able-bodied population which is thus denied the necessary means of existence, such as the exploitation of man by man, crying inequality in the distribution of wealth, etc.

A look back at the origins allows us to make quite a few interesting discoveries which at times are unexpected but encouraging and constructive for the search of common interests with our Western neighbours.

THE MECHANISM OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

Alexei KOZHEMYAKOV

OUR COUNTRY has traditionally been interested in various aspects of French foreign policy, diplomacy included. This interest is perfectly justified, for French diplomacy has for centuries been viewed with good reason as classical and as one of the world's leading diplomacies. The skill of French politicians and diplomats has repeatedly borne out the old truth that a highly professional, tactically experienced and flexible diplomacy contributes in large measure to a state's leverage and prestige in world politics. I think France owes much to the structure of its contemporary foreign policy mechanism, its legal standards and hierarchic principles and to the place and influence of the various parts of this mechanism, primarily the Foreign Ministry.

The reappraisal now being made in our country of outdated foreign policy stereotypes understandably involves the manner in which our partners in other countries, including France, make their foreign policy in practice. To appreciate the motives of any state's policy, we need to have a clear idea of the political, organisational and human springs of its foreign policy mechanism. We also need to take a sober look at the experience of other countries now that we are creating a law-governed foreign policy mechanism in our country within the framework of comprehensive democratisation.

If we discard the earlier "preset concept" of history and politics we must recognise that the activity of people, organisations and administrative structures—in short, all that is generally regarded as part of the superstructure or the subjective factor—is gaining in importance. From this point of view, the foreign policy process is recovering its natural quality as one of several options.

To renounce a slogan-like, blackwashing approach to whatever has to do with the Western political system (while insisting, needless to say, on our fundamental definition of the nature of the bourgeois state) is to remove the blinkers that prevented us in the past from discerning the rational elements of its foreign policy structure which have passed the test of practice. Like other Western countries, France has evolved a particular legal, political and ideological system in this sphere. But at present it would hardly be right to attribute the existence of this system to the class factor only, to the circumstance that foreign policy is treated as a priority by Western leaders. Indeed, administrative structures are now being politicised, not so much directly, by organising them from without, as indirectly, or from within, above all by giving the foreign policy apparatus a definite ideological and political orientation.

In spite of distinctions between contemporary states as to political system, they have much in common as regards organisation of the foreign policy mechanism. There are similarities even between countries

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with differing social and political systems. An unbiased and painstaking analysis of the foreign policy structures of our Western partners is bound to help us avoid miscalculations in developing new parameters of our foreign policy mechanism.

France's experience is instructive in this respect, for the system existing in that country has been polished as it were by time and the country itself is exerting a notable influence on the concepts of democracy, in particular political democracy, which has formed in the West and throughout the world.

SOME FRENCH ANALYSTS use an almost grotesque formula to describe the general pattern of the foreign policy mechanism of their country: "We have a chief actor, the president, a secondary actor, the foreign minister, supers, the members of the cabinet, and an audience, the French." But this formula certainly does not cover all the complexities of the actual relations that form in French government bodies as they work out foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, while the constitutional foundations of the Fifth Republic are unshakable, the practices of its foreign policy agencies are changing in step with the evolution of international relations, the changing content of the country's external ties, the evolution of social consciousness at home and abroad, and the ups and downs of political struggles inside the country.

In the process, the president of the republic, who is elected by universal suffrage and direct vote, remains at the top of the foreign policy pyramid. This status of his is guaranteed primarily by his constitutional powers. The Constitution in force since 1958 follows a pattern proposed by Charles de Gaulle, who made his view on the matter quite clear. "Our foreign policy activity," he stated, "requires my leadership, for it consists in the country assuming lasting obligations of vital importance." All subsequent presidents of the Fifth Republic considered it their duty to confirm in one form or another the special predestination of the head of state in international affairs for all that, by and large, nobody in France ever disputed it.

By proclaiming the president arbiter of the state institutions of France and guarantor of its external commitments, Article 5 of the Constitution gives him grounds for making his own appraisals of the international situation and personally participating in foreign policy actions without special authorisation. Art. 15 empowers the president to lead the armed forces and head national defence councils and committees. Of particular significance is Art. 52, which provides for the possibility of presidential participation in talks on the signing of international treaties and in their ratification. All this makes the president an obligatory party to the working out of all major foreign policy decisions.

There are also other articles of the Constitution supporting the president's extensive powers in the area of foreign policy. Art. 13 empowers him to appoint officials to high positions, Art. 14, to accredit foreign ambassadors, Art. 11, to submit any bill to a referendum. Besides, Art. 16 vests him with extraordinary powers.

The president's primacy in foreign policy matters rests largely on his exclusive right to use the French nuclear potential (under the Decree of January 14, 1961) and, in broader terms, on the presumption of the existence of a permanent external threat to the country which his extraordinary powers are intended to help counter.

The very antecedents of the drafting of the 1958 Constitution indicated that the spirit of government introduced by de Gaulle was partly justified at the time by external circumstances. Article 16 as

worded initially concerned chiefly the external threat to France. According to it, Charles de Gaulle and former premier Michel Debré, one of the founders of the Fifth Republic, envisaged "the likelihood of nuclear war and the need to organise authority in a manner meeting such circumstances". (It is fair to ask how far the spirit and letter of this provision meet present-day concepts of civilised international relations and a peaceful common European home.)

However, no list of the president's foreign policy prerogatives, however detailed, can give all the reasons for his dominant position in this sphere. This is due in no small measure to the politico-ideological concept of the so-called reserved sphere. Advanced in 1959, or almost simultaneously with the rise of the Fifth Republic, this concept assigned the president to a privileged role in foreign policy and defence.

It maintained the necessity for a "reserved sphere" by arguing that foreign policy bore on all and not merely individual aspects of the life of the state and society and that therefore decisions should be made at the summit of state power. Actually the president's role and influence have become decisive, not only in making specific foreign policy decisions, but throughout the foreign policy process, including formulation of general concepts and approaches, the implementation of decisions and the evaluation of the efficacy of the foreign policy line. The conceptual background of this line is seen as fundamental.

No official institution has sufficient constitutional powers or real opportunities to seriously challenge the president on foreign policy matters.

The president's leadership in foreign policy probably stands out most of all in his personal diplomatic effort, especially at summits. What was sporadic has become an important regular diplomatic practice and a catalyst of world politics. It is evident that behind this phenomenon are the growing dynamism of international intercourse, the connection between internal and international developments, the unprecedented responsibility involved in foreign policy decision-making today, fast-growing communications, and lastly, the need to overcome "from above" contradictions which result in the lower echelons failing to make decision.

The foregoing suggests that the increasing personal role of the heads of contemporary states and governments in foreign policy is prompted in part by the objective course of international development. In this sense, the French system seems to have adapted to the exigencies of our times quite well in many respects.

FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, we are now taking a considerable interest in the functioning of representative bodies in various countries. It is noteworthy that in the foreign policy sphere, the classical principle of "divide and rule", a cornerstone of bourgeois statehood, is undergoing major changes. It was the founder of the concept of foreign policy department, Charles Montesquieu, who envisaged a special status for this agency. His famous work *On the Spirit of Laws* treated international relations as a special area to be governed by a particular regime since the problems within its range of activity demanded an early solution.²

Montesquieu saw all that had to do with foreign relations, with the possible exception of questions of war and peace, as a prerogative of the executive authority. In the early 20th century, the idea that parliament allegedly cannot keep track of a fast-changing international

card d'Estaing has said that initially France had of all other Western countries the least "appreciation for the effects of Soviet perestroika".³

Unfolding fast in France as in many other Western countries today is a process of drawing ministries and departments responsible for defence, the economy, culture and other matters, and concerned until recently with internal affairs only, into the sphere of foreign relations. The "redistribution" of the functions of maintaining foreign relations called for better coordination of the activities of the echelons involved. It led to a debate in socio-political and scientific circles on the allegedly uncontrollable character of French foreign policy. Some experts described this as largely an overstatement aimed at perpetuating the Foreign Ministry's primacy in foreign policy.⁴

Another group of French political scientists pointed out that "interdepartmental rivalries" were likely to help improve the working methods of various departments and expand the channels through which the president is supplied with international information. If, however, the executive bodies concerned with foreign relations concentrated too strictly on the Foreign Ministry this would limit their freedom of manoeuvre, dampen their aspiration for innovation and reduce their ability to promptly adapt to changes and unexpected situations.

Some participants in the debate stressed that, generally speaking, any "administrative monopoly" inevitably lowered the efficiency of all echelons of the "foreign policy community". An up-to-date approach implied more flexible administrative decisions. The main reason for insufficient coordination in the foreign policy sphere was not so much shortcomings in the interdependence of diverse departments as the fact that occasionally the leadership failed to formulate its aims clearly enough or issued no explicit directives.

In spite of the controversy over coordination, the French Foreign Ministry is still in the lead, largely as a result of the reforms effected in this agency in the mid-seventies. The explanation is not only its legal status but the presidential system of government and the concept of "reserved sphere".

As top leader of foreign policy, the president wants the Foreign Ministry to take more orders from him than from the premier. This is apparently why the Fifth Republic's foreign ministers are trusted aides to the president, many of them being his close associates. Roland Dumas' promotion to state minister is an obvious indication of recognition of his role as Foreign Minister in the present government team.

The French Foreign Ministry differs noticeably from other government departments in that it is influenced from within by socio-psychological factors typical of it alone and creating a peculiar microclimate and a distinctive intellectual, professional and social environment. As a result, the apparatus of Quai d'Orsay has a fairly durable system of stereotypes, guidelines and images. All this has a certain effect on the perception of contemporary international realities, including the attitude to innovations in the foreign policy sphere.

The importance of such factors increases in the context of the ongoing significant changes in the system of international relations, which the ideas of new political thinking are intended to bring about.

THE ECHELONS of the Elysée Palace subordinated directly to the president arouse a considerable interest from the point of view of how French foreign policy is shaped. They used to be off limits for public opinion but in recent years they have become more "visible" to the

media and researchers. The role of the foreign policy section of the president's apparatus is assessed variously, some analysts considering it purely technical while others comparing it to that of a supergovernment. Reality is far from both extremes.

The staff of the Elysée Palace office has about 30 members, with only four or five of them specialising in international problems. It goes without saying that so small a staff cannot coordinate, let alone do, the work of the entire foreign policy mechanism of the nation, nor is this its primary function. What it concentrates on is foreign policy problems whose solution depends on the president or is of some interest to him. They include the biggest international problems influencing world development trends, crisis situations, disarmament, France's position at international talks involving the president, questions relating to his visits abroad.

Some analysts consider the fact that the president's foreign policy staff is so small (partly because the Foreign Ministry maintains direct and very close ties with it) as a shortcoming. "One of the main weak points of the decision-making system in existence for two decades now," writes Samy Cohen, a French political scientist who has written several works on the subject, "is the discrepancy between the Elysée structure and the responsibility for foreign and defence policy resting with the president of the republic. There is a lack of coordination between a very strong personalisation of the 'captain's' authority and his navigation instruments, which come from a different epoch."⁵

The president and his small staff therefore risk, in Cohen's opinion, giving priority to the more pressing and relevant issues and overlooking the broader long-term perspective. They might leave the administrative agencies without clearly formulated directives and have no reserve of alternatives linking together inner and foreign political considerations. The task was, therefore, to limit the numerous international issues submitted to the president for arbitration, leaving their decision to the administration, which is directly concerned with it or to increase the staff subordinated personally to him.

In advocating a larger foreign policy staff for the Elysée Palace, however, Cohen feels that this can be done only if staff members do not become a barrier between the president and cabinet ministers nor fulfil for the ministries and their apparatus current tasks entrusted to these.

Samy Cohen admits of the possibility of setting up a standing foreign policy agency comparable to the US National Security Council. This narrow council could meet whenever necessary, inviting the ministers directly concerned to join in the discussion of the most serious problems. Periodically comparing the approaches of various departments to international problems, it would settle the more serious of interdepartmental contradictions and help promptly readjust the country's foreign policy priorities. But while the French system would seem to lend itself to establishing such an agency, it has not done so. Cohen sees one reason for this in the Foreign Ministry's reluctance to have a competitor in the form of a French counterpart of the US National Security Council.

THIS ANALYSIS of the French "foreign policy community" would be incomplete without mention of the role of political parties in it. Paradoxically, their role, so important in home policy, is far less noticeable in foreign policy. To be sure, large and influential opposition parties never miss a chance to take exception to actions by the president or the government and to state their own views, which may concern matters of principle or programme, in particular European and

disarmament problems. However, they can hardly be said to have complete and elaborate alternative foreign policy programmes.

This state of affairs must be due to the idea of a national consensus over foreign policy issues, which has deep roots in the political culture of the Fifth Republic. To infringe on it would mean shaking a principle of the foreign policy mechanism and, indeed, of the whole political system of the country. A latent factor for this kind of unity or at least this adherence to "good form" is that each leading party seeking power has an understandable stake in not calling the established order in question.

It is therefore very important for parties to ascertain how sensitive public opinion is to foreign policy issues and to shape their tactics accordingly. Opinion polls suggest that at decisive moments in political life, such as presidential or parliamentary elections, the French take little account of the foreign policy views of candidates or the parties behind them. Interest in the international aspects of election battles is plainly declining with the poorest section of the population. Elections for the European Parliament are probably a special case, for problems of the European Community are increasingly linked with the internal social and economic problems of the member countries' electorates.

I am not implying that the role of parties in the foreign policy process is immaterial. Still less do I mean to say that French opinion is indifferent to international problems. Many examples to the contrary indicate a trend towards the polarisation of views and assessments and a sharp clash of opinions over issues of principle.

French Communists have been active critics of official foreign policy in recent years. As for the Right and part of the Centre, their acceptance of President Mitterrand's foreign policy line is anything but unqualified on every point. The new inner political climate which has developed in France over the years of "coexistence" spurred the formation by the French of a serious outlook on the problem of national consensus over foreign policy. A seemingly simple question arose: Why is it that France, a traditional arena of sharp inner political struggles, is so unexpectedly unanimous on foreign policy (something which France's West European neighbours lack, incidentally)?⁶

Revealingly, it was the centrepiece of national consensus, the attitude to the defence doctrine and disarmament, that led to an open controversy in the country. The FCP took an explicit stand against the French military programme for the further buildup and modernisation of nuclear weapons. In late 1987, François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac made the difference in their approach to a "double zero option" clear enough.

Pierre Hassner, a politologist, writes that the more the president and the premier insisted that there was a solid national consensus, the more often he recalled the saying: "Don't touch the vase, it is broken." Hassner adds that basically there is consensus but that, "being eroded from within and attacked from without, it can survive only by changing".⁷

Without going into the details of this complicated question, I wish to note that one reason for the changed view on national consensus is, in effect, the circumstance that the country's political forces are not prepared to find a common response suitable for France to the evolution of the military-political situation throughout Europe. A further factor is the positive changes that have occurred in French public opinion even though some of them do not show clearly enough.

In practical terms, a party's influence on the foreign policy process changes considerably according to whether the party is in power or in

opposition, in a situation where its critical attitude fits in with the inner political struggle. Ruling parties normally avoid a direct connection between their views and government policy, which is purposely freed from direct party influence. This is not only because it is more than the relevant echelons of the party apparatus can do to compete with the government in keeping track of all processes and phenomena in world politics but also because they proceed from the fundamental postulate that a foreign policy led by the president must reflect national interests and not the views of the party serving as the mainstay of power.

Nevertheless, the foreign policy activity of the ruling majority parties does not come to nothing—it merely changes its trend. Besides supporting the country's foreign policy line, in particular through the media, these parties effect feedback with national and international public opinion. They are faced with the important task of detecting changes and new ideas in this sphere, in particular among experts on international affairs and in social organisations so as to turn them into specific recommendations.

Operating as "laboratories" of ideas, parties prepare statements, occasionally in the nature of programmes, on various key problems. These statements, many of which bear on elections and offer a vision of likely developments, are not, however, strictly binding on the future government. By getting their supporters into government offices responsible for foreign policy, parties maintain fairly close, if informal, relations with the administration. This enables them to keep up a durable connection (which is not always obvious) between the political leadership and civil society in working out foreign policy decisions.

IN EXAMINING the main peculiarities of the foreign policy mechanism of today's France, it would be wrong to withhold a general appraisal of it from the point of view of democracy. Yet the majority of French politologists and lawyers, while debating the merits and demerits of the country's political system, give little attention to its foreign affairs. They regard the strongly hierarchic character of the foreign department as a logical product of the existing legal system. Debates on democracy therefore fail to focus on this sphere.

Things should certainly not be oversimplified by reducing the entire foreign policy process to the functioning of the top echelons of state power. It is apparently logical, however, that the principles of French foreign policy are defined by the nation's top political leadership. The foreign policy department is closely linked with the inner political system of the country and is sensitive to changes in it. There are numerous ways in which the French can express different opinions on foreign policy issues, thereby exerting indirect influence on the official line.

However, as a matter of fact, the mechanism for shaping French foreign policy is, now as in the past, far less sensitive to pressure from without and guarantees a reasonably high degree of control over the "foreign policy community" by legal and political means. What is a certain rigidity of this system is made up for by the flexibility of various informal ties and the practice of supplying public opinion with ample information on world politics and on steps taken by France.

Until recently, the West described the procedure of approving foreign policy decisions used in the Soviet Union as undemocratic. Some pointed ironically to certain advantages of the procedure, which they said made it possible to adopt important decisions promptly,

without "democratic delays". It is time to admit that this criticism was justified in a measure.

In watching how our partners, including France, make their foreign policy, we cannot help assessing our observations in light of the task of setting up a well-functioning foreign policy mechanism meeting the main criteria of a rule-of-law socialist state. Eduard Shevardnadze said in one of his public statements that this task was becoming particularly important "because the degree of the democratic orientation of policy in general and diplomacy in particular can be judged according to how this mechanism is functioning".⁸

Having a clear idea of the reasonable limits of "full glasnost" and democratisation in this sphere, which are conditioned by the present state of international relations, we are set, here too, on extending democracy and creating a constitutional mechanism for shaping foreign policy, with the people as its maker.

The experience of other countries, which is a result of their independent choice and accords with their distinctive legal systems and their political history and culture, is both useful food for thought about our own road and a new area in which to compare the socio-political practices of various countries from the point of view of democracy.

One of the numerous definitions of democracy offered by French history says: "Democracy is the possibility of arguing about what democracy is." I think the debate on this subject should also concern the manner in which foreign policy is made in each particular country.

¹ A. Duhamel, *La république giscardienne. Anatomie politique de la France*, Paris, 1980, p. 31.

² See Charles Montesquieu, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 295-296 (in Russian).

³ *Paris-Match*, Dec. 29, 1988.

⁴ *Politique étrangère*, No. 1, 1986, p. 146.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁶ *Politique internationale*, No. 35, 1987.

⁷ *Esprit. La France en politique 1988*, p. 74.

⁸ *Izvestia*, March 22, 1989.

We Shall Live as We Decide Now

IT IS A WIDELY KNOWN Russian phenomenon that since time immemorial the intelligentsia has been actively involved in various areas of Russian life. Its foremost representatives have been crusaders for truth, for a better national future.

The present time, if anything, is no exception. In the days when the country's fate is being decided, the responsibility of the artistic intelligentsia for the destinies of individuals and the whole humankind is greater than ever.

The name of Mikhail Ulyanov is known to many people in this country and abroad. Head of the Vakhtangov Theatre, People's Artist of the USSR, Winner of the State Prize, Hero of Socialist Labour, People's Deputy, Member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU, he is a man of strong civic commitment.

International Affairs. Mikhail Alexandrovich, as an artist, public figure, citizen and family man, how do you see the country's internal and external life today?

M. Ulyanov. Let's face it, our life, is very intense and in many ways tense. On the one hand, there appeared a glimmer of hope that our former, sinful life would change. Both we and the state have sinned. So now there is a new hope. This is on the credit side. On the other hand, the perestroika work has brought the cleavages in our society into sharper focus. Some people take a tough stand against perestroika for the simple reason that they have for years been trying to foster an individual that is a "cog in the wheel", an unthinking person who only lives by the immediate concerns of the day. Now attempts are being made to wake up this individual, but he doesn't feel like waking up because it is more comfortable to sleep. He doesn't mind living in poverty, though not in rags, he would rather be poor and indolent. He resists attempts to stir him to more active life.

Another kind of resistance comes from people who can only exist at their present level if the administrative powers are stronger than the people's powers. When the people becomes stronger than the administration they will naturally be thrown out. They don't want that to happen. They are clinging to their position like grim death. They are resisting, sabotaging and struggling.

None of those who oppose perestroika can come up with an alternative. What do they propose? A return to Stalin's "iron fist", Khrushchev's voluntarism, Brezhnev's stagnation? At the end of the day, what do they have to offer apart from the fact that they are defending the old times? But if the old times were so good, why are things so bad today? If we had been following the correct course why are we in such an impasse now?

There are some extremist forces that want to see everything remade at once. But to attempt to remake everything at once in a country as huge as ours means to unleash incredible anarchy and chaos which no one would be able to sort out. The country is too large, the dreadnought is too huge to make a sharp turn as if we were a little boat. It takes time. And this is precisely what worries people.

People are awakening and seeing the world from two sides, as it were. On the one hand they had suspected all along that our previous

life had been far from perfect. But when some aspects of our life, only tiny fragments of it, were revealed to them, their hair stood on end and they shrank from the truth in horror and said, oh, no, we'd rather not know, we prefer ignorance to knowledge.

External life seems to be more decent and more favourable. We are treated differently than before. We are a nation on which great hopes are pinned. Two years ago, when I was in Italy, the papers were full of news about our country and all the meetings and conversations I had revolved around "perestroika, Gorbachev, socialism and new winds". I found very much the same attitude in Britain recently. When I asked, "Why do you feel so excited about our perestroika?" they replied, "Your success will be our success. The success of perestroika means a more stable world. The world must be balanced by two forces, but not by arms as it's clear that you can't prove anything by arms, but only by the force of dignity of the two groups of states." You know, it's like a good family. If mother and father are intelligent and live in harmony then everything is well balanced. But if they don't see eye to eye that's the end, the family falls apart. The same is true of the world. Of course, the world is diverse. Perhaps the comparison is simplistic, but that is the way it looks to me.

The approach of Gorbachev and the country's leadership is to seek resolution of problems and not confrontation and it is a position that is desired and welcomed in the world. People are tired of threats, tension conflicts, fear of tomorrow.

I. A. What, in your opinion, would guarantee the success of perestroika?

M. Ulyanov. I don't think we should begin rectifying the state in which our society finds itself by seeking instant redress of the moral and ethical distortions which exist and are only too apparent. Man is weak, he is prey to vanity, selfishness and greed. And he will remain so. But if these human foibles are reinforced by lies, hypocrisy, duality, the loss of all inhibitions, the calling of white black and black white, lawlessness, the violation of the rights of the individual, and, indeed, the destruction of the individual, by apathy, crass indifference, the thirst to grab more at the expense of others, by social injustice, dependence on those on high, impotence in the face of lawlessness, and the rape of common sense by bureaucratic nonsense—then man is brutalised. And then everything turns upside down. economics, politics, art, daily life—everything.

What to do? To try to change man without changing the conditions of life? Or to change life so as to change man? Being determines consciousness, this has been drummed into our heads from childhood. But we would often like to see a consciousness that does not correspond to our existence. We want to see a progressive, decent, good man while the conditions of life are often the opposite of those needed to bring up such a man.

Monstrous distortions appear when man becomes the means, when ideology replaces life and when it is not socialism in the service of man, but man is in the service of socialism. There emerge cults, big and small, the peasantry is cruelly and thoughtlessly decimated, the cream of the intelligentsia is exiled, free thought becomes the most heinous sin, constitutional provisions remain on paper and the constitution itself is not meant to be used. Then public consciousness, culture and art fall under the sway of wicked double-speak, double standards, official lies encouraged by conferring titles and honours on those who lie. If a person has to spend hours standing in queues to buy staple food items, if he is confronted with gruff, surly shop assistants and officials, if there are no laws—enforceable laws and not laws proclaimed on paper—that would really protect the rights of the individual, any individual and not only an outstanding individual—how can you expect people to be human? The

gap between slogan and life is growing ever wider. How to bridge it? I think the conditions of life should be changed, to use the current phrase, words should be matched by deeds. But how do you go about changing the conditions? Where do you begin?

As I see it, if perestroika is to be a success, we must, while being aware of the complexity of the gigantic economic system and the moral problems, translate our achievements into laws as quickly as possible. So far, we've talked a lot, but much remains as it was. We are very slow in getting rid of ingrained life habits. They must be got rid of and "exorcised", so to speak, through legislation. If we say one thing but our life continues to be governed by the outdated laws of the 1930s and 1940s, then we won't succeed.

Another thing we need to do in order to succeed is, while being cautious, to be more resolute in making certain decisions. Look how we have been shilly-shallying over the question of cooperatives. First we allowed them, then we banned them, first we set one tax, then another. In other words, we try to eat our cake and have it too. We want cooperatives to yield benefits and yet we are afraid that—God forbid!—some people might get rich. But you can't have it both ways. It's either—or. Either the cooperatives will turn in a sizeable profit and contribute it to our table, to our life, and get rich in the process. Or they will be stifled and turned into little more than work associations of invalids.

Of course we should not be rushed into hasty decisions, but on the other hand, a wobbly and indecisive reform of economic, political and constitutional life could deepen the crisis. We must all think about it together.

The country is in a fever, it is trembling like in an earthquake. A lot of new phenomena appear. When asked whether I think we should have a second or a third party and a multi-party system I reply that we shouldn't do it today. We shall tear the country apart and slip into civil war. People will reach for their axes, stakes, it'll be terrible if the Russian spirit of revolt is aroused, there would be no stopping it, and a Stenka Razin will always be found. The situation being what it is, we have no alternative leader. So, we must give Gorbachev all our support. This is not toadying. I say this out of fear of upheavals that may occur if we are not united around one force.

I. A. What, in your opinion, is the main challenge of perestroika in the intellectual sphere?

M. Ulyanov The spiritual sphere takes on special importance today. Formerly, there was no spiritual sphere for the simple reason that nobody asked you what you felt, no one asked you what you thought, no one asked you what you brooded over. It was assumed that people were thinking about Brezhnev, that they loved Stalin and were ready to give their lives for the country, for Stalin. That was it. But the world is much more diverse, awesome, complex, interesting and mysterious. From the letters I receive I see how much pent-up anger and bewilderment there is in people, how eager they are to pin the blame for what is happening on someone. Some people feel that if a culprit is found and punished everything will be straightened out. But that is not so.

The spiritual domain is becoming important because one has to be spiritually enriched in order to be democratic and free. A slave, an ignorant and ill-bred person cannot be free. Freedom and democracy presuppose a certain spiritual level. This does not only mean reading books, it covers the whole area of relations among people.

Take for instance the Russian village of old. People were poor and wore bast shoes, but they had values which no one dared to ignore. The peasant wore bast shoes, but he knew that he should respect elders, that he should call his juniors to order if they misbehaved, that one shouldn't

spit in the community well, that one shouldn't cut the woods near the village. The church was held in high regard.

In short, there was a code of ethics, of spiritual life. All this was destroyed in this country. Church, morality, conscience, honour—everything was destroyed: for such a large nation as ours cannot be ruled by one man. If the people are on their knees and glorifying one man, they lose their dignity. People said one thing and did another, lies were covered up with high-sounding phrases, corruption was rampant, whole sections of our society were corrupt. The people who lived well were not those who worked well but those who earned well, people were not promoted on merit, ignorance held sway. Many of our leaders couldn't speak Russian well enough, let alone know philosophy or what have you.

All this gradually brought out nihilism, resentment, rudeness, boorishness and, most of all, anger which has swept many sections of our society. Consider the following situation. A farmer starts taking land on lease and earning big money. What happens? His farm is set on fire. Why? He makes a lot of money and I don't. Can't you work and earn too? No, I don't want to work, I want him to earn as little as me. This is ignorance and savagery, this is anger and malice, lack of any moral checks. We are not afraid of anything, we don't value anyone, we don't respect anyone, and we don't obey any laws. As a nation we face spiritual collapse unless we do something about it.

And yet, the nation is already being enhanced spiritually. When it became known that four of the delegates to the 19th Party Conference were thieves and bribe-takers this came as a shock to the conference. "How could such a thing happen?" Now we have found out that such things can happen. Did it shake the Party? No, to my mind, it strengthened it. The fact that the Party said that any law-breaker, especially someone who holds high office, will be thrown overboard—this fact has strengthened the Party. For if I know that someone is a thief, a bribe-taker and a grubber, and yet he can't be touched, then I do not believe in the Party. The Party regenerates itself by purifying itself. The Party grows stronger by telling the truth.

I. A. What can culture do to purify our society? How do you, a People's Deputy, see the role of the intelligentsia, artists, writers and journalists, your own role at the present stage in our life?

M. Ulyanov. This is the time of journalism, the time of clearing the decks, so art has stepped aside, as it were, to give a chance to journalism to perform the labour of Hercules, to clear the Augean stable of the former years. Today, the press is the locus of a heated controversy. People with a retrograde mentality are fiercely resisting the democratisation of the press and dream of turning the clock back. Then they could live comfortably and have things all their way, they could order a paper to shut up, muzzle the press and make it sing Hallelujah in chorus. Then a journalist was reduced to dust for a mildly critical article, the press was a mouthpiece for panegyrics; lying and garbling of facts were all in a day's work for newspapers. Events were hushed up, nothing seemed to happen in our country: no disasters, no hurricanes, no landslides, no earthquakes. The press was obedient and docile.

But today, when the country's life is being reformed, the press must be a powerful bulldozer for cleansing the Augean stable. And yet, how can it be a lever, a bulldozer if the press is constantly in danger of having its hands tied, its mouth gagged and accused of all the deadly sins? The press must be free. As long as it is an organ of the Central Committee, the Trades Union Council, the YCL Central Committee, and of government ministries, there can be no serious talk about pluralism. The press must offer more alternatives. I think the editors of the major papers should be elected by congresses and should report to congresses. We

need a law on the press that would protect the interests and freedom of the media people. We need a law on glasnost reaffirming that glasnost means the possibility to express opposite points of view on any matter under discussion. The press, I believe, is the other mainstay of democracy. If the nation's laws are the foundation, the press is the voice of the people. The voice should not be shrill, or stifled, or soft and servile. It should be loud, audible, clear and honest.

I have often been asked at election meetings about my attitude to the erasing of the "blank spots" of history. Yes, we have our origins and there are reasons why we have become what we are. We must sort it out finally and clearly. But I would also like to make clear the following: we seem to be trying to find all the answers in the past and shy away from the present. We want to resolve everything concerning the past but we are vague about the future. One thing I am sure of: while looking back, we must take a longer, harder and more fearless look at today, we must work to democratise society. Not everything is in the roots, something can be found in the fruits too.

The importance of the press does not mean that art cannot contribute to the development of the individual in its own way. How? Through education, through beauty, through the moulding of aesthetic taste, through knowledge and exposure to the cultural diversity of the world. For many years theatre, like all art, was forced to bow. For years, the officialdom backed a dead art that distorted the real life of the people. The years which saw rampant terror, when human life counted for nothing, also saw the rise of a surrogate culture which was generously financed and was inculcated in the mass consciousness. An aesthetic of films, novels and plays had developed and become part of our flesh and blood, a cheerful and glib aesthetic that promoted starry-eyed optimism when artists should have been ringing an alarm bell. Realism was nipped in the bud, the bureaucratic play-it-safe attitude, meaningless control of every stirring in artistic thought were the order of the day. Instead of true information about the country's spiritual life which art alone can provide misinformation which crippled people's souls was pouring from the screen, from books and from the stage.

Even in the domain of culture, we have succeeded in fostering hatred. We said: "We are the best, all the others are bad. We are the only ones, all the others are terrible, we are right, all the others are wrong." So, instead of studying, as Lenin bid us, the whole heritage of world knowledge, we split it into two parts, "ours and theirs", "mine and his".

Such an approach brought up a generation of cultural figures who were one-sided and intolerant of any other mode of expressing life. But life is diverse. From the snake to the eagle, from a villain to a hero all this is life. Why do we insist on showing only heroes and only eagles? Reptiles exist and there is no getting away from them, we should turn the spotlight on them too.

The main task of art today is to portray the truth in an adequate aesthetic garb. We must teach people to reflect, to compare, to think. In the art field, too, we must make a resurgence of the past impossible. For this; fine words are not enough the present gains must be backed up by a legislative mechanism which would forever protect art against any encroachments, any attempts of the authorities to use it towards marginal ends. Creative unions are an important instrument. But they must have the protection of the law. As it is, the right of the unions to control the appointment of people to offices directly linked with the management of art is not respected. As before, there are constant reshuffles in the cultural bureaucracy, but that makes no difference. As before, culture is financed from what is left over of the government budget. The material basis of culture, including theatres, is in an abject state. It must be said

for fairness sake that the attitude has recently been changing, but I feel that the country's supreme body of power must come to grips with this important issue.

The lowly position of culture and the arts is humiliating for the whole people. A people cannot exist without spiritual benchmarks and spiritual constraints. Genuine democracy and freedom require inner culture.

I. A. Should culture be subject to administration?

M. Ulyanov. Culture takes its cue from life. Culture should be accountable to life, it should try to reflect its essence. For instance, Pushkin came along and expressed the poetry of life. Lermontov came along and expressed the essence of human suffering. Gogol came along and expressed the essence of the Russian soul. Dostoyevsky came along and expressed the essence of Russian suffering. They had no bosses, no government minister ever told them, "Comrade Dostoyevsky, start writing" or "Comrade Gogol, it is high time you sat down to write *The Dead Souls*". This is nonsense. So, we don't need to be controlled as we were in the old days, that is, by a cohort of bureaucrats who knew little about art but had great powers. The spectator and the reader are the most important guides.

The reader and the spectator, however, can be very dictatorial. He wants to have fun and to relax and he will dictate and demand that we obey him.

The Culture Ministry should deal with economics and organisation. This is necessary because a theatre or an artist cannot exist by themselves outside some organisation. It was not for nothing that there were circles (*kruzhki*) in the old days: Wednesday, Arzamas, The Green Lamp, The Knave of Diamonds, etc. Organisation is needed, but it should not meddle in ideological matters.

I. A. To what extent can the average modern person appreciate theatre? Should the theatre adjust itself to the educational level of our audience?

M. Ulyanov. One theatre aims to get a full house, another theatre aims to educate its audience. I dare not to speak for all the areas of culture I know the theatre world better and I can say that the spectators in their mass come to the theatre to be entertained. A minority comes to the theatre for instruction, aesthetic experience, catharsis. So, we have some good plays which are poorly attended because they make people think, compare and meditate. But a lot of people are too tired, reluctant or unable to think. So, educating the audience is a very important concern today. It's not that we should try to make people better, we should try to make them think. This is the mission of the intelligentsia. To our deep regret, we have been told to do the opposite.

I. A. What do you consider to be the most important thing for preserving universal human values, the continuity of cultural traditions so that we should not have to regret irretrievable losses later? How can we preserve culture which, to use Dmitri Likhachev's words, is an open door of the people's soul?

M. Ulyanov. The answer is very simple. Of course, it's a terrible thing that we have destroyed so many churches, and burnt so many country estates. There was a justification for this, but that makes no difference. I recently visited Muranovo, the estate of the poet Tyutchev. He was a good master for his peasants, and his house was not burnt down. It survived, and what a miracle it is. But how many wonderful palaces have been burnt, monasteries blown up, and splendid buildings boarded up! That's why we have so much filth in the land now.

We don't value anything. Churches are not valued, estates are not valued, palaces and houses are not valued. In no other country would you find such graffiti on house walls as here. Why? The answer is

simple: in the West, apartments are bought at a dear piece, and here they are provided by the state. It's not "mine but ours". This is an attitude that we have fostered gradually: "Give them hell, smash, smash!" So we've done a lot of smashing, but we haven't built anything instead. People should be encouraged to take a considerate attitude towards our heritage. It is very important that we now have a campaign to restore history, whatever remains of it, that history is now seen as a way to understanding our present state, our present worries and victories.

I. A. And yet, what are the priorities? To restore historical landmarks, palaces, and churches? Some feel that you have first to feed and clothe people and then they will go to theatres and cinemas.

M. Ulyanov. I don't agree with this point of view. Of course, people have to be fed and clothed, they are tired of queues, of scarcities. But you don't need to wear special clothes to the theatre these days. It's even become trendy to be dressed casually when going to a theatre. In the old days going to a theatre was an occasion, today it's like going to a cafe. So, clothes have nothing to do with it. It's all a matter of inner need. But who knows, perhaps it is true that people are too tired chasing goods and food to care about theatre. It is true that the business of daily living calls for a lot of effort, nerves and brains. Something should be done to improve this important sphere.

But things are not as simple as that. Let me give you an example. We were touring Switzerland. It's a showpiece of a country! Neat and trim, with mountains of butter and meat. But people don't care about theatre, nobody needs it there.

"First feed me and then I will be cultured." It doesn't work that way. Either you are drawn to culture or you aren't. And in this country too we have quite a few well-off people who don't care about culture.

I. A. You are a People's Deputy. You will be called upon to decide on the national budget matters. Where, in your opinion, should public money go?

M. Ulyanov. I am not an economist, but I think it should go to untangle the knots in such areas as food, the services, culture, and the solution of these problems calls for the improvement of the entire economic base. We should pay attention to bottlenecks. In the past, we used to be told something like this, "Wait a little, boys. You live badly, but you will have everything some day. Just you wait, and we'll build and create." For decades we have lived by slogans which succeeded each other, and in most cases represented man as a means for achieving some highest goals. A mentality has been inculcated into us whereby the present is always despised, is always considered to be "transitional", and whole generations are expected to pave the road to a "happy future" with their lives.

We must leave such an attitude behind. The people don't want to play this game anymore. Money should go into today's problems and to meet today's requirements. They will naturally lead to future problems. It would be wrong to build only clothes factories. Money will also be needed for basic research and to implement long-term plans. We are so much behind the world.

I. A. Theatre and cinema provide a bridge, a vehicle for people abroad to know us and our country. But it has to be good theatre. What is standing in the way?

M. Ulyanov. Soviet theatre is by no means the worst in the world; it is probably one of the most interesting. This is acknowledged by all world authorities in theatre, Stein, Brook, Bergman. Stanislavsky and Chekhov are loved and studied everywhere. A recent example was an international seminar in Moscow devoted to Stanislavsky. The problem lies elsewhere. Our theatre has been humstrung by official tutelage. But

here is the paradox: now we don't have such tutelage, we are free in that sense. But theatre has yet to meet the many challenges facing it. Today, we are not up against official structures, the only thing we are up against is the stormy, contradictory life which is seething. Everything is on the boil and nobody knows what sort of brew is cooking. It will settle of course, in time, but at the moment it's difficult.

Many of our theatres are successfully showing their plays abroad. For instance, Anatoly Vasiliev's theatre. He is seldom to be found in the USSR because he is truly one of the outstanding modern directors as good as any. Lev Dodin is staging interesting plays, and youth studios are commanding growing interest in the West. So, we do have something to offer.

I. A. What is basic in your election platform as a People's Deputy?

M. Ulyanov. I am an actor. I have to proceed from my background and my knowledge of life. I can't cover all problems, I don't want to be a windbag like Khlestakov. I would direct my efforts as a deputy towards creating a society that is governed and protected by law, stable and not rocked by conflicting decrees, subordinate only to the will of the people and the law of the people. This is the foundation of the edifice of state. Without a solid, unshakeable and monolithic foundation, a building cracks, subsides and can crumble. Without legislation which protects the people by a strong and insuperable barrier against all those who would command, self-aggrandise and even, on occasion, engage in some blood-letting, all talk about democracy and glasnost will remain hot air. We must have, first, an election system based entirely on the rule of the people. The people elect their government, and their leader. The people remove them from power if necessary. The people must be aware of their strength and opportunities and the leaders must be aware of their limits, duties and their dependence. The people will not suffer a bad leader and they will always support a good one. If our system had been truly democratic, a true system of the people, the people would not have suffered Brezhnev for 18 years. Everybody saw that he was incapable of governing. People saw it but there were no levers for putting an end to the tragic farce. People laughed, made up jokes, but they suffered and did not speak up. All power had been taken away from the people and given to a group of courtiers. And the so-called election of Chernenko? Things came to absurd lengths. But the people was silent. In a democratic state, even Stalin could not have appeared.

In this remarkable time which is truly fateful—our future will be as we decide now— we must try to create genuine laws and ensure that all are equal before them, that no one is allowed to change or abolish or bend the law. One doesn't have to be an expert in law to understand which law is for the people and which is against. We must create conditions that will preclude the resurgence of what we are now trying to get rid of: the consequences of the Stalin cult, Brezhnevism, stupidity, the administrative command system. We must create a state based on the rule of law, so that a repetition of the past should be impossible. If all these things reappear—then perestroika makes no sense.

I. A. How democratic, in your opinion, is our electoral system?

M. Ulyanov. It is still very much in the melting pot. In some places things are ideally democratic, in others there is a resistance to democracy. The system is being born now, it has some good and bad features, it is in some ways democratic, but there are hangovers of the past, for instance the appointment or mere endorsement of some people to public office. Newspapers covered the elections. One read that in some places elections were wonderfully fair; there were five or six rounds until those whom the people preferred were elected. From the lists of candidates I have read I can see that interesting people are being elected.

It is true, though, that such democratic procedure occasionally reveals trends which formerly were not very noticeable. Take, for instance, the elections at the Academy of Sciences. Everything was done according to law, according to rules, and on closer inspection we discovered that our Academy is conservative. Since the elections we held according to rules, their results indicate that most Academicians are against Sagdeyev, Sakharov, Likhachev, Bunich and Popov. They want to see as their deputies people of whom I for one have never heard before. The conservatism of this part of our society has been starkly revealed. Yet the very example of the Academy of Sciences is a proof that conservatism is omnipotent no more. A democratic system will eventually emerge provided it is not strangled.

I. A. What in your view are the difficulties in the emergence of a democratic law-governed state?

M. Ulyanov. The state must pass many of its rights to the people. This is the main difficulty. The state believes that no decisions can be made without it, that if people are not told which way to go—to the right or to the left—they will never know. Fear of surrendering many “reins” is the main difficulty.

I. A. Where do you think are the roots of the ethnic conflicts which have come to the surface today? Why has it to happen now?

M. Ulyanov. The main reason, to my mind, is that the nationalities problems did not get the attention they deserved, and still deserve, that problems had been shelved for years. We invented a “friendship of the peoples”, repeated it as a litany for years. Meanwhile, a lot of problem spots appeared in the friendship, but we denied their existence. Now when things have come to a head, we have discovered that our friendship is far from perfect.

Second, nationalism is on the rise everywhere. It may have some thing to do with crowded life, and with the fact that there is little culture among the majority of the people. The people can be made to turn in any direction. But the intelligentsia, and a well-educated nation cannot be easily turned. In this country, national conflicts arise out of nothing, and are being kindled by all sorts of individuals. It is believed that all the misfortunes and suffering come from a certain nation.

Similar things happen in other places. When a person is socially ignorant, when he does not know the world he lives in, when he does not understand the causes of everything, he naturally tends to blame the neighbour. But it is not the neighbour nation that is to blame.

I. A. How, in your opinion, does the Soviet foreign policy, the present state of international relations influence our domestic policy?

M. Ulyanov. International stability makes it possible to scrutinise domestic problems. If we were saddled with, say, the Carribean crisis, we would have no time for our internal problems—democracy, pluralism, and other internal affairs. We would have to muster all our strength to be ready for a showdown. But if we are assured that no serious international conflict will flare up in the near future, this will give us time to put our own house in order. It is, if you like, a repeat of the Peace of Brest, only on a larger scale.

Our people can breathe, not deeply yet, but they breathe. They ask themselves, why are we resigned to our sorry state? Are we really so ignorant and so hidebound that nothing will reform us? Have we always lived like this? But Shchukin is Russia, and Chaliapin, Stanislavsky and Mendeleyev are Russia.

“When the people breathes, there is a storm”, says a proverb. But for people to breathe deeply, all of us will have to work very hard.

Mikhail Ulyanov was interviewed by our correspondent N. Popova.

IN SWEDEN

Boris PANKIN

International Affairs. It's the job of an ambassador to further the development of relations in all spheres—political, economic, humanitarian. Have your priorities changed somewhat during your years in Sweden? What has this depended on?

Pankin. My great predecessor, Alexandra Kollontai, once said that for an ambassador the day he does not make friends for his country is a day lost. This is the main and constant priority and imperative.

Specifically, I went to that country expecting to place the emphasis on cultural ties. This is the sphere I am most familiar with. By that time I had many partners and even friends in Sweden in connection with my former work at the Soviet Copyright Agency. And it was perhaps these ties and these relations that occupied me in particular during the first months, if not an entire year. Later political contacts emerged to the forefront due to the overall situation in the world and the development of Soviet-Swedish relations. All the more so since the Swedish government was headed by such an extraordinary man as Olof Palme, whom I got to know well and, it seemed to me, whom I was on somewhat friendly terms with.

However, as far as the current period, the last three years, is concerned, the accent is being placed more on humanitarian, socio-economic and economic ties between our two countries. I think that this is the surest way to do most good for our country. I believe that Sweden's interests only stand to gain from this, too.

International Affairs. You are not a career diplomat. Your appointment as the ambassador to Sweden is your first diplomatic post. What were your earliest impressions in your new job? What was unexpected for you?

Pankin. As to my personal impressions, one of the most exciting and unforgettable episodes occurred during the very first weeks of my work. It was late October 1982, when the international situation was, as you remember very tense. On United Nations Day an impressive manifestation was staged in Stockholm. Tens of thousands of people joined hands to form a chain, laying a "peace bridge" several kilometres long between the embassies of the USSR and the USA. They wanted the Soviet and American ambassadors to come out to the demonstrators and join hands with them and thus close the chain. The American ambassador had stated to the press in advance that he would not join the demonstration because he did not expect anything good from it for himself. I said just as frankly that I would go out to the people and receive a delegation if one was to appear. But for some reason pe-

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ople either did not believe this or did not want to believe it; in any event, when my wife and I went out of the gate and greeted the delegates—a young woman and an elderly man holding a child in his arms—who had been instructed to hand me a petition, this produced a sensation; we were applauded warmly, and this was all shot by press photographers and TV cameramen. The next day I woke up a celebrity. And this was an act that I did not have to particularly reflect on; it proved to be a bridge between Stockholm and myself, between Sweden and myself.

Over six years have elapsed since then, but people still recall that event. Incidentally, it was long recalled at our Foreign Affairs Ministry, too. There was much discussion as to whether this wasn't a breach of manners. The fact of the matter is that this was virtually the first time in Soviet diplomatic history when an ambassador went out to demonstrators and received a petition. The fact that I am not a career diplomat was an extenuating circumstance. But later this came to be common practice.

As to the second part of the question, I must admit that it was unexpected for me, especially at the beginning, that a great deal of time—during and after working hours (if an ambassador has “non-working” hours)—had to be spent on so-called work with the staff and among staff, i. e., on inside matters. It seemed to me that ideally, people who no longer need “education” should be the ones to be given jobs abroad, all the more so at embassies. However, this is, regrettably, very far from being the case. The weight of obsolete traditions, corporate interests and departmental ambitions make themselves felt. In short, all of us have to break down a great deal in ourselves to meet the demands of perestroika.

Generally speaking, this is a multifaceted problem. There are many shortcomings in the way staffs are manned. Today the staffs of embassies, at least the one in Sweden, consists chiefly of area-studied experts. They are capable of professionally handling matters of bilateral relations, have a good understanding of the domestic and foreign policies of the host country, and know how to establish business and friendly contacts. However, far from everyone is well versed in such topics that have become prominent today as disarmament, multilateral diplomacy and regional problems. There is a lack of experts in international law and external economic activity. I believe that staffers should be assigned not to an embassy as a whole but to a specific group or department to deal with a particular problem. In this case diplomats could have the time and opportunity while still in Moscow to undergo the appropriate training with due account for their future specialisation.

International Affairs. What areas of Soviet-Swedish ties do you find to be the most promising? Where do you see the biggest returns for the Soviet Union?

Pankin. Without getting into so-called big-time politics, which is always in the forefront, here I will mention above all what is linked with the satisfaction of the most pressing needs of the individual. Here are several examples from different spheres. Take ecology. The session of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw devoted a special document to this matter. This problem figures prominently in the Murmansk initiatives. And yet, the environmental situation at home is chronically very unfavourable. Proof is hardly necessary. Two years ago Valentin Rasputin [a Soviet writer—*Ed.*] discussed this problem in Stockholm with Birgitta Dahl, the Minister of the Environment and of Energy. In reply to her questions, he related what is being written each day in Soviet newspapers, but she simply did not believe him in some instances.

All the same, the Swedes take our official statements on this score seriously and, like us, regard protection of man's habitat as one of the priority tasks of the entire world community. At present an international ecological institute is being formed in Stockholm, and the Swedish prime minister will be its patron. In a desire to designate right from the start the political and business level of this institution, for which the future of the famous Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is intended, the Swedish side has proposed to the USSR to join the Board of Directors and also the Research Council.

Or take another example. Under contracts with the world-famous IKEA furniture firm we have already set about renovating our furniture industry. We are to modernise some 30 enterprises which will be producing new-generation furniture. It is planned to sell it in the Soviet Union and abroad.

The food industry offers great possibilities. An entire complex of joint ventures are now being set up in the USSR with the Swedish transnational concern Tetra Pak. They are to modernise our entire dairy industry. The point at issue is the production of packaging paper, the packaging itself, and automatic packaging machines. Economists estimate that if our entire dairy industry starts using Tetra Pak packaging the effect would be as though we increased by 1,000 litres the yearly production of milk per cow nationwide. Losses would be reduced. The officials of this firm are very energetic, and at times are even taking a risk, considering the scope of the plan. The Swedes intend to invest over 1,000 million kronas (almost 200 million dollars). Construction of enterprises and delivery of equipment have already begun.

A number of Swedish companies are promoting the spread in the Soviet Union of such a valuable technical and fodder and oil-yielding crop as the rape. This crop is worth its weight in gold. Lipetsk Region has become a seed-growing centre, and the rape has already spread throughout the country.

If we take the sphere of science, such a form of cooperation where fundamental, theoretical and applied research by Soviet scientists are combined with modern Swedish engineering and technology has increasingly established itself. Such cooperation is apace in ecology, space exploration, the chemical industry and a number of other fields. Both sides are finding that this is profitable, and they are eager to develop ties.

International Affairs. Soviet policy in external economic ties has been inconsistent unsuccessful initial decisions gradually improve and, conversely, good measures are greatly emasculated by regulations and clarifications. How is this perceived in Sweden? How does it affect the embassy's work in strengthening Soviet-Swedish economic ties?

Pankin. I must say that on the whole Sweden is taking a positive attitude to and is even enthusiastic over perestroika, glasnost and democratisation, including as applied to the external economic sphere. This in principle pertains to the government, opposition political quarters and big and small business.

At the same time, they are worried, of course, about the inconsistency you are talking about. This is like the movement of an old train when the steam engine, starting to move, begins jerking and puffing and emitting clouds of steam. Initially they took a calmer attitude to snags and meanders, rightly believing that each big undertaking requires some preparation, but now they are getting the feeling that too much time has passed already. And thus far, no particular results have been evident. The paradox is that although our external economic system is being liberalised, it is in effect becoming more and more difficult to work with our representatives because some organisations keep being

created and others closed down, responsibility is footballed about from one amalgamation to another, new people appear who are not responsible for their predecessors, and so on.

Therefore, frankly speaking, a very great deal of patience is required on the part of our foreign partners to establish and develop external economic ties at this moment. A large part of my activity and that of the embassy apparatus and our trade office is being analysed and revamped. We are helping to establish contacts, we are clearing away the snags and constantly impressing upon the Swedish business community and political and economic quarters that this process is temporary and we are putting pressure to bear on our organisations and departments.

I just have to take advantage of this convenient opportunity to discuss in earnest a problem that is literally knocking on our door. I am referring to joint ventures. No matter how slowly and tortuously they establish themselves in the Soviet economy, no matter how carefully we elaborate the legal aspect of the endeavour, this form of cooperation has a big future ahead, and this, along with other circumstances, means that more and more foreign businessmen will be coming to the USSR—and not for a month nor even for a year. Sometimes—for good. And what we used to perceive as the representation of a firm looks completely different even today. This is not only and not so much flats and modest offices but entire institutions, often with space for laboratories, control and testing work, arrangement of courses and various types of seminars, etc.

As far as allocating premises for them and setting them in order is concerned, the local Soviets, including the Moscow Soviet, continue to view this as an unnecessary burden, as a result of which you can hear from all quarters that the dire need for all of the above is becoming one of the major impediments to the formation of joint ventures. It hardly needs to be said that this applies not only and even not so much to the Swedes because they are still far from being champions in the number of joint ventures built. Meanwhile, they are already offering a solution—establishment of joint ventures for the construction and retooling of housing and office space. Building them and fitting facilities with everything required for living and working and renting them for hard currency which this country is in dire need of. A workable proposal, isn't it? Nevertheless, there is still no efficient, zealous, modern chief to take charge of the effort. Unable to elicit support in Moscow, perplexed businessmen knock on the embassy door. They, too, have already realised that a request sent by an ambassador is virtually the only thing they can count on.

International Affairs. Can you name at least one transaction that was concluded properly, one which did not require enormous additional effort?

Pankin. There are many examples, of course. They are transactions which are made every year. We sell Sweden oil, which comprises the lion's share of our export to this country. Now, as in the past, the representatives of the respective Swedish companies and Soviet foreign trade amalgamations meet at the appointed time in Moscow or Stockholm and conclude contracts with due account for the prices existing on the world market and for plans and needs. Then they announce this with pleasure in the press as a particularly big event. This is truly an important result, but it is ordinary, usual.

However, all that is new, like joint ventures, payback transactions, etc., still, I must repeat, involves enormous effort and entails innumerable stages of preliminary talks, including the signing of letters of intention. Incidentally, Soviet organisations and foreign trade offi-

cials eagerly sign these letters of intention, the probable reason being that they do not feel obliged by them, while the representatives of the Swedish side take them very seriously, in the belief that in 90-95 per cent of the cases a specific transaction should follow.

By and large, it seems to me that we are evolving too slowly towards taking advantage of the possibilities which external economic ties can provide. The point at issue today should be our economy entering into real market competition-cooperation with the West in order to save itself, and not only abroad, which has already been realised and is inevitable, but within the country, which is also ultimately inevitable, but at the current stage depends on our political will and how quickly it matures and develops into the appropriate juridical and practical acts.

I ask myself the following question in this connection: Why couldn't such transnational Swedish firms as Alfa-Laval or Tetra Pak, which have their own enterprises all over the world and export up to 90 per cent of their own civilian output—packaging, separators, cold storage facilities, etc., open their own branches in our country and not only joint ventures? And I can't find an answer.

It is also taking us too much time to make headway with the creation of various types of zones—economic, free-trade, joint-venture, etc. Even today, if we look to the beginning of the 1990s, I can see such a zone on both sides of the Baltic Sea which would embody the achievements of the Scandinavian countries and the USSR and would become a generator of scientific and technical progress in our region. There is every possibility for this—personnel, capital, advanced technology for launching highly efficient production of output competitive on world markets.

The point at issue, however, is not only economic or scientific and technological cooperation. In my imagination there is a far from idle dream of a vast zone of intensive humanitarian and socio-economic cooperation, a zone that would incorporate the Scandinavian countries, on the one hand, and the northwest of the Russian Federation and the Baltic republics, on the other. I don't want to appear biased, but I image that here, on the western borders of the USSR, there are many more prerequisites—historical, geographical and psychological—for success, for a widescale experiment than, say, in the Far East, although the one does not hamper the other, of course. Let the western and eastern flanks of this truly vast power compete, after all. Let's not be afraid to learn from one another.

Take, for example, personnel for external economic activity. The fact that they are insufficiently trained is not the worst problem at the present stage. Here our partners can help. In Sweden, for example, as, for that matter, in other countries, a veritable movement for the training and retraining of these personnel has been started and is developing, and not without our push. These proposals are not charity. This is mutual interest. What is being proposed are more or less lengthy training programmes, courses, joint seminars, and exchanges of scientists and skilled manpower. Some things have already taken place, but a great deal is being slowed down due to a lack of understanding, exhausting formalities, at times out of bumpiousness and, most frequently, inordinate apprehension.

Or take the situation with trade representations. No country has trade offices like ours. This type of organisation was created by the scheme of external economic activity which has now been broken down. Is it right to leave this scheme unshakeable with regard to a trade representation abroad? I can recall that the Soviet trade representative and I sent to Moscow our considerations on the functioning of the

trade office in the new situation. We received three brief replies: the name remains as before, the staff size remains unchanged, and all the personnel, too. At the present stage shouldn't we make these offices—essentially, not formally—an inalienable part of the embassy and concentrate in them fewer but better-trained people who are capable of thinking strategically and resourcefully and of directing and regulating external economic ties? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is supposed to handle not only external political matters.

As far as the host of everyday technical and organisational functions are concerned, they should go over directly to the contractors from both sides. In developing our external economic system we need to place the emphasis on keeping the bulk of the staffers abroad not in the trade representation, where they are simply functionaries, but in mixed societies and companies especially set up and even bought, where they are Soviet merchants, financiers, managers and advertising and marketing experts.

I think that in our external economic policy we need measures today that are as bold and sweeping as those which we are proclaiming and carrying out in disarmament, security and the humanitarian sphere. However, I am still drawing the conclusion that the new thinking has tripped on the doorstep of external economic activity.

International Affairs. After living a few years in a foreign country an ambassador establishes firm business and purely personal contacts and develops an affection for the country in which he is working. Does this lead to a sort of departmentalism, where the interests of relations with the country eclipse broader interests?

Pankin. Theoretically, every ambassador likes to think of the country in which he is working as being particularly important for the Soviet Union. Such a tendency exists, and it has to be dealt with, but without excesses. In other words, an ambassador and the entire staff of an institution abroad should not be deprived of the right to explore and emphasise the specifics of the country where they represent the Soviet Union's interests. I, for one, am of the conviction that in the period of perestroika Sweden is of unique interest for us, which cannot be measured according to the customary parameters. There is a great deal here that we can learn from and adopt and that exists only in Sweden or is most manifest in that country.

International Affairs. It is a known fact that the Swedish model of socialism, the so-called third road, is one of the most efficient economic models in the world, and human rights and freedoms in this country are a priority.

Pankin. There is no pure market economy and no pure social democratic model, just as economic laws do not function anywhere in pure form, being modified as they are by national and cultural specifics and historical traditions.

As far as Sweden is concerned, the Social Democrats marked the centenary of their movement this past April. In 1932 they came to power and have been ruling for practically half a century, with a six year interruption, from 1976 to 1982. And it is accepted worldwide that the country has become a state where, simply put, people live well and where the principles of social justice have been implemented perhaps to a greater degree than in many other countries. You will say that essentially in any West European country a person lives decently if he has a job. But this is a big "if".

Perhaps the overriding feature of the Swedish model is that it is consciously geared to the exclusion of unemployment. That is, its low level (1.2 per cent at present) is not simply a coincidence but the

result of purposeful activity, of targeted policies of state and public institutions. The Swedes, incidentally, do not subsidise unprofitable enterprises and sectors. If, say, we take the entire amount of resources channeled into the fight against unemployment, approximately 70 per cent of it is spent on creating jobs in promising fields, on retraining manpower and retooling plants, and only 30 per cent on unemployment benefits. In other countries, including those where bourgeois governments are in power, the proportion is reversed.

Sweden has high taxes, perhaps the highest in the world, but they are very progressive and flexible. Their orientation is social and they are aimed at stimulating labour on the one hand and levelling out incomes on the other. Although the differences—and they are considerable—are preserved. The main thing is that the lion's share of the tax revenues are funneled into the development of the social structure, in to the social protection of the population, including maintenance of a high employment level. Also, the Social Democrats have balanced the state budget of late, which the government of the bourgeois parties could not manage.

Of course, in purely everyday terms, everybody in the country—industrial and office workers, farmers, transnational corporations, small businesses—is complaining about the high taxes. It is not fortuitous that the tax system is gradually being revamped. One has only to touch it radically for the population to rise up against such plans. Four years ago the Conservatives lost at the elections to the Riksdag precisely by virtue of their economic policy orientation.

And the Swedish economy is given a big boost, of course, by its export and transnational system. About half of Sweden's industrial output is exported and the share of this country with its population of 8.3 million comprises over two per cent in world trade.

Naturally, the workings of the Swedish model cannot be described in a few words. As a summary I will mention the main point—the Social Democrats in this country proceed not from dogmas but from life. For them everything that yields one result—a worthy life for the individual—is socialist.

International Affairs. Please talk about what is now called people-to-people diplomacy, and how the embassy works with the press.

Punkin. I have been more or less fortunate with the Swedish press because before my arrival in Sweden as ambassador I had had a certain reputation here, a reputation as a literary critic and writer who supports the most poignant and frank works by Soviet writers, such as Chingiz Aitmatov, Vassily Shukshin, Yuri Trifonov, Vasil Bykov, Vladimir Iendryakov, Daniil Granin, Fyodor Abramov and Valentin Rasputin, i. e., works which in my book of essays on literary criticism I called "strict literature". In Sweden, however, these writers were simply called semi-dissidents at the time.

When I arrived I felt that the bourgeois press was suffused with a host of prejudices against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, I must objectively admit that we gave much cause for the emergence and existence of such prejudices with our behaviour in the international community and towards Sweden, for that matter.

Take if only the two following examples. It is a known fact that for years now Sweden has been plagued by paroxysms of "submarine sickness". There was a time, about five years ago, when newspapers reported that submarine periscopes were all but popping up in front of the royal palace. This was preposterous, of course, and it is often blown up with definite aims by right-wing forces, including military circles which want to snatch higher budget allocations.

On the other hand, there was an incident when we gave due cause to whip up all these doubts and inventions. In October 1981 a U-137 submarine whose navigational instruments had gone out of commission indeed found itself at the location of a Swedish naval base, in front of everyone. Even though this was a mistake, a sad misunderstanding for which we apologised, the logic of the press and that of ordinary public opinion is such that if this could happen once it could happen a hundred times. And it is sometimes very difficult to debunk this folk wisdom.

Or take the story of Raoul Wallenberg, the famous Swedish diplomat and humanist who worked in Hungary during the war and through his mission saved the lives of a large number of Jews from the Nazis. In 1945 during the liberation of Budapest he was arrested by the Soviet military authorities and then disappeared. This, of course, did not improve our standing with the Swedish people. All the more so since for a long time, regrettably, even through Ambassador Alexandra Kollontai, we stated that we knew nothing about any Wallenberg. It was only in 1957, at the instructions of Nikita Khrushchev, that an investigation was carried out, as a result of which it was reported that Raoul Wallenberg had indeed been arrested in 1944 and had died in 1947 in his cell at Lubyanka, presumably of a myocardial infarction. The document which attests to this is a report by the chief of the prison's medical service which was addressed to the then minister of the interior, Abakumov, who was later executed for his crimes. Today we praise the feat of Raoul Wallenberg and respect his memory, but we cannot of course change his fate. But it is perhaps because we did not tell this grievous truth right away that there are still people in Sweden and the United States who claim—some sincerely and others for purely provocative purposes—that Raoul Wallenberg is still alive and is still in some Soviet prison. Continued requests are being submitted to the Soviet government to find Wallenberg and return him to his country and his relatives. And although we have today stated, at Moscow's instructions after additional checks, that the truth, unfortunately, is as was reported in the 1950s, there is still a great deal of mistrust and speculation.

Nevertheless, with the start of perestroika and the development of glasnost and democratisation, Swedish public opinion and the press have become more trusting towards us, and we are displaying greater tolerance for the whole range of public statements about us. For this reason work is now much more interesting, in some respects easier and in others, harder. In the past diplomats had to rack their brains to present in the most harmless way possible a truth that was unfavourable for us. Today we talk about everything the way it actually is. And this produces an impression and yields an enormous positive effect, even when the subject is our modern-day problems and the dark annals of the past.

Today the Soviet theme is present in the Swedish mass media virtually every day. I am referring to the efforts of our press groups and the entire embassy, visits of delegations and journalists and, most importantly, news from Moscow. It has become commonplace for Soviet TV news to appear on Swedish television half an hour after airing in the USSR.

Books, articles and speeches by Soviet officials are printed in Sweden. The statements of publicists, scholars and figures in all fields, when they openly and truthfully discuss developments in the Soviet Union and our relations with the outside world, are commented on in various manners and are frequently expounded in detail.

I frequently recall one remark made by Olof Palme. Once, at the height of another submarine ballyhoo, I complained to him that there were very many anti-Soviet articles in the press. He said: "What can I

do, Boris, if there are ten anti-Social Democratic articles for every anti-Soviet one? As you know, traditionally 80 per cent of the Swedish mass media belongs and works for the bourgeoisie, despite the fact that we Social Democrats are the ruling party in the country."

Such is one of the paradoxes of Sweden, one of the unique lessons of public opinion.

I had many meetings with Palme. They were not always lengthy, but each time they made a strong impression. I don't know whether he prepared for them the way I did, but there was invariably an interesting turn in them. In one instance this was, for example, an album with photographs of his family and his forebears who on his mother's side were immigrants from Latvia. With this he wanted to show his closeness, his informal attitude to our country.

Once, in late 1984, I visited the Swedish prime minister to fulfil an instruction from the centre; it wasn't that important, as far as I remember. He listened to me rather inattentively, and then opened his album which he had been impatiently glancing at since the beginning of our talk, thus arousing my curiosity.

When he and I finished looking at the photographs he suddenly said: "You, Mr. Ambassador,"—he preferred the more formal term of address here—"have repeatedly invited me to Moscow. I have decided to go."

He immediately took a diary out of his jacket pocket and began figuring out together with me what time would be more convenient for both sides. We were talking not about the distant future but literally the next few months.

Here I should talk at least briefly about the time when Palme made his proposal. The Swedish parliamentary elections were about to be held (they are staged every three years, in September), and the anti-Sovietism card was being played by the opponents of the Social Democrats to the full. And the submarine hysteria was rampant in the ranks of the Social Democrats, too, for that matter. The press was in an uproar over their tractability towards the Soviet Union. And here, at this delicate moment, there was the head of government and the ruling party suddenly stating his intention to make an official visit to the Soviet Union. Just recently he had given me a very evasive response to my proposal to come to Moscow if only as a member of the "Initiative of the Six", which was just getting under way.¹

"In my life I have taken part in four visits of a Swedish prime minister to Moscow," he said as he saw me to the door of his office, and, surprise evident on my face, added: "twice as a person accompanying Prime Minister T. Erlander and twice as head of government." And he concluded: "I hope that I will participate in a fifth visit."

Elated, I rushed back to the embassy to report to Moscow such a striking turnabout in the plans and aspirations of the Swedish leadership. Of course, my recommendation to Moscow as an ambassador was to send an official invitation to Olof Palme without delay and propose dates of the visit with due account for his wishes. And you can imagine my surprise when I received in reply an instruction signed by the now-retired deputy minister handling ties with Scandinavia that I report immediately on the basis of whose orders (indicating the date) I invited Palme to Moscow.

In short, it required many more telegrams on my part—and the processes following April 1985 had to establish themselves—for the invitation to be made and the time, April 1986, arranged.

Credit has to be given to the prime minister: for all his impulsive nature, he was philosophical about each "intermediate" report. "I'm sure it will be a good visit," he would repeat every time he saw me.

"Things are taking a very interesting turn in your country nowadays."

He also repeated this three weeks before his death, when at luncheon at the Embassy he and I discussed, as he put it, the "philosophy of the visit", a visit which, however, was not fated to take place.

It so happened that the last time I saw Olof Palme was literally a day and a half before his murder—on one of the most crowded intersections in Stockholm. He was alone. He was wearing a musquash fur hat presented to him in the Soviet Union, the kind a lot of top Soviet officials wear. He was standing there, holding a briefcase and waiting patiently for the green light in order to cross the street. That's the way I'll always remember him.

International Affairs. You mentioned that Palme was from a family of immigrants from the Baltic area. I suppose there are immigrants from the Soviet Union living in Sweden. What are their relations with the Soviet embassy?

Pankin. The immigrants are mainly from the Baltic republics. There are about 30,000 Estonians, 5,000 Latvians and several hundred people from regions of the Russian Federation. Frankly, before perestroika our relations with these immigrants, to put it mildly, were reminiscent of armed neutrality on both sides. A rather energetic ideological and propaganda struggle was being waged, too. However, over the past few years we have as it were come to understand each other better, and, so it turns out, there is not all that impassable a divide between the Soviet citizens working in Soviet institutions in Sweden and the people who for various reasons have left their homeland. We are promoting in every possible way their contacts with delegations from the Soviet Union, especially from the Baltic part of the country. We frequently deliver lectures and talks. We invite people to the embassy for functions arranged by the Swedish-Soviet Friendship Society, and we organise their visits and trips to the USSR.

Today many foes of the Soviet Union have become people that at least think constructively and call for economic and cultural ties with the USSR. As in any human society, there are, of course, extremists there, too, who still believe that it is impossible to find anything in common with the Soviet Union and that it is imperative first to liberate the Baltic republics from "communist oppression" and then have dealings with the Soviet Union. Such people are becoming fewer and fewer, and they do not enjoy the support of the Swedish population at large or in the immigrant community, for that matter.

The official policy of the Swedish government has been not to do anything that would hamper the favourable development of perestroika in the "Gorbachev variant". The fortunes of the restructuring drive, they say, are made in Moscow. And in this sense the hot-heads from the Baltic republics who come to Sweden seemingly for support and advice are advised precisely to strengthen ties with Moscow and with the Party and state leadership that has headed perestroika. And the very consolidation of cooperation between the Baltic republics and Sweden is viewed precisely through the prism of the restructuring process in the USSR. Such is the government's policy, and to this day there is a consensus on the issue between all six parliamentary parties. And this is a rather broad political spectrum—from right-wing bourgeois parties to the parties of environmentalists and communists...

...For a Soviet diplomat, all the more so for a person who is not alien to literature and journalism, Sweden is, aside from all else, a very advantageous observation point. Being close by, we are constantly in the thick of perestroika—we are working for it and at the same time have an opportunity to view it a bit from the sidelines and get a clearer picture of the merits of the processes taking place in the USSR and

also that of its negative aspects. We have an opportunity to form our own opinion of this as well as to compare it with the viewpoint of the Swedish mass media and Western public opinion.

In summation, I believe that our country is moving in the right direction. The processes that are taking place are favourable and necessary, and there is no alternative. However, to my mind, a great deal could be done more quickly, energetically, efficiently and, most importantly, consistently. And when I come to such conclusions I try in one form or another to use the means at my disposal as an ambassador to influence the situation with my reports and proposals through diplomatic channels, as well as with considerations stated in the press, which I still try to work in concert with not only as a diplomat but also as a journalist and man of letters.

¹ A reference to the initiative of the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Sweden, Greece and Tanzania which they have repeatedly submitted to the leaders of the USSR and the USA.

The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan

OVER A YEAR have elapsed since April 14 when the foreign ministers of four countries—Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USA and the USSR—signed, in Geneva in the presence of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, documents comprising a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. Although the texts of the documents were made public at that time in the Soviet and foreign press, we believe it is worthwhile to call to mind their main provisions. This will provide a clearer idea of how the Geneva Agreements are working and who or what is responsible for the fact that some precisely formalised commitments have, regrettably, not been implemented.

The Geneva package includes the following:

- a bilateral Afghan-Pakistani Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations in particular on non-interference and non-intervention;
- a bilateral Afghan-Pakistani Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;
- a Soviet-American Declaration on International Guarantees;
- a quadripartite Agreement on Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation relating to Afghanistan, in which the deadlines for and stages of the withdrawal of Soviet troops were defined;
- a Memorandum of Understanding, which defined the functions of the UN control mechanism for monitoring the sides' compliance with their commitments.

Afghanistan and Pakistan took upon themselves juridical commitments which exclude interference in each other's affairs in any form. They pledged:

- not to provide their territory for hostile activity against the other side;
- to refrain from all forms of intervention, overt or covert, and from any act of military, political or economic interference;
- to refrain from promoting, encouraging or supporting any insurgent or separatist activity;
- not to permit on their territory the training, equipping, financing or recruitment of mercenaries of any origin;
- not to conclude any agreements or accords with other states aimed at intervention or interference in the internal or foreign affairs of the other side;

not to allow any aid to, utilisation of, or tolerance towards terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents acting against the other side.

As guarantors of the Geneva Agreements, the USSR and the USA for their part pledged to strictly refrain from interfering or intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan in any form and to respect the provisions contained in the bilateral Afghan-Pakistani Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention.

The Geneva package thus laid the moral and juridical foundation for a political settlement of the external aspects of the Afghan issue, the main one being outside interference in the country's internal affairs and the related presence on Afghan territory of the Soviet troops requested

by the republic's government to furnish aid in rebuffing external aggression.

What occurred in Geneva cannot be rated too highly. Suffice it to say that in terms of their international and political significance the agreements signed have justly been equated with the Soviet-American INF Treaty. In any event—and this is well remembered by all—the world breathed a sigh of relief when it learned what transpired in Geneva. It could hardly have been otherwise, as this was the first time after nine years of confrontation and whipped-up passions over the Afghan issue that hope appeared that it would finally become possible to close this bleeding wound and eliminate this highly volatile issue, which was poisoning not only the regional climate but the international one as well.

As far as the Afghans are concerned, they perceived Geneva as a signal to the world that they should tackle their domestic problems themselves, without any interference, on the basis of national reconciliation and the establishment of a government on a broad coalition basis. For many countries and peoples and for all who seek a reordering of international relations, the successful conclusion of the Geneva process was an encouraging sign that a good impetus can be imparted to untying other regional knots of tension following the example of the political settlement around Afghanistan.

Thus, the importance of the Geneva Agreements is unquestionable. The signing of the Geneva accords opened the way for a comprehensive Afghan settlement. Their centrepiece is eliminating all external circumstances that did not contribute to an end to inter-Afghan discord and impressing upon the Afghans the unconditional conclusion that a constructive search for ways to overcome strife by peace negotiations and political compromise is an absolute imperative.

The Geneva Agreements were also fully supported by the world community, specifically in the consensus resolution passed at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly in November 1988, in which the agreements are applauded. The resolution contains an appeal "for the scrupulous respect for the faithful implementation of the Geneva Agreements by all Parties concerned who should fully abide by their letter and spirit", and to "working to achieve without delay a comprehensive political settlement and the creation of the requisite conditions for peace and normalisation" in Afghanistan. The resolution underscores the "need for an inter-Afghan dialogue for the establishment of a broad-based government to ensure the broadest support and immediate participation of all segments of the Afghan people".

One can justifiably query: Why is it that today, when more than a year has passed since the conclusion of the political settlement in Geneva, and when the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan has become a reality, the flames of war in that country have not only failed to be extinguished, but continue to burn even stronger, bringing fresh suffering and deprivations to the Afghan nation?

The reason hardly lies in "weaknesses" or "shortcomings" of the Geneva Agreements, as is sometimes stated even by people well versed in the Afghan situation. The problem is that the Geneva Agreements contain a great peacemaking potential which, however, can be tapped only if they are implemented by all the sides honestly and in full measure.

Regrettably, this, as we know, is not taking place. On the one hand, the Soviet troops left Afghanistan on February 15 this year in accordance with the established timetable, and the USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan are strictly complying with their commitments. However, Pakistan is crudely and openly trampling upon the Geneva Agreements, while the USA, to put it mildly, is treating its role as a guarantor of the achieved accords very lightly. There are plenty of facts to bear this out, and they

are adduced in the mass media rather frequently. They were also brought up at sittings of the UN Security Council this past April, specifically, in the address of Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdul Wakil, who presented a list over 50 pages long of Pakistani acts of aggression and interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, which was brought to the cognizance of the UN Good Offices Mission, as well as that of centres for the military training of the armed opposition in Pakistan. On the whole, however, the Afghan side sent the UN Good Offices Mission some 400 notes regarding more than 300 Pakistani violations of the Geneva accords.

Pakistani interference was particularly manifest in the developments near Jalalabad. Some examples can be cited from recent reports in Western periodicals. *The New York Times*, quoting Islamabad sources, reported approval by representatives of American and Pakistani intelligence of a plan to block off Jalalabad. The London-based *Financial Times* carried an article by one of its correspondents in which it is observed that the united intelligence department of the Pakistani Ministry of Defence which planned the seizure of Jalalabad, continues to prod the "Mujaheddin" into continuing the war. A Pacific edition of *Newsweek* reports the direct involvement of General Gul, the chief of Pakistani army intelligence, in the preparation of the operation to seize Jalalabad.

However, even if we abstract ourselves from such information, we can easily descry that Pakistan is openly ignoring its commitments, if only on the basis that a "transitional government of the Afghan opposition" has been created on the territory of that country. There are on Pakistani territory camps and centres for the training of armed antigovernment units. It is from here that an endless stream of weapons and military supplies are coming for the opposition forces which are bent on toppling the government of the Republic of Afghanistan. What is more, the Pakistani side is hampering the repatriation of Afghan refugees and refusing to take part in the mixed Afghan-Pakistani commission provided for by the Geneva accords. Pakistan is also impeding the UN control mechanism by not permitting its representatives to proceed to the points where the oppositions camps and their bases are located.

As to the United States which, as a guarantor of the Geneva Agreements, must not only disallow interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan itself but also call upon others to do likewise, it is not setting a good example. After all, by supplying the Afghan opposition with weapons on Pakistani territory, the American side is prodding Pakistan to violate the bilateral Afghan-Pakistani agreement on non-interference and non-intervention.

As a result, the leaders of the Afghan extremists, the repeated appeals for peace by the Afghan government notwithstanding, continue the fratricide and perpetrate atrocities against the civilian population. Tens of thousands of shells, missiles and mines have been dropped on Jalalabad, Khost, Qandahar, Kabul and other cities, and the rebels are trying to erect an economic blockade around them. They shoot women, old people and children at point-blank range. This was the case in the vicinity of the village of Sherkudubab near the town of Surubi, where extremists calling themselves fighters for the faith shot the drivers of a convoy of vehicles and their passengers, mostly women, old people and children, who were fleeing from the threat of death from Jalalabad and Kabul.

Although the Geneva Agreements do not contain provisions on an intra-Afghan settlement, the Cordovez Statement of April 8, 1988, which was made with the approval of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USA, and the USSR, reads that the sides shall promote the formation of a broad-based government in Afghanistan. This was unequivocal confirmation by the Geneva participants of their commitment to a political settlement of the

discord among Afghans and a desire to energetically contribute to this settlement. In practice, however, everything looks different here as well. Pakistan and the USA stubbornly reject steps proposed by the USSR and the Afghan side to cease hostilities and mutual arms deliveries to the belligerents and to launch dialogue on an inter-Afghan settlement.

All sorts of pretexts are advanced to the effect that they supposedly run counter to the Afghans' natural right to handle their own domestic matters and that the "Mujaheddin" refuse to speak to the government of the Republic of Afghanistan although it is common knowledge that Pakistan and the USA are the ones that are encouraging the "Mujaheddin" to continue the war in Afghanistan.

The following assessments can often be heard: that the Geneva Agreements have not led to a settlement of the Afghan problem and have in effect boiled down solely to the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, and that they were not profitable for the Afghan government and the Soviet Union and therefore supposedly they should not have been signed. It should be said in this connection that aside from saving the lives of thousands of its young men, the Soviet Union demonstrated by signing the Geneva Agreements its constructive approach to regional conflicts, an approach based on the new political thinking. By affixing its signature to these documents, and more so by implementing them honestly and conscientiously, the USSR made a weighty contribution to the policy of restructuring international relations and promoting international trust and security.

On the other hand, the Geneva Agreements were a good example of a search for ways to resolve other regional conflicts. Their beneficial influence has already told on the signing of accords on Southern Africa, and it is also manifest in the fact that positive elements have appeared in the efforts for settlements in Kampuchea and the Middle East.

As a touchstone of the sincerity and goodwill of the signatories of the Geneva Agreements, these documents and their implementation brought out the true intentions of those who affixed their signatures to them. The Geneva package showed the value of the assurances of those who advocate in words a political settlement in Afghanistan and an end to the fratricidal war between Afghans.

Last but not least, the Geneva Agreements, which were an appeal to peace in Afghanistan, led to an upsurge of Afghans' national and patriotic feelings and enhanced their resistance to foreign interference in the country's internal affairs. This is evidenced above all by the heroic defence of Jalalabad, where Afghans are fighting not so much against Afghans as against those who are encouraging the opposition to spill blood for the sake of their own selfish goals. The developments in Afghanistan are showing that the opposition's stake on seizing power is unrealistic. It is totally obvious that its attempts to resort to coercive methods are hopeless. The heroic defence of Jalalabad has sparked an unprecedented upswing in the patriotic spirit of a large part of the population, which is acquiring an increasingly clear-cut anti-Pakistani orientation. Today the foes of the government are being countered by a well-organised force which does not intend to give way and has every possibility to defend itself successfully.

Realising, however, that the path of war leads only to fresh casualties and sufferings for the people, the Afghan leadership is doing all in its power to convince the opposing side to sit down at the negotiating table. Once again President Najibullah set forth a set of peace initiatives on April 15 during a speech before the diplomatic corps in Kabul.

These initiatives, which the Soviet Union fully supports, are based on a clear-cut and realistic plan to achieve peace on the long-suffering Afghan land. It includes a cease-fire, an end to arms deliveries to the

warring Afghan sides, an international conference on neutrality and demilitarisation of Afghanistan, and the establishment of a broad-coalition government with the participation of all the belligerents. The USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan call upon all countries, the UN and other international organisations to bend a maximum of efforts to settle the Afghan problem once and for all, a problem that is of deep concern not only to the South Asian region but the entire world.

Today there appear to be two possible variants of the development of the situation—either a protracted bloody war, which can turn Afghanistan into a second Lebanon with all the obtaining negative consequences for the Afghan people first and foremost, and also for its neighbours and all the countries involved in the conflict, or a reasonable and just compromise that takes into account the interests of all the Afghan political forces.

The time has come when each sober-minded politician and each country should make their contribution to an end to the bloodshed in Afghanistan. Common sense and a constructive and non-confrontation approach must ultimately prevail over ambitions and selfish interests. This is a demand of the times, one which is based on the new political thinking and a revamping of the entire system of international relations in which the universal factor is pre-eminent.

A WESTERN CAPITALIST'S VIEW

Kurt A. KÖRBER

IT IS GREAT HONOUR for me to write in *International Affairs* what I, an engineer and entrepreneur, that is, a capitalist, think about the processes going on in the Soviet Union, processes which in our country we also call "perestroika". My impressions and judgements are purely personal. As a practical man who has spent most of his life working in Western production, I should like initially to share with you some conclusions prompted by my own experience. To make things clearer, I should, perhaps, recall how it all started with me.

My parents brought me up to be diligent and thrifty, and to be able to think and act independently, primarily in a spirit of social reforms. After World War I my mother along with Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht took part in founding the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany in Berlin. During the November 1918 revolution—I was nine years old then—at Party meetings I recited verses on stage calling for a renewal of Germany: "And when Christ comes again to save the whole world with its sins, he will become, like ourselves, a socialist, and join our battle".

My father always encouraged me with love and knowledge to develop my technical capabilities. I made my first invention when I was fifteen. It is commonly known now: the radio tuning dial with a moving pointer to indicate broadcasting stations. I owe a great deal to my early passion for radio, because the sale of the batches of devices I made along with the assistants I had trained enabled me to pay for my education as an engineer.

When I finished my studies, I was able to duly appreciate my inventions (now I have over 200 patents which brought me large earnings and Diesel's Gold Medal). That was how I became a businessman. At the beginning of World War II, I designed a device with a guiding beam, a kind of a precursor of the radar. I was manufacturing these devices during the war and therefore was not called up to the army.

There are three things in my life which I am proud of. First, I have never shot an army-issue cartridge. Second, I have never appeared in court as a plaintiff or a defendant. And third, I have never resorted to inherited or borrowed money when founding and expanding my industrial enterprises.

One day after the war I noticed that during lunch break my workers preferred milk and soft drinks to beer, that is, people wanted to live a healthier life. So I concluded that people would prefer also cigarettes less detrimental to health. Using a new industrial method, I designed a highly productive machine for manufacturing filter cigarettes. When I showed the first samples of the cigarettes made by that method to the

Dr. Kurt A. Körber is an outstanding industrialist and public figure in the FRG; he is the owner of the Körber AG firm. The article was written specially for INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

major tobacco industrialists, they rejected them for the following reason: "The smoker wants tobacco, not a 'hospital', and he doesn't want a filter in his mouth".

Nonetheless, I was convinced that a breach could be made in the market. So, I invested a few million Deutsche Marks in the development and rational manufacture of machines making such cigarettes.

In 1952, cancer caused by smoking was a subject widely discussed by the US public. As a result, the demand for filter cigarettes increased to unprecedented proportions in the US tobacco industry. My enterprise was the only one in the world that could provide the machines for making such cigarettes. During the first year I chartered more than thirty four engine planes to dispatch the machines to America, where they were in urgent demand. Nearly all filter cigarettes in the world, including the Soviet Union, are made by my machines. In this field I am simply a monopolist.

At present, about 7,000 people work at my 15 enterprises. They develop and manufacture machine tools for the automobile and aircraft industries, as well as for the food, confectionery and paper industries. Most copy-books produced at factories, including those in the Soviet Union, are made by my machines. Over 90 per cent of my output is exported all over the world.

I am telling you all this to show what can be achieved through individual initiative which may be freely displayed in the conditions of the Western market and commodity-money system. I wonder in this connection whether the financial resources required for carrying out some projects spurred by private initiative can be obtained at all in such a centralised economy as the Soviet one.

I do not care who owns the means of production—the owner may be the state, or they may be owned by private shareholders. Therefore I turned over the property rights for my enterprises to a charity foundation, which means that greater part of the earned money will directly or indirectly go to the society. But I have reserved for myself and the future management of my enterprises the right to use the production means, and I have legally formalised this right.

I should like to also note that more than once in my life I became the owner of insolvent and unprofitable enterprises. My experience tells me that there is no sense in helping a ruined enterprise and trying to make it profitable again.

It is much harder to modernise an obsolete factory, it is more expensive and, most important, it takes far more time than in the case of building a new one. Therefore it would be wiser for a national economy to get rid of obsolete equipment and so release the resources and production space in order to concentrate on the practical implementation of new ideas on the basis of modern production.

As technological progress was going on, I was also compelled to change the organisational structures and planning systems. For instance, I had to abandon the manufacture of some hand-made elements and go over to computer-controlled production systems. If during the replacement of an old system the new one is not accurately programmed for the new project and is little understood by the participants in the production process, then the enterprise may find itself in a tight spot because of the losses caused by the frictions between the old and the new.

In this case there appear defects in production planning, in storage, in the supply of spare parts, in the payment of wages to the workers, and in many other areas. It is clear that, if it is impossible to ensure prompt deliveries, the sale of the product on the market stops, and so the very reason for the existence of the enterprise collapses and jobs are jeopardised.

Reasoning in this way, I have already started to dwell my opinion of the modernisation of the Soviet economy and society. I do this, naturally, from the position of a Western businessman, and I'd like to stress once again that I am expressing my personal views. But in my assessments I am certainly not alone in the Western world.

In the first place, I should like to say that the initiatives of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev give the Western nations great hope associated with the real possibility of peaceful coexistence of people in the East and the West. This is caused primarily by the changed "image" of the USSR presented by the General Secretary to us in the West who for a long time lived in fear of a spectre of nuclear war which can destroy mankind and seemed inevitable to many people.

This gloomy prospect was associated in the West with a "communist threat". The new image of the Soviet Union which assumed the leading role in the struggle for disarmament in order to save civilisation and gain the opportunity to concentrate on internal restructuring, allows at least a few versions of building a better and safer world not gripped by fear as before.

The big hopes associated in the Western world with the initiatives of General Secretary Gorbachev give rise to some timid questions now being discussed everywhere. The most essential of them concerns guarantees of the success of perestroika, its prospects and, consequently, the stability of the new image of the Soviet Union.

Sure, optimism is a self-evident privilege of a reformer, while a detached onlooker is more inclined to sober analysis and forecasts. In the process the idea has arisen, among others, that the Soviet Union urgently needs to restructure its economy but, evidently, is not well enough prepared to do so.

Here is a clear example: in framework of perestroika. Western firms are offered share participation in joint ventures. My enterprise was offered that, too. I should like to explain why I declined the offer to take part in a joint venture in the conditions of the economic planning system that now exists in the Soviet Union.

To begin with, it seems to me that under your present system of centralised supply and control of resources it is impossible to ensure the deliveries of the materials and equipment required for my production strictly within fixed time limits. I and my enterprises will be able to take part in a joint venture only when there appear signs in the USSR showing that the omnipresent bureaucracy will give way to a market-oriented economy.

Judging by the data on the Soviet Union available to me, socialism has given the people many social benefits, but at the same time it has made them accustomed to a situation in which state bureaucrats have the final say, while they often lack information and competence. Under such a system, as I see it, the population cannot have a sense of personal responsibility and be ready to display initiative.

It is not surprising therefore that under these circumstances some people tend to take things for granted. But such an attitude breeds a passivity causing low labour efficiency. Those who in the conditions of a planned economic management of supply do not have to worry about getting a job or an apartment are inevitably trained to think that the state is responsible for everything and should provide for basic requirements of man. Such attitudes evidently are supported and are even spreading due to the numerous functionaries for whom, no doubt, there can be nothing worse than to give up the habitual and in the final analysis, comfortable routine.

Please, forgive me, a Western observer, the following categorical assertion: the supply system under socialism, which has been practiced over the past seventy years, was no doubt dictated by humane goals, but

it has weaned every individual away from thinking of how to ensure his own existence.

Meanwhile perestroika, in my view, needs exactly the opposite principled position, namely, a high level of personal readiness to back the all-round development of society by one's creative initiative and activity. This will require changes on a broader scale in the motivation and behavior style—something that most obviously cannot be achieved by using the old formulas of "socialist competition." I don't believe these statements differ greatly from what General Secretary Gorbachev has always emphasised in his speeches.

But there is one thing on which he will, perhaps, disagree with me. To me personally, it is necessary to stimulate the "profit motive", to use a typically Western phrase. The West with its market-oriented "capitalist system" is better off in economic terms than the socialist countries only because the vast creative potential of each individual is released more fully due to the material incentives people are given.

Of course, one can abuse personal freedom in the "drive for profit". But Western experience tells us that only a minority of the population uses this for criminal purposes. For the population at large, and therefore for the entire national economy, profit incentives are indispensable for free and creative self-expression.

In my view, the improvement of your country's living conditions would be largely facilitated by reforming the state apparatus, so that the bureaucrats would no longer want to decide and regulate in advance all questions themselves. I think that a lot more can be achieved, if one first asks the people how ability for self-organising and self-control can be enhanced and how the drive to attain the desired goal can be encouraged?

I want to stress that it is not my intention to offer solutions to the Soviet people and their elected leaders. And as I dwell on definite problems of perestroika further on in this article, I will hardly be free of the influence of the Western businessman's philosophy of success.

The activities of planners and government officials should be oriented towards organising sellers' markets and building the necessary infrastructures in order to make the Soviet economy competitive in the world, while the rigid rules regulating state trade should be abandoned. If I see it right, no programme for completing the initial phase of perestroika has so far been elaborated in the Soviet Union in sufficient detail, and the prospects do not appear too encouraging, judging by the latest reports from Moscow.

In economic terms, perestroika is just at the outset. And I do not believe one should be content with scientific essays written by academic advisers and with politicians' promises to effect far-reaching and painless reforms. By saying this I do not intend to belittle the indisputable significance of the measures taken in recent months to carry out political reform. In the final analysis, they extend the freedom of manoeuvre for the necessary economic reforms as well. But, still, I do not see a conception that would be convincing.

No doubt, perestroika at its present stage, especially considering the above-mentioned tendency towards "lethargy", cannot be painless. It is necessary to give up the vast administrative personnel, and deeply ingrained habits. Profound rationalisation and restructuring should be carried out wherever there is unproductive labour. Many people should take up quite different work, for which they are yet to be trained. Therefore perestroika presents them with new tasks, and they will have to devote all their energies to accomplishing them.

It seems that with the start of perestroika the material wealth of the population has somewhat declined, and the mood in the country is tinged with dissatisfaction and fault-finding. This fact stresses the difficulties

confronting the Soviet leadership as it carries its great programme into effect. The proclamation of perestroika has, no doubt, aroused high hopes among the population, which I consider a major social and psychological "raw-material resource" for the policy of renewal.

In my opinion, this resource should be used to the utmost, making people more active in speeding up the planned development. But if disillusion grows, there is a danger that this resource will be wasted, and then hope may give way to distrust and pessimism. If this occurs, it will be the end of perestroika, just like other reforms in the Soviet Union failed in their initial phases.

It is quite obvious that perestroika cannot gain ground also because numerous measures in the field of commodity-money economy, adopted in recent time, are reduced to naught wherever they come up against the barriers of old economic planning which have not been given up to this day.

Some visualise a transition to a new system so that elements of commodity-money economy will be gradually introduced in the planned economy of the previous type. But, in my opinion, individual initiative will hardly have any chance for success if this indeterminate process goes on. What, really, is the use of a manager's boldness, if he is entangled in official trammels and reservations?

Of course, it is impossible in the Soviet Union to go over from planned economy to entirely "capitalist" commodity-money relations, as was the case in the Federal Republic after 1948, nor is it sought in your country. But I believe that the success of perestroika requires greater courage for a genuine renewal of the existing system. Will this courage be allowed to be displayed? It is only for the Soviet leadership itself to answer this question.

By my estimates, the industrial sector should be consistently freed from excessive centralised control and be given an opportunity to plan production and capital investment independently. Besides, it would be expedient to restructure the centralised planning, and to change it towards regulating, data-gathering, incentive and supporting activities. In principle, state enterprises should themselves look for suppliers and markets. It would be very useful as well if they establish their own competent consultant services.

The enterprises should have an opportunity to market the surplus of their output, and invest the money thus earned in production or even distribute it among all the members of their collectives. They should be offered large credits for modernisation, for new capital investments and for building new production capacities. But banking should be reorganised for that purpose.

There is a need to establish efficient mediatory agencies for employment. But first the sector of education and skill-upgrading should be modernised. The study of modern management should become a real drive. It is in this sense that one should understand the proposal of my foundation to give young Soviet prospective managers an opportunity to upgrade their professional skills for 18 months at the enterprises of the Körber AG Group in the West. I addressed such a proposal—in which I offered to bear the necessary expenses—to the Soviet leadership during the Moscow visit by Federal Chancellor Kohl in October 1988. In the autumn of 1989, ten young Soviet scientists will begin studying economy, organisation of production and commodity-money relations at Körber AG in the Federal Republic.

Now allow me to tell you in this connection a few words about the Körber Foundation. Way back, when I was a young engineer, I made several economically expedient inventions which, as I have already said,

I introduced in production, having founded my own enterprises in the countries of the West. That is how I became wealthy.

Many years ago, looking for the best way of turning the acquired financial capital into "social capital", I established the social Körber Foundation. That foundation, with the money I had donated for the purpose, performs various social and political functions and acts as a centre for collecting ethic values. For instance, the Foundation gives annual awards to scientists who help nature preservation by their research. The prize is over 2 million Deutsche Marks, which is more than the Nobel Prize.

Apart from some other prizes designed for promoting the arts and culture, I used the Foundation's money to establish the Bergedorfer Debate Club almost three decades ago in order to look for new ways of extending East-West understanding and cooperation.

This international debate club acts as a bridge between Moscow and Washington, and it holds its sessions alternately in Western, and East-European countries. As an example I would name our session held in 1971 in Leningrad in connection with the signing of the Eastern treaties. One of the latest actions undertaken by the Foundation was the institution of scholarships for young prospective Soviet managers for the term of their professional upgrading in Western countries.

But let us go back to perestroika. All my reasoning does not mean that there is a "market or plan" alternative. No Western enterprise can do without planning. But this implies correct information about the competitiveness of their output. Such information allows them to fix flexible prices as a result of open, including international, competition.

A few more words on the important subject of foreign-trade policy. In principle there could be nothing more harmful than to follow the advice of those who expect to cover the domestic deficit associated with the current reform exclusively through trade with the West. Despite the long-term programmes for training experts and increasing their professional skills in a number of fields which until now have been poorly developed, and despite the advanced technological achievements of Soviet science, there still are very few spheres for possible development of foreign-trade cooperation.

The legal framework for establishing joint ventures, somewhat corrected in recent months, may serve at best only for gaining experience in entrepreneurial decision-making. Joint enterprises can be established only when the entire economic mechanism is oriented more on market relations, while the business initiative is encouraged in every way. This is one of the main reasons why the Western business partners are in no hurry to enlarge their participation in joint ventures.

The political and academic debate currently going on in the West over the need and possibility to "help perestroika" by granting credits is running a risk to remain just that, since the internal reform being conducted in the country is aimed above all at speeding up technological progress in industry and at enhancing labour productivity. Only with such an impulse to the national economy will it be possible to fill the empty store shelves.

In conclusion I should like to express a concern to which none of us should be indifferent. This goes beyond the ideologies of the two systems. I am referring to the preservation of life on our planet. The threat confronting mankind, the danger of the destruction of flora and fauna as a result of the mounting pressure on the environment, and that of the worsening of world climate, are growing.

To stop this dangerous development, I think it is necessary that,

DIPLOMACY AND CULTURE

Yevgeni YAGODKIN

DIPLOMACY has long been seen as a special sphere of activity, surrounded with a romantic aura of mystery and elitism. Whether because diplomats often confer behind closed doors or because they form a very small group concerned mostly with its professional problems, diplomacy is still a topic of debate, and opinions, some of them one-sided or exaggerated, vary to the point of contradicting each other.

There are those who imagine that a diplomat is a witty, well-mannered man in full dress whose job is to attend various protocol events, such as receptions or dinners. Others are certain that a diplomat is a shrewd politician who prefers to keep in the shadow as he indefatigably weaves intrigues and to speak exclusively in hints and allegories. Literature on diplomats, of which there is very little, by the way, occasionally portrays them prosaically, as officials humbly bearing the heavy burden of tasks of various kinds and dimensions assigned to them by the capital.

Reality generally differs from stereotypes although there is some truth to them. At any rate, the diplomatic profession has many facets, being a combination of knowledge, skills and traditions needed for the fulfilment of specific political tasks.

Circumstances often compel diplomats abroad to assume the role of historians, economists or lawyers. Expert knowledge of these fields underlies professional competence and is therefore considered indispensable. However, it has long been customary for cultural problems—meaning not only cultural relations but culture as the basis for closer ties between people and countries and also as an attribute of high-standard diplomacy—to hold an equally big, and often a bigger, place in diplomatic work. Indeed, it is safe to say that a country's cultural heritage largely determines the intellectual character, vitality and real merits of diplomacy. Diplomatic skill fades unless it draws on national and universal culture.

History abounds in instances where diplomacy and culture closely connect. Both in our country and abroad, one of the finest traditions of diplomacy is that it meets the highest world standards of culture and education, contributes its share to culture, to the enrichment of intellectual values, and is constantly engaged in intense intellectual activity. This tradition has been built up over the centuries and has survived crucial periods of history. World culture is indebted to diplomacy for the work of many talented people.

In many countries the diplomatic service has always been joined by people extraordinary and competent in various fields. Most of those who became diplomats in Europe were lawyers, administrators, clergymen, merchants, military men. But there were also poets, authors and artists among diplomats. And it is perfectly natural that many diplomatic posts were held by scientists, thinkers, historians, whose creative potential

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grew in the course of their diplomatic career. However, one of the early theorists of diplomacy as a professional occupation, Francois de Callières (1645—1717), who served for a long time as a diplomat at the court of Louis XIV and wrote a book about diplomatic practice based on his personal experience, recommended men of letters as particularly fit for diplomatic work.

Many professional diplomats have gone down in history as both politicians and men of letters. A powerful imagination and an artistic perception of the world, which generally mark poets and authors, can obviously coexist quite well with a sober, calculating political mind and with clarity of vision. Evidence of this can be found in the history of virtually every European country.

Diplomacy in its present form originated in Italy during the Renaissance. That country's outstanding literary figures included successful diplomats. Three great Florentines—Dante, Petrarca and Boccaccio—were also diplomats although their involvement in foreign policy was rather sporadic. With the subsequent evolution of diplomacy as a profession, more and more people—mostly on the other side of the Alps, it is true—coupled literary with diplomatic activity.

Peter Barber, a British researcher, portrayed numerous diplomats of various periods, some of whom belonged to the above category.¹

Philip Sidney, an Englishman, probably owed it to his poetic gift that in 1577 Queen Elizabeth I sent him on an important diplomatic mission to Prague, to the court of the young Emperor Rudolf II, to extend condolences over the death of the monarch's father and at the same time to congratulate him on his accession to the throne. True, Sidney's uncle was a long-standing and influential favourite of the Queen, and this circumstance evidently played its part in her decision. Sidney accomplished his task successfully enough, and there is reason to believe that he was helped in this by his poetic mind and his knowledge of human psychology. And while he gave no precise answers to all the questions put in his instructions, he accurately forecast the subsequent course of events. Those questions, quite typical of royal directives of the time, were intended to ascertain who was in the Emperor's favour, whose advice he acted on, whom he was going to marry, how he treated his relatives. Sidney proved right in predicting a conflict between Rudolf II and his younger brothers. It was only the Emperor's death in 1612 that averted his dethronement. Incidentally, Franz Grillparzer, the Austrian dramatist and poet, wrote a tragedy based on that conflict and the Emperor's fate, and Shakespeare's *The Tempest* came hard on the heels of those events.

In 1668, King Charles II of Britain included the dramatist George Etherege in an embassy sent to Constantinople. Etherege did well and was appointed in 1685 Resident * to Regensburg, where German princes used to hold their congresses. It is only fair to add that the covert reason for appointing Etherege, a rake, was to help him get away from his gambling debts. This explains why he was assigned no big diplomatic tasks, being rather expected to have a chance to devote himself to literary work.

Those expectations turned out to be partly justified, if in a peculiar way. Etherege got down to work with a will, being resolved to demonstrate his diplomatic efficiency, but his enthusiasm soon fizzled out because there was hardly anything to report about political life in Regensburg. He gave in to melancholy. He was not only disillusioned but dissatisfied because Residents ranked low in the diplomatic hierarchy whereas diplomats accredited to Regensburg attached excessive importance to protocol

* In the 17th century, this was the designation of diplomatic representatives, residents to the country concerned.

for lack of fruitful activity, wounding his pride every now and then. Boredom and an inferiority complex demanded an outlet for the dramatist's energetic and emotional character. And so he began writing letters in verse to his friend, Count Middleton, complaining of boredom and the hopeless stupidity of his fellow diplomats. His disposition improved when he fell in love with a woman he met in Regensburg. He began sending serious reports to the capital, won recognition from the German princes and even sought a more important post in Berlin.

The English poet Andrew Marvell made a diplomatic career and was Foreign Minister for some time.

The French diplomatic service had many men of letters among its members. François René de Chateaubriand, poet and author, one of the prominent early romanticists, won renown as both author and diplomat. As regards literary fame, Stendhal unquestionably ranked first among French diplomats. During the last ten years of his life he was French Consul in Italy. It was there that he wrote many of his well-known works, in particular *The Charterhouse of Parma*.

Russia held a special place from the point of view of its diplomats' contribution to literature. Its diplomatic history was made by, among others, men of great literary talent. Antiokh Kantemir, poet and satirist, a pioneer of 18th-century Russian literature, was Ambassador to Britain and France. Poet Konstantin Batyushkov served as secretary of the Russian diplomatic mission to Naples. Alexander Griboyedov died a tragic death as Russian Ambassador to Tehran. Denis Fonvizin, author, enlightener and publicist, was secretary to Count Nikita Panin, an outstanding statesman who headed the Collegium for Foreign Affairs.

Special mention should be made of the diplomatic activity of Fyodor Tyutchev, a career diplomat who served abroad for about 20 years running. Although he was separated from his country for a long time he became, possibly thanks to this circumstance, a truly Russian poet whom few could match and who pondered a great deal on Russia's historical destiny. He had a rare gift for prognostication. Pierre Leroux, a French philosopher of the last century, was probably right when he described all real poets as prophets. At any rate, historians consider that nobody could foresee so well as Tyutchev the fatal consequences of the miscalculations of Nicholas I's diplomacy, which led to the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War. He also proposed and played intricate diplomatic games, using his education, knowledge and talent as philosopher and publicist to win public support for Russia in European countries. A recently published book about Tyutchev² probes into the extraordinary diplomatic activity of the great Russian poet, whom we are now rediscovering, so to speak, as a literary classic, politician and diplomat.

Konstantin Leontyev, author, publicist and literary critic, served as Russian Consul in Ioannina and Saloniki. His writings show him to have been a subtle observer of the East.

It cannot be said that diplomats' predilection for literary work declined in this century. One of the prominent diplomats was Saint-John Perse (Marie-René-Auguste-Alexis Saint-Léger), a French poet and Nobel Prize winner. Shortly before World War II, he made as Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry an unsuccessful attempt to induce his government to prepare for resistance to the oncoming fascist aggression. In 1940 he was relieved of his post and emigrated to the United States, where he became adviser to President Roosevelt on French affairs and one of the moving spirits of the French Resistance.

Another Nobel Prize winner, the Greek symbolist poet George Seferis (Georgios Seferiadis), was a diplomat for upwards of 30 years and concluded his career in the early 1960s as Ambassador to London. When, in 1967, a coup brought a military fascist clique to power in Athens, Se-

feris sided with the regime's opponents and forbade publication of his poetry, doing it in protest against the coup. Among the foreign men of letters who have served as diplomats is Lawrence Durrell (Charles Norden), a British author and poet, whose works are said to enjoy particular popularity among his former Foreign Office colleagues.

The list of Soviet diplomats also known as men of letters and publicists is topped by the names of the founders of the Soviet diplomatic school: Georgi Chicherin, Maxim Litvinov and Wacław Vorovsky. Alexandra Kollontai's literary gift is widely known. Her books on the working class movement, women's rights, the life and culture of Scandinavian countries were popular with contemporaries. Her works of fiction are less known but it was her first steps in prose and drama that predetermined her bent for literary pursuits.

There are also publicists, poets and authors among present-day Soviet diplomats. Nevertheless, our diplomats could apparently have made a more substantial contribution to Soviet literature and journalism. The original information many of them have plus their personal impressions would have been enough to tell the Soviet reader many interesting things about both everyday diplomatic work and foreign countries. Even without looking into statistics, it is obvious that our diplomats have produced little in the way of literary works or journalistic commentaries. Glasnost, the renunciation of excessive secrecy and the unfettering of the mind from dogma offer ample opportunities for a comeback of the "literary" tradition in diplomacy.

THE FREQUENT COUPLING of two seemingly different activities can hardly be seen as accidental. The reason for it lies in the unique nature of the diplomatic profession and the working conditions of diplomats, who operate as politicians, translators, analysts, scholars, publicists. As for the cultural aspect of diplomatic work, it is still there and is, in fact, gaining in leverage.

To begin with, varied impressions, increasing acquaintance with the experience of diverse countries and extensive contacts objectively help mould diplomats as harmoniously developed, civilised and highly organised people. Where this is not the case the reason must be distortions and deformations in the diplomatic service itself or possibly in the society it represents.

Second, the role of the humanitarian factor in international relations is growing. The ongoing restoration of universal moral values in politics forms a new idea of the image and role of diplomats. This professional sphere is among the first to benefit from a warming in the international climate. The renunciation of barren controversies, of accusatory bias and confrontational excesses enhances the value of such diplomatic qualities as tolerance, the ability to speak in terms understandable to the other side and to respect its opinion, effort for intensive cultural dialogue. Our diplomats' utterances are heard attentively abroad, where perestroika arouses the liveliest interest.

Third, diplomats, like people active in other areas of government, owe a debt to their national culture, which is now badly in need of support from the public and the state. Soviet diplomacy is coming to play a more active role in the cultural renaissance of the country and in the international activity of the Soviet Cultural Fund and other public organisations. Specifically, it contributes to the solution of the problem of bringing national cultural values back to the country which is both difficult and delicate. This applies above all to relics of art and history which must not remain abroad, for they will be doomed if left outside the country they belong to.

Recent years have seen scientists, writers and cultural figures join increasingly in foreign political activity, with the concept of people's diplomacy gaining ground. This phenomenon is a sign of our times. It reflects democratic changes in international relations and the life of our country as politics and diplomacy gradually cease to be a privilege of the few. Besides, the growing intricacy and diversity of international ties and exchanges objectively draw the most prominent public figures of various countries into reciprocal contacts. It is perfectly natural that the prestige and renown of scientists and cultural figures predetermine their special role in people's diplomacy and social movements. Furthermore, novel forms of international intellectual cooperation are being tried out today. They are devised in response to the need for an integral universal planetary outlook on a world in process of renewal, on ways and means of solving global problems. An example is the Issyk Kul Forum, which is no organisation, conference or club and is operating as a council of outstanding intellectuals who have freely chosen each other for free and constructive exchanges of ideas and for philosophical discussions of problems of world development. The forum held its latest meeting in Granada a short time ago at the invitation of the Soviet writer Chingiz Aitmatov, its President, and the Spanish biologist Federico Mayor Zaragoza, a public and cultural figure who now serves as Director-General of UNESCO.

A contribution to the process of stepping up intellectual cooperation was made by Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal for setting up under the aegis of the UN a world consultative council of politicians and public figures, prominent scientists, people active in culture and the arts and letters, and clergymen.

Professional diplomats are entitled to both a coordinating role and unrestricted participation in international intellectual cooperation, which means that the range of the problems facing diplomats and of the knowledge required of them is widening.

There is yet another trend in the evolution of our diplomatic service, a trend which has acquired special significance thanks to perestroika and is closely linked with the problem of cultural cooperation. Until not so long ago, Soviet embassies in many countries strongly resembled besieged fortresses cut off from the world around by a powerful barrier of instructions, bans and restrictions inherited from cold war years. The situation is changing. The barrier is crumbling, and accordingly, the culture of association, of appreciating and accepting what is different, is coming to the fore as an aspect of diplomatic professionalism.

Every diplomat serving abroad is faced time and again with the need to reckon with subjective factors like his partners' personal traits and hence to know their traditions and customs, the cultural and historical roots of their national mentality. Any diplomat knows how very important it is to see the motivation of his partners' behaviour, to steer clear of overhasty conclusions, to refrain from attaching labels. Tolerance and culture are particularly valuable also because in the course of working contacts the dividing line between the official and the personal often proves merely symbolic, for the former is frequently in the nature of also purely human contacts. Association with noted cultural and public figures makes up at least half of all the ties of many embassies. These ties cannot grow in the absence of mutual sympathy and common interests. It follows that the diplomat's personality, its dimensions and potentialities, are of key importance. As was rightly noted, the soul of culture is the culture of the soul.

In other words, diplomats today require more knowledge, greater wisdom and tolerance, a higher cultural level in the broadest sense. How far can today's foreign policy service meet these requirements? Generally

speaking, there is nothing new about them. Such qualities have always been valued in diplomacy. For centuries the diplomatic profession has been classed as elitist, inaccessible, exacting in terms of special skills and qualities. Both public opinion and their position in the government hierarchy assure diplomats high prestige. Everyday consciousness always sees diplomatic activity as having special meaning and associates it with great responsibility and an uncommon personal content. The high social standing of diplomats occasionally suggests that the diplomatic service is the domain of a caste.

Every state naturally has a stake in being represented abroad by people not only trustworthy as to convictions but capable of maintaining the moral prestige of their country and representing its culture. Preference to loyalty and trustworthiness rather than to personal qualities, including a high cultural level, is mostly given under the pressure of circumstances, such as internal instability, or because society is in an unhealthy state. The latter may translate in some countries into the regrettably frequent practice of assigning prestigious and well-paid diplomatic posts to friends or relatives. This is elitism of the worst variety, as it were, which disregards the objective requirements and interests of diplomacy that gravitates towards a different, intellectual kind of elitism.

However, it often happens that in appraising a diplomat's performance, the criteria put first are different. In our case it is customary to use such definitions as "fighter on the foreign policy front" or "member of the foreign staff". They clearly suggest the roles normally assigned to diplomats, who are thus seen as proponents of the ideological policy line and, on the other hand, as minor components of a big bureaucratic machine. The latter description is used more often than the former.

Many claim that the diplomatic profession has become standardised and is largely a routine, mechanical occupation now. Others are of the opinion that diplomatic work, having gone out of existence in the classical sense of the term, comes down in the main to reasonably competent and conscientious executive activity. Indeed, diplomats often find it very difficult to overcome a purely bureaucratic approach to their profession. They operate within the bounds of rigid instructions and are shackled financially. The distribution of time between diplomatic and purely technical work is unbalanced, since part of the latter has to be done by diplomats for lack of technical facilities. Fulfilling diverse administrative assignments and attending to the wants of delegations and to consular matters take up a great deal of time, which is perfectly normal and natural. Still, if our diplomats' work remains under purely bureaucratic pressure their professional "competitiveness" will certainly not increase. Yet many of them, especially young people, are drawn to such forms of work that allow greater scope for creativity.

It is well known that in many countries of the West, especially Europe, the diplomatic service recruits most of its new members from distinguished and wealthy families which bring up their children in the cultural traditions of the aristocracy and give them a classical education. It would, of course, be absurd to borrow all the tastes and habits evolved by other nations, seeing them as a model. But it would be equally absurd to oppose to them a vulgar conception of democracy, "national pride" in one's ignorance, as it were. Both approaches are untenable.

Many of our diplomats who have served in the West complain of serious gaps in their education. Most of them are hardly familiar with the Bible, for example. You can tell a Western colleague that this is due to your atheistic education. But it is really absurd for a diplomat or for any other cultured person to be unfamiliar with the Scriptures, or the

very foundation of a whole stratum of human culture—the art of Rome, Byzantium and the Renaissance, to say nothing of Russian culture.

Many of the diplomats who have graduated from the Moscow Institute for International Relations, our main school of diplomacy, sincerely regret that as students they were not offered the opportunity to study subjects like the history of world culture, aesthetics and artistic theory, and as for studying the achievements of foreign culture and social thought, it was very superficial. The humanitarian education offered by the institute plainly lags behind that given by our universities and is overburdened with obligatory social subjects abounding in repetitions and distortions. However, this involves the wider problem of teaching the social sciences generally.

The problem of diplomatic education can apparently be solved primarily according to our concept of the ideal diplomat of the foreseeable future. Obviously, with the world changing so fast, the model of a diplomat must be mobile, and it has yet to evolve in many respects. But we can predict with a fair measure of confidence that the profession must retain its traditional qualities like an education meeting world standards, breadth of vision, the intellectual depth of the researcher and the organising gift of the executive, rationalism, receptiveness to the new, artistic taste and a patriotic ideal. The devaluation of the profession that has occurred can be overcome to some extent by really increasing the independence of youth and encouraging them in their creative designs. All this is part of the reconstruction going on in our diplomatic service.

The problem of the interaction of culture and diplomacy has a special meaning today. It can hardly be solved quickly and completely. The years of the personality cult and stagnation made for a certain dissociation of the two spheres or, at all events, hardly provided favourable conditions for their synthesis. Diplomacy remained in large measure a strictly ideological and political activity, and as for cultural, economic and humanitarian problems, they were seen as marginal. This state of affairs has begun to change for the better. New echelons of the diplomatic service in charge of these foreign policy lines are at work now. The proclaimed principles of new political thinking reflect the awakening in progress in our country, people's awareness of the fundamental role of culture in the development of society, for without highly developed culture a technologically advanced economy, the solution of social problems, the pursuit of a truly popular, humane policy and, above all, the priority of moral and intellectual values are clearly out of the question. By expressing the essence of precisely this kind of policy and by serving the national interest, diplomacy is being getting rid of dogma and bureaucratic practices, opening the door to more extensive cooperation with universal and national culture and acquiring a new moral dimension.

We know from history that relations between states are crippled by disregard of the fact that without culture there can be no policy dominated by the universal humanitarian idea and that in foreign policy as in other spheres, culture is a value serving as at once the goal and the means of promoting international cooperation, drawing nations closer together and fostering confidence and mutual understanding between them.

New world trends and the extension of the place of culture in international relations offer opportunities for the diplomatic profession to bring its intimate connection with culture to bear.

¹ See Peter Barber, *Diplomacy*, London, 1979.

² Vadim Kozhinov, *Tyutchev*, Moscow, Molodaya gvardia, 1988 (in Russian).

PRIVATE PROPERTY: A QUIET REVOLUTION

Oleg SHAKHNAZAROV

NEW POLITICAL THINKING necessarily poses questions extending far beyond the strictly "diplomatic concepts" or abstract ideological categories we are accustomed to. What is, for instance, the fundamental interest of our country? What is our society socially and economically? Experience has shown these questions to be very difficult to answer.

Neither is it easy to see clear in the essence of the social system which we are used to consider our antagonist. Indeed, what is capitalism? What kind of system are we dealing with on the world scene, after all?

Our notions of the opposite system took shape many decades ago. That was also when the higher stage of capitalism was "defined". But while the founders of Marxism investigated the real world relying on a scientific methodology as well as on the ideas and traditions of the centuries-long evolution of progressive social thought, subsequently that world came to be treated as an illustration to canonical texts. Yet today's reality has nothing to do with rigid patterns, for the world is in a state of flux, its components are changing, and as they change they are transforming the whole.

This thesis is bound to be opposed by arguing that capitalism cannot shed so fundamental an element of its essence as the contradiction between the social character of production and the private capitalist form of appropriation. Well, this contradiction is still there. But isn't its very presence an earnest of the system's evolution? And then, why must its development take the form of a revolutionary explosion?

Marxism has always regarded human history as a process of accumulation and solution of contradictions. Their solvability is a requisite for progress and will be so for the foreseeable future. An exception from this objective law, when the "obvious" insolvability of the contradiction between the social character of production and the private capitalist form of appropriation was declared an earnest of progress, became a dogma in our theoretical model of the world. But does not this imply that a forcible solution of the problem is the only correct and possible one?

When a solid, capable of fluidity is heated, its particles begin moving without changing externally at first, and then the solid softens, plastically loses shape and takes on a new form. Something similar is happening to contemporary Western society, to its highly developed market economy "heated" by the third scientific and technological revolution (STR) to a critical temperature. Every component of this intricate system has been set in motion far beyond an oscillatory amplitude. Endless mutations, the rise and disappearance of enterprises, the integration of corporations, the globalisation of industrial and financial activity, individualisation of the producer, universal interconnections and rivalries, economic restructuring, innovations in production organisation, major changes among the

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working people in terms of skill and social composition are all processes resembling Brownian motion. But it is important to detect in this seeming chaos a perfectly definite vector: enlarged reproduction of *non-exploitative* possession of the means of production and self-employment on an increasing scale. The "human factor" is becoming the subject of the economy, refusing to be merely a factor in it.

"HANDICRAFTSMAN" OF THE LATE 20TH CENTURY

THE CHANGES taking place in production relations are due to a transformation of the entire market economy. The economy has moved on to qualitative growth, and resource-saving has become a decisive factor for meeting social requirements. The output of oil and gas, iron, and steel, tractors and combines is decreasing. Ten cows yield as much milk as 100 cows did a short time ago. Gross national product is increasing while per unit energy consumption is diminishing.

Growing productivity is inexorably reducing labour consumption. The state can no longer stabilise the market economy in the old way. In 1970-1985, unemployment grew sixfold in Britain, 16.5 times over in the FRG, ninefold in France, fourfold in Italy and twofold in the United States. Expenditures and losses incurred through unemployment and involving budget appropriations for social insurance and employment programmes exceed twice to five times the burden of military spending heavy as it is. The state sector traditionally operated as a pool absorbing a substantial part of surplus labour force. This made it unprofitable. The costs of state enterprises exceeded those of the private capitalist sector, specifically by 33 per cent in Britain and 50 per cent in the FRG. The French and Italian budgets were burdened with deficit funding of the nationalised sector. In Italy state enterprises accounted for 60 per cent of industrial output and two thirds of the banks, with the result that the public debt is close to the annual amount of GNP.

The commodity-money economy developed no regulating mechanism capable of providing centrally planned full employment. But it offered a way out based on its own laws.

In the seventies and eighties, the phased displacement of labour force from the production sphere became a common practice. Before losing their job, many first work part-time and then become temporary employees. As of 1985, the share of part-time workers was estimated at 21.2 per cent in Britain, 15-19 per cent in the United States and 10 per cent in France and the FRG. Temporary employment in these countries generally stayed close to the 10 per cent mark. These indicators tend to increase, their growth rate checked by the depletion of the labour market. *Going on in parallel with this process is a replacement of wage labour by self-employment, with people first working at their own enterprises by way of secondary employment and then dropping altogether out of the hired workforce.*

Some fifteen years ago, individual, family and small-group enterprise came to be known as the shadow economy. The name stuck although it can hardly be called "shadow", any longer. In the early eighties, as many as 39 per cent of American households were drawing on this source for services. Around 80 per cent of families were engaged in some form of independent production activity. According to statistics, the "shadow" economy in the United States was producing an additional 22 per cent of GNP in 1976, 33 per cent in 1978 and about 50 per cent in 1987. In Western Europe the relevant percentages were estimated to range from 25 to 40. (One indication of the technological equipment of these households is that power consumption in American homes is eight times as high as in the Soviet Union.)

The state now sees in self-employment the possibility for social amortisation of the market economy. It encourages small business through relevant legislation, lower taxes on individual and family enterprise, budget funding and state consultancies as well as by granting economic and legal powers to local government bodies to promote individual initiative. It organises courses for those who set up family and small-group businesses, publishes manuals and provides information facilities at both the national and international level.

The resultant problem of a "shadow" economy does not embarrass the state too much, for such is essentially the concept of social amortisation: while the Treasury is deprived of a part of tax receipts, it is at the same time relieved of the burden of assuring a livelihood to an increasing number of people. In Spain, for instance, nearly one million of the three million jobless are believed to be engaged in the underground economy. The counting in of the underground economy in Italy made it possible for the official 1988 statistics to set average per capita income above the British official index, thereby implying that Italy had become one of the five leading capitalist countries.

It is therefore important to stress that encouraging small business is a policy directed (notwithstanding its cost) towards fostering business culture. Not everybody can be at once employee and employer. In the underdeveloped South of Italy, where the government business promotion programme grants jobless youth generous non-repayable loans, exempting them from taxes and partly defraying their current expenses over a period of three years (75, 50 and 25 per cent, respectively), recipients try to spend these loans on meeting their personal needs. In the industrial North, however, unemployed people who have come into possession of original capital generally use it as envisaged. There is a similar practice in other developed countries, where it is coupled with special business training for the jobless. The implementation of the six programmes funded by the British government involves universities, further education colleges, institutes, chambers of commerce, private consultants, entrepreneurial agencies. The number of the latter rose from three in 1978 to 300 in 1988. They account for about an annual 90,000 newly trained businessmen. This year the French Ministry of Labour wants to make 80,000 jobless people owners of independent enterprises.

Trade unions contribute their share to the promotion of small business. In Italy they have won relevant legislation. Written into French collective agreements is a commitment by the management to grant employees unpaid leave for several years to enable them to have a go at doing business while retaining the right to be reinstated in their former job. An employee dismissed on the employer's initiative is entitled to severance pay by the terms of the collective agreement. Depending on length of service, it may amount to the sum total of his pays for several years, or enough money to buy implements and rent premises. Such cases generally result in founding small-group firms.

Besides, collective agreements now include provisions for the right of employees to take a second job with another company that is not a competitor. Employers accede to all these demands to be able to cut workforce or to introduce a shorter work week without creating new problems. Production adapts to the exigencies of the market while employees are given a chance to earn extra money elsewhere in the hours freed by the reduction of the working week, thereby offsetting the drop in their earnings and making provisions in case they are laid off.

A recent investigation into French enterprises employing up to 11 people showed that small firms have established themselves in most economic fields including the food industry, electronics, building materials, metalworking and chemicals. Such firms on average are groups

of three people aged 45. For 20 per cent of their heads, self-employment is secondary employment. Accordingly, 80 per cent of them would have been jobless without a business of their own. In Italy, about five million of the 15 million wage workers have a secondary job, often an independent one.

Individual, family and small-group enterprises tend to form associations or cooperatives as a means adjusting a small-scale economy to the economic environment, thereby opposing their own monopoly to a highly monopolised market. They include branch associations, savings and credit societies, industrial cooperatives, purchase and sales unions and consumers' unions. One indication of their role in economic development is that in the FRG over half the purchases and sales of farm produce are handled by federations of rural cooperatives. Farmers' cooperatives feed Britain. Purchase and sales cooperatives handle two thirds of Austria's grain harvest. Besides, they supply their customers and shareholders with fertiliser, seed, fodder, machines, building materials and household goods. To this end they set up computerised industrial storage and processing facilities and an elaborate transport infrastructure.

France has about 1,500 production cooperatives with 120,000 members, or roughly 12 per cent of individual producers. About half of them are construction enterprises. The French Builders' Association has a network of training courses for beginners.

The West European cooperatives' immune system includes savings and credit associations of its own. Every other Austrian, for instance, has a deposit in a cooperative bank, and these banks account for 25 per cent of all national bank credits. In France credit cooperatives group about 3.5 million members and in Britain, 1.5 million. Besides, the eighties saw the rise of numerous investment trusts in Western Europe which help promote local small business and buy shares of major companies. These trusts set up subsidiaries abroad. In short, the lower echelons of the Western society are being drawn into the internationalisation of economic activity.

However, the crossing of frontiers by small business does not at all imply that horizontal expansion, or development "on its own floor" alone, is the only line of its growth. Individual labour and small firms maintain a durable and mutually beneficial symbiosis with big business, all the more since the latter has undergone major changes.

Factories employing many thousands of workers are becoming a thing of the past, giving way to commodity-producing systems, with medium-size plants as the basic component. These are mostly owned by monopoly capital but surrounded by a network of autonomous subsidiaries and a host of small suppliers. Firms exclude from their production structure activities which are not indispensable to the firms' specialisation. Where large firms have an option of setting up their own sub-units or using the potentialities of small firms on a competitive basis, they prefer the latter. This adds to their flexibility and helps them survive mounting competition. Furthermore, subcontracting on a growing scale makes for an increase in the number of small proprietors, who are not on the periphery of national economies but in their vital centres. The "new handicraftsman" is thus becoming an inseparable component of advanced productive forces.

In France, the eighties saw the emergence of over one million new enterprises, with only three per cent of them employing more than 10 people. In Italy two-thirds of the economically active population serve with small and medium-size firms employing up to 100 people, the most efficient being those that employ 50 people or less. In the United States, enterprises employing from one to 20 people have in these years created 88 per cent of all new jobs while plants employing from 100 to 4,999

people have been shrinking. In Britain about 200,000 new companies are founded every year, and half of all new jobs are created at enterprises staffed by one to 100 people. All advanced capitalist countries have state programmes for the development of small-scale and medium-scale production and grant them tax discounts and liberal credit terms.

Big capital has a direct stake in its plants attracting as many small subcontractors as possible. Even the automobile industry, that citadel of mass production, is increasingly geared to manufacturing small batches of items under diversified production programmes. Medium-lot and small-lot production is gaining dominance in other industries as well. It is estimated that 75 per cent of America's industrial output is produced in 50-piece batches. In Britain over 50 per cent of all items is produced in batches of up to 100 pieces. Consequently, the trend towards transferring small-lot production to small plants should be seen as a law governing qualitative economic growth.

Lately major companies cutting work force have on their own initiative offered redundant employees administrative and technological aid to start their own business. Occasionally they grant their former employees long-term interest-free loans. European companies have begun to follow the example of American companies by joining in the establishment of small enterprises as shareholders. Big business and banks operating on their own or in collaboration with the state and local authorities set up "hatcheries" of small enterprises which for a time render newly founded firms the requisite services, help them in providing favourable conditions of management and in renting premises, organise telephone and telex services, bookkeeping and contacts with other firms, perform representative functions, offer legal advice, sales promotion and advise them on management. In the United States, the number of these "hatcheries" soared from 26 in 1984 to 130 in 1985.

Self-employment is becoming a distinguishing characteristic of contemporary production relations in the West. The eighties witnessed for the first time a steady increase in the proportion of independently working people from among the jobless and part-time workers in the United States, where there are 14 million family firms alone. Ever since 1975, the number of those "working for themselves" in France has been steadily growing; 30 per cent of them were unemployed before. In the eighties, small enterprises in the FRG have strengthened their positions; one third of them are one-person businesses. In Italy one in three is self-employed. In Britain independent small businesses are growing at an annual rate of nearly five per cent. In short, ownership is spreading out going through a process of democratisation.

It is obviously very hard to reconcile these new realities with our traditional notions of capitalism. Indeed, the gradual proletarianisation of the population went on for fully two centuries, and we looked on small proprietors as members of a disappearing social group. This trend peaked in the sixties and seventies. But now we are witnessing a reverse process unfolding on the basis of a qualitatively new state of society.

The rising standard of living is one of the objective factors for deproletarianisation. Bourgeois society today is called a society of two-thirds, it being held that one-third of the population has reason to be dissatisfied with the way life treats them. Do not let us question this point of view although it is exaggerated somewhat. In any case, today's capitalism is not the same as it was early in this century, when the absolute majority lived in dire poverty. Social spending on reproducing the workforce makes up 54.3 per cent of GNP in France, 55.1 per cent in Italy, 55.8 per cent in Britain and 60.3 per cent in the United States; in some periods its share is bigger still.

Still, percentages are hardly the main thing. The point is that requirements are going through a revolution. Thanks to an unprecedented increase in labour productivity, the absolute share of this indicator in GNP plainly exceeds spending on personal consumption. This is why the two thirds mentioned above, or a majority of the population, are in a position to acquire the means of production, all the more so since electronic equipment is now getting cheaper by 30 per cent a year and as for more expensive equipment, it can be leased.

The growing role of the household, the family enterprise and various kinds of individual labour is a result of, among other things, people's regained capacity for economic self-realisation. The patriarchal economy that was dominant in the past is being re-established, except that this restoration is based on a powerful industrialisation process followed by processes of intellectualisation and individualisation of labour. Economic dynamics depends increasingly on the individual effort of people in small groups possessing the means of production and having access to information and new technology. And increasing in step with this is people's duty of responsible decision-making.

People's knowledge and abilities are undergoing an amazing metamorphosis by assuming a sovereign character and acquiring material significance. There is a new form of property in the making, namely, intellectual property, valued at times more than some well-known exploitative or non-exploitative forms of owning objects of the material world. It is expected that in the next decade, when the potential of the earlier wave of the STR is spent and before a fourth STR sets in on a fundamentally new basis, the "human factor", the personal aptness of the working man, the "handicraftsman" of the early 21st century operating as an entrepreneur, will become the locomotive of economic progress.

METAMORPHOSES OF BIG BUSINESS

PRODUCTION ORGANISATION on new lines is not the only reason for the current diffusion of property. Diffusion also involves enterprises directly owned by big capital. Millions of people became shareholders of leading companies in the United States from the mid-seventies and in Western Europe from the eighties. In 1987 there were 47 million shareholders in the United States (one of every three adult Americans was a shareholder) and from nine to 9.5 million in Britain and France (one of every five adult Englishmen and Frenchmen was a shareholder). The officially recorded number of shareholders in West Germany was 1.3 million. The reason for this "lag" was that in the FRG only 500 companies offered their shares for sale on the stock exchange. The proportion of shareholders is much larger if account is taken of intrafirm shares, which also applies, strictly speaking, to the countries listed above, if to a lesser degree. This situation is typical of Central European and Nordic countries.

Employees and pensioners who buy shares of their companies are granted various privileges: substantial discounts on and reschedulings of payments, tax exemption of dividends, higher rates of concentration of shares in the hands of one holder, gratuitous distribution of additional shares among those who remain co-holders of joint stock, part payment of over half of the value of shares out of the state budget and private capital, the establishment of collective joint-stock funds fully paid out of corporate profits. Shares are bought on the stock exchange or directly in the companies concerned under employee share ownership programmes. By the mid-eighties, the United States had over 7,000 companies known to have adopted such programmes. In the year 2000, they are expected to involve 25 per cent of all those engaged in production. In

Britain there are 1,685 such companies. More and more employees share property even in countries where this economic phenomenon is still left out of statistics.

The biggest corporations discuss and implement plans for the sale of their shares at local, regional and national level in the area of their business activity, thereby drawing both production staff and the public into share ownership. Know-how in administering common investment funds is becoming a commodity on the international market, and now there are transnationals offering such services. Major banks, broker firms and insurance companies deal in the technology of these programmes. Individual holders account for nearly 60 per cent of the American stock market. Britain and France have yet to attain this level but the stock exchange is beginning to adjust to the interests of small shareholders, shifting part of their expenditures onto the shoulders of big capital.

Time was when monopoly capital could offer a lifelong job to and interest wage workers in fruitful labour by the prospect of increasing pay and by various favourable terms. It now prefers temporary employees as devoted to the enterprise as the traditional permanent employee even in the absence of favourable long-term prospects. This virtually makes possession of a share of assets the most effective incentive to labour. Fewer and fewer workers are left at today's factory, and every worker controls such productive equipment that the slightest breakdown may lead to unsustainable loss. Besides, competition is now going on at global level and not at local or national level as in the past. This struggle by everyone against everyone else also induces the employer to relinquish part of his right to the means of production in order to survive.

Changes in the traditional property system have been occurring for a long time, though. Family capital no longer plays its former role. Depersonalised property is gaining in importance. Its development is assisted chiefly by banks and insurance companies, which started on vigorous investment during the twenties and thirties. The sixties and seventies saw a rapid increase in pension funds, which are also used as loan capital. As early as the mid-seventies, Britain had nine insurance companies, six banks and three pension funds among 20 financial institutions that were major shareholders of industrial companies. Working people are mass depositors in these financial institutions; they are paid bonuses and interest on their deposits and have shared in the division of loan interest for several decades now. They are becoming "proprietors" who perform no functions in the matter of owning, controlling or managing production and yet appropriate part of the surplus value that is created. The role of the indirect proprietor in funding production is exemplified by the fact that West German commercial banks, for instance, owe 75 per cent of their net profit to rank-and-file depositors.

The merger of banking capital with industrial capital, the formation of monopoly capital, went on hand in hand with the growing intricacy of the pattern of this unity at cellular level. Capital monopolisation and socialisation are a twofold trend. With the sharp increase in the capital intensity of contemporary production, the STR lent this process a new dimension.

An increase in advanced capital coupled with a simultaneous reduction in the number of employees at the enterprise concerned tended to force down the profit rate as the main indicator of profitability. This trend was compensated for by growing productivity, that is, by making both live and past labour cheaper. But compensation turned out to be inadequate as the pace of technological renovation quickened and competition at commodity markets intensified. Employers came to have a stake

in making capital, not only of surplus value, but of that part of it created by paid labour, dispensing with costly financial mediation.

There developed objective prerequisites for drawing the hired worker's spare cash into entrepreneurial capital as a source of considerably cheaper investment than loan capital and hence compensating in greater measure for a lower profit rate. The increasing organic structure of capital helped make more working people co-owners of the means of production. The eighties therefore witnessed a decrease in working people's bank savings and, accordingly, a simultaneous, increase in the proportions of employee share ownership. Major package of shares held by production personnel ceased to be a rarity. The indirect proprietor brought into existence by the previous stage of capitalist development began to transform into a direct proprietor.

The growing self-financing of industrial companies registered in the seventies was accompanied by the transformation of banks from mediators in loan capital movement into financial service companies. But to define this development as the disappearance of loan capital would be as futile as to exaggerate its parasitism. Loan capital is and will go on functioning as a common reserve for funding breakthroughs in priority development sectors, helping optimise production of commodities. This is in evidence even today in its combination with intellectual capital. The financial system offers people active in culture and the arts, science and technology, managers, economists, inventors and rationalisers buy-outs and buy-ins to prop up ailing companies.

THE STR AND PROPERTY DIFFUSION

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT brought in existence private ownership and capitalist way of production. Capitalism strengthened its positions in step with the division of labour. The first two STRs mechanised and automated individual operations without altering the conditions which engendered the assembly line worker. Due to their relative imperfection, the technologies of the third STR are still reproducing such workforce, if on a diminishing scale. This lends decisive importance to qualitatively new technologies capable of replacing the "partial" worker and re-establishing him in his long ago lost role as sovereign producer, this time at a new stage in human history.

The objective laws of optimising production are irrevocably generating new material productive forces which attain their highest productivity outside the framework of hired labour. Underlying this phenomenon is the twofold process of transformation in the "man-machine" and "producer-means of production" systems. The worker at the assembly line is being forced out of production. From being an appendage to the machine, he is becoming an independent factor in economic activity. He is regaining his sovereignty as an exponent of live knowledge. Taking place at the same time and of necessity is a reunification of actual producer and means of production, the optimum condition for the working man's constructive effort.

There are forecasts saying that in the early 21st century commodities will be made up chiefly of "intellect"—90 to 95 per cent—with a mere five to ten per cent left to raw materials and energy. These forecasts may come true only in part but they reflect real processes that have made the human mind a material force which it is economically unprofitable to sell, buy or exploit. The degree of freedom predetermines its efficiency. Automated plants are a reality already. So will soon be self-improving robots. No room is being left for live labour. Productivity and the adequacy of such production to social requirements are predetermined by intellectual effort which acquires a capacity for creating new

value. This statement is largely in the nature of a forecast but the vectorial character of the process is discernible in the changes which the workforce in industrial countries of the West has undergone in recent decades from the point of view of skill and social class composition.

Statistics indicate a steady increase in the proportion of engineers and managers. In the United States, for one, their share rose from 17.7 per cent in 1950 to 30 per cent in 1985 while the share of workers dropped from 40 to 30 per cent. As a result of the transition from managing people and implements to managing production processes, the 1970-1985 period saw a 57 per cent increase in the number of technicians and other specialists and a 154 per cent increase in the proportion of managers and other executives. These data are comparable to indices registered in Western Europe.

Parallel to this trend, buy-outs by engineers and managers of small and medium-size high-technology firms are gaining in scale. In the United States, 5,388 buy-outs were registered in the 1986-1987 period alone. In Britain, where this process began in 1985, as many as 1,300 enterprises found themselves in the hands of group proprietors by mid-1988. The trend is slower in West Germany but engineers and managers have already taken over well-known firms, such as Loewe Opta (electronic processing of texts) and Kickert (car equipment). In France, about 100 buy-outs were effected between 1984 and 1988, and by the year 2000 their number is likely to run into tens of thousands. Production facilities taken over by new owners show increased competitiveness. The state encourages property diffusion legislatively and economically. Loans granted by banks enable engineers and managers to control property exceeding their financial potentialities dozens of times.

What is happening is not merely the replacement of one owner by a group of entrepreneurs although it is obvious that the buy-out is effected by drawing on funds earned as remuneration for past labour, that the number of owners of the means of production is growing as wage workers join their ranks. Most importantly, private property is diffused among wage workers representing the most steadily growing group engaged in production and is taken over by those who can handle it best of all. In other words, with the effacement of distinctions between brainwork and manual labour, an end is put to alienation between the subjective and objectivised components of advanced productive forces shaping up under the influence of the STR.

CHANGES at the basis of bourgeois society show that the self-regulation of capitalist reproduction is beginning to negate the exploitation of man by man but that this is not a single act; it is a process during which there arises a large group of people differing from both exploiters and exploited in class characteristics. And while we are only just witnessing the beginning of another stage in the spiral of evolution, even what we see is evidence of the market economy having far greater social and economic potentialities than it used to be believed. The fundamental contradiction of capitalism apparently lends itself to solution within the framework of this economy.

These developments help us answer another question of revolutionary theory that is not yet clear enough. We know of three exploitative formations: slave-holding, feudal and capitalist. The development of humanity may be described as a succession of rebellions, uprisings and wars by exploited people. And yet it was not slave who emancipated slave nor feudal peasant who freed feudal peasant; the proletariat is the only one to have been assigned by theory to the role of his own liberator. *Life is eliminating this contradiction. Violation of this universal objective law*

is not a must, for liberation is brought by a fundamentally new type of working people. Coming to light is the latent depth of the idea of the primacy of supraclass interests which underlies new political thinking.

The democratisation of property is an inevitable result of the evolution of commodity-money relations and a requisite for their further improvement. At the same time, it is a result and catalyst of scientific and technological progress. "People's capitalism" was spoken of in the 19th century, the 1920s and 1930s and the first postwar decade, but to paraphrase what Plekhanov said, capitalism has not yet ground enough wheat to bake the pie of non-capitalist property. At present the situation is qualitatively different. Property diffusion is encouraged by the state seeking to relieve itself of the duties of centralised distributor in the interest of the market economy and to make them merely a function of the latter. It is also encouraged by traditional capitalism, which regards this way of socialising property as both acceptable and desirable since it is accompanied by increasingly profitable production.

Capitalist and socialist properties have always been seen as antipodes, and therefore our concept of an interdependent world does not yet go beyond recognising the need for their interaction. But the time has evidently come to carry this concept of ours as far as to recognise that private and socialised means of production are not antipodes but just different forms of ownership. The existence of either of them is predetermined by the attained level of the productive forces and by the adequacy to the requirements of the reproduction of society and the satisfaction of its interests.

MOSCOW DIPLOMATIC CORPS

KHRUSHCHEV AND TWENTY YEARS AFTER...

Rudolph THORNING-PETERSEN

A MOSCOW OVERTURE

"NOBODY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO MOSCOW who did not serve there before"—was the somewhat paradoxical conclusion drawn by a distinguished predecessor on leaving the post of Danish ambassador to Moscow.

The point was obviously taken by the party concerned, in casu the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he decided on my transfer from Beijing, to entrust me, as from October 1983, with one of the most difficult, most challenging, but also—and in particular over the last 3-4 years—most fascinating posts in international diplomacy.

I have had all reason to be grateful for previous personal experiences gained during a short term as counsellor to our embassy in 1964 and 1965—and not only as an introduction to my present assignment, but increasingly over the last few years which have seen an intense public debate on Soviet political history. Foreign observers in Moscow, so I believe, have always been aware that a reasonably profound knowledge of Russian/Soviet history was among the prerequisites for understanding and assessing present-day developments. It is therefore gratifying that under "glasnost" many taboos have been lifted, thus enabling a long historical tale of sufferings and heroism, of drama and inertia to be told by Soviet voices—from all strata of society and in public. It is also wise. Transparency and its companion predictability are indispensable ingredients in building international stability and trust.

Although but a short spell my previous term in Moscow was a period full of events. 1964 saw the end of the Khrushchev era. Even if the Soviet media, as was to be expected in those days, carried no hints of the oncoming drama everybody in Moscow's diplomatic community was aware that something was in the making the day the Politbureau decided upon Khrushchev's political fate.

When late at night TASS published a short communique informing the public that Nikita Sergeyevitch Khrushchev had resigned as First Secretary of the CC CPSU and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I had the chance to ask an elderly Russian, a veteran of the October revolution with a party-membership dating from the early 1920s, what he personally felt at receiving this news. Shrugging his shoulders he replied that the coming and going of the political leaders was not the concern of the common people.

Hopefully the intense political debate in the present-day Soviet media marks an irreversible end to this kind of political apathy.

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With his highly unconventional performance, restless energy, undeniable charm and humour, which without warning might give way to a rather shocking brutality, Khrushchev had fascinated the world. We, the younger foreign diplomats, were intrigued, positively and negatively, at the apparent contradictions of his personality and his policy. With a markedly unprejudiced approach to the economic problems of the Soviet society he combined a dogmatic—and as it seemed to us—often unreflected view of many other phenomena, including the cultural life, the representatives and activities of which were from time to time brought to feel the weight of his personal biases. If, at certain occasions, something of a *hajaccio*, he was also an exceptionally talented—maybe even visionary—autodidact;—and he was never dull.

I had met Khrushchev, who had also been the guest of our embassy, a couple of times but never got the opportunity to talk personally with him before I (as acting *chargé d'affaires*) saw him off to the train, which took him on what was to be his last trip abroad—an official visit to Scandinavian countries. One sunny November day in 1964 I was on the pavement of Ostrovskij Pereulok, a few steps from our embassy, on my way home for lunch, when a well-known figure came walking straight against me. Khrushchev, accompanied by two “attendants”, recognized me and stopped to say hello. He told me that he had greatly enjoyed his visit to Denmark and had several compliments to offer my country. I took it upon myself to express (unauthorized) greetings from our prime minister who had been his host during the visit. Mr. Khrushchev reciprocated and—when asked by me how he was now (on retirement)—answered with the well-known twinkle in the eye that his life now had become “surprisingly quiet”. A discreet tap on the shoulder by one of the “attendants” ended this brief encounter between the former ruler of the Soviet Union and a Danish junior diplomat.

On leaving Moscow in 1965 I was soon—and for many years to come—absorbed in work which offered but few opportunities for direct contact with Soviet developments. When these—almost twenty years later—look a completely new turn, of no less than historical importance, I was lucky enough to be back in place.

A LONG BUT EVENTFUL INTERMISSION

A POSTING as minister counsellor to our embassy in Stockholm—to a Danish diplomat a post which is as rewarding as it is relevant—broke in two periods the ten years which followed my departure from Moscow. These years, spent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen, meant much and concentrated work, partly with the extensive preparations for Danish membership of the European Community, which came into effect in 1972, partly with UN- and Third World-affairs, where the Middle East loomed large, an area in which I had taken a keen interest already in early years (my first regular posting abroad was in Cairo in the aftermath of the Suez-crisis).

On November 2nd 1975, late in the afternoon I landed in Beyrouth airport as a newly appointed ambassador to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Cyprus—and for a short period even in Iraq—with (supposed) residence in Beyrouth. Brought by a heavily armed escort into the city I had known so well in earlier and happier days I found its scenic beauty obscured—not by the oncoming darkness, but by the unmistakable signs of warfare. The city was ablaze with artillery-fire and bomb explosions, the “music” made up by the “tatata” of the “Kalashnikovs”—the only “goods” which during the protracted civil war never seemed in short supply.

Before the end of the month I had repatriated my entire Danish embassy staff; before the end of the year I had completed the evacuation

of all members of our once quite numerous Danish colony in Lebanon.

Over the summer 1976 it was decided to relocate the embassy on an interim basis in Cyprus. The two years we spent on this beautiful island and among its charming and friendly population was to my wife and myself as well as to my collaborators and their families two years in paradise.

During this period I had often the occasion to meet with the president of the republic, the legendary Archbishop Makarios—and invariably to admire the ease with which he played his various roles—as the dignified prince of the church, as the experienced international statesman, as the shrewd political tactician and agitator. I realised that all roles were founded on an almost unparalleled intimacy with the people he had led in victory and disaster, in happiness and grief. When I, as personal representative of H. M. the Queen, attended his funeral and witnessed the reaction of the crowds along the roads to his last resting place I realised that to them the loss was not only of the founding father of their republic but of their father-confessor.

Back in Beyrouth as from 1978 meant a daily exposure to physical danger. Somehow or other one gets adapted even to that. We were extremely lucky that none of our embassy came to any serious harm—although at a couple of occasions it was escape by a hairbreadth. Thus one evening we had a bullet right through our drawing room, entering through a window a few inches above a sofa from which my wife less than a minute before had got up. My incredibly courageous wife, who during all our stay in Lebanon never panicked or even complained, hardly flickered. One of the more unpleasant and quite risky experiences—repeated over and over—was being held at gunpoint at a road-blocking, manned by 13-14 year old boys, heavily armed, and as keen to “prove themselves” towards their irresponsible elders as they were scared, and therefore completely unpredictable.

To witness a gifted and well-educated people turn their beautiful and highly developed country into a camp of self-destruction was a heart-breaking experience for one who over the years had learned to love the place, the human warmth and loyalty that amidst all cruelty and horror never ceased to exist.

On leaving Beyrouth in spring 1980 we were ripe for a change. And yet we realised that part of our hearts was left in the Middle East. The smell and the noise of the bazaars, the stillness and the colours of the deserts, the warmth of a highly emotional people will stay with us forever.

Arriving at Beijing in spring 1980 was a meeting with a different world and with a society in transition, striving to overcome the disasters of that strange and sinister phenomenon, the Cultural Revolution, which had caused endless human misery, deeply divided the people and set the clock back—not years but centuries.

Actually this was not my first encounter with China. In 1973 I accompanied our Foreign Minister on an official visit to the People's Republic—at a time when the Cultural Revolution was about to fade away, but not totally overcome. Most cultural monuments, e. g. “The Forbidden City” (the old Imperial Palaces in Beijing), the temples etc. were closed to the public, if not destroyed. Thanks to a personal intervention by the Prime Minister, the late Zhou Enlai, we were nevertheless admitted, often through back-doors. The enforced cutting off of an exceptionally traditional people from its unique historical past was one of the strangest features of the Cultural Revolution. Here as elsewhere it proved to be an impossible and backfiring policy.

During this short visit I had the opportunity of being able to observe Zhou Enlai at close quarters when he received our Foreign Minister. One

of the founding fathers of the non-aligned movement this international statesman and Marxist politician who was also the heir to twenty generations of Confucian mandarin-culture, equally intimate with the western cultural heritage, possessed a unique and charismatic personality of which grace was a predominant feature.

During my three-and-half years in Beijing I, like other heads of mission, even from small and far away countries like my own, had easy access to members of the political leadership. When on transfer from China I paid my farewell calls on the Prime Minister, whom I had met a couple of times, and on the Foreign Minister, whom I had frequently seen and entertained as my guest at our embassy, both took time off to brief me on their personal concepts of the internal and the external situation of the country.

It happened occasionally that on contacts with the political leadership the cultural gap between East and West surfaced. Thus one of the vice-premiers, a gentleman well over eighty, explained to me at length that due to the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution there was a generation gap in the political leadership. "Those well-educated enough are only in their early fifties and quite too young for such responsibility." With still a month to go to my 53rd birthday I bowed my head in silent admission of my own supposed immaturity. At another occasion I—the representative of a so-called capitalist country—was not very successful in explaining to the presumably socialist Minister of Works why we in Denmark considered it right to pay unemployment benefits. "Why pay money to people who don't work?" was the comment.

The economic reform programme, then in its initial stages was of course at the forefront of the foreign observer's interest. Most of us, I am sure, found the reforms indispensable and, at least in the general outline, quite well conceived. We admired the consequence with which the Chinese leadership set about this gigantic task. It is to be hoped that certain negative effects, which not surprisingly were to observe, will not cause too many halts in the momentum required for continued economic progress.

It was more difficult to understand the endeavour to limit the opening up of the country to the economic reforms, thus isolating other social, cultural and political phenomena and sealing off the country from foreign influences and stimuli in these important spheres. Western science and technology may well be acquired, but hardly put to use isolated from the totality of the culture of which they grew out.

MOSCOW REVISITED

MY WIFE AND I regained Moscow the right way—which is to say slowly by train from Helsinki via Leningrad—and arrived at Leningradskij Voksal one day in October 1983 with about ten days to get settled, to present credentials and to prepare for a working visit by our Foreign Minister to his Soviet counterpart of the day. The last books were put on the shelves in the library at three o'clock in the morning preceding the arrival of the minister; the solemn and grand ceremony of presenting the credentials had been accomplished due to a very cooperative and helpful effort by the Protocol Department of the MID (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

I ought of course to have been taken up 24 hours a day with these preparations—and was—almost. The exception being two hours on the day of our arrival where I stole out of the house to stroll in that beautiful area where we are located, to see again the many beautiful historical houses, so familiar to me, to inhale the atmosphere, to feel that I was back in Moscow once more.

I have often wondered why I out of several prospective candidates for this post was chosen as ambassador of my country to the Soviet Union. I am not a slavist by education, I am—and I better admit it, though public confessions seem out of fashion these days—not a socialist either. I am just an ordinary career diplomat, now with a certain experience. Did anybody back in Copenhagen spot the fascination which this country has held for me ever since I as a junior officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stayed here way back in 1954 for two months as secretary to a government delegation, headed by our late Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag? Did anybody sense the importance which the drama of Russian history, the depths and intensity of Russian literature and the almost unearthly beauty of Russian Church music has had for me?

I arrived in Moscow at a time when General Secretary Andropov was already known to be at his death-bed. The shortness of the Chernenko parenthesis in Soviet history meant that twice within a short period of time. I attended at the Red Square the grand and strictly formal, but to me strangely unemotional ceremony by which a highly emotional people takes leave of its leaders.

From then on began a development, which it has been my good (and unforeseen) privilege to witness at close quarters. The reader may already have suspected that the reading of political history to me is an obsession bordering on vice. Over the last few years the stimulus has been found in Soviet press and publications, and to an extent almost unbelievable to an observer who was familiar with the Soviet society ante Gorbachev. But the real task for the foreign diplomat in Moscow in this present period has developed into witnessing history being made.

On the last reception for the heads of diplomatic missions in Moscow President Gorbachev promised to keep his guests more busy than ever, a promise faithfully kept. He also held out to them easier access to the relevant political personalities of the country.

In the Soviet Union the daily life and work of a diplomat is to an extent unknown in other countries dependent on the help and cooperation he may expect from the regional department of the MID dealing with his country. In my case the Second European Department (and its predecessor the old Scandinavian department). I have at mind to express my appreciation for the unfailing help and cooperation with which I have invariably met at "my" department—and my admiration for the high professional standard prevailing there. If they are not always able to penetrate the jungle of Soviet bureaucracy or combat attitudes elsewhere that should by now seem obsolete, it is not, I know, due to any lack of endeavour on their part.

To be the official observer—and interpreter—of your country in a society in transition is a responsibility and a challenge. When this society happens to be the Soviet Union it is also a formidable task—but a highly rewarding one in view of the interest taken by the entire world community in this process of change. In the part of the world to which I belong we see this process as inseparable from the endeavours to lower and to contain international tensions with a view to arrive at a situation where antagonism may eventually give way to cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world. We appreciate the realization by the present Soviet leadership that a more open and transparent society respecting the rights and dignity of the individual is a prerequisite also for a genuine and successful process of restructuring.

An increasingly interdependent world might be the head-line when describing world politics, East-West relations etc. It may, however, also represent a realistic approach to analyses of the bilateral relations between two countries, and particularly so, when the two countries in

question are the leading member of the Warsaw pact and one of the smallest members of the Western alliance.

This is to say that our relations cannot remain insensible to changes in the overall East-West relationship. But it is equally true to say that we have a direct, strictly bilateral relationship with a life of its own which we have succeeded in keeping remarkably unharmed even during periods of East-West tension—and remarkably free of major problems. In a few years time we will be able to celebrate five centuries of official contacts. During this long historic period our countries have never been at war—our soldiers have never confronted each other—a record not easily beaten by other European states. Commercial and cultural exchanges in the wider sense make up the substance of these relations.

Danish-Soviet trade is subject to close interest from the Danish Government. Day-to-day development is supported by the Danish-Soviet Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Technical-Scientific Cooperation, as well as its sub-groups, the most active one being the Working Group on Economic and Industrial Cooperation.

On a regular basis, the efforts of the Commission have been supplemented through an exchange of visits by Ministers and high-level specialists and business representatives. The main actors, however, are active Danish and Soviet business representatives. The aim of both sides has been to achieve a balanced trade at the highest possible volume. It is no secret that both sides feel that the results obtained in no way reflect the efforts made and the resources spent at both official and enterprise level.

After an increasing trend in our two-way exchange of goods, its development in recent years can at best be characterized as stagnant, although 1989 will probably even become a record year for Danish exports, showing a Danish trade surplus for the first time. This will particularly be due to the scheduled delivery of 3 highly developed ships now under construction at a leading Danish shipyard on behalf of the USSR Ministry for Fisheries, bringing continuity to the more than 100 years of traditional bilateral cooperation in shipbuilding. Yet, only 0.5-1 per cent of Danish exports are finding customers in the USSR. Soviet goods are equally rarely seen by Danish consumers. Both sides agree that the commodity programme of our mutual trade should be diversified further, in both directions.

Danish business circles, both exporters and importers, expect and hope that the ongoing "perestroika", particularly the efforts to mobilize the export potential of USSR enterprises, will create, in the long run, the basis for such development.

In the short run, however, the ongoing restructuring process has created considerable delays to the conclusion of export and import transactions due to uncertainty and shift of competence, to the effect that Danish companies had to use considerably more time and resources just to maintain previous levels of trade.

It is to be hoped that the development of a new organizational framework and management of foreign trade may soon become more transparent and fully operational, creating a basis for a better utilization of our common trade potential.

For almost thirty years Denmark and the Soviet Union have had an agreement on cooperation in the field of culture, forming the framework of detailed programmes on cultural and scientific cooperation. Although bureaucratic obstacles not infrequently tend to complicate the practical implementation of cultural exchanges, I find the current level of cultural cooperation between Denmark and the USSR if not completely satisfactory at least acceptable and stable.

To broaden the cooperation as far as existing economic restrictions

will allow, for instance as regards the exchange of young experts, to include a more diverse range of fields and subjects would undoubtedly contribute to enriching the bilateral relations. Furthermore to encourage direct contacts between institutions, organizations and individuals in the two countries would in my opinion tally with current trends of our time.

The strictly political side of the bilateral relations founds on institutional base in the protocol on consultations signed in 1976. The parties agreed to meet regularly to discuss international problems of common interest as well as bilateral issues. Consultations have been held yearly under this arrangement with the venue alternating between Moscow and Copenhagen. Gradually, additional consultations on specialized subjects (UN affairs, disarmament, CSCE etc.) have enriched the dialogue. The frequency of consultations has obviously also depended on the need to prefer for visits on a high level, of which several have occurred in the last few years.

Thus, all the fields of Danish-Soviet relations witness considerable achievements. Yet, it is clear that we could do better.



THE FIVE and a half years in which I have so far had the honour to represent my country in Moscow have been a challenging, relevant and rewarding part of my professional and personal life. I will for ever remain grateful for the good fate which allowed me to be present as a front-row observer during one of the most interesting, most crucial but also most promising stages of the history of this country.

Occasional assessments—made just before going to sleep at night—of what I had accomplished that particular day and what I felt I ought to have accomplished have not tended to increasing my self-esteem. Nor has a comparison between the knowledge and experience acquired and how much there is still left to learn.

When bothered too much by bad conscience I take refuge in enjoying the beautiful pre-fire building with its dramatic history which is our residence in Moscow. I stroll a Saturday afternoon among the children of Arbat—now beautifully restored and full of atmosphere. I enjoy the richness of musical and theatrical life in Moscow and I observe life in Moscow as it is displayed in the streets and the parks, the shops, the restaurants and the cinemas. Trips to the country and to other republics, including some with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, have illustrated that Moscow is not the USSR. And yet it is the beating heart of an enormous conglomerate of countries, territories and peoples. It is not always an easy place to live and to work for a foreign diplomat—the difficulties being essentially related to certain attitudes rather than to shortness in supplies and conveniences. The present trend in Soviet policy does however bode well for improvements also in this field.

When the day comes that it is time for me to say good bye to Moscow I will have innumerable precious memories to bring along. One among them is particularly close to my heart: the memory of the common man, of the ordinary Soviet citizen, of his patience, endurance and fitness for survival.

RUSSIA: A NEW INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY?

(Foreign Capital and Industrial Revolution in Russia)

Alexander DONGAROV

THE "ROBINSONADE" of our national economy on the immense island known as the Soviet Union, an island practically cut off from the world economy, lasted about 60 years and seems to be coming to an end.

Foreign capital has begun making its way into our country now that joint ventures have been launched here. This has greatly enhanced the value of the experience in such cooperation we gained in the twenties and thirties. However, that experience cannot be called inspiring even though it was important. For a variety of reasons, cooperation with foreign capital never assumed a large scale. It is true that in some years there were scores of foreign concessions operating in the Soviet Union simultaneously and that they played a very considerable role by producing certain items. But these were a drop in the economic bucket; in 1928, they only made up one per cent of the country's industrial output.

Obviously this will not solve major economic problems, any more than it will solve the key problem of connecting our economy to the main arteries of the world economy, through which investments, technologies and expertise flow from country to country. Without a continuous and abundant infusion of this new blood, our economy is doomed to a chronic lag and inefficiency by world standards. The so-called new industrial countries, whose development strategy is based on extensive use of foreign investments, provide enviable examples of rapid economic progress.

However, the Soviet Union is neither Singapore, Taiwan, nor South Korea. Can foreign investment play an adequate role in so enormous a set-up as the Soviet economy? How great is the capacity of our economy to absorb and digest direct foreign investments? What price would we have to pay for this kind of aid? Would we be safe from becoming dependent at the level of the state and industries?

In searching for the answer, we should look back at the period of the first Russian industrial revolution, the late 19th and early 20th centuries. That was when Russia, by assigning foreign capital to the role of an important motive force of that revolution, became one of the first "new industrial countries". What did it lose on the way and what did it find?

The concession policy of the Soviet period, a policy which we must study, was a direct continuation of that of attracting foreign capital pursued before 1917. Not only the general idea and concept of the possible extent of foreign participation in the national economy were borrowed but even individual projects dated from that time. For instance, the plan for forest concessions in the North drawn up by the Ministry of Agriculture before the revolution was taken over by the Soviet government and

approved by Lenin. When the state plan for the electrification of Russia (GOELRO), called the "second party programme", was being elaborated Lenin used Russia's experience of industrialisation on the understanding that one third of all the measures for the rehabilitation and advancement of Soviet industry would be carried out with help from foreign capital.

It may be argued that experience going as far back as 80 to 100 years is hopelessly outdated since the country has come a long way from what it was at the time. But so has the world. From the economic point of view, the change in our country's world standing hardly goes further than its moving from fourth or fifth place in 1913 to third place today. And, like 100 years ago, our economy still ranks low within the world economic system in terms of investments, technologies and experience and needs them every bit as much as in the past. Just as 100 years ago, we are threatened with lagging dangerously behind advanced countries. And once again we are faced with the task of achieving a breakthrough to move closer to them.

A hundred years ago, a fairly effective cure was found for Russia's long-standing backwardness. While the course of treatment was not completed, the state of the Russian economy improved considerably.

THE FIRST FOREIGN COMPANY on Russian soil, the German Continental Gas Company, was founded in 1855. But one swallow does not make a summer, does it? It was only the abolition of serfdom in Russia that provided the primary condition for capital investment, a free labour market. In all other respects, however, Russian soil was still unsuited for so exotic a plant as foreign capital.

Russia might have long remained what Engels described as a "European China" but for a helpful disaster, the defeat in the Crimean War, due above all else to the country's backwardness. Indeed, for lack of railroads, military supplies from London and Paris arrived in the Crimea much faster than from Tula, and besides, an army normally lost up to two thirds of its strength on its way to the theatre of war.

It was railroad-building that led off the industrialisation of Russia. In 1838, a narrow-gauge railroad 27 km long linked St Petersburg with Tsarskoye Selo. By 1913 Russia's railroads totalled 70,900 km in length.¹ Between 1893 and 1900, some 2,600 km of new track went into operation every year, which is quite a lot even by present-day standards. Where did a backward, semi-Asiatic country get the means and know-how to accomplish that? After all, Marx and Lenin saw railroads as "couronnement de l'oeuvre" (Marx), "a summation of the basic capitalist industries".²

It was due to foreign investments that the "railroad miracle" was wrought in Russia as if by magic. With their aid, 35,000 of the 50,000 versts of track, or 70 per cent of its total length, had been built by the early 20th century. To this end the country was granted foreign loans totalling 1.5 billion gold rubles, a gigantic amount at the time. Another 1.5 billion railroad loans were received in the 20th century.

One of the main results of railroad-building was that it set off a chain reaction throughout the Russian economy. As Engels wrote: "...Railways implied a capitalist industry... An extensive network of railways cannot be built and run without a domestic industry supplying rails, locomotives, waggons, etc. But it is impossible to create *one* branch of large-scale industry, without also introducing the whole system... In this way, all the foundations of the capitalist mode of production were laid in Russia in a short time."³

Foreign railroad loans added tremendously to Russia's purchasing capacity. Drawing on them, the government showered Russian manu-

facturers with contracts for rails, ties, locomotives, lubricants, building materials, rolling stock, steel station and communications equipment, and so on. In a country whose population was engaged mainly in a subsistence economy and *purchased very little*, fast-growing demand made solvent by foreign loans created a nutrient medium indispensable to industry. Throughout the 50 years of the "great railroad-building", the billions invested in railroads helped feed domestic industry and cope with passing slumps.

The emergence of a reasonably developed transport system as a result of the railroad boom was just as important. Without this system, large-scale mechanical engineering generating both individual plants and whole industries could not have functioned normally. Nor could the giant plants typical of the Russian industrial landscape have survived if isolated from national raw materials and sales markets. The following figures exemplify their growth: Russian railroads hauled 439 million poods of freight in 1868 and 11,072 million poods in 1904—a 25-fold increase in 36 years.⁴

Railroads advancing southwards and eastwards opened up the god-forsaken *inland* Russia for industry, drawing it into capitalist business, rousing dormant forces to productive activity and rapidly turning untapped resources (land, forests, minerals) into wealth.

Credit may be seen as another factor for industrial development on capitalist lines. Foreign capital was drawn to Russian credit institutions as soon as they came into being. Marx wrote that thanks to it, Russia "have managed to introduce in a flash the whole mechanism of exchange (banks, credit societies, etc.), which took centuries to grow up in the West".⁵ By late 1913; 11 of Russia's 19 biggest banks had been founded virtually with foreign capital (four of them with German, two with British and five with French capital). The "working" capital of all 19 banks was close to four billion rubles. Lenin pointed out that "*more than three-fourths*, more than 3,000 million, belonged banks which in reality we-itself on 'foreign' soil: ubi bene, ibi patria".¹⁰

It was not until after it had long done business with Russia as a debtor state and prepared the ground there that foreign capital resolved to move into the Russian industry. Even so, it proceeded timidly for a long time.

One reason for the slow pace of direct foreign investments in Russian industry was the lack of system in the country's finance. The Russian Finance Ministry was aware of the problem and made appreciable efforts to solve it. The 1880s and 1890s saw a vigorous buildup of the gold stock, and in December 1895 this made it possible to raise the rate of the paper ruble to 1.5 ruble in banknotes per gold ruble, and a directive dated January 3, 1897, defined this rate as final and invariable. From then on, the paper ruble could again be exchanged for a gold coin at the decreed rate, and a directive issued on November 14, 1897, guaranteed such an exchange.

For a long time, Russia's very low custom tariffs discouraged foreign investments. "Our customs door was almost wide open until the 1876-1880 period," wrote I. A. Milyutin, a Russian economist.⁷ Competition by the West Europeans and the "Greek gifts" of their industry tended to destroy the shoots of Russia's budding, inexperienced industry. Things came to a pass where Germany, for one, began exporting ordinary sacks to Russia at an annual rate of five to seven million rubles, which was enormous at the time.⁸ There arose a real danger of Europe taking advantage of the economic boom in Russia brought about by railroad-building, and hence of Russia being cheated out of its fair share.

Russia's tariff policy served its purpose for as long as the country was unable to make locomotives, for otherwise it would have taken two

or three more decades to switch over from cart to railroad car. But as soon as the Finance Ministry found itself on firm ground, or rather gained some footholds in domestic industry, a sacred tariff war was declared on uncontrolled imports. When, in 1891, a new edition of the country's custom tariffs put together all the amendments to its tariffs system made over the course of 14 years, it became clear that the system was prohibitive rather than protectionist. Imports of finished products were made difficult and the range of products was narrow. "This protective system," Witte wrote in a report to the Tsar in February 1899, "was intended to create a manufacturing industry of Russia's own that would help us in winning greater economic and hence political independence..."⁹

The government's financial and economic policy aimed at creating an image of Russia which would attract foreign investors did not begin to bear fruit in full measure until the 1895-1902 period. Ambitious plans for industrial development and railroad-building as well as the completion of the financial reform by introducing gold currency removed the last obstacles to direct foreign investment and allowed a truly unlimited scope for it. It was then that foreign investments in the Russian economy reached a record high level as to intensity (see the Table). Lenin noted that on being refused a Russian entry visa for its goods, international capital "has not hesitated to settle within the tariff wall and establish itself on 'foreign' soil: 'ubi bene, ibi patria'".¹⁰

Setting up its own companies was not, however, the only nor the chief form of immigration by foreign capital. Before the revolution (1917), this form accounted for slightly more than 40 per cent of the total amount of foreign investments, the rest being capital invested by purchasing shares in Russian companies.

Prior to 1917, foreign investments in Russian industry totalled 1,436 million rubles (a third of their overall amount), 775 million rubles being invested in mining, 354 million in metalworking and machine-building and 80 million in the chemical industry whereas the textile industry accounted for 126 million and the food industry, for 36 million rubles. Besides, 229 million rubles of foreign capital was invested in transport, lighting, water supply, sewage and other municipal services, 225 million in credit institutions, 80 million in trade, and 35 million rubles in transport and insurance. The total of foreign investments in the Russian economy was 2,007 million rubles.¹²

To begin with, foreign capital played a very big role in setting up metallurgy, a basic industry. Foreign capital helped build the South Russian metallurgical complex, the country's largest, which in 1913 produced 67 per cent of all iron and 60 per cent of all steel. "There has been," Lenin wrote, "a mass influx of foreign capital, engineers and workers into South Russia; and in the present period of boom (1898) entire factories are being brought there from America."¹³

While playing a dominant role in iron and steel production, the South Russian complex included a mere 22 of the 167 metallurgical plants of the country. A South Russian plant produced 14 times more iron on average than a plant in the Urals, and labour productivity per worker in the former case was five times as high as in the latter.¹⁴

Table 1

Opening years of foreign companies active until World War I	Number of companies	Fixed company assets (million rubles)
1856-1887	15	71.7
1888-1894	22	62.9
1895-1902	90	253.0
1903-1905	41	9.5
1906-1913	88	168.6

Foreign investments played an even bigger role in the power industry, electrical engineering and the chemical industry, or the most advanced industries of the time. Strictly speaking, the initiative of setting them up in Russia and by far the greater part of investments in them came from abroad, primarily Germany. Over 100 million rubles was invested in the Russian power industry by foreign capital in a very short time, by 1914, the total amount of investments exceeding this figure but slightly. It was with these investments that the Russian power industry was brought into existence. They were instrumental in building the first power plants and setting up a power network, and hence in switching industry and the municipal services (lighting and transport) to a more progressive source of power. Indeed, 98 per cent of all of Russia's tram track was laid by German and Belgian companies.

Russian electrical engineering was set up by seven major German companies, including General Electric Company, Siemens & Halske, and Schuckert. It was direct connection with the centre of German electrical engineering that enabled the latter's representatives in Russia to operate in coordinated fashion, on a large scale and efficiently. Before long Russia was producing articles ranging from wire to generators. The Russian subsidiaries of German companies experienced no shortage of capital, which the metropolis made available without let or hindrance because its investment in this particular industry in Russia was highly profitable. As a result, the total of the seven subsidiaries' fixed assets rose from 10.7 million rubles in 1901 and 22.11 million in 1911 to 43.05 million rubles in 1913.¹⁶ German investments in Russian electrical engineering were as large as the industry could digest with due regard to the economic realities of the home market. The figures given above indicate that German companies responded to the economic upturn in Russia between 1910 and 1914 by nearly doubling their fixed assets in a mere two years.

Progress in electrical engineering, the power industry and communications necessitated a sharp increase in copper production. Russia's own copper-smelting in the Urals and Transcaucasia was declining fast, being unable to compete with West European copper. The trend at copper plants built by foreigners pointed in the opposite direction. Siemens & Halske bought a small facility in Georgia in 1865 and then another, and reorganised production according to the latest European technological standards, with the result that in 1900 the two plants were smelting nearly 200,000 poods, or 34.6 per cent of the country's total amount.

In 1908, Siemens & Halske were pushed to second place by the French Caucasian Industrial and Metallurgical Society which in 1912-1914 produced over 220,000 poods of unalloyed copper per year. However, a new competitor, the Anglo-American Caucasian Copper Industry Society, pushed the French company back in its turn in 1913.

A natural effect of the German chemical industry's dominant position on the world market was that the industry wielded considerable influence on Russia's chemical production.

Operating in Russia in 1913 were 14 German chemical companies. The plants owned by them accounted for a notable part of Russia's chemical output, including nearly all mineral fertilisers. The fixed assets of these companies added up to 18.33 million rubles in 1913 and showed a trend towards rapid growth in the final prewar years. As in the case of electrical engineering, it was not individual capitalists but the whole chemical industry of Germany and the financial institutions behind them that were out to conquer the Russian market. Hence a sufficiency of investments a steadfast conquest of the market (setting up basic and auxiliary industries, organising trade in chemical and pharmaceutical products, and so on) and a high degree of know-how.

Oil production, too, was growing fast. Lenin stated the trend as follows: about 600,000 poods in 1865, 1.7 million in 1870, 21.5 in 1880, 116 in 1885, 242.9 in 1890, 384 in 1895 and 637.7 million poods in 1902.¹⁶ These figures imply that oil output increased 1,000 times over in forty years, 30 times in the last twenty years and 2.6 times in the last decade.

The news of Baku's oil El Dorado drew a powerful flow of foreign capital into the Russian oil industry. In 1915, the fixed assets of foreign oil companies in Baku totalled 487.4 million rubles, 130 million of this amount being controlled by the Nobel Brothers.¹⁷ Another major company was Rothschild's Caspian-Black Sea Petroleum Industry and Trading Company. Almost the only Russian oil company that could match them was Mantashev's. But how pure its "origin" was is hard to say.

Let us turn to the cotton industry. "Even in this industry, which would seem to be a perfectly national branch of our capitalism," wrote Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, the Russian economist, in *The Russian Factory*, "it was foreigners who came out as pioneers and propagators. One of the best-known among these was L. Knop, a German, whose company built turnkey textile mills and equipped them with British spinning frames. Nearly all the cotton mills of Russia's central industrial region were built by Knop, who soon became a major shareholder in a whole number of mills. "No church without a priest, no mill without Knop," people quipped in those days. Knop also had mills of his own, including the Krenholm Manufactory, Russia's biggest and best-equipped textile mill, which an economist of the time called "a corner of England, on Russian soil".

Foreign Capital helped set up agricultural machine-building. The first three plants of this type were what Lenin described as a "huge" farm machinery works built by the Americans in Lyubertsy, near Moscow, and another two built in Kharkov and Berdyansk.¹⁸

Worthy of special note are foreign investments in Siberia, primarily its eastern part, and the Far East, where they went mostly into mining, particularly gold mining.

In the early 20th century, 14 foreign companies began operating in Siberia. Their fixed assets totalled 33.7 million rubles, or 23 per cent of all investments in the region's mining industry. The share of foreign capital in Russia mining joint-stock companies ranged from two per cent with the Draga company to 67 per cent with the Ridder company.

Foreign Capital helped set up agricultural machine-building. The first 1870s. The region lacked a developed home market (it still had no railroads), and foreign trade therefore gained dominance and became the main incentive to industrial growth.

WHAT DID RUSSIA ACHIEVE in the initial period of industrialisation and at what price?

Between the late 1870s and early 1880s, the country was producing 110 million poods of coal, 23 million poods of iron, three million poods of steel and 13 million poods of oil a year while mechanical engineering and the chemical industry were still in the making.¹⁹

A great deal was accomplished in the eighties. But industrial growth between 1890 and 1900 was far more impressive. That decade constituted the first phase of the Russian industrial revolution. Industrial production doubled, heavy industry increasing output 2.8 times over and light industry, 1.6 times. Iron output went up from 45 to 165 million poods, or by 270 per cent, and steel output, from 16 to 116 million poods, or by 620 per cent. The value of mechanical engineering products rose from 56

to 209 million rubles, or by 270 per cent, and the number of locomotives built, from 83 to 875, or tenfold. Oil production reached 550 million poods (a 190 per cent increase), moving Russia to first place in the world. Coal production went up from 379 to 853 million poods (a 120 per cent increase). Building materials production almost doubled. From 1893 to 1900, Russia built more railroads than in the previous twenty years, their length increasing by 2,600 km a year. The total length of rail placed the country second in the world, next to the United States. In iron and steel production, which was crucial for industry at the time, Russia outdid France, moving into fourth place among industrial powers.²⁰ Russia's share of world industrial production doubled in those years.

Another gigantic leap in industrial development came when, between 1909 and 1914, Russia seemed "all at once to have changed from a patriarchal into a modern capitalist country", as Lenin wrote.²¹ What was more important, however, was not industrial growth in itself but the rise of fundamentally new industries, the most advanced at the time: power, electrical engineering and chemicals. That period saw the onset of a second powerful wave of foreign investment, which exceeded half of all new investments in Russian industry. Speaking of it, Lenin said: "...The might of capital to the tune of thousands of millions in the hands of the bourgeoisie of all countries" is pulling Russia along with it."²²

Whereas the leap of the nineties increased the share of the output of heavy industry to one third of the country's total industrial output, in 1914 this indicator equalled 40 per cent. The overall result of foreign investment was that by 1913 Russia, which in 1877 was importing ordinary sacks, had become a country meeting 56 per cent of its requirement for machine tools and equipment by producing them at home (with industrial production up 19 per cent).

In gauging the role of foreign capital in various economic fields of the country, the occasionally very high indicators of foreign participation should not be seen as the only factor. Foreign investments operated as a locomotive of industrial progress, not only by organising new and more advanced industries unprecedented in Russia until then, but by raising industries already there to a qualitatively new, post-manufactory level. Russian investments often merely joined in a movement initiated by foreigners. The weakness of Russian industry was due to insufficient investment and technological backwardness, which even major achievements of the country's own science could not remedy, as well as to the lack of proper organising skills.

Foreign investments also induced Russia to adopt the higher forms of organisation brought by them into industry and banking at all levels, from the lowest to state level. The road from tiny manufactories to vast syndicates was travelled by the most enterprising Russian capitalists, such as the Morozovs, Prokhorovs, Guchkovs, Kuznetsovs and others, and by the Russian industry as a whole.

The leap taken by the country delivered it from dependence on European rails, locomotives, iron, steel, copper, and so forth. The industrial potential created by Russia was not enough yet to assure the whole population a high standard of living (although a worker at a South Russian iron and steel plant "cost" several times as much as his counterpart in the Urals according to Lenin),²³ but it was enough to guarantee the country's military and political security as well as, to a considerable extent its economic security. It is safe to say, therefore, that at macro-level, or the level of state policy, capital imports on so enormous a scale do not threaten powers of the stature of Russia with dependence on donor countries and are, in fact, likely to help them strengthen their independence.

The problem of relations of dependence developing at the level of va-

rious sectors and industries is a different matter. It is real and needs attention. Such a situation, however, is not irreparable. To begin with, the monopoly of producing definite articles held by this or that industry of a country (or by a transnational in today's world) cannot last for ever. This makes diversification of investment sources one of the most reliable means of combating financial and technological dependence. The higher the stature of the importing country, the greater its opportunities for diversification. Besides, it was a general rule that in step with gaining experience Russian industrialist elbowed foreigners out of industries monopolised by them, such as textile, oil industries, electrical engineering.

Foreign investments did not reduce Russia to a "banana republic", or a "banana empire" to be precise. Capital export to Russia was not normally intended to develop extractive industries that would supply the investor. As a rule, mines built by foreigners supplied Russia first, with the world market getting its share only after that—the world market, I repeat, and not particular investor countries. While the South Russian mining and metallurgical complex, for example, was brought into being chiefly with Franco-Belgian capital, part of its iron ore exports went in the main to Germany, Britain and Holland.

Or take oil, for example. As a major producer of it, Russia held a fitting place on the world market. But it exported very little crude oil. What it did export was oil products meeting high standards of refining. In 1911-1914, technically valuable products made up 88.6 per cent of oil exports. And it should be recalled that Russia only exported that part of its output which did not sell on the home market and was never large; in 1913 it only made up 12 per cent of the total output.

Russia imported larger quantities of industrial raw materials and semi-finished items than it exported. The figures for raw materials imports and exports in 1913 are 668 and 200 million rubles, respectively. Two of the more developed countries of the world, Britain and Germany, supplied Russia with coal, for instance.

Now let us look into one of the aspects of "plundering" Russia, i.e. taking out profits made by foreign investors. To derive profit from activity in Russia, it was necessary to invest real capital: money, industrial products, technology, the expertise and labour of European engineers, managers and workers. In the final analysis, there was reason to speak of Russia "plundering" Europe in return, for the industrial and human capital exported to our country was essentially a transfer of European industry's profits and technological achievements, of the fruits of European education.

Let us, however, turn to figures. L. Y. Eventov²⁴ stated the total amount of foreign capital invested over a period of 27 years (1887-1913) as follows: foreign investments totalled 177 million rubles in 1887; in the next 27 years direct private foreign capital investments increased by another 1,783 million.²⁴ Many of these millions were "born" in Russia and were the "Russified" part of profits derived from earlier foreign investments.

Net profit from all foreign investments in the Russian economy minus industrial tax totalled 2,326.1 million rubles, or exceeded the amount of direct foreign investments by 543.1 million rubles in 27 years. It should be borne in mind, however, that not all of this amount was taken out of the country, for part of it was used for paying other taxes on industrial and commercial activity or simply spent by the fairly numerous foreigners living in Russia. The rate of profit on foreign commercial and industrial capital (a generalising indicator of the "value" of foreign aid) in 1885-1913 averaged 12.9 per cent. Russia paid creditors 4.5 per cent interest on its national debt.²⁵

Let us look at the "value" of foreign investments from another angle. Had Russia refused to attract foreign capital and withdrawn into

"splendid isolation", it would have had to duplicate Europe's industrial development. But its road would have been immeasurably longer whereas the country had no time to lose, as the Crimean War showed. And so Russia decided to hitch its Eurasian cart to European industry's speeding locomotive.

To be sure, Russia could have taken out foreign loans to buy machines and equipment. But this solution leads to a situation where the country is constantly lagging behind the rest of the world, as practice has revealed. Besides, you cannot buy initiative, know-how or competence in general. And an exclusive orientation on foreign trade would have led to a colossal flight of resources from Russia.

This is what actually happened in what I. A. Milyutin called the "duty-free decade" (1870-1880). He estimated that by 1880 Russia had overpaid Germany 500 to 700 million rubles for items which it could have produced quite well itself. That it was equal to accomplishing¹ this was demonstrated in the first 13 years of "independent life" (1880-1893). During that period Russia saved, according to Milyutin, 750 million rubles by developing import-replacing production, in particular iron, steel, rolled metal and locomotives.²⁶

A substantial part of this output came from foreign-owned enterprises. This was a new and very important factor to be taken into account in striking a final balance of foreign investments in Russia.

(Continued on page 144)

¹ See S. G. Strumilin, *Essays on the Soviet Economy*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930, p. 175 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 190.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 407.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, 1960, p. 552.

⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, 1973, p. 153.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 231.

⁷ I. A. Milyutin, *Russia and Germany*, St Petersburg, 1894, p. 9 (in Russian).

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Quoted from *Tsarism and the Development of Capitalism in Russia*, A Collection of Articles, Moscow, 1964, p. 6 (in Russian).

¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 489.

¹¹ *Central State Archives of the National Economy of the USSR*, f. 3429, i. 6, d. 87, p. 199 (in Russian).

¹² These data are apparently trustworthy because they practically square with the estimates of other researchers, in particular L. Y. Eventov, a Soviet scholar, who cited 1,989 million rubles. I. V. Ol, a major authority on these problems, estimated the total of foreign investments in Russian industry, trade and credit institutions by 1917 at 2,243 million rubles.

¹³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 489.

¹⁴ *CSANE*, f. 3429, i. 6, d. 87, p. 192.

¹⁵ See V. S. Ziv, *Foreign Investments in Russian Joint-Stock Companies*, Issue 1. *German Investments*, Petrograd, 1915, p. 26 (in Russian).

¹⁶ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 491.

¹⁷ See S. S. Aliyarov, *Oil Monopolies in Azerbaijan During World War I*, Baku, 1974, p. 38 (in Russian).

¹⁸ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, 1963, p. 129.

¹⁹ See S. Y. Witte, *Notes for the Lectures on the National and State Economy* St Petersburg, 1912, pp. 208-209.

²⁰ See V. I. Bovykin, *The Industrial Development of Russia Before 1917*, A Collection of Essays of the Fifth International Congress of Economic History, Moscow, 1970, p. 8 (in Russian).

²¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, 1977, p. 189.

²² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, 1963, p. 376.

²³ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 487.

²⁴ See L. Y. Eventov, *Foreign Investments in Russian Industry*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1931, p. 38 (in Russian).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

²⁶ See I. A. Milyutin, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: AN INSIDE VIEW

Peter FLORIN

THE PROCESSES taking place in the world today show that new political thinking is successfully asserting itself in international affairs. We are witnessing a turn from confrontation to cooperation, a turn which became necessary because we have found ourselves confronted with burdensome global problems which becloud the future of civilisation. It is becoming evident that the challenge facing us at the end of the 20th century is global and not merely national in scope. So, as Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR, said at the opening of the international meeting for nuclear free zones held in Berlin in June 1988, in the name of peace and prosperity it is high time we should "overcome the existing barriers, claims to an exclusive position in the world and prejudice from the practice of international relations".

The positive processes going on in the world have not bypassed the United Nations. The organisation is increasingly becoming a centre for agreeing the actions of the world community and can play an important role in realising the idea of co-creation, co-development and internationalisation of the peace-making process of which Mikhail Gorbachev spoke at the UN in December last year. The very fact that the large-scale, programmatic statement of the Soviet leader who set forth the conceptual approach to building the foundations of a future world took place at the United Nations, at its main forum—the General Assembly—was received with profound satisfaction everywhere in the world, signalling a revival of the biggest universal international organisation of our time.

THE TWO RECENT REGULAR SESSIONS of the UN General Assembly (the 42nd and the 43rd) marked a turning point in the role of that organisation in the peace-making process. It was an honour for me to preside over the 42nd session which began in September 1987 and ended in September 1988 and the Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament held in June 1988. From the "captain's bridge" of the General Assembly I got an inside view of the work of this major international forum and the functioning of the UN mechanism.

This was a varied and useful experience, especially if one considers that the General Assembly was working at a turbulent and eventful period of international life. This period was marked by such events as the Soviet-American summits in Washington and Moscow, the signing and ratification of the INF Treaty, the Guatemala peace plan for Central

Peter Florin, member of the SUPG Central Committee, President of the 42nd regular and the 3rd special sessions of the UN General Assembly.

America, the signing of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, and progress towards a settlement of regional conflicts. In short, we saw, in the world and in the UN the beginning of long-awaited changes with which we linked great hopes for a better future.

International Affairs has already reported on the results of the 42nd regular and the third special sessions of the UN General Assembly and analysed them. So I would like to recall some of the more memorable episodes.

Looking at the work of the session and the functioning of the UN mechanism from the platform of the General Assembly President, you become aware of the dynamism the policies of the socialist countries impart to the United Nations. These countries generate far-reaching ideas and conceptual approaches to solving the tasks facing the UN and the world community.

I recall my meeting, as President of the General Assembly session, with the USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and our talk on the current activities of the UN. I recall the atmosphere in the hall of the General Assembly when the Soviet Foreign Minister spoke: all his speeches were addressed to a full house. They were followed with close attention by the delegates and the press—both in the United States and in other countries. The new approach of the socialist countries to the problems facing mankind, their persistent efforts in search of mutually acceptable solutions contribute to a constructive atmosphere in the work of the world organisation.

The interaction between the socialist and non-aligned countries on the pressing problems of our time goes a long way towards ensuring the success of the UN. The cooperation between the representatives of these groups of countries, based as it is on equality, trust and mutual respect, is of exceptional importance for solving world problems. For the non-aligned states, the UN is still a forum where they can formulate and realise their foreign policy interests and positions. The Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe, the country which was then the chairman of the non-aligned movement, declared: "It is the one truly universal body representing the free association of States on the basis of sovereign equality and reflecting the hopes and aspirations of all peoples all over the world. We cannot therefore accept the undermining of its role." Considering that the non-aligned states form an absolute majority of UN members one can understand the world importance of the documents of the summit meetings and the conferences of the foreign ministers of the non-aligned movement such as the conference in Nicosia (September 5-10, 1988) and the initiatives of the leaders of six states from four continents (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden).

The Western countries take an active and concerted part in the work of the General Assembly. Their attitude to the positive processes in the world and in the UN was most fully summed up by the Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen who spoke on behalf of the European community: "Difficulties remain in many parts of the world, but it should be noted that international tension has to some extent been reduced as a result of improving relations between East and West. Numerous challenges remain, however, and the United Nations continues to have a central role to play in meeting them... After a period in which the United Nations was too often seen as marginal to the great issues of the day, the Twelve welcome the Organisation's increasingly central and active role." Even so, one must note that a certain lack of constructiveness on the part of some of these states has prevented the adoption of consensus resolutions which would have helped to resolve the outstanding problems facing humankind.

On the whole, in spite of all the difficulties and differences of positions and approaches of the states, the period when I presided over the UN General Assembly sessions was characterised by what I think was a sincere desire to preserve peace and ensure international security, to overcome underdevelopment and poverty, to bring sanguinary conflicts in various parts of the world to a peaceful settlement. This is a measure of the deepening awareness of global problems, which pose a challenge to all the governments and peoples, and the growing understanding of the fact that these problems must be solved through joint efforts.

The policy statements made at the 42nd session of the General Assembly and the Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament made by 47 heads of state and government and 157 foreign ministers, were evidence of the growing authority of the UN. They outlined the range of real problems facing the international community. The first visitor I received in my office of President of the General Assembly session was Yasuhiro Nakasone, the then Prime Minister of Japan. He welcomed the forthcoming summit meeting, and in his address to the General Assembly he stressed: "...A new global ethic, together with the systems to support it, is necessary if we are to save the earth from the gravest perils of destruction it has ever faced and ensure mankind's very survival... Indeed, this is the most significant session in the history of the Organisation for ensuring peace and coexistence."

This goes to show that a growing number of political and state leaders from various countries, leaders belonging to diverse parties and political trends, are aware of the need to use the UN as a place for dialogue and multilateral talks aimed at achieving success, a forum that can contribute greatly to resolving international problems. The GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer said in his speech: "This world Organisation has a multitude of issues to resolve that are crucial for the existence and survival of humanity... In saying this we do not overlook the fact that its effectiveness and that of all its bodies, the strengthening of its role and authority, the enhancement of its effectiveness, the binding character of its resolutions as well as the implementation of its decisions depend on the coordinated cooperation of all its Member States."

This was clearly expressed in the desire of the majority of states to see healthier international relations and in the content of resolutions. The decisive role was played by the will and readiness for dialogue and mutual understanding. A pointer in the same direction was the increased number of consensus decisions adopted by the UN.

I believe that during the 42nd session, the Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament and the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly greater possibilities emerged for the countries of the East, West, South and North to work together creatively towards lasting peace for the whole mankind.

THE FACT that a representative of the socialist German state was elected by acclamation as President of the 42nd session of the General Assembly and the Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament is a tribute to the policy of dialogue, negotiations and international cooperation pursued by the German Democratic Republic. As President of the General Assembly session I faced the following objectives. To contribute to the solution of the basic issues of our time by consistently promoting mutual understanding. To preside over the deliberations correctly and efficiently, to make the General Assembly more effective, and to use my powers to direct the General Assembly to the main political issues, to prevent discussions being dragged out and in general to strengthen the role of the world organisation.

These were the goals that guided me in the process of close interaction with the representatives of all the groups of states, at numerous conferences and more than 80 bilateral meetings with presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers. Consultations with the delegations and heads of regional groups to whom the doors of the session President's office were always open, were very interesting and instructive. Topical political issues were raised at these meetings. For example, the time of the plenary meeting debate on the Afghan issue was agreed with the delegations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and other parties concerned. There were consultations with the African group and the OAU over the dispute between Chad and Libya. The approach to the solution of that problem provides an interesting illustration of the UN's activities.

Chad asked the General Assembly to put its conflict with Libya on the agenda. Any state has the right to make such requests. Chad's request at the General Committee was granted by a small majority, with Libya and other African states opposing. I thought it was my duty to prevent discord among the parties concerned, let alone a row among African states at the plenary session. Acting on behalf of the General Assembly I held consultations with the delegations of Chad and Libya, with the head of the group of African states and other parties concerned. I then appealed to the then OAU Chairman, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, to use his personal influence. The consultations were marking time. One African state, in accordance with Rule 74 of the Procedure of the General Assembly, suggested that no decision be made on the problem.

Having given the floor to all the representatives who wanted to speak and thus reaffirming my adherence to democratic procedure, I put the proposal to the vote, that is, the proposal not to make any decision concerning the inclusion of the Chad-Libyan conflict on the agenda. Some states objected to this course of action and I had to put this objection to the General Assembly, which rejected it by an overwhelming majority. So, the conflict was not after all included in the agenda and a settlement of the issue was left to the Organisation of African Unity. Today we can say that the General Assembly had taken a wise decision. It backed the efforts of a regional organisation towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute and in the final count contributed to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Chad and Libya.

The session offered me ample opportunities for establishing necessary international cooperation. After consultations with the heads of regional groups and at the initiative of the Central American states the session adopted, in its early days, a resolution in support of the Guatemala peace plan for Central America. Such a beginning set an optimistic tone to the General Assembly, it showed that the settlement of regional conflicts in various parts of the planet was getting off the ground. The impassioned and courageous speech by President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua in defence of his country's political and economic independence was truly unforgettable.

Overcoming the obstacles in the way of peace processes in Central America was the subject of conferences throughout the session. Preparing the session of the General Assembly called to discuss the issue in May 1988 I exchanged opinions with the Vice Presidents of five Central American states who specially came to the UN headquarters. In retrospect, that meeting did much to spur on the peace-making process.

After thorough-going consultations at the request of the group of Arab states, I called General Assembly sessions in February, March and May, 1988 to discuss the observer status of the Palestine Liberation Organisation's mission at the UN. In the light of the unlawful attempts of the US Congress to close the mission the almost unanimous

demand for equal participation of the PLO in the talks on the Middle East problem was a major demonstration of international solidarity with the just struggle of the Palestinian people. It was said that the US had to observe the 1947 agreement with the UN on its headquarters and to recognise the PLO's right to have an observer mission at the UN under the General Assembly Resolution No. 32/37 of November 22, 1974. That right was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in accordance with the ruling of the International Court of Justice and, incidentally, was recognised by the Federal Court of the USA. The PLO is still represented at the UN and the decision has since been proved to be right.

According to the tradition of many years, the President of the General Assembly session holds a press conference for journalists accredited to the UN immediately upon assuming his post. All the former holders of that high post shared their thoughts on the main goals of the forthcoming session. At the press conference at the start of the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly I said that its main task was to make a substantial contribution towards a turn for the better in international relations, to the cause of disarmament and international security, the cause of settlement of regional conflicts, the cause of progress in the economic, social and humanitarian fields.

During the main part of the session (September-December) I gave about 30 interviews to representatives of the press, radio and television. Besides, I made several statements on current events through my press spokeswoman. I should mention the Soviet-American agreement on the conclusion of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles, the declaration of six states on this important issues, and the signing of the INF Treaty during the summit meeting in December 1987. I have also made statements for the press on many aspects of the work of the General Assembly, notably in connection with the declaration on the non-use of force in international relations.

Statements on my behalf were made at daily press conferences on such subject as the tragic incidents in the Persian Gulf which claimed numerous casualties and on the aggressive policies of the racist South African regime. The list of the problems raised in our information activity was an indication of the hope that the 42nd session could contribute to their solution and, on the other hand, it shows the growing significance of public statements by the President of the General Assembly.

The account of the UN's work in 1987-1988 would not be complete without mentioning the Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament held from May 31 to June 25, 1988. That session was greatly influenced by the Soviet-American summit in Moscow. May 1988 in general saw intensive negotiations on disarmament which outlined far-reaching perspectives and set the tasks for the future. The third special session was stormy, reflecting the realities and contradictions of our time. It made it abundantly clear that the time had come to break the vicious circle of mistrust, arms buildup and mounting military rivalry, that the time had come to seek universal security. The high point of the session was the productive and businesslike general discussion in whose course the session was addressed by representatives of 135 states among whom were heads of state and government, and foreign ministers. All the participants will long remember the momentous night of June 25-26, 1988 when "the clock was stopped" in a last-minute effort to finalise the concluding document of the session. Negotiations lasted through the night and the session was closed at 7:25 a. m. Unanimity on the practically agreed document proposed by Ambassador Ahmed of Pakistan, who chaired the general committee, was not achieved due to the position of a single country which did not agree with the thinking of the majority

of states on a stronger role for the UN in the disarmament process, the propositions on preventing the arms race in space and other issues.

Conventional disarmament and regional disarmament measures came in for wide-ranging discussion at the session. There was a useful, frank and constructive dialogue on many disputed issues.

By submitting a comprehensive disarmament programme and a memorandum "Security Through Disarmament", the socialist states demonstrated a new approach to international security and disarmament. The non-aligned and developing countries took a clear stand in favour of multilateral negotiations on disarmament in the interests of peace and stability and social progress. President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina declared: "It reaffirms my conviction that it is necessary to ensure a sustained process of disarmament which may generate a climate of détente no longer based on nuclear deterrence but on rational criteria that may guarantee survival for us all." President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe said it should be clear to everyone that it is impossible to continue along the road of the arms race and the continuing threat of nuclear war. He welcomed "the declaration made by some nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons".

The programme of action to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2010 and talks on the creation of a global security system within the United Nations framework proposed by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was received with great interest and broad approval.

Finally, the Third Special Session Devoted to Disarmament and its preparation gave a boost to the international public campaign for peace through disarmament. The session was addressed by 129 representatives of non-governmental organisations and scientific associations. Anti-war demonstrations were held. Personal meetings and petitions signed by millions of people which I received convinced me of the strength of the peace movement. I was particularly impressed by the meetings with representatives of the Japanese Association Against Nuclear Catastrophe, the US National Conference for Disarmament, the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Scientific Workers.

YES, the world is changing for the better. Not as fast as one would like, but much faster than could be expected at the beginning of the eighties. Promising changes are taking place in the UN, although the burden of the past is making itself felt. One often heard before and still hears today doubts that a world organisation comprising 159 states with different social and economic systems can cope with its tasks. My answer to these doubts is prompted by my many years of work at that forum, including as President of the 42nd regular session and the third special session of the General Assembly. I am confident that the goal "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" formulated in the UN Charter is more relevant today than ever before. The UN is and will be an indispensable base for dialogue, cooperation and negotiations. As the world changes, the forum and its agencies will become more effective.

In my farewell speech as President of the 42nd General Assembly session, I said with hope that the task was to mobilise and use more effectively the potential of our world organisation to carry on the process of disarmament, the strengthening of peace on Earth and of international security, the resolution of international conflicts, and promoting cooperation in the economic, ecological, social and humanitarian spheres.

It can be said that these hopes have in many ways been justified by the results of the 43rd session of the General Assembly. They confirm that the UN is contributing to the preservation of peace and to creating prerequisites for a non-violent world free of mass destruction weapons.

SOME OF THE 400 MEETINGS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Leonid KUTAKOV

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL holds a priority place as the only UN body empowered to adopt measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes (see Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and to take action binding on UN members with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression (see Chapter VII). This ensures the Security Council the implementation of effective measures for the prevention or curbing of possible aggression, and to this end it is necessary for the five permanent member of the Council—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France and China *—to respect the principle of unanimity. During my service in the Soviet Mission to the UN and later, when I was UN Under-Secretary-General on Political and Security Council Affairs (1965-1973), I attended nearly 400 Council meetings.

THE "SIX-DAY WAR" OF 1967 AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

ON SUNDAY, June 4, 1967, I was at the Glen Cove mansion of the Soviet Mission to the UN, 50 kilometres from New York.

For ten days running, the Security Council had been discussing the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. That morning it was reported that the Vice-President of the UAR was flying to Washington to consult with President Lyndon Johnson on a peaceful settlement and that Cairo was ready to host the US Vice-President.

The information brought relief at the UN. That evening the television news broadcast included glimpses of an unruffled Cairo.

On June 5, at 5 a. m., there was a sharp knock at my door.

"Telephone!" the superintendent of the mansion whispered from the corridor.

The call came from a diplomat on duty in New York.

"Israel has attacked the UAR," he told me. "The President of the Security Council has set a special Council meeting for 8 a. m. at the Egyptians' request."

Nikolai Fedorenko, Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN, and I left immediately for New York.

We switched on the car radio. Announcers reported hurriedly that at daybreak on June 5, Israeli aircraft coming in from the sea and outflanking the Egyptians' radar system had launched a surprise attack on Egyptian airfields and bombed Cairo, Port Said and Suez. Israeli tank divisions were attacking the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and had delivered strikes against Jordan and Syria.

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* Since January 1, 1966, the Security Council has had 15 members, including 10 non-permanent ones elected by the UN General Assembly for a term of two years, without the right to immediate re-election.

The Security Council hall was full to capacity in spite of the early hour.

Diplomats, journalists, and cameramen were anxiously discussing the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East and its likely implications.

Agitated press attachés and reporters burst in every minute with teletype reports. News kept on pouring in from all over the world. It said that Iraq, Algeria and Kuwait had declared their support for the UAR, that Iraq was sending troops to Egypt, that the Iraqi air force had bombed Israel.

On the first day of war, we lacked reasonably authentic information on the situation at the front. So did the Arab diplomats.

It was in that uneasy atmosphere that the Security Council met.

Cameramen had their hands full. They were anxious to record the more dramatic and sensational moments, to show the expression on the face of El Kony, the Egyptian delegate, to illustrate the mood of the Soviet delegate, to indicate whether or not the Arab diplomats were disconcerted.

The Council meeting (the 1347th) was opened by the President, Hans Tabor of Denmark.

The representatives of the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Israel were invited to join in the debate without the right of vote. The Arabs seated themselves at the left end of the horseshoe-shaped table, not far from us. The Israeli delegation took seats at the other end. On hearing statements by the representatives of the UAR and Israel, the Council broke off its meeting to hold consultations. There was no time for argument. The member states' representatives sat down at a long rectangular table in the Council President's office next door. There were no interpreters, no protocol, no photographers nor guests. Discussion focussed on urgent Council action.

Sitting near the President was US Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and somewhat farther off, French delegate Roger Seydoux, an intelligent and shrewd diplomat. The latter was the first to speak. He stated his country's position briefly, precisely and convincingly. He said the Council should demand, not only an end to hostilities, but the withdrawal of troops to the positions held by the two sides before the conflict. The cool-tempered and generally laconic representative of India, Ambassador Gopalaswami Parthasarathi, readily backed his French colleague.

During informal consultations on the first day of the Israeli attack, with the United States still uncertain of Israel's military success, Goldberg did not rule out the possibility of the Council calling for the withdrawal of troops. His pro-Israeli stance was well known. One day Ambassador Jamil Baroody of Saudi Arabia, a man popular at the UN, went as far as to remark at a Council meeting: "I wonder whether Mr. Goldberg is speaking on behalf of the United States or Israel."

Lord Caradon, the British delegate, attracted particular attention because he had served in the Middle East for years. Assigned to the UN in 1964, he was also Secretary of State and a member of the Labour Cabinet. He generally read out a text received from London and liked to begin with a maxim or joke. Nikolai Fedorenko responded to one of these by citing the oriental saying: "When the lion parts its lips don't think it is laughing. It is baring its teeth." The saying made diplomats grin and delighted the guests sitting in the Council gallery.

Caradon said that he was prepared to vote for a decision on a ceasefire and even for the disengagement and withdrawal of troops.

The Soviet Union, loyal to the principle of helping victims of aggression and supporting peoples defending their freedom and independence, took a resolute stand in defence of the Arab countries. Fedorenko announced that on June 5 the Soviet government had published a statement

emphatically condemning Israel's aggression against the UAR and other Arab countries. He said the Soviet government insisted on the UN doing its main duty by condemning Israel's acts of aggression and taking urgent action to restore peace in the Middle East.

While coming out in favour of a resolution on a ceasefire and troops withdrawal, Goldberg and Caradon did not urge the Security Council to adopt a relevant decision. They were waiting to see how events developed.

Shortly afterwards reports came in about major setbacks for the Egyptian armed forces. The surprise attack mounted by well-trained Israeli troops using American equipment, the criminal neglect shown by certain Egyptian generals and the reluctance of the reactionary section of the high command to really defend the gains of the Egyptian revolution assured the Israelis' speedy success.

On being informed that Israel had scored some military gains, the US and the British diplomats changed their position. On June 6, Goldberg and Caradon told the Soviet delegates that they were against any Council resolution demanding the withdrawal of troops. Goldberg said this was a matter for the future.

Moving various amendments to the draft resolution and dragging out consultations, Goldberg, Caradon and the Canadian delegate, George Ignatieff, obstructed even a resolution on a ceasefire. This suited the Israeli generals, who were bent on exploiting their success and bringing about the downfall of the progressive regimes in the UAR and Syria.

Shortly before the Council meeting on the morning of June 6, I walked up to Goldberg.

"The Soviet delegation," I said, "hopes the American representative, who earlier showed concern about the threat of conflict in the Middle East, will be consistent and will support the motion of several delegations in favour of immediately adopting a resolution on a ceasefire."

"I'm not sure I'll be able to support such a resolution," Goldberg replied curtly.

The situation at the front was going from bad to worse. Moscow instructed us "to ensure at all costs the adoption of a resolution on a ceasefire within 24 hours". The delegation did everything possible to bring about such a resolution.

During intensive consultations with every one of the Council members, we, Soviet diplomats stressed that hostilities in the Middle East, if continued, were likely to extend to other countries and areas. This could in its turn result in the conflict getting out of hand, a development fraught with the threat of world war. Bulgaria, India, Nigeria and Mali insisted on effective steps to end the conflict.

Our talks with spokesmen for NATO countries and some extremist diplomats representing the Arab countries required infinite patience, flexibility and a prompt response to the arguments of those who were against ending the war. The Foreign Minister of an Arab country tried to persuade me that there was no need to end the war. "You Russians," he said, "surrendered Moscow in 1812 and defeated Napoleon, and in 1941 you let the Germans reach Moscow and then defeated them."

The Council was in continuous session, with sharp debates going on all day.

In the end even the closest allies of the United States wavered—Britain, Canada and Denmark. They came to realise the danger of the war spreading to other countries and regions.

At about 10 p.m. on June 6, the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that all measures be adopted without delay for an immediate ceasefire and an end to hostilities. The resolution stressed that these measures should only be seen as a first step. This was an important state-

ment, for it implied that the UN took an uncompromising stand on all seizure of foreign territory.

The Israeli army ignored the resolution. It went on attacking with support from the air. Its armoured units pushed towards the Suez and reached the banks of the Jordan.

There was a threat that Israeli troops would reach the western bank of the Suez Canal. The Soviet delegation demanded another extraordinary meeting of the Council. Discussing the matter with Council members, we insisted that the Council act without delay and demand categorically a ceasefire.

Late on June 7, the Council adopted Resolution 234, which categorically demanded a ceasefire within a few hours.

After successful operations in the Sinai, the Israeli army withdrew some of its troops from there to attack Syria. The Israelis planned to take Damascus in their stride and overthrow Syria's progressive regime. On the morning of June 9, the Security Council demanded an immediate end to all hostilities on the Israeli-Syrian front.

That evening the Council met at Syria's request. The Syrian Ambassador read out a report from Damascus saying that, contrary to the Council resolution, Israel had stepped up its air and land attacks and landed paratroopers in the Al-Kuneitra area of the Golan Heights.

The United States and Israel started a diplomatic game in the Council by claiming that it was unclear who was violating the Council resolution. To allow the Israelis time for a deeper thrust into Syria, Goldber said there was a need for an "impartial" investigation into mutual recriminations. He disputed reports about further advances by Israeli troops, arguing that it was necessary to check all data. The United States plainly wanted Israel not only to seize as much Arab territory as possible but to bring down progressive Arab regimes. It seemed to believe that this object was within reach, for President Nasser had announced his intention to resign. The Israelis' main blow was now aimed at Syria.

On June 9, the Council sat until late into the night. We had hardly returned to Glen Cove when, early on June 10, a member of the Syrian Mission called. He told us in a voice breaking with emotion that the situation in Syria had seriously deteriorated, according to a report from Damascus. Israeli troops had captured Al-Kuneitra and their tanks were advancing on Damascus.

We rushed to headquarters.

"What's it like at the front?" we asked the deputy representative of Syria.

He was pale. "Israeli tanks are within 60 kilometres of Damascus," he answered.

We firmly supported Syria's request for an urgent meeting of the Council.

UN observers confirmed that fighting on Syrian territory was continuing, with Israeli aircraft bombing the Damascus airport and suburbs.

The delegates of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, India and Mali demanded that the Council immediately take steps to stop the Israeli offensive.

The situation was becoming increasingly dangerous. There was the possibility the Middle East conflict could grow into a world war. It called for drastic action also outside the UN, whose decisions were being blocked by Western countries.

On June 9, the Central Committees of the communist and workers' parties and the governments of seven socialist countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—adopted a joint statement on the situation in the Middle East. It emphatically warned Israel that unless it desisted from aggression the

signatories would do "everything necessary to help the peoples of the Arab countries offer firm resistance to the aggressor".

Meanwhile Council debates became more heated than ever. The atmosphere was heavy with cigarette smoke and the nervous tension of hundreds of people. Air conditioning seemed to have stopped functioning. Every now and again, sharp controversies broke out between the Israelis and their allies, on the one hand, and diplomats from socialist and non-aligned countries, on the other. Fedorenko announced the Soviet governments' decision to sever diplomatic relations with Israel because it persisted in aggression despite the resolution of the Security Council and warnings from the governments of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. "Unless Israel stops military operations," he said, "the Soviet Union will in common with other peace-loving countries impose sanctions against Israel."

The decision of the governments of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had an extraordinary effect. Hours later, UN Secretary-General U Thant informed the Council that the Israeli government agreed to the adoption of measures for an end to all hostilities and troop movements as from 16.30 hours (Central European time) on June 10 as well as to the stationing of UN observers on both sides of the Syrian-Israeli front.

The "Six-Day War" was over.

The ceasefire and the discontinuance of hostilities constituted a certain success for the Security Council and peace forces. But they were only the first step, since Israel still occupied Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian lands three times as large as its own territory.

Between November 9 and 22, 1967, the Security Council met seven times to discuss the situation in the Middle East. Caradon and Goldberg strongly opposed a Soviet draft resolution condemning Israel's policy of aggression and outlining specific measures to remove the effects of Israeli policy. In addition to Council sittings there were protracted and exhausting informal consultations among the Council's permanent members. It was becoming obvious that the British draft resolution had the biggest chance of being carried. Our attempts to improve it by including a provision for the return of refugees to their homes, compensation for damage sustained by victims of aggression, and so on, brought emphatic objections from the United States and Britain.

On November 22, 1967, the Council unanimously approved Resolution 242. The latter envisaged the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, the termination of the state of war, respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace, a just settlement of the refugee problem and guarantees for the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the region.

The resolution was an important milestone on the road to settling the Middle East conflict. It provided an international legal basis for defending the interests of the Arab countries and eliminating the effects of Israeli aggression. Israel did not formally recognise the resolution until 1970 and failed to respect it afterwards.

(to be continued in our issue No. 8)

Muscovites on Soviet Foreign Policy

THE MANSION occupied by the editorial offices of *International Affairs* is situated in one of Moscow's oldest districts. What do people living in this quaint neighbourhood think of international affairs, of Soviet diplomacy, of perestroika? What do they say about them on Basmannaya St. or the Razgulyai?

Almost at random, we invited Muscovites differing in occupation, knowledge and experience of life to join in a round table discussion. Following is the list of our guests.

Mikhail BELOUSOV, tool maker, Automobile and Tractor Electrical Equipment Plant;

Vladimir BOLOTOV, second-year student, Moscow Bauman Higher Technological School;

Timur ESADZE, student, Dramatic Art Section, Studio School under the Moscow Academic Art Theatre;

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NEW THINKING, GHOSTS OF THE PAST, AND PERESTROIKA

International Affairs. What is our national security? We used to be spell-bound by that incantation, "As long as there is no war". But that isn't enough, is it?

Life has shown that real security conceived in contemporary terms is something more than the absence of war. This being so, what is our national interests? Where does the greatest threat to it come from? How realistic is our disarmament policy? How can we make it bear more tangible fruits for the people? What's the relationship between universal and class values? The list of questions is endless.

KATALYMOV. We are now "reverting" actively to Lenin, Marx, the true image of socialism, and so on. But the question arises: What about the class approach? Are we to go back to it, too? Let us admit that the class point of view doesn't lead after all to a stereoscopic perception of the problem. Yet such perception is very necessary right now, and so is a consensus over interests among all social strata and groups. There is no need to demonstrate that infringing the interests of one group or a people leads to an explosion causing

trouble to all. Speaking of "reverting", I would therefore prefer to revert to Hegel: "All that is actual is reasonable, all that is reasonable is actual." It's the reasonable that we need more than ever.

A consensus over interests is something the whole world needs. It is anachronistic today to defend "class interests" in the international arena. It's downright dangerous. What we must bear in mind is things benefiting humanity. We stand to gain where humanity benefits from a reasonable foreign policy on our part. Nobody can now secure advantages by himself or for himself alone, neither a small nor a large nation. The ecological problem is the most striking case in point.

OLENEV-HIRSCHFELD. I agree. But let us see just the same who we are. They call our country a superpower. Very well, let us accept the term—why shouldn't we? After all, it is true objectively, nor am I speaking of our military strength. Our country is a great world power, a continent comprising hundreds of peoples and influencing the lives of its neighbours.

The only point is to interpret this "superpower" status of ours correctly. We are doing so already, it seems. Our country isn't a formidable monolithic colossus that has only to stretch itself for the world to be shaken by upheavals. On the contrary, it is a great pacifying and stabilising force. This is so objectively, and it's the view we should take ourselves. It puts all conflicts, all regional collisions, in a entirely different light.

What is, from the point of view of our interests, the Soviet-Albanian conflict, which has lasted so unnaturally long? In the past we did a lot for Albania, and it found its feet. But what happened afterwards? There occurred events which made us psychologically unacceptable to the Albanians, and on top of this the discord was made worse by perfectly incomprehensible grievances and ambitions. Great powers have neither ambitions nor grievances for those are the weaknesses of small countries.

Let me express a general opinion. For a superpower, to be the first to speak openly of its mistakes, to apologise, and so on, is to take a fine, dignified stand that is also to its advantage if you will. A superpower cannot lose face by doing so (a small state dreads just that) but can, on the contrary, acquire a human face and even make political capital.

Nowadays it is profitable to be kind and humane. At home and abroad, and in every sense. This is an objective reality which all leaders would do well to appreciate, for some of them still imagine that new thinking is a cunning stratagem of Gorbachev's. The time is over when Frederick II could say: "Take the territory you like. Afterwards you can find a hundred lawyers who will prove that the seizure was legitimate." Everything has changed, and the process of change is objective. And so the less cynical you now are, the better for yourself and the world. The inference with regard to us is: what is good for the world and humanity is good for the Soviet Union. Conversely, what objectively benefits the Soviet Union benefits civilisation. This is the gist of the idea of interdependence provided that you see in it a working concept and not a slogan.

I think the notion of sufficient defence should be seen from the same point of view. Far from being a weakness or a concession, it is an objective conclusion prompted by an analysis of the development of the modern warfare means, of our ever democratising and humanising world, and of properly understood superpower pride. This is, incidentally, what guided me in 1983-1985 when I was developing my conception of sufficient defence, a fact immediately noted by the *Detente* magazine and *The Guardian* and *The Observer* newspapers. At the time this idea was, unfortunately, viewed here as heretic, but time flies fast...

ESADZE. For me, the problem of new thinking is primarily a human problem. I'm a playwright, and this means that I'm a politician in a sense because politicians, too, must work with people, at least theoretically must know them. Nobody will therefore deny, I suppose, that people are central to diplomacy

and foreign policy. They are both the subject and the object of politics. Indeed, what's the purpose of politics? What makes it profitable? It is the welfare of people and society as a whole.

But let there be no mistake: I don't at all want to invoke the concept of the "human factor". Incidentally, it's a coinage of the new period, the period of perestroika, but genetically it belongs in our past. The phrase is absurd, false and ultimately harmful. Why? Let us realise at long last that man neither can nor must be a factor. He is a goal. The economy, diplomacy, ideology are all factors. The blame for this misconception of the essence of man must evidently be put on ideology, especially its notorious propositions about "class content" and "class values".

It's clearly time we reappraised this slogan-like concept. For 10 years, it made us look continuously for enemies in our society, for those who were "right" in class terms and those who were "wrong" and hence guilty. We tried to distinguish between the "pure" and the "impure", that is were engaged in a permanent civil war. As it happens, war—any war—invariably cripples people spiritually, deforms the accepted set of values, psychology, distorts the sense of morality and occasionally even kills it. Isn't this the reason for our current troubles? Why, we are still fighting against ourselves.

We also have to "thank" past rounds of that war for many things. Their results are well known: depeasantisation, the destruction of millions of peasants and intellectuals, a disastrous decline in cultural standards. And here's another paradox. We talked for decades about "class values" and the hegemony of the proletariat, but what good, specifically, did that scanning of slogans do to the proletariat? Now that we know all our troubles, this question sounds rhetorical. But I think we still haven't quite renounced this approach which classifies people as botany and biology classify plants and animals. Yet what we need first and foremost is democracy and humanism.

The thesis about "class values" has an amazingly bizarre record in our country. Let us recall that Marx didn't evolve his doctrine of classes for its own sake but because he had been investigating a specific philosophical and social problem, that of man's total alienation from the products of his labour, from production and society and politics, from other people. A class vision of the world in the Marxian sense is needed primarily as a means of ending that alienation. But what did we do? Having mesmerised ourselves by insisting on the primacy of "class values" (even without comprehending them properly—isn't this why we now find it hard to define what class values we are defending on the international scene?), we not only failed to solve the problem of alienation but aggravated to a monstrous degree. It looks as if we have yet to realise that the situation in our country is analogous: while admitting that man was alienated from power, production and property for decades, we affirm just the same that we "live under socialism" and we must merely "restore its human image".

I think this universal alienation, which makes people drop out of the social context, stop feeling responsible for the political situation in the country and blame their troubles on others, is the chief trouble affecting our society and the chief obstacle to perestroika.

KRIKOV. I would like to go further on that point. Yes, we now talk a lot about the primacy of universal over class values, of new thinking, democracy and other useful things. All that is correct. But I fear that we may start praising and overpraising ourselves all over again and slide back into the old rut.

We mustn't fear the truth nor a sober outlook on life. I am all for Gorbachev, for perestroika, but I was better off before, under Brezhnev. Do you see what I mean? Here's a simple example. In the past, I could buy baby food without difficulty before nine a.m. But now it is sold from half past six, and you get nothing if you come at seven. Why is this? Somebody in our country has forgotten to buy milk cartons from the West. But why must

my child smart for that? And what can I do as an individual to ensure the guilty bureaucrat is fired? Nothing.

We all know about our food situation. But last year one million tons of quick-frozen meat was allowed to rot. The only reason for it was that two ministries couldn't come to terms on how to ship it by rail. So what? Was anybody called to account? I have a feeling that this leading class, which is leading at my own expense, has a system of mutual protection everywhere. As for those who are criticised too harshly, they are offered some other cushy job, that's all. We say that perestroika is a revolution, so let officials who have failed become its first "victims".

This prompts me to ask a question about our electoral system. I agree that the earlier Supreme Soviet was no good—it was a body of supers, a mass meeting. But how am I to go about toppling a bureaucrat who is minister now? Theoretically, I can bring him down through my MP by asking him to make inquiries with the bureaucrat in question, and then to have him black-balled. But I will no longer have that kind of connection or will only have it for a short time and rather by chance. Indeed, I haven't elected an MP, have I? It's a member of the Congress of People's Deputies that I elected. Yet previously we elected people directly to the Supreme Soviet. Does this imply that the earlier system was better? I'm saying all this because we don't seem to have a precise idea of how to democratise the country. We are still afraid of something and so take a step to the left and then to the right, a step forward and then a step back.

NIKONOV. It's worth recalling here what a class is by definition. Textbooks tell us that a class is a group of people differing from another social group according to the place it holds in the production and distribution systems. What if we look at ourselves as we now are? The classes that were active in October 1917 are gone. New social groups have come into being but textbooks say nothing about them.

We now have, for example, a whole class (I'm sure it's a class) of *nomenklatura* administrators who have no legal title to our property yet control it while we nominal owners of this property of the people "enjoy" the fruits of that control. After all, it is bureaucrats and their apparatus that decide whether the country should build atomic submarines or kindergartens, erect a pompous Victory memorial worth millions or buy artificial limbs that will really serve veterans of the Patriotic and Afghan wars. I have no doubt that the bureaucrat's class values are very different from ours, especially in view of the fact that he solves his private everyday problems quite successfully and irrespective of whether or not his instructions are of any use to people, whether the people's money is spent properly or buried in a further foundation pit, "the world's largest".

Nevertheless, we pursued a "class foreign policy" for decades, defending "our class values". It was in their service that we had to tighten our belts and put up with many absurdities inside the country, with a distorted existence. But what were those "class values"? I think what we had was an ominous, gigantic travesty of concepts, with a bureaucracy alien to us and sponging on slogans as it exploited our emotional allegiance to the ideals of our fathers and grandfathers. It was a sort of psychological exploitation, and as for the bureaucrats themselves, they saw jealously to their class interests (without quotation marks) and their tranquillity and prosperity.

Correlating national security with class interests may be interesting. We were long hypnotised by the war menace and therefore overlooked the mortal danger that crept upon us from behind. The Moscow Committee for the Protection of Nature recently carried out an interesting experiment by testing baby food (pumpkin with sugar) supplied to Moscow from the Baltic region. The paper indicator "blushed"—not with shame but because the nitrate content per kilogram of the product was too high, ranging from 500 to 1,000 milligrams. Yet the permissible amount of nitrates for the adult con-

sumer is 300 to 400 milligrams a day. This standard is exceeded in the case of baby food, and besides, we must remember that children are generally more sensitive to any contaminant than adults.

What class (or social group) stands to gain by producing objectively harmful "baby food" and keeping quiet about it?

Now for another example. There are nuclear reactors operating in Moscow. But we don't know how many there are nor how the resultant radioactive waste is disposed of. Besides, are there plans for the removal of these reactors from Moscow? We don't even know where we could get iodic preparations in the event of an accident—God forbid!—at one of the atomic power plants surrounding Moscow. What prevents us from using individual dosimeters? Who will protect us against this "peaceful" variety of the nuclear threat?

Environmental protection is a costly business whereas it is claimed we have no money. According to statistics, however, the Ministry of Water Resources alone spends nine billion rubles a year. It builds irrigation canals. Aren't we short of money because it's carefully buried? Yet it is only in the Fools' Land that buried coins sprout.

We need a lot of money primarily to undo the damage we caused nature. What I mean was said long ago by Abbot Delille:

The lovely fields that please the eye
Require reflection more than outlays.
Lest the charm of Nature be waylaid,
Give it thought, not expenditures high.

We must, first of all, renounce our input-maximising economy as soon as possible (incidentally, it suits a lot of people quite well). It is only when we've done so that society and nature will draw a sigh of relief. Small wonder that an economy openly concerned with using resources on as large a scale as possible is literally devouring nature. We must call a halt to meaningless construction and absurd projects such as gigantic canals leading to ecological disasters and even to national catastrophes in many cases. That would release money for environmental protection, safe baby food and education.

KOKSHAISKAYA. I don't quite understand why we call new thinking "political". I believe we should desist at long last from a "political" approach—we've politicised and ideologised everything beyond all measure as it is. Why not cultivate elementary economic thinking, for instance? It's what we lack more than anything else. Why not calculate how much a human life is worth—say, mine? What we now have is just a distorted set of values: we make tanks to defend our people yet children born to these people are poisoned by the nearest chemical plant. But parents cannot take offence because the plant has provided them with housing.

Since we don't seem to be able to tell good from bad, let us see what can benefit us. If we figure out everything we'll discover that museums mustn't be starved of funds or the country will "lose" its citizens, that it doesn't pay to keep people made diplomats by way of "penalising" them (they may do harm), that it's better for society to have healthy and cheerful members, who can spend their leisure time pleasantly, take a walk in the woods, smell flowers—in short, can live a normal, comfortable life, which is still something unfamiliar to us, I'm sorry to say.

NIKONOV. It is really high time we updated the concept of national security. The Ecological Union in which I'm deputy Chairman already has international ties. They have shown us many things, such as the fact that serious people abroad have long ago stopped seeing our country as a war menace—they now look on it as a source of ecological danger. That is quite understandable, I suppose, because our industries lacking clean-up facilities "present" emissions not only to us but to our neighbours across the frontier

and those farther away. There is the Baltic Sea, for one, whose state is worrying the Scandinavians and the rest of the continent. It is something to think about.

We must realise that what is required for the solution of the ecological problem isn't appeals or declarations coming from various platforms, not yet sounding the alarm but above all comprehensive, painstaking, intelligent efforts in our own country. We must show no mercy to bureaucrats active in the economy because we and the world are paying too dearly for their activity. In fact, they are undermining our security. I'm sure our effort for cleanliness in our house and around it will be fully appreciated by all.

Many countries are willing to cooperate with us in both ecological education and specific areas of nature conservation. Joint research and production complexes could be a promising form of such cooperation. The problem of universal security might be solved as a result of joint efforts to eliminate the threat to the environment. After all, environmental security is part of national security.

KRIKOV. I keep wondering what sort of country and society we have. This is a question asked by many today but I haven't yet heard a clear answer from anybody. Many phrases are used nowadays, such as "command system", "state socialism", "barracks" and even "military-feudal socialism". What seems to be lacking is "capitalist socialism". In short, it's a juggling of words that makes you dizzy. But see what Reagan did. To be able to give the Somozistas money (just money!), he had to squabble with Congress for a long time, that is, had to ask his parliament's permission. By contrast, Brezhnev moved troops into Afghanistan without asking anybody's permission. He sprung a big surprise on all, civilians and us servicemen alike. And that war lasted longer than the Great Patriotic War.

I wonder which variety of socialism made that move possible. Who is to blame? Our system?

SOKOLOV. You shouldn't talk like that. Our socialism is a very good system except that we should do everything properly and fairly. Had Brezhnev and his entourage been real, honest Communists and not just party members, nothing would have happened. You must simply be honest. Where does the system come in? Had there been honesty and a Leninist concept of party principle in the leadership, it would never have come to one or two men deciding whether or not to move troops in, whether or not to send off our boys to get killed. You have to be honest, that's the point.

KRIKOV. I will tell you about my experience to illustrate what you said about honesty. I served in an airborne unit. In 1984 I found myself in Afghanistan. It's important to say how.

Nobody even hinted that we would be sent to Afghanistan. On the contrary, we were told that we were going to do regimental training. A commission from airborne troop headquarters ordered the dismantling of all our powder jet systems used for landing military equipment. The order seemed strange but we were told we wouldn't need the systems any longer because we were going to Lake Sevan and wouldn't be airdropped there but landed in the usual way. We believed that because it came from very high up.

About lunch time our regiment was informed that it would be alerted at 4.00 hours and so we had better get ready, do our shopping, and so on. Once again there was not a hint. The only thing that put us on our guard was sniper rifles. The regiment had none but this time they were delivered and immediate training of "sharpshooters" was ordered. Finally we were alerted and drove to the airfield. Officers told us there to fill out "killed in action" forms, that is, cards giving our home addresses, our parents' names and everything else in case we "died by accident while training" as we were told. We boarded a plane at 6.00 hours and stayed on board for six hours, or until 12, when we took off. Some time during the flight a pilot came out. "Is this your first flight to those parts, boys?" he asked. "What parts?" we asked. He

was surprised. "Don't you know?" he replies. "We're flying to Kabul." That was when our company commander said yes, we were on our way to Kabul. We were surprised because the only weapons we had were tommyguns.

How did we take the news? We felt kind of elated at first as if it were a game. We certainly had no inkling of what was coming. Finally the plane landed at an airfield and we got off, saying to ourselves it was probably a stopover, all the more since we were surrounded by Soviet soldiers. "Where are we?" we asked. "This is Kabul international airport", they replied. Two hours later, the airfield came under shellfire. That was how it all started. We finally realised that we had been cheated by the talk about "training".

In Afghanistan we trained for two months on mountainous terrain. Our first combat operation came in the fourth month of our stay there. Those operations are described variously now but there is little truth in what we hear or read. It wasn't only we who beat the enemy, but the other way round, too, and a sound thrashing it was. Just imagine a boy of eighteen who fired his tommygun a couple of times before taking the oath. He was faced with an enemy who had been fighting for five to eight years and had handled his weapon from childhood, with his own people and his native mountains around him. Many of our boys were killed. I think this is just the time to ask: What did they die for? But who can we ask? Not Brezhnev, because he rests in a place of honour, on Red Square. It follows that there's nobody we can ask, or am I wrong?

BELOUSOV. We must certainly help the Afghan revolution but how? This is one question. And here's another: Who benefited from that all?

KOKSHAISKAYA. You said "revolution". I'm a historian and yet I can't understand what kind of revolution it was. Afghanistan is a peasant country with a feudal system. Does that mean that the revolution was bourgeois? Or socialist? What was it?

OLENEV-HIRSCHFELD. It's disgraceful. Indeed, we've been neighbours for a thousand years but we never got around to finding out who was the neighbour next door. We are "lazy and uninquisitive", as Pushkin put it. To come to the point, the whole business of sending troops is evidence of the absence of any scientific analysis of the situation. I suppose part of the blame must be put on diplomats and the Embassy but the heaviest responsibility falls on those who acted without consulting experts. They should learn thoroughly at least the lesson of the Afghan war.

Generally speaking, we are deficient in sound geopolitical thinking. What I mean is a capacity to analyse our international situation calmly and with due regard to every option. The result was Afghanistan. Why, we always prepare for a war that is over. We feared that this neighbour of ours would become a bridgehead for Western aggression against us. But that was a myth. Afghanistan is primarily a security area for three great Asian powers: the Soviet Union, China and India. Had there been no Soviet-Chinese confrontation, neither would we have had the Afghan war.

Now do we have the slightest reason to speak of a "Chinese danger"? It's equally absurd to fear for our borders with Iran, Turkey or the Balkans. Our military strategic situation is just splendid right now. There is talk of a "Western front". That's serious, all right. But let us realise that underlying it is the so-called German question. Hence the conclusions to be drawn.

The important thing, however, is to put an end to the costliest and most provocative foolishness of this century, Soviet-American rivalry. This is the chief bastion of old thinking that has yet to be taken. Let us realise this and tell the Americans that objectively we are not enemies and that there are no objective reasons for rivalry. Unless we realise this we'll change from two superpowers to two superfools for good.

One of the working mottos of our Civic Diplomacy group is: "Open your eyes and get to the root." It means that now is the time to shake off ideological torpor and see things in their right perspective.

FOREIGN POLICY, DIPLOMACY AND GLASNOST

BELOUSOV. "See things in their right perspective". But I who only follow our foreign policy on the basis of press reports find that very difficult. Occasionally I'm simply baffled. For instance, I cannot understand our concept of foreign trade. It looks as if we're carrying it on as we are "used" to doing. We seem to feel that we must by all means resist America, export caviar and oil, and buy our coffee from Brazil. But why from Brazil? Why can't we buy coffee in Ethiopia? It might cost us less. Does anybody ever consider the options? You can find no competition of alternatives in the press. How is a foreign policy decision normally drafted in our country? What are my chances of keeping track of its drafting?

In preparing for today's discussion, I did some reading on our foreign policy. All comments praise it for its predictability. But to be frank, I see it as full of unexpected things. I learnt from Mikhail Gorbachev's UN address that we were going to cut our army by half a million men. Is that a good idea? It's excellent! The trouble is, however, that the news was first heard by the Americans and as for me, a Soviet citizen, it came to me literally from overseas. The same address said that we were willing to declare a 100-year moratorium on the servicing of debts owed to us by developing countries or even to cancel them altogether. That's a noble step, of course. Still, I don't know who owes us money and how much. And so I have no idea of how much I would have to sacrifice.

We have many expenses brooking no delay. It might therefore have been right to consult public opinion and submit the matter to the coming session of the new Supreme Soviet—in short, to carefully calculate everything. This is a time of glasnost, isn't it?

International Affairs. We've arrived at what is unquestionably a most important subject. It is glasnost in foreign policy and diplomacy. Indeed, does our public know all about our diplomacy and diplomatic service, our ambassadors and embassies? How closed is this sphere? What are the reasonable limits of keeping it closed to ensure that there is control and avoid a recurrence of past mistakes?

KATALYMOV. Let me tell you briefly about my impressions of the Soviet Embassy in Italy. In 1982 and 1983, I took a 10-month scientific course at Rome University. It was done within the framework of exchanges of groups between the two countries, and so it was our Embassy that received us.

To begin with I wish to stress that we generally know very little about the work of our missions, and more often than not, that knowledge is limited to what meets the eye. I, however, had a chance to acquaint myself with our diplomats' work from within. That work is very demanding. The councillor in charge of science, for one, who I associated with, didn't knock off before seven or eight p. m. at best, and after that he often had to go somewhere, take care of some further problem, and so on. I'm saying this to give you an idea of the "pleasant life" of embassy people.

There is a lot of talk now about non-professional diplomats assigned to embassies from various spheres. Is this practice right or wrong? The problem isn't all that simple. Our group of 20 maintained contacts with the councillors responsible for science and culture as well as with other non-professional diplomats. I would say that they were very helpful to us on our trips around the country, in establishing ties with the scientific community, relevant institutions, and so on, for it was specialists who talked to specialists. In short, they fitted in very well with the scientific and technological milieu.

One day we had a conflict with the Italian Foreign Ministry because it failed to pay us our cash allowance. It was soon settled, of course, but it was plainly easier for our non-professional diplomats to negotiate the matter with Rome via, yes, Moscow, through our Foreign Ministry, than on the spot, by

approaching the Italian Foreign ministry. Why? I don't know. The reason may have been mutual distrust.

And here's another impression of our stay in Italy, one that I remember only too well, unfortunately. Most embassy people treated us with unmistakable snobbishness. They seemed to make clear that while it was their official duty to keep in touch with us, talk to us sympathetically, and so forth, this didn't at all imply that they must show us the same kind of friendliness after hours. In short, there was a kind of supercilious coldness. It was a pity because we had nowhere to go, and besides, I think conditions in the Soviet colony in Rome are excellent—I mean the mansion and the tennis court and the place where you can play soccer. Maybe it was a trifling matter but somehow I can't forget it.

OLENEV-HIRSCHFELD. You know, I've had no dealings with our embassies of late but it's an environment in which I literally grew up and lived for a long time in Germany. The amazing thing is that formerly—I remember it from childhood—our diplomats could work in a country for eight years without speaking its language and that the situation is on the whole unchanged to this day. We still have ambassadors who speak no foreign language.

Yet our ambassadorial service has untapped resources, nor do I hesitate to affirm that they are enormous. Our leader and our Foreign Minister are very popular and efficient abroad but they can by no means cope with all the work required of our apparatus abroad. There are tasks left for the apparatus itself. Our diplomatic service should work hard to raise its efficiency. Let me be more specific.

One of the main shortcomings of our embassies is that they are like so many settlements. They are very isolated colonies centred on themselves and lacking the numerous integrational ties they so badly need, the bonds that must link one living entity—with another, a huge one, the foreign country. Here's an example.

Some 15 years ago, I talked to a group of Chinese. They kept telling me almost in unison that the *Huaqiao* were "traitors". I argued with them, saying that the Chinese living abroad were a treasury of their country possessing immense potential. By now it has been shown how great it is. But isn't our case similar?

Just think: we have millions of "ambassadors", our compatriots living in different countries since different periods. Why should we "write them off"? They embody a very important human link between our country and the outside world. Besides, let us remember that the diaspora or the historical homeland is a more serious problem for the Soviet Union, a union of numerous peoples, than for any other country. There are millions of Ukrainians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Jews and others living abroad. Encouraging the activity of the diaspora would benefit us both externally—in terms of, say, foreign trade—and internally. One indication of this is the Armenian phenomenon, the Armenians' attachment to their historical homeland. And what if we look into this phenomenon in terms of promoting joint ventures? Isn't this a powerful economic lever? I'm certain Armenian businessmen from the West and the Arab East could revive Soviet Armenia's foreign economic ties more successfully than our lazy trade mission officials. Ties, joint projects and funds could help effectively in rebuilding the cities destroyed by the earthquake. That would be merely a small part of the many things that could be done. In short, our countrymen abroad are a treasure, especially if not counted by the million as we used to do in the past but down to the individual man or woman as required by the spirit of new thinking. As the poet put it: "The people are incomplete without me."

I would like to elaborate this idea. The Foreign Ministry recently held a conference on our consular service. Very important things were said at the conference. But it's probably time to draw conclusions from them. I mean the

concept of representing the Soviet Union abroad. Let us realise at last that our country is the first unique integration of peoples in the 20th century. But they are represented as a union, that is, in the same way as Britain, France, Italy, Poland and other countries which are nationally homogeneous in principle. Why not mobilise our tremendous diplomatic reserves in the form of missions of the Soviet Unions peoples? This would be all the more logical because their explicit aspiration for self-expression and self-assertion are urging us to do so. It seems to me, therefore, that we should be represented abroad in a twofold form, that is, as a federation (through embassies of the USSR) and according to nationalities (through republican consulates, funds, cultural and trading centres, and so on). Nor should this be seen as an innovation. It's rather an idea carried through to its logical end. Indeed, it is this logic that underlies our government system, or the very concept behind our Supreme Soviet, to be exact, meaning the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. Perestroika, far from abolishing this logic, is carrying it forward, especially since decentralisation is the watchword of democratisation, if you will. So let us be logical and consistent.

BOLOTOV. You say our people abroad are a treasure. But why do we neglect it so barbarously?

Let us make a comparison. A Japanese woman who marries a Chinese and emigrates to China has no problem getting a job at the Japanese Embassy. But how do things stand with us? Living in Ethiopia, for one, are 17 Soviet women married to citizens of that country—that is, as far as I know. The job situation there is unfavourable, of course, and those women have been virtually unemployed for years. A way out could be found by giving them jobs at our Embassy but they are refused that. Indeed, their children are refused admission to the school and day nursery under the Embassy. Thus people carrying Soviet passports have been reduced to pariahs of their own state. And a state which doesn't respect its citizens may be said not to respect itself. After all, it is there to serve the people and not the other way round.

KRAIKO. I fully agree with Victor Olenov, who says that we have a huge informal "diplomatic corps" abroad made up of our compatriots and that it's unwise to ignore it. Why not help those of our citizens living abroad who wish to retain their Soviet citizenship? Why not give them due credit for it? Retained Soviet citizenship creates problems in some cases, as we all know. In developing countries, all job restrictions hit primarily foreign nationals—they are the first to be fired and the last to be hired.

Here's another example. During US presidential elections, a special commission arrives in Japan to enable American wives of Japanese to vote. The gesture is probably unimportant as far as the elections are concerned. What is important is the idea that a great democratic power has no stepchildren. Incidentally, when the electoral law was being drafted I wrote to the Commission for Proposed Legislation to suggest that a similar practice be introduced in our country. As for our citizens in Ethiopia who are refused employment at our own Embassy, I think it's a scandal.

LOSIKOV. The fact that I serve in the Soviet Navy has understandably put its mark on my contacts with Soviet missions abroad. The earliest of them was a visit to Egypt by an atomic submarine. It was in Nasser's days, and on arriving in the port of Alexandria after a three-month cruise, we showed the Egyptian leadership around the submarine. It was a very warm meeting, and our Ambassador to Egypt, Sergei Vinogradov, was in on it. On that occasion I saw how very exacting our representative's mission abroad is, especially in a trouble spot such as that. We were therefore very pleased to hear from the Ambassador that we had helped the Embassy greatly in fulfilling its tasks, in strengthening Soviet-Egyptian friendship.

I'm sure he meant it because we had arrived on a friendly visit within the framework of "naval people's diplomacy", so to say. Our sailors, who never

show the slightest arrogance, by the way, because they are never intoxicated by power, mixed well with ordinary Egyptians, continuing in a fitting manner a long-standing democratic tradition of the Russian Navy.

It was a fine lesson in internationalism, all the more so since the ship's complement comprised 30 nationalities, and we were proud of that. This is why I disagree with Victor Olenev, who suggested that each of our republics should be represented separately abroad. I think what makes us strong, as in the case of a ship's crew, is unity of mind and will. Otherwise we could dilute everything. Our joint efforts are particularly necessary abroad.

When the world was marking the 30th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany we paid a friendly visit to Boston, USA. US ships reciprocated by arriving in Leningrad. We spent five days in Boston. Well, our whole Embassy headed by Anatoli Dobrynin installed itself on board ship, or so it seemed. We worked together in harmony, the Embassy helped us greatly, and I think we helped it in accomplishing a common task, effacing the "enemy image".

Everything would have been all right except for an annoying circumstance. Our ship, that is, about 1,000 men, was America's guest for five days, and there were very interesting meetings. But our press confined itself to reporting dryly: "Soviet ships visited Boston, USA...". It follows that while we talk a lot about "people-to-people diplomacy", our people hardly know anything about its real actions.

How did the American press cover the event? It carried ample comments on everything from a description of our ships to details of the biography of, say, a Soviet sailor. One of our men had only to taste American ice-cream and put up his thumb, saying "OK", for a reporter to take his photograph then and there, supply it with a caption and publish it in his paper. What's wrong with that? It was both publicity and simple fact showing the perfectly human image of Soviet people. But why can't we do that sort of thing? Why is there no "parity" in information? I think we may put the blame on our Embassy. It should cooperate with the press more actively, on more modern lines, I suppose.

KOKSHAISKAYA. I refuse to be awed by the diplomatic corps and its work. "What a difficult, demanding, dangerous, exhausting job!" we are told. "How well, how skillfully our diplomats settle complicated international relations!" Let us admit that they often settle problems created by themselves or their leadership. If we break a deadlock of our own making or finally come to stand on our feet instead of on our heads, do we really have to clap our hands? Or must we pride ourselves on something or applaud ourselves for something because it is a habit with us?

I'm not at all trying to question the necessity or importance of diplomacy. But I fear all that talk about the difficulty of the job may make us overlook a simple thing. Yes, embassy people are "in the forefront of the struggle for peace" but they aren't robots, are they? They are ordinary people having their own, often down-to-earth interests. It follows that we should also take a critical look at our diplomatic service. Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichev wrote in the May issue of *International Affairs* that our diplomats might only be called an "elite" in the sense of being chosen from the best, and so on. But I would describe that as a sort of sly understatement. I affirm that an elite is invariably a select group rising above ordinary people (the dictionary confirms this). The diplomatic service is therefore a magnet, something desirable, and those drawn to it are not motivated solely by an aspiration to serve their country. In view of our goods shortages, the reason for joining it is often simpler than that. So let us really see things as they are.

It was said here that occasionally the ambassador stays in his office until as late as eight p. m. Yes, he does, but then he is paid for it, and let us agree that he isn't paid so very poorly, at least in comparison with me, for one. However, money is beside the point because if our money were a real currency and not just banknotes I could save enough to make a trip abroad

so as to undergo treatment in the same hospital or spend my vacation in the same holiday hotel as our ambassador. I cannot afford that because ambassadors stand on a different rung of the social ladder and are therefore spoken to, treated as patients and catered for in a manner differing from what I am entitled to. That's how it is, you see. So let us not delude ourselves on this point, either. Ambassadors belong by every formal standard to precisely the elite typical and indicative of our society.

That they cannot be blamed for being members of the elite is a different matter, of course. And so I think we should try and find out how come we have social groups differing in standards of comfort. What am I in comparison with, say, an ambassador? Something of a serf who must live where she's registered and seek medical aid where she's registered. And so I live in one place, seek medical aid in another and order spectacles in a third.

SOKOLOV. You know, our ambassadors aren't paid so very well, and besides, pay isn't the point. As the ambassador is merely a mirror of the country he represents, we must look at the problem more broadly. I mean the responsibility of those holding positions of responsibility. They must answer for the fruits of their activity, primarily in material terms. Why keep that "iron curtain" inside the country, between leaders and the people? If a leader's wife were to stand in a queue and then tell him about her impressions he would stop to think.

Maybe that's no way out. But I know by experience that nothing adds to social tensions in the country as much as an awareness that there is a leading elite whose members always have everything, no matter what.

ESADZE. Let us return to glasnost, however. There is no question that it must be complete, without any exceptions, particularly in the diplomatic sphere. We know nothing about newly-appointed ambassadors except their names reported by the press. Yet this post should go to people well known to the public. Maybe the new Supreme Soviet should hold hearings on such appointments like the US Senate does. I know that the Foreign Ministry now selects chauffeurs, cooks and technical personnel generally for embassies by competitive examination. That's a good idea but why not extend the practice to prospective ambassadors? If it were done we would have competent diplomats abroad who had proved in competition with opponents that they were fit for precisely that kind of job.

Now for glasnost once again. It was described here as a new "epoch" in our history. Yet the word is as old as the concept itself, which gained currency as far back as the last century. Dal's Russian dictionary defines "glasnost" as an "announcement". But this isn't enough. We need something more than a spelling out of our own diplomacy to ourselves. After all, this is still an "epoch" of democratisation and new thinking, which require that every citizen be in a position to influence policy, to shape or criticise it. And so I ask: What is the relationship between glasnost and freedom of speech as written into our constitution? Freedom of speech is a fundamental concept going deeper than the narrow concept of glasnost. It follows what we need are guarantees of precisely free speech.

KRAIKO. Yes, our diplomacy is still shackled by relics of old thinking. One of them is the practice of "penalising" officials by appointing them ambassadors—I mean people who've botched their job in, say, agriculture, are no longer backed by a highly-placed patron, and so on. We ought to respect our own foreign policy and hence our diplomacy. Also, we should respect the country chosen as a place of "exile" for an official made ambassador.

For nine years running, our ambassadors in Afghanistan were former party functionaries whose worldview and very behaviour had shaped up when they were Party committee secretaries. We all know the result. It is only now, with the curtain down, that we have a real professional diplomat, Yuly Vorontsev, serving there as Ambassador. I'm sure everything would have been different had we sent a man of similar stature there much earlier. By

the way, this is my comment on the talk about breakdowns in the work of those "penalised" and about an effective foreign policy.

KATALYMOV. I wish to touch specially on that last point. We "consumers" of our foreign policy, so to speak, still come across attempts to uphold some solution supposed to be the only correct one, and across the lack of any competition in evaluating past solutions, let alone in proposing a solution. This explains why people often feel that they are merely part of a mass of plastic material that can be moulded at will. And it annoys them, you know. After the signing of the INF Treaty, everybody said it was a triumph of reason, a "breakthrough", and so on. But if so, what are we to make of NATO's "zero option" so scathingly criticised in the past? And what are we to think of Reykjavik? Why, we were told that the "package" could in no circumstances be "unpacked" but when it "unpacked" after all the same people argued that this was the only correct solution. Wasn't that a striking recurrence of a past practice?

Generally speaking, our politicians, political scientists and public should stop to think very seriously why we cannot advance to a goal in a straight line, making but few adjustments? Why do we advance as through corridor, lurching from wall to wall and bumping our heads against them? Isn't this a matter of an effective policy which is being discussed so widely today?

WHERE RESERVES OF NEW THINKING LIE

ESADZE. We've come to a topic intriguing us all. We really need to emancipate and transform people. And to this end we need not only glasnost but something greater than that, namely, alternatives. Not only at the level of personal opinion which I hope will now be represented in the Supreme Soviet but at political level. We don't have to invent anything because there exists a universal, general democratic value such as political pluralism and a multi-party system. Why should we be afraid of it?

LOSIKOV. Each of us interprets pluralism in his own way. Yet the principles of new thinking apply to both foreign and home policy. And so the more tolerant we are of each other's opinion and the more democratically we proceed at home, the easier it will be for us to bring about a democratisation of international relations. We admittedly influence them most of all by our home policy. Why not draw on past experience in this matter?

Let us recall Lenin's approach. At the Seventh All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP(B), a large group of delegates objected to nominating Kamenev for election to the Central Committee. Lenin took the floor and said that Kamenev expressed the sentiments of a definite section of the people and therefore it was important to have an exponent of those sentiments on the CC. And he added:

"Our arguing with Comrade Kamenev yields but positive results. Comrade Kamenev's presence is very important, for the debates I am waging with him are very valuable. When you persuade him, after overcoming some difficulties, you realise that by so doing you overcome the difficulties that spring up among the masses."

That was how the country's leaders argued in the past. Lenin taught an excellent lesson which is still highly relevant. It's this culture of argument that we should carry forward. There is a severe shortage of it.

KRAIKO. Since we've now come to recognise the wholesome effect of pluralist opinion, I think we ought to take the next step by providing real forms for expressing this diversity. Let us admit that our entire press is in fact a state press either by definition or by virtue of being semi-official on a "compulsorily voluntary" basis. This is particularly obvious whenever our press comments on international politics.

It is done by way of "helping our diplomacy". Yet I consider that help extremely doubtful. I'm certain that if part of our press became really independent of the state that would also benefit diplomacy. The advantages—even for the Foreign Ministry—are easy enough to calculate. Indeed, why should the government and the press be chained together? Why does the press objectively hold our leadership hostage and vice versa?

When we were setting up the Novosti Press Agency we saw its mission, as far as I know, in offering our public a rostrum to enable it to express independent, alternative opinions, discuss various options, and so on. We should revert to the original concept of Novosti if journalists are to express differing views on the policy of the United States, the KPDR, France, Romania and other countries. I suppose that would close the gap between our international and internal journalism, a gap whose cause is known to all of us, I believe.

There is another tangle of problems that is worrying me. I mean conversion. We are now cutting our armed forces, our military production, programmes and expenditures. That's fine. But unless there is a precise concept of conversion we may incur serious loss. Why so? Because should we deprive many of our research centres, such as those concerned with aircraft, of military contracts, demand for their research would plummet. This is because our industry has no competitors and objectively needs no innovations whatever, being a monopolist. It isn't accidental that we virtually impose scientific and technological achievements on industry. In short, we run a perfectly real risk of incurring considerable economic, technological, intellectual and moral loss.

Incidentally, the Votkinsk missile plant is going to make prams. But has anybody calculated their cost?

Joint science-intensive ventures could be one solution in the circumstances. We could, for instance, cooperate with West Germany or Japan in manufacturing airliners that would compete even with Boeings. Why not? The Germans or Japanese would supply electronic equipment and technology and we, designs, aerodynamic know-how, and so on. That would earn us money, stimulate our science and help solve our social problems. My idea is simple: disarmament requires an economic, competent approach and a precise conversion programme.

ESADZE. Our whole economy is in need of competence. The inconceivable paradox of our society is that we have a non-economic economy. Non-economic! It is still dominated by commands, slogans and instructions. Let us say somebody higher up suggests promoting joint ventures. There comes—from those who are eager to report execution—a spate of joint ventures ranging from firms selling liquor or renting cars of foreign make to foreigners to leasing our natural resources and parts of our territory for the construction of chemical giants. As a result a useful and important idea is distorted.

If you ask what we need such joint ventures for the answer you get is: "We need them to secure hard currency and new technology." "But what do we need hard currency for?" "Don't you see? We need it to buy up-to-date equipment." The trouble is, however, that we cannot bring world progress in science and technology to our country bit by bit as we bring cucumbers from a neighbour's vegetable garden. Yet the situation with regard to introducing new technologies is just like that—it couldn't be worse. Everybody is fed up with talking about Western machinery rotting in the rain or production lines churning out nothing but rejects. Yet there is nothing surprising about the phenomenon because it's natural and logical with us.

The reason is that to master advanced technology, we need an entirely different production culture, a streamlined enterprise infrastructure, a new, civilised kind of worker, special economic areas where this whole new technological and economic civilisation of ours could develop. As for confining ourselves to a particular, widely advertised joint venture, it is not just

pointless but harmful. This could land us in the vicious circle of earning and squandering hard currency and reduce us to an existence fit for an underdeveloped and dependent country. The inference is that just as we need a conversion programme, so we need—possibly to a greater extent—a streamlined, unorthodox concept of joint ventures.

KRIKOV. I wish to ask our People's Deputy a question. Alexander Nikolayevich, you've just given us a good idea of conversion and the opportunities which a wise policy of reducing armed forces could provide. But shouldn't we go even further? Look—we've pulled out of Afghanistan although the war is still on there and the situation around the country is as complicated as ever. Besides, everything is taking place close to our frontiers. Not so in Eastern Europe because there is no war there, and come to think of it, neither is the situation likely to lead to a recurrence of 1941. Carrying forward the logic of Afghanistan, wouldn't it be right and useful—allowing for all alternative trends of development west of our borders—to withdraw our troops from the East European countries where they are still stationed?

KRAIKO. I stand in principle for our pulling out. I think it is the ideal both we and our allies are seeking. But don't let us forget that there is a third party, the West and NATO. It's therefore necessary to carefully explore the situation from every point of view, including that of reciprocity on the part of the North Atlantic bloc. My general feeling, however, is that developments will gradually take a course desirable for everybody. The process is on already, isn't it?

NIKONOV. We are now talking about the problem of disarmament, and this reminds me of a short story by Robert Sheckley about a warlike general. It so happened that all weapons disappeared unexpectedly everywhere. So the general broke off the leg of a chair and attacked the enemy with that weapon, roaring furiously.

We seem to be hypnotised by one goal. If we are fighting for disarmament it gradually becomes an end in itself. Growing in the back of our minds is the conviction that the abolition of arms will lead to a non-violent world. But violence will always find some weapon. I think it's more important to create a mechanism blocking violence, something of a behavioral stereotype for states.

We often find in nature analogues of concepts current in man's world: love, morality, religion, war, aggression. Zoopsychologist Konrad Lorentz writes in his book **On Aggression** that beasts capable like the lion of killing a member of their species at one blow never do so. If two lions are fighting for a female the weaker lion may lie down and stop the fight that way. His rival, heated by the duel, may claw at himself with rage but will never "raise a paw" against his prostrate adversary. By contrast, doves—that symbol of gentleness and peace—often peck each other to death. This should give us food for thought.

Right now we humans are in a position thanks to our intellect to wipe out entire nations and, indeed, all humanity at one blow. I think awareness of our might must curb our aggressive intentions, taking the place of the "ban" on killing one's kin which is the rule with certain animals. In short, we must develop a new, non-violent consciousness by rallying our reason.

KOKSHAISKAYA. The problem of state-to-state or rather international intercourse is overburdened in our country with all sorts of artificial difficulties, with a kind of dreary ideological prejudice. Right now we talk a lot about mutual confidence, the "enemy image", and so forth. Yet the problem is very simple. That foolish self-isolation, shutting ourselves off from everybody, primarily from ourselves was self-imposed, and had every one of us been free to travel abroad and mix, just as tourists, with Americans, for example, I'm sure many problems wouldn't be there at all. In any case, neither professional nor "people's" diplomats would have to prove that we have no horns and know how to use a spoon or fork like anybody else.

I've been to many countries as a tourist. What did I find remarkable? Why, the fact that kindness to others is inherent in everybody, and everybody is inquisitive in a goodnatured, friendly way. It is a natural rule of behaviour, you see. This is why certain "problems" would have disappeared of themselves and "people's diplomacy" itself would be unnecessary had we approached international intercourse in a similar way.

BOLOTOV. Speaking of people's diplomacy and free contacts between people of various countries, I wish to tell you that we at the Moscow Higher Technical School have a group of students who have applied for permission to visit Poland. Their application has been under consideration for two months now. I believe the procedure of granting permission to go abroad has really been simplified in our country but it looks as if students are an exception. Our students have come up against a lot of formalities, including the most unexpected ones. One of the problems facing them is that of the character reference—some have been able to get it but others haven't.

Now what is a character reference in our case? It's a frankly undemocratic thing, a lever of pressure and control. You may be allowed to travel if you make the right impression on somebody or may have to wait until you contrive to make it. But why does a student, a full-fledged citizen, have to make a favourable impression on somebody to be able to go abroad? Isn't the opportunity to travel at home and abroad every citizen's individual and inalienable right? What's that got to do with anybody's traits? Why should they interest somebody? I don't think the Vienna accords say anything about character references.

KRIKOV. Quite true. We've already said a lot about self-respect, respect for our country, and so on. But we need to do something—what are we waiting for? I've long wanted to respect myself, my country, Russia, to take pride in it. But look around you. We are in the editorial offices of the journal, in one of Moscow's oldest neighbourhoods. There are numerous monuments to the past around us, such as we should be proud of because they belong in the category of spiritual values which everybody is now freely talking about, and we here can even feel them with our hands. But look at the state of nearby churches. I'm sure no European nation would have tolerated such a thing. Yet we aren't worse than others, are we? The nearest church—it dates from the 18th century—in a storehouse of the Ministry of Culture. Just think: a cultural institution set up a storehouse in a church, of all places!

They say there's no money to restore the church. So give those crumbling buildings back to their original owner, the Church. The public would help it by both contributing funds and joining in restoration work. Personally I'm willing to work without pay, to carry bricks, so as not to see that insulting decay any longer. Otherwise nothing will be left but fine talk.

SOKOLOV. I disagree with our historian here. She said everybody was friendly and over there strangers were sympathetic and responsive to each other. Maybe, but where? In a lounge or on a hike? Probably. But besides them there is the state with its interests and principles which have to be defended. Or take another example, the Second International during World War I. Everybody seemed to be at one with everybody else but when the war broke out everyone rushed to the defence of his state. It's the same now. And so the conclusion I draw is that a strong, powerful state is the chief factor for our security and we must therefore defend its interests and principles.

Why, some now go almost as far as to say we have no enemies any longer. Oh, yes, we do have them, now as before, and always will. Let us open our frontiers, we are told. I cannot agree with that, either, because we could lose everything that way. I wonder why we keep tacking?

We certainly need interchanges, meetings, people-to-people diplomacy and all that. But everything has a limit. We must do things properly and not rush from one extreme to another, as we often do.

KOKSHAISKAYA. So where would you say our chief enemy is?

SOKOLOV. I have no doubt about that—he's at home. Irrespective of what we say about the enemy the roots of the main problem we must solve lie in our own society itself. Everybody here has been speaking about spiritual values—it's a fashionable topic. What I would say as a professional, if you will, is that we now need just elementary honesty. See what I mean? Honesty with regard to our history. Let the archives be opened for us to study the records. Because we are guessing what Stalin thought of this or that. Speaking of the honesty of our leaders, we need to know everything about them—how much they earn, where exactly they prefer to do their shopping. In short, we need honesty towards ourselves. We must tolerate no shortage of the truth. There's a shortage of sausages for the moment — well, we can wait. We are used to it. But if somebody lies to us or conceals something it will be the end because he will forfeit our confidence for good.

KOKSHAISKAYA. Let me give you a last example. At the museum I often have to help children as a guide or in some other way. What amazes and distresses me is that when I ask a junior pupil a question he takes his time over answering it. He stops to think, trying to guess what kind of answer would suit me best. And then he answers me, doing so "correctly", of course, that is, as he "should", as he has been "taught" to.

It's children who do that. Yet we are talking of new thinking. The problem is that our lives were robbed of independent opinion, of free, independent thinking. Indeed, we had come to be afraid of these words. The episode I've told you reveals our whole system without our having to read articles by publicists.

This makes us ponder on the destiny of new thinking. Our children may learn its correct slogans by heart, may repeat certain words, may scan them, but where would new thinking come in? There wouldn't be any at all.

And so I believe the important thing now is to educate people, to remould them if I may say so. They should be induced to respect themselves, their ideas, convictions and actions, should be educated as citizens. That would make new thinking really new. You cannot just tell people to switch from old to new thinking.

A EUROPEAN ECOLOGICAL FUND?

An Answer to the Swedish Public Representatives' Open Letter to the Governments of Europe *

WE APPRECIATE the anxiety shown by the Swedish public over the worsening environmental situation in the European region. Sweden champions an international environmental policy, helping set a common course to be followed by the Scandinavian countries in the interest of growing cooperation in this highly important sphere.

Today's environmental problems are complicated and contradictory but the mechanism of the rise of every one of them lies ultimately in the area of relations between man and nature.

In this century, environmental problems have assumed a fundamentally new character under the impact of anthropogenic factors, and in recent decades they have taken the form of global ecological crises or even tragedies. Blooming areas of the planet are fast becoming deserts; many rivers and lakes are now dangerous for man, and the biggest cities of the world are suffocated by smog. Specialists the world over are deeply worried about the global warming of the climate, soil loss, deforestation, the planet's dwindling genetic fund and biological diversity, the thinning of the ozone layer, acid rain, the accumulation of hazardous chemical waste. The environment, especially in developing countries, is strongly affected by the population explosion, food shortages and many other problems.

Still, ecological disasters are not an inevitable consequence of contemporary scientific and technological progress. Indeed, this progress itself, if geared to solving environmental problems, can help overcome the difficulties facing humanity and preserve the vast, fascinating diversity of the natural environment for future generations.

Even now, the experience of many countries shows that it is possible to make greater use of renewable resources by cultivating them, to preserve non-renewable resources by utilising them judiciously, to evolve and introduce low-waste or waste-free technological processes without reducing the necessary amount of output.

It has to be admitted that environmental problems cannot be solved by the efforts of one country or within the boundaries of a particular region. The environment cuts across national frontiers and ideological differences, and it is only on a multilateral basis that a global nature conservation strategy can be worked out and implemented. Hence the obvious importance of studying the interconnection and general causes and sources of environmental problems and of searching for alternatives and resources to solve them comprehensively and in harmony with industrial development.

Environmental protection should be given as high political priority as disarmament problems and regional conflicts.

* See *International Affairs*, No. 5, 1989.

This has prompted the Soviet Union to propose holding under UN auspices a series of extraordinary meetings to coordinate efforts conducive to environmental security: a consultative meeting of experts on the health of the Earth (1989), a top-level meeting of 15 to 20 countries representing all continents and the non-aligned movement (1990) and a second UN environmental summit (1992).

We consider that giving environmental problems a higher status within the UN system is a prerequisite for success in the world community's collective efforts to solve them. It would apparently be advisable to set up an Environmental Protection Committee under the UN Security Council. An equally important task is to enhance the prestige of UNEP. This could be done by having at least cabinet ministers represent their countries on the Board of Directors.

Preparations for the environmental conference due in 1992 are an important task for the world community. We believe the conference could discuss and adopt principles and standards of behaviour binding on states as well as the main lines of international cooperation in environmental protection. Our opinion is that the ecoforum should be held at the top political level. In preparing the conference consideration could be given to setting up an emergency environmental aid centre proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his address to the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly, with a view to detecting critical environmental situations and accidents at an early date and working out appropriate recommendations for governments. The efficiency and importance of collective aid in an emergency and awareness of the fact that different nations have common problems and destinies were demonstrated by the international community during the tragedy which befell the people of Soviet Armenia.

We would like to stress how tremendously important it is that all countries join existing international conventions on environmental protection. An effort should be made to put international environmental protection standards at the basis of relevant national legislation.

Allocations for UNEP activity add up to a mere 30 million dollars per year against 700 to 800 million dollars to be spent on settling the Namibian problem alone. The question arises: Are we not spending too little on solving so very important a problem as environmental protection? The answer is clear, we believe. With due regard to the strain put on the state plans and budgets of all countries bar none as well as to the proportions of the requisite outlays, the Soviet Union therefore proposes establishing an International Ecological Fund with money to be released by cutting national military budgets.

Needless to say, we have no ready-made answers to all the questions under discussion. The foregoing is meant as merely food for collective thought. The idea of establishing a European Ecological Fund should, in our view, receive the closest attention. It is also necessary to examine the legal and financial aspects of setting up the Fund with due regard to the opinions of the European countries and international organisations concerned.

Fyodor MORGUN

Chairman, USSR State Committee
for Nature Protection

SOCIALISM WITHOUT DOGMA

WE HAVE repeatedly read both scientific and literary publications returning us what had seemed to be a hopelessly lost knowledge of simple, everlasting truths. And we try again and again to look at ourselves objectively so as to see what we are and what our place in the world is.

Igor Yanin's article "Returning to Simple Truths" induces us to think once more what we want to build in our country after all. What must we renounce and what should we borrow from humanity's treasury of forms and elements of social organisation? More importantly, what will our socialist response to the challenge of the times be? There are plenty of questions. As for answers, we are searching for them together, all of us. Yanin's article contributes its share to this search.

The author is perfectly right in stressing that there is no identifying science with ideology in either theory or reality. The Soviet people, in particular intellectuals, know only too well what attempts at this kind of identification, or rather at substituting ideological dogma for science, lead to. Their worldview is currently undergoing a renewal as the country rids itself of ideocratic fetters. Some habitual concepts have acquired a new quality.

We are impressed by Igor Yanin's incisive, uninhibited presentation of certain questions, such as that of the partisanship of Marxism. This principle was long interpreted as submission and kowtowing to the arbitrariness of bureaucrats equipped with a party card. Matters stood precisely thus whatever the fine talk that went with them. No wonder in "some languages", as well as for many of our compatriots, "partisanship" connotes "partiality or preconception—in short, something subjective", as is mentioned by Yanin.

We all know that Lenin took a different view of this principle. Marxism is partisan only in the sense that it expresses the interests of social progress and advanced ideas of the epoch completely and precisely. What he called "communist partisanship" in science was not mere membership of the party, nor an effort to identify oneself with the majority (of the party, the class, the population) always and on everything, but scientific honesty and objectivity, an ability to "foresee" the future, sustained effort in the interest of a just and reasonable organisation of society. This makes it highly important now to follow the "evolution of Lenin's thought", as Yanin points out.

Lenin's legacy offers us immense opportunities for reflection, in particular with a view to evaluating the progress made to date. One of his precepts is that we must under no circumstances separate socialism from democracy, for the former is impossible without the latter or the result is a totalitarian society hostile to the individual. The people's historical memory retains bitter evidence of this. The article devotes close attention to the phenomenon of Stalinism as an Orwellian society incarnate whose nightmarish paradoxes still dominate many minds.

One of Lenin's ideas which Yanin proceeds from to analyse ways of evolving a new concept of socialism is the need to generalise and use the collective experience of the working class and communist movement in all countries of the world. The experience of socialist community countries is of special value to us. But the capitalist system, too, has evol-

ved, as Yanin writes, definite ways and means of organising various social subsystems on optimum lines. We should take this into account.

Igor Yanin rightly underlines in the conclusion of his article that we need "a continuous, natural historical perestroika as self-development, self-motion, self-tuning". Perestroika is not just another campaign ordered from higher up. It is socialism's historic response to the challenge of the times. If our society is to fully correspond to its name—socialist society—the people must concentrate on making the process of renewal irreversible. Everything is important in this matter: a radical economic reform, the growing democratisation of our socio-political life, a review of obsolete ideological constructions. It is primarily social science and philosophy that must guarantee perestroika scientifically. This calls for discussion and debate and for hard-hitting analyses that may be controversial in some respects, such as Yanin's article.

We think an article like this could hardly have appeared in *International Affairs* (we are among its permanent readers) a few years ago, any more than many other writings of a similar nature, sometimes polemical, dealing with such vexed questions as the essence of world processes, Soviet foreign policy, problems of diplomacy and international relations. It follows that perestroika is making headway, with democratisation and glasnost thrusting deeper and deeper into both the "secret diplomacy" of the past and the scientific sphere.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS BY BORIS PIADYSHEV, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AT THE INFORMATION FORUM

London, May 11, 1989

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to begin with an appraisal of the nearly month-long work of this Information Forum.

The Soviet delegation considers that the intensive debate in which coinciding as well as differing or even opposed points of view were expressed has led to a better understanding of every aspect of the information sphere of the European process.

Our delegation sees the chief result of the Forum in this lively and fruitful debate and in the proposals made by delegations, groups of journalists or individual media spokesmen who did so on their own behalf.

The debate, which ended on a positive note, and the useful proposals and initiatives that were put together may be described as the crowning piece of the Forum.

We live at a time when global and continental problems can hardly be solved without the free flow of information, without reciprocal transparency, without a wide-ranging knowledge of the intentions, national peculiarities and historical traditions of other nations. There is no disagreeing with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who said at the opening of the Forum that if there were to be a "common European home", this would be possible only if its tenants could freely speak to one another.

Glasnost is salutary for humanity and each particular country. History seems to be about to stop allowing of decisions worked out without discussion or debate and hence worthless or even disastrous. In a political process following a normal course, the media should operate as a generator of new ideas and, at the same time, as an opponent calling many things in question and making those responsible weigh the implications of their decisions more than once.

We have reason to describe glasnost as one of the greatest universal values rising above the interests of movements and alignments. It is a universal value comparable to the desire for the survival of humanity, for its salvation from nuclear catastrophe. And it is as valuable as the effort for environmental protection and nature conservation.

I am saying this to bring out all the better the essence of the innovative philosophy and programme of action in the information sphere which the Soviet Union has presented to this meeting of 35 countries.

The Information Forum of European Countries, the United States and Canada was held in London from April 18 to May 12, 1989, within the framework of the European process.

I believe we have stated in sufficient detail our considerations regarding the transformation of Europe into an area of glasnost and openness. We favour extensive and fair exchanges of information, ideas and news and would like all countries to abide in deeds, not words, by their commitments under the final documents of Helsinki, Madrid and Vienna.

We note with satisfaction that other delegations have demonstrated the readiness of their countries to travel their part of the road.

The debate has resulted in an impressive package of proposals. Many of them call for the provision of better working conditions for journalists both at home and abroad.

The Soviet delegation considers this approach reasonable. Indeed, journalists are occasionally handicapped by a months-long wait for an entry visa. The same goes for restrictions on trips around the country where they are accredited and for the difficulty of gaining access to sources of information. The best solution would be a situation where journalists felt at home in any participating state of the CSCE.

Further, I regret to say that problems of cooperation in the information sphere, of promoting creative contacts between the press, radio and television as well as film producers of various countries, were ignored to a degree. This makes the relevant suggestions made here all the more noteworthy. We were encouraged by the generally favourable response to the Soviet idea of creating a European information and cultural television programme. The Forum appreciates, as I see it, the meaning of another Soviet proposal, that for setting up a European Information Council to contribute to informal exchanges of opinion involving both spokesmen for government agencies and, in equal measure, spokesmen for the press. The Nordic countries' proposal contains good ideas about how cooperation in the information sphere in the period between London and Helsinki should be built.

There is yet another group of proposals which we consider important. I mean the proposals for developing cooperation in the area of the latest communications technologies. The idea was mentioned by the West German, Spanish and other delegations. However, we must not allow technological cooperation in information to be blocked by political obstacles. The fear was voiced that the "iron curtain" which is falling apart might be replaced by a new, technological curtain that could be even more impenetrable for the free flow of information. It was also said that tactical considerations limiting the introduction of technologies that have become elementary in some places into everyday life, might hold up the progress of the nation.

In short, it would be reasonable to ponder the proposals put forward at the Forum and to search in common for solutions helping make the information environment cleaner for Europeans and the inhabitants of other continents.

Every one of the 35 nations represented at this Forum has its history, traditions and destiny. It would be futile to try to apply one standard to all of them, just as it would be futile to expect different countries to approach information problems in one and the same way.

Now for a further point. For the first time in the history of meetings within the framework of the CSCE process, the working groups' meetings were open to journalists. Renouncing a tradition proved justified in this case. By joining vigorously in the debate, journalists certainly added to the content of our exchange of views even though they also heightened the intensity of discussion. They have professional interests and problems of their own, and it is really gratifying that they made optimum use of the Forum to express journalistic solidarity and raise pressing questions of their work.

I think the participation of the Soviet press in the Forum was useful. About 20 of our journalists took the floor. By joining in the debate, the General Director of TASS, a leading official of Soviet TV, the editors-in-chief of *Moscow News* and *New Times*, the Chairman of Lithuania's State Committee for Radio and Television, the Editor-in-Chief of *Radyanska Ukraina*, representatives of *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and other publications as well as of the Novosti Press Agency supplied first-hand information on the perestroika processes under way in the Soviet people's social and political life. At the same time, they got an idea of the information situation in other CSCE countries and took note of experience which can be used in Soviet journalism.

The Forum was also useful to me as Editor-in-Chief of *International Affairs* from the practical point of view. The new format of the monthly reflects notable changes in favour of greater glasnost and openness in Soviet foreign policy. Over the past year, we have published detailed articles by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, the US President and Secretary of State and the foreign ministers of several European countries. We plan to explore problems of the European process, meaning both information and other aspects.

We hope the London Forum serves as the starting point for progress towards a considerably better information situation in Europe.

In concluding the Forum, we can say that we now have a clearer vision of the lines of this progress and additional opportunities to promote glasnost and openness in the area covered by the European process.

In concluding the Forum, we can say that as a result of the debate here, we have fresh confirmation of the fact that, notwithstanding distinctions in basic philosophy and fundamental views between countries or groups of countries, substantive accords in so complex, ideologised a sphere as information are perfectly possible.

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As a result, the real basis for joint actions is widening and hope is restored. The hope is growing due to the turn towards common values, the most interesting of which I have tried to emphasise here.

Somewhere in this direction we should come to terms with the West, which would make it possible to add a new dimension to international relations, raise them to a higher level, in keeping with the task of preserving our civilisation.

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instead of the weapons aimed at each other, we should develop some kind of common weapons aimed against the destruction of our environment. To that end we should use all the resources of modern society with its rich intellectual potential and ingenuity in order to bring out all theoretical and practical possibilities for solving these most urgent problems.

This, naturally, will require investments in amounts that may be obtained only through disarmament.

Allow me to end my article with the words by General Secretary Gorbachev from his book *Perestroika*, in which he justifies the need for cooperation in the context of the tasks facing us: "All of us are passengers on board one ship named Earth, and we should not allow it to sink".

(Continued from page 108)

RUSSIA travelled the road to industrialisation once before, if not to the end. The starting point was a lag which left no hope for catching up with developed countries without outside help. The remedy was full use of capital, technology and know-how accumulated in the world.

Losses and excesses could hardly have been avoided in so tremendous an undertaking but it is necessary to separate the sheep from the goats and the general from the particular. The main thing is that in practically two decades our country achieved what had taken centuries to attain

ON THE BALANCE OF POWER

**Radomir BOGDANOV,
Andrei KORTUNOV**

NUCLEAR WEAPONS entered the world scene slightly less than five decades ago. The philosophy of using them, which has taken the form of strategic nuclear thinking, is just as old. Its founders were American civilian specialists, who in the mid-forties began working for the famous Rand Corporation. As for the Soviet school of strategic nuclear thinking, it lags visibly behind the American school. For a long time, no open discussion was allowed in our country on questions relating to possible "exchanges of nuclear strikes", strategic stability or, say, the principles of building up strategic forces. The fact that our nuclear arms race was virtually a response to challenges from the United States and that we traditionally kept our military strategy secret played a negative role in its turn.

However, recent years have seen the situation change. There is more information now about our strategic programmes, and debates on prospects for the development of the Soviet strategic doctrine and for a military reform have found their way into the press. Already we have a whole school of Soviet nuclear strategists who can discuss the problem with their Western colleagues on an equal footing. Some express the hope that it will not be long before we and the Americans work out a common concept of strategic stability equally acceptable to both sides and reliably safeguarding world security.

These trends may apparently be regarded with some reservations as expressive of new thinking. It is certainly necessary and very important to overcome bias towards Western military strategic thought, seek compromise, renounce the traditional notion of the allegedly inherent "aggressiveness" of the West and master the achievements of US and West European military science. But there is no denying that in thrusting deep into the Americans' "strategic culture", we may drift to mechanically duplicating some of their strategic concepts and doctrines with all their shortcomings and negative implications. On one occasion in the history of Soviet foreign policy, we tried to deal with the United States according to its rules of the game. We mean the Soviet-US talks in the seventies on limiting strategic offensive weapons. The outcome? The nuclear arms race, far from being stopped, went on in the costliest and most dangerous directions.

Could the emerging limited "convergence" of the Soviet and US strategic schools lead to our country renouncing its independence in evolving nuclear strategy? Would we not tie ourselves to the United States and doom nuclear disarmament to a snail's pace? And then, how would the world react to such a Soviet-American nuclear condominium, to the setting up of a sort of world general staff, with the two leading powers deciding on what benefited or did not benefit international military strategic stability?

We consider these questions highly important and relevant. They concern a fundamental choice of development lines for the armed forces for several

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decades ahead. It has to be a choice between "equalising" Soviet and strategic forces (and hence putting strategic doctrines on an equal level under the name of a common concept of stability), or giving an asymmetric answer—both material and conceptual—firmly rejecting the American version of the game. In the former case we would have a predictably long process of limiting nuclear armaments through Soviet-US talks and in the latter, unilateral measures of a revolutionary nature by the Soviet Union.

If the choice of our country is to be historically sound, we believe we must stop to think once again about the real role nuclear weapons have been playing and can play in our foreign policy and about how independent of the United States our military political decision-making actually is.

IT HAS LONG BECOME a banality to stress the exceptional role of the nuclear weapon in altering the relationship between war and politics. An essentially "absolute" weapon that may be said to have summed up trends in the millenniums-long evolution of means of warfare, it has confirmed a forecast first made at least as far back as Clausewitz's days. The forecast said that some day war was bound to stop obeying politics and serving as a guarantee of national security and to become a means of committing collective suicide.

All this has been mentioned many times in scientific works and in statesmen's speeches. But it is probably a major paradox of our times that the decades-old nuclear era has had relatively little effect on statesmen's traditional notions of national security and ways of safeguarding it and brought about no revolutionary changes in the foreign and military policy strategy of countries possessing nuclear arms. True, mankind has managed to escape a new world war but many a time mankind was close to it and, consequently, to destruction. Nuclear technology and political relations have been developing on two different planes as it were, without interacting. Where such interaction did take place it was very superficial and produced no essential or lasting changes in international relations, as it "logically" should have.

Indeed, for a very long period of history, international security was based on a "balance of power", of the military potentials of opposing states or coalitions. Every time the potential of one side grew, the only thing the other side could do to reinforce its security was to build up its own potential so as to restore the military balance. The principle of "balance of power" implied a most careful analysis of the quantitative proportions of the potentials of the two sides, for the problems of personnel and the quantity of armaments could prove decisive (although account had also to be taken of combat experience, the standard of troop training, the morale of the population and other qualitative parameters).

The appearance and deployment of nuclear arms necessarily led to the adoption of a new concept on international security based on "containment" ("deterrence"). From then on, there was no particular need in seeking reliable security through matching the strength of the potential enemy—in view of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons. All that was needed was to make it clear to him that should he start an armed conflict, he would inevitably lose much more than he could gain. After a certain capability for mutual annihilation has been achieved, quantitative analysis of the balance of power becomes pointless.

All the main principles of military strategy, too, must change in the nuclear age. Whereas the system of international relations based on a "balance of power" provided for the possibility of periodical "trials of strength" to adjust the balance, deterrence cannot be based on the permissibility of testing it in practice. Whereas parties involved in the "balance of power" system had to be in a position to carry on warfare for months or even years, the appearance of nuclear weapons made acquiring a capability for "response" the chief task. And whereas alliances, coalitions and satellite countries were vastly

important in the prenuclear world, their role from the point of view of dependable nuclear deterrence is negligible.

The transition to a nuclear world took long, as postwar history has shown. The leading military powers of today—the Soviet Union and United States—still largely base their strategy on traditional postulates, giving priority to quantitative indicators of the alignment of forces, the preservation of strategic alliances and the achievement of a capability for protracted combat operations. This lagging behind the developments which are dictated by logic and common sense not only entails huge material expenditures but causes immense damage to international security by heightening the threat of world war. Only of late have there been signs of abandoning traditional notions of military power based on quantitative indices. The principle of "reasonable sufficiency" as the pivot of contemporary strategic thinking is bringing qualitative parameters to the fore. But their sphere of application is not quite clear yet. Specifically, it is unclear whether they cover strategic nuclear weapons.

Why is it, then, that development and deployment of nuclear weapons did not lead to the substitution of a strategy of "nuclear deterrence" for the "balance of power" strategy and then to a reasonable and mutually acceptable modification of the former? Why did the arms race, including its quantitative aspect, continue? Why didn't alliances, buffer states and other traditional means of guaranteeing security become a thing of the past? Why is it so hard to bring about even a small reduction in the absurdly colossal nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and United States?

The most obvious explanation would be that the special nature of nuclear weapons, their fundamental distinction from other weapons, did not dawn upon Soviet statesmen and military leaders immediately—far from it. Both during the Potsdam Conference and after the US bomb raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin made certain statements minimising the significance of the new weapon and trying to prove that it would not decide the outcome of war. And while he was seriously concerned about the Soviet nuclear lag, there is reason to believe that neither he nor his immediate entourage ever appreciated the revolutionising role of nuclear power.

The materials published in the late forties and early fifties and statements by political and military leaders suggest that Soviet military thought turned out to be unable at the time to respond adequately to the revolution under way in means of warfare. It still proceeded from the concept of classical war. As a result, the Soviet military doctrine failed to advance beyond the experience of World War II, which, moreover, was analysed very cautiously. No reasonably serious attempt was made to ascertain the causes of the military setbacks of 1941 and 1942, let alone fully reproduce the panorama of the war. Nor was the oppressive atmosphere of Stalin's last years conducive to working out new approaches.

As regards the United States, it was painfully slow in realising the nature of the new weapon. True, US military science was well ahead of its Soviet counterpart but this had no real effect on that country's political or military practice.

It is only fair to say that in the late forties and early fifties, when the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals were only just coming into existence while means of delivering nuclear weapons were most imperfect and unreliable, it was hard to see a situation fraught with "guaranteed mutual annihilation". Nor is it possible to establish the exact moment when the two powers found themselves in that situation. (Current research into the likely climatic, geological and medical effects of nuclear war is pushing that moment farther and farther back.) But it is apparently safe to say that during the Caribbean crisis (October 1962), a situation threatening "guaranteed mutual annihilation" not only existed but was recognised as such by the leaders of both powers.

Nevertheless, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States stopped at

the levels which their nuclear potentials had reached by the time of the crisis—they continued building up and improving nuclear armaments. And what is more, Soviet and US military leaders went on claiming contrary to all logic that a nuclear war could be won and would result in defeating the enemy without destroying human civilisation.

The foregoing implies that the refusal of Soviet and American leaders to adopt new rules of the game prompted by the logic of the nuclear age cannot be attributed to their misinterpreting the nature of nuclear weapons or underrating the latter's devastating power. The reason must have been different—we would say that the two countries' leaders expected to use nuclear weapons for ends having no direct relation to safeguarding international security. Both countries must have considered these ends important enough to justify both the back-breaking economic burden of the nuclear arms race and the mounting threat of nuclear war due to the growth of their respective nuclear potentials. As there can be no race with an only entrant, the United States would have had far less reason to build up its arsenal had the Soviet Union restricted itself at the time to maintaining its stockpile at a level guaranteeing "minimum deterrence".

WE MUST NOTE to begin with that the level of a "minimum deterrence" strategy was exceeded because both powers expected to use nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding their security and, furthermore, of increasing their global political influence. This understandably necessitated greatly diversified and numerous scenarios of the "nuclear threat".

Much has been written in our country about how and in what circumstances the United States tried to use its nuclear weapons as an instrument of "extended deterrence", that is, of political blackmail against and pressure on other countries. The US military political doctrine still envisages such a contingency, especially in Europe. But we, too, made attempts to the same end. There was the note which Nikita Khrushchev sent to Britain in the autumn of 1956 threatening that country with a Soviet nuclear strike should it persist in aggression against Egypt.

Another reason why the United States and Soviet Union exceeded the level of "minimum deterrence" was, in our view, the political significance which the nuclear arms race itself had acquired. According to a concept current in international relations by then, the quantitative indicators of armed forces, particularly their strategic component, symbolised the nation's might. Both the Soviet Union and the United States supported this purely politico-psychological concept, not only because it set them apart from other countries, exalting them to a "superpower" status, but because both countries had their own reasons for following that irrational logic.

The Soviet Union, which still lagged considerably behind the United States in the economic sphere and had many unsolved social problems, found it tactically convenient to reduce all the diverse forms of competition between the two systems to chiefly military strategic ones. Military strategic parity, conceived as approximate quantitative equality, became something of a substitute for socialism's social and economic achievements in the competition with capitalism. There developed a certain parity worship, and what had been a means of guaranteeing security became an end in itself.

For the United States, the nuclear arms race acquired a useful economic function. But then it began to show its own inertia, which was harder to overcome with every passing decade. The United States was very hopeful that the economic and technological burden of the race would break the Soviet Union's back sooner or later and that the country would fall apart, being "worn out economically". Besides, with US economic domination in the capitalist world showing a relative decline, the Americans came to regard nuclear power as a guarantee of their political leadership.

A third reason why the Soviet Union and United States went beyond "minimum deterrence" was, paradoxically enough, the mechanism of disarmament talks which existed until very recently. The main negative aspects of these talks are the Americans' effort to negotiate from a "position of strength" ensured by a continuous arms race and the principle of obligatory reciprocity underlying the talks. Taking advantage of this principle, the side having a stake in the arms race and continued tension can by simply blocking the talks make it impossible for the other side to cut its armaments unilaterally.

As a result, both sides find themselves unable to reduce their armaments even if this would meet their military or political interests. Such reduction might be mistaken for a concession or a sign of weakness. By the same token, the principle of reciprocity makes one side respond to an arms build-up undertaken by the other side even if defence interests do not call for it. Indeed, failure to respond in this way would be seen as an indication of "weakness". In other words, the negotiating mechanism in use until recently tied Soviet and US military construction together, as it were, preventing either of the sides from breaking the rules of the game by taking bold steps to reduce armaments.

The existing allied relations are the fourth reason why no "minimum deterrence" strategy has been adopted. One paradox of the nuclear era is that while the value of alliances is declining and for "junior" partners the involvement in them becomes extremely dangerous, the "fee" nuclear powers "pay" for their alliances becomes ever more dear.

In the prenuclear age, alliances were seen as a means by which a country could build up its national power, thereby strengthening its security. The emergence of nuclear weapons has changed the attitude to military alliances. As matters now stand, a country allied with one or several nuclear countries is less certain of its security and can do less than before to decide its own fate. And while alliances still ensure contacts between member countries and make it more difficult for an aggressor to implement his plans, they have lost their one-time importance. This is because nuclear weapons are a factor tying allies together and uniting them while at the same time accentuating their differentiation and tending to disunite them.

The fifth reason why the Soviet Union and United States exceeded "minimum deterrence" is, now as in the past, the looseness of the definition of the level of "deterrence", or the proportions of the damage which makes it politically unacceptable for the potential enemy to start a war. For the Soviet Union, it means ascertaining what damage is unacceptable to the United States and what the latter could decide to sacrifice in order to try to defeat the Soviet Union. US strategists currently estimate that the destruction of over 20 million Americans, one third of the population of their country or even half of it would be unacceptable.

In regard to the United States, these estimates (even the most conservative of them) are enormously exaggerated, of course, with the possible aim of exerting psychological pressure on the Soviet Union, as if to say that the United States could afford to lose one third of its population and hence to risk a strike to disable the Soviet Union. Yet the United States found the loss of 50,000 men in its war of aggression in Vietnam unacceptable and had to get out.

Declassified documents testify that from the early fifties on, the US leadership, presuming (in accordance with the most pessimistic estimates) that Soviet bombers could carry several atom bombs all the way to the American territory, regarded a policy of triggering war as unacceptable.

It seems to us that today, when cold war structures are being dismantled and the incompatibility of a "balance of power" strategy with the realities of the nuclear age is more evident than ever, there are objective prerequisites for adopting a strategy of "minimum deterrence". Such a strategy presupposes a drastic unilateral cut in the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the preservation of a

small number of warheads which could not be destroyed by a first-strike from the potential enemy and would inflict "unacceptable damage" upon him as a result of retaliation.

To provide "minimum deterrence", it is indeed enough to retain 500 nuclear warheads differing in yield and mounted on SS 25 mobile single-warhead land-based missiles and Delta 4 submarines, which carry a total of up to 64 warheads on 16 missiles. This is less than one-twentieth of the present number of nuclear warheads. The rest may, in our opinion, be scrapped without detriment to national security.

THE ELIMINATION of 95 per cent of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear capability would be a most serious step requiring careful consideration. The most diverse arguments could be advanced against going over to "minimum deterrence". The very fact that this would be a radical solution is likely to generate internal resistance, for the issue is national security. Any mistake in this matter could bring on irreparable disaster.

Let us look into the reasons usually given by those who object to "minimum deterrence" strategy and insist on keeping the existing nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union.

Going over to "minimum deterrence" would sharply reduce the flexibility of Soviet military political strategy and limit the range of likely responses to US actions, thereby tempting the potential enemy to try various acts of provocation. Let us imagine, for instance, that the United States were to deliver a "selective strike" against the Soviet Union and its allies, using low-yield nuclear weapons. Would we have to choose between refraining from retaliation and hitting Washington, New York and Los Angeles with megaton warheads? The former response would merely encourage the aggressor to go on while the latter would precipitate an all-out nuclear war. Hadn't we better preserve the existing "nuclear infrastructure", which makes it possible to respond to every strike from the aggressor with a commensurate strike?

These arguments would seem convincing except that to preserve and improve the existing "nuclear infrastructure" is to actually increase the war menace. We may be said to agree tacitly that a nuclear war could be limited to a controlled exchange of counterforce strikes. The development of new and high precision ICBMs and MIRVs gives the other side additional cause to seek greater flexibility, accuracy and invulnerability for its weapons systems and for a more rational strategy geared to waging war.

But a "minimum deterrence" potential (500 warheads differing in yield) would be such as to make it possible to use more than one retaliation scenario. In the event of a "selective strike" against the Soviet Union or its allies by means of several warheads (that is, a strike by way of blackmail rather than as an attempt to disarm the Soviet Union or inflict a decisive defeat upon it), the greater part of the "minimum deterrence" capability would be left intact. Thus the range of retaliation scenarios would be wide enough as to both targets and yields. The important thing is that retaliation would in all circumstances take the form of a countervalue strike and not a counterforce one, that is, would be aimed at civilian targets.

"Minimum deterrence" might guarantee security but only for the time being. Sustained effort by the United States in the area of ABM systems and anti-submarine weapons, increasingly accurate delivery vehicles and ever more effective civil defence would sooner or later endanger the means of "minimum deterrence" left to us and make it possible to limit damage from the few Soviet nuclear weapons systems that would have survived a US nuclear first-strike.

The scenario may be visualised as follows. Highly accurate American first-strike weapons plus the latest anti-submarine systems would knock out nine-tenths (let us proceed from the maximum) of the Soviet "minimum deterrence"

potential. The Soviet Union would thus be left with only 50 of its 500 warheads. It would retaliate by using these 50 warheads. Another nine tenths of these would be neutralised by a highly efficient ABM system with space-based components. Only five warheads would hit home, and civil defence measures would make it possible to substantially reduce casualties among civilians. As a result, the Soviet Union would find itself disarmed and compelled to surrender.

We think this line of reasoning is untenable, too. First of all, it is based on the abstract supposition that the United States would be able to destroy or intercept 99 per cent of the nuclear warheads of the Soviet "minimum deterrence" potential. No serious American expert on ABM and anti-submarine defence and strategic vehicle targeting systems would venture such a forecast. Even if the Soviet side were to do nothing at all to make its potential more "viable" and if the United States were to use all its material and intellectual resources to develop ABM and anti-submarine systems, so high a degree of neutralisation of Soviet "minimum deterrence" nuclear systems is unthinkable in the foreseeable future.

Second, what would the remaining one per cent which reached US territory after all be made up of? Five nuclear warheads with a yield of, say, one megaton each? That would be sufficient to wipe out Bost-Wash, or one of the two largest agglomerations of the United States (the belt of industrial centres on the East Coast extending from Boston to Washington), or San-San (the urbanised part of the West Coast from San Diego to San Francisco). This means tens of millions of inhabitants who would die in the early hours after the attack, an economic collapse of American society, a breakdown of the political system, ecological damage that would make itself felt for many decades. Is there an aim that would justify such damage? Are there any foreign policy considerations outweighing this amount of loss? We believe the answer is no.

"Medium deterrence" strategy is based on the concept of the US political and military leadership's rationality. But that leadership might act irrationally, ideological stereotypes might prove stronger than the opinion of experts, and illusions might outweigh sober calculation, with group interests winning the upper hand over national interests. The United States might risk a nuclear conflict even if the risk were objectively too great. Remember the early years of the Reagan administration, when top political leaders of the country affirmed that a nuclear war could be won, that it could be limited, and so forth. Couldn't this happen again?

Of course, if the race for the White House were won by a nuclear maniac, an adventurer like Hitler, "minimum deterrence" would not be effective enough as a strategy. But then there is no defence at all against an irrational nuclear strategy. Nor would a "balance of power" strategy be effective.

But is it wise to allow for such doubtful contingencies? After all, even Ronald Reagan, possibly the most conservative and anti-Soviet US president of the post-war period, a man who made very dangerous statements, especially in 1981 and 1982, showed great restraint and prudence in pursuing his policy. His administration never did anything that could have led to a US-Soviet clash.

Besides, the political situation in the United States and the level of anti-Sovietism in social consciousness and the thinking of the political leadership are largely conditioned by the international activity and military construction of the Soviet Union. Our very first real steps towards applying the principles of "reasonable sufficiency" in military construction and implementing the ideas of new political thinking in our foreign policy led to a marked drop in anti-Sovietism in the United States and discouraged support for a further increase in military spending. Now imagine the powerful effect that a unilateral transition to a "minimum deterrence" strategy by the Soviet Union would have. There is not the slightest likelihood that in such a situation power in the

United States could be taken over by militarist ultras willing to risk suicide in the hope of crushing communism.

Incidentally, we should take account of the political impact of the Soviet Union adopting a "minimum deterrence" strategy when we stop to think of the possibility of the United States acquiring a capability for a "disarming strike" some time in the future. We do not think anybody would want to finance "Star War" programmes, the development of anti-submarine weapons, and so on, were the Soviet Union to opt for "minimum deterrence". SDI comes up even now against financial problems that are hard to solve. Every step towards "minimum deterrence" would be a blow to the positions of the US right.

By reducing our strategic potential to the proportions of "minimum deterrence", we would descend to a level comparable to that of the nuclear forces of China, France and Britain. Whereas these countries may be discounted in assessing the strategic nuclear balance (the Soviet Union and United States account for over nine tenths of the world nuclear potential), the potentials of third countries would become important in the event of the Soviet Union going over to "minimum deterrence". Thus the world strategic balance would become more complex and hence less stable. It would be not only the United States but other countries that we would have to reckon with as potential enemies, which means that it would be much more difficult to maintain the "credibility" of deterrence. Besides, a sharp cut in the Soviet strategic potential might encourage third nuclear countries to speed up their modernisation programmes since this would become more important from the practical point of view than it is now.

Of course, in terms of cold war logic, a bipolar structure is preferable to a multipolar one. But whether we like it or not, the bipolar structure is disintegrating. Seeing that the Soviet Union advocates pluralism in world politics and rejects the "superpower" status imposed upon it, there is no point in clinging to military bipolarity. As regards the "credibility" of deterrence, the strength needed to reliably deter the United States would be more than enough to deter France or Britain. A further circumstance to be borne in mind is that the Soviet Union's unilateral renunciation of its status of nuclear "superpower" and a transition to "minimum deterrence" would undoubtedly lead to increased public pressure on the French and British governments aimed at making them wind down their nuclear modernisation programmes, especially if the transition were accompanied by corresponding moves in regard to conventional armaments.

"Minimum deterrence", like any countervalue strategy, is immoral because it holds the civilian population of the potential enemy hostage. For all the shortcomings of counterforce strategy, it provides for strikes against military targets, command centres and the political leadership. It leaves at least some hope that the war would not be disastrous to millions, that the more important cities would be spared and that the war could be kept within certain limits. The increasing accuracy of delivery vehicles and the diminishing yield of nuclear warheads hold out hope that future operations could be restricted to "surgical" strikes and so would not result in destroying the whole of civilisation. The adoption of a "minimum deterrence" strategy would mean returning to the period of "nuclear barbarity" and desisting from attempts to make nuclear weapons more "civilised".

It seems to us that the two concepts are being mixed up on this point. If in speaking of the strategy of preventing nuclear war, we proceed from the assumption that such a war is perfectly possible and that we must therefore work out optimum scenarios for the conduct of military operations, a counterforce strategy really seems more humane than a countervalue one. However, even a superficial analysis suggests that as far as casualties among civilians are concerned, the difference would not be so very great. But if we consider that there must be no nuclear war at all and that the chief task is to

prevent it, then it would be the height of immorality to try in any way to "civilise" nuclear arms, to prove that damage could be "limited", and so on. "Minimum deterrence" raises the "nuclear threshold" and makes the dividing line between war and peace perfectly clear, while a counterforce strategy virtually lowers the "nuclear threshold", giving rise to illusions about the permissibility of war.

Going over to "minimum deterrence" could provide new and greater opportunities for a global proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet and US nuclear arsenals are so enormous as to make attempts by further countries to join the "nuclear club" meaningless. Indeed, the political effect of coming into possession of nuclear arms (several units) of one's own is rather negligible against the background of the two "superpowers' " 50,000 nuclear warheads whereas the negative implications would be considerable (the likely hostility and mistrust of neighbours, a negative response from world opinion, a likely reduction in foreign aid, and so on). But if the Soviet Union were to cut its strategic potential to one twentieth, other countries may view differently the balance between the gains due to possessing nuclear weapons and its costs.

The comment this invites is, first of all, that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons binds the nuclear powers to seek a maximum reduction in their arsenals. Many countries which have the technology needed for the production of nuclear weapons and refuse to sign the treaty argue that the nuclear powers are still doing less than enough to meet their commitments. The adoption of a "minimum deterrence" strategy by the Soviet Union would demonstrate a responsible approach by one of the two leading nuclear powers and help strengthen the regime of non-proliferation.

The threat of proliferation would still be there, of course. It could only be removed through steadfast efforts by the world community. However, it is unlikely that this threat would grow sharply in the event of a reduction in the Soviet nuclear potential. After all, what is involved is not only the number of nuclear warheads (although 500 warheads amount to a quantitative level which no "threshold" country is equal to attaining in the foreseeable future) but the quality of delivery vehicles. In terms of qualitative indicators, the price of joining the "nuclear club" is going to remain very high.

A "minimum deterrence" strategy would make it impossible for the Soviet Union to defend its allies against an attack launched by means of nuclear or conventional arms, nor could we in such a contingency defend interests going beyond the prevention of nuclear war.

Now let us see what alliances and what interests are involved. In the context of confrontation between the WTO and NATO, any large-scale conflict between them would grow rapidly and almost inevitably into a global nuclear war. We have repeatedly declared that it would be impossible to limit a nuclear war to Europe. It follows that there is no need to preserve the material means of fighting such a war, including tactical nuclear weapons. In today's situation on our continent, East European countries have no need for Soviet "nuclear guarantees" since their security is inseparable from that of the Soviet Union.

In the matter of supporting Soviet interests in the developing world with nuclear weapons, an "extended deterrence" strategy based on nuclear weapons is an extremely hazardous business. There is no deterring the United States from undesirable activity without the concomitant and unacceptable danger of conflict and a loss utterly incommensurate with the importance of the interests being defended.

As for putting pressure on various forces in the Third World having no direct ties to potential nuclear adversaries of the Soviet Union, such attempts are mostly doomed to failure, as we know from history. Nuclear weapons were of little help to the Americans in Vietnam, the British in their conflict with Argentina and ourselves in Afghanistan.

The adoption of a "minimum deterrence" strategy and drastic unilateral cuts in Soviet nuclear forces would greatly complicate further Soviet-US talks on nuclear armaments. For us, it would mean renouncing the rules of the game formed over a long period. Reductions in Soviet nuclear forces would not be accompanied by the setting up of adequate verification mechanisms, and asymmetry between the Soviet and American potentials would grow. Unilateral moves by the Soviet Union would cause perplexity and nervousness in Washington even among those who stand in principle for arms cuts. The implication would be that we were refusing to use the opportunities offered us by talks.

All of it is true, of course. But let us stop and think which is more important to us: to continue talks or to achieve security at minimum cost to our economy. Talks should not be an end in itself. If the other side is unprepared for decisive breakthroughs at the talks (the Americans are not yet prepared to accept "minimum deterrence" and will hardly be prepared for it soon), unilateral moves appear to be completely justified. All important steps towards disarmament in the postwar period, with the possible exception of the IRM-SRM Treaty, were a result of unilateral decisions by the Soviet Union, the United States, China and other countries. Surely we are not doomed to be tied to the US war machine for all time and to be dependent on the political situation that happens to shape up on the Potomac.

"Minimum deterrence" would necessitate a shift of the emphasis in our military construction to conventional armaments and general-purpose armed forces. To make up for the reduction in nuclear forces, we would have to effect a corresponding increase in the capabilities of other components of our military power. Going over to "minimum deterrence" would be disadvantageous above all economically, for instead of saving resources, we would have to shoulder additional expenditures.

This kind of logic might be acceptable if it were a question of preserving the traditional functions of the armed forces while altering the proportions of their various components. Yet the point at issue is a revision of the functions themselves, of renouncing "surpluses" of both nuclear and conventional armaments, which could be reduced simultaneously. China once set an instructive example by simultaneously freezing its nuclear programme and cutting its general-purpose armed forces by nearly one million men. This did not tell on its security. The principle of reasonable sufficiency applies in equal measure to all types of armed forces. Going over to "minimum deterrence" in the nuclear sphere should hasten the optimisation of our military construction as a whole.

A transition to "minimum deterrence" and a reduction of our nuclear forces to 500 warheads would be seen both at home and abroad as a sign of weakness, of our inability to bear up under the arms race imposed upon us. American hawks would attribute it to Washington's "position of strength" policy. And even if the reduction process itself proved to be relatively painless, it would still lead to a substantial decline in Soviet influence in the world and reduce our role in international affairs. Whereas the Soviet Union today is one of the two leading world "power centres", going over to "minimum deterrence" would make it just one of the great powers burdened, moreover, with many big internal problems.

How justified are these fears? If we are to go by the reaction of American hawks, we had better do nothing in this respect, for no matter what we did, they would interpret it in the most negative way, would represent it as a cunning tactic designed to lull the West or as a result of US pressure. As for the likely reaction of public opinion—both at home and abroad—we have gained experience we can draw on. We mean the reduction in Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men announced in December 1988. Numerous world opinion polls have shown that our unilateral measures are appreciated and meet universal support.

As to our status in world politics it is objectively bound to decline irrespective of whether or not we preserve a surplus of nuclear arms. This is because we fall short of a highly developed country on very many counts, including economic structure, living standards, life expectancy and the environment. Our weakness will come out more and more as the cold war system disintegrates and international relations are demilitarised, with new, non-military components of national power coming to the fore. Of course, we could delay this inevitable process, but hadn't we better give up obsolete symbols of international status and concentrate on catching up with countries which have surpassed us in recent decades?

"Minimum deterrence", like any deterrence, is contrary to the idea of a nuclear-free world. It means perpetuating nuclear weapons and condemning humanity to a permanent threat of universal destruction.

We suppose nobody would deny that from the point of view of international security, it would be better to scrap all nuclear weapons as soon as possible. But we cannot expect such a thing just yet. Our likely partners, at least now, are taking their time over subscribing to the programme for the abolition of nuclear arsenals by the year 2000 which our country has put forward. There is apparently a need for intermediate stages in the advance to a nuclear-free world, stages at which all parties to international relations could feel secure. "Minimum deterrence" could be such an intermediate stage for our country and, indeed, for the world community as a whole.

THUS THE ARGUMENTS against a "minimum deterrence" strategy turn out not to be very convincing when examined closely enough. Generally speaking, the idea of "minimum deterrence" and a twenty-fold reduction in Soviet strategic nuclear forces seems radical and almost Utopian only to those who stick to traditional political thinking and ideas of "balance of power". One has only to discard this approach, and all arguments in favour of a "balance", "parity" or an approximate quantitative and qualitative equality of Soviet and US strategic forces would fall apart like a house of cards.

What could progress towards "minimum deterrence" begin with? We see the best start in a unilateral 50 per cent reduction of strategic armaments, which we are negotiating with the United States. It is obvious even now that the Bush administration is going to stall, making further demands and revising agreements. Why should we again keep to the Americans' rules of the game? Hadn't we better give up this game, all the more so since certain provisions of the treaty on nuclear armaments now in sight would compel us to invest more in strategic area instead of spending less?

A unilateral 50 per cent cut in strategic armaments would represent something more than a big step towards optimising our military construction. It would have its effect on the United States by making it realise that there is no going back to the past, and would end all that is left of the cold war. The measure necessitates no extra talks or consultations—the political boldness repeatedly shown by the Soviet leadership in international affairs is sufficient for it to be carried out.

AMMAN IS READY FOR COOPERATION

Taher al-MASRI

MORE THAN A QUARTER of a century has gone by since diplomatic relations were established between the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We note with deep satisfaction the positive results achieved in Jordanian-Soviet relations to date. They indicate that our ties are a rewarding example of constructive cooperation, durable friendship, mutual respect and understanding.

The Soviet Union invariably enjoys high prestige with the Jordanian people and the Arab nation as a whole, for it is prompted by the noble principles of justice and international law and comes out consistently against aggression and in support of the Palestinians' legitimate demands. It has repeatedly shown itself to be a steadfast friend of the Arabs and an opponent of the forces whose aim is to make our region the object of a hegemonist policy. The Soviet Union has never stopped working for the realisation of its initiatives intended to settle the Middle East conflict and representing a forceful manifestation of its political realism and its constructive approach to the solution of a number of other regional and international problems.

It is in point to note the truly impressive domestic and foreign policy achievements of the peoples of the Soviet Union, one of the planet's great powers. These achievements directly influence world developments and have already played a visible role in determining the outlook for the evolution of human civilisation.

In recent years we have found it interesting to watch the perestroika process being boldly and wisely carried out by the new Soviet leadership, whose policy of glasnost and democratisation is an earnest of the Soviet people—a people friendly to us—scoring even bigger gains.

I wish to add that the Soviet Union, while restructuring every sphere of social life, continues at the same time bearing its share of responsibility for international peace and security as a country which takes the lead in the world community in the matter of advancing and implementing constructive proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We think highly of the Soviet contribution to the drafting and signing with the United States late in 1987 of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. The treaty constituted an important step towards ending the nuclear arms race and concentrating the efforts

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of nations on the social and economic development of the planet and eliminating the nuclear threat, so that humanity may live in an atmosphere of security, freedom and stability.

We appreciate the historic role which the Soviet Union has been playing since the beginning of this century in rendering aid and support to peoples subjugated by foreign occupation. This noble role finds special expression in the Soviet Union's efforts in support of the Arab nation's just cause, with the Palestinian problem as its pivot.

It is on this platform resting on a principled approach and lofty humanist values that Jordan and other Arab countries have arrived at mutual understanding and coinciding points of view with the Soviet Union. A sincere desire for the solution of the Palestinian problem and a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict has prompted the Soviet Union to put forward a whole number of ideas and initiatives, including a proposal for an international peace conference on the Middle East. Jordan has accepted and subscribed to these proposals and is doing all in its power to win growing international support for them. The Arab summit meeting in Amman succeeded in evolving a common position on the principles of a settlement guaranteeing solution of the problem. This approach accords with the call for an international peace conference under UN auspices, to be attended by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the only lawful representative of the Palestinian people. This is the optimum means of bringing about a comprehensive solution of the Palestinian problem.

King Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union late in 1987 brought out an identity of appraisals and a coincidence of points of view as well as agreement between Jordan and the Soviet Union on many lines of international and bilateral relations. During the visit, the two sides reaffirmed their common approach to the Middle East problem and ways of settling it. The visit opened a new stage in the durable, steadily developing relations between the two countries, confirmed their mutual confidence and respect and their resolve to persevere in consultations and cooperation on the basis of sincerity and firm principles and positions. Besides, it enabled King Hussein and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to familiarise themselves directly with each other's points of view and lay the groundwork for personal friendship, which is bound to have its effect on further bilateral cooperation and make for closer coordination and cooperation in all fields and on all levels of relations between the two friendly countries.

Jordan, which considers the Palestinian problem a priority, is doing its best to help put its solution on the right path and make it a point of concern of the international community. Specifically, it has met the PLO and all Arabs half-way by breaking off legal and administrative ties between the two banks of the River Jordan, thereby reaffirming the Palestinians' identity on Palestinian soil. We hope this measure will induce the influential parties concerned to set about establishing comprehensive, lasting and just peace in the Middle East and enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their lawful rights under the leadership of the PLO.

In taking this step, we considered that it would be an important factor for solving the problem and providing a qualitatively new incentive for the Palestinian population's continuing uprising on the occupied Palestinian lands. Thereby we demonstrated the Palestinian people's goals to the world, doing it clearly and unambiguously, reaffirmed their right to their homeland and defeated Israel's schemes intended to turn the territory of Jordan into an alternative home for the Palestinians. We also reaffirmed the invariable position of Jordan, which aids and supports the Palestinian people in their effort to achieve their just objectives and is working towards enabling the Palestinians to participate in the world

process on an equal footing with other peoples. We would go as far as to affirm that thanks to Jordan's contribution, this process has come close to creating an international consensus on the convocation of an international peace conference on the Middle East.

We are glad to note that within the detente process encompassing the world, the two great powers have come to a common conclusion about the need to settle international problems. In view of the urgent need to resolve the Middle East conflict, we hope the Soviet Union will play a constructive and effective role to ensure that all the parties and countries concerned adopt more flexible and realistic positions and concentrate on achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the conflict and on delivering the region and the world from the dangers of confrontation and war.

In conclusion I would like to stress once again that we are following with satisfaction the development of friendly ties between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Soviet Union on the principles of mutual respect and common interests. One indication of this is the successful implementation of the agreements on culture, science and trade signed between our countries. We favour stronger and more extensive Jordanian-Soviet ties. We note with satisfaction the stability of Arab-Soviet relations generally. They are making good progress because they reflect both sides' noble goals based on reality. This is seen in, among other things, the fact that most Persian Gulf countries have established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The USA and Common European Home

Sergei KARAGANOV

US MILITARY-POLITICAL STRATEGY towards Europe is a web of contradictions and divergent trends. Washington is calling for a build-up of NATO's military power and offensive potential, including its nuclear capability in order to strengthen the bloc as an instrument of pressure on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of Europe. Along with this, however, the US military-political leadership is trying to put less emphasis on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy in an effort to distance itself from a potential war in Europe.

The Pentagon now advocates the shifting over to a "maritime strategy", which implies emphasis on flexible operations of the US war machine in various regions of the developing world and a redistribution of a larger share of the US military budget for naval forces in Asia and the Persian Gulf. One after another, the leaders of US administrations swear allegiance to their allied commitments, vowing never to "betray" Europe. And yet, on leaving office, they warn their allies against counting on US guarantees and take a stand for a reduction of the US military presence in Europe.

On the evidence, these and other contradictions in the American approach to Europe reflect the fact that inter-Atlantic relations and US policy towards Europe have reached a boundary line. This is the result of an fundamental change in the military balance in Europe, the restoration of the trend towards stronger economic and political positions for Western Europe and the dynamic processes under way in Eastern Europe.

The postwar period of European history is coming to an end, giving way to a new, peaceful period.

What are the recent years' guidelines of US policy towards Europe? Does this policy fit in with the construction of a common European home, with the growing processes of qualitative rapprochement between European nations and of overcoming the military-political division of the continent?

The eighties have witnessed an increased US tendency to "withdraw" from Europe. The debate on the concept of no-first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe is now livelier in the United States than ever. It is gaining in popularity as Americans realise more and more that there would be no keeping out of a European war. "The risks that stem from our extended deterrence will inspire attempts to avoid the contingent nuclear destruction of our homeland". This is how Professor Earl C. Ravenal of Georgetown University disclosed one of the motives of American opponents of the concept of the first-use of nuclear weapons in the event of war in Europe.¹

Meanwhile Washington formally rejects proposals for renouncing the concept. It still declares that it would be prepared to use nuclear arms

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first should NATO be in danger of losing a war in Europe. Indeed, it has relevant operational plans. But few people, if any, believe its assurances. After all, such a move would amount to certain national suicide and, what is more, the annihilation of the human race. Given the present nuclear balance, the move could provide no military advantage even in theory. Gathering force in US strategy is a rapid if unsteady trend towards relying less on nuclear weapons in Europe.

The most obvious indication of the growing trend towards US "withdrawal" from Europe is probably "unilateralism". There has been growing support for it in Washington in recent years. "Unilateralism" is not a purely military political concept. It is rather a philosophy of approaching international relations which has always been present in US politics and came to the fore under Ronald Reagan.

This approach implies primarily reliance on military force and disregard for restrictions imposed by international law and tradition, for the principle of regulating state-to-state relations in common with other countries. It also means putting a heavier burden on partners in preparing for military operations in the zones they are responsible for. All this is strongly reminiscent of the original strategic concept of NATO evolved in Washington in the 1949-1950 period. The United States is trying to fall back on its past ideal of alliance.

I see several reasons for Washington's shift to "unilateralism" and the increasing popularity of the idea of "withdrawing" from Europe. One of them is that the significance of Western Europe has diminished somewhat from the point of view of the economic interests of that section of the American ruling class involved in international operations. Since 1978, US trade with Pacific countries has exceeded trade with Western Europe. The markets of some developing countries showed dynamic growth, especially in the seventies. From the mid-sixties to the early eighties, the share of developing countries in world industrial production went up from five to 10 per cent.

The seventies saw the United States enter a new period marked by a sharp increase in the country's economic dependence on the outside world. The foreign political interests of influential groups of the American ruling class began to shift to the so-called periphery, that is, the Third World, above all the Pacific region. But this shift was compounded by mounting instability, trends towards conflict and a build-up of armaments in the developing world, all of which makes US economic and political expansion there difficult. Along with frustration over reformist methods of strengthening its positions there, which the United States had particularly banked on, this must have predetermined shifting the emphasis in US military construction and military political thought to a "maritime strategy".

Washington's loss of strategic superiority and advantages at the level of nuclear forces in the European theatre of operations has reduced its opportunities for using NATO to put pressure on the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances American conservatives and militarists are out to shift the focus of military rivalry to areas where the United States still has some advantages and to set up in this way more fronts for pressure on the USSR.

This trend stands out in "Discriminate Deterrence", a semi-official report prepared in 1988 by a commission of prominent American conservative theorists, politicians and military officials. As a clash in Europe is very unlikely, the European continent should, in their opinion, stop dominating US military planning. They believe the emphasis should be put on the Third World, on preparations for flexible operations and on involvement in so-called "low intensity conflicts".²

The tendency to dissociate from Europe also expresses itself in a recurrence of "Mansfieldism", or the demand for a partial pullout of US forces from this continent. Unlike earlier years, the call for a partial or even complete withdrawal from Europe is now upheld by conservatives. The amazing thing is that it now comes from both isolationist-minded provincial right-wingers and the most outspoken Atlanticists in US ruling quarters, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger, who had vehemently opposed Senator Mansfield's proposals.

An amendment calling for a 90,000 cut in the US force in Europe by 1990 unless the West European allies augmented their military budgets by three per cent a year or fulfilled such programmes as extending the military infrastructure of NATO and increasing the stockpile of ammunition was moved in 1984 by Senator Sam Nunn, reputed to be the most consistent supporter of NATO in the US Congress.

Nunn's formula (troop withdrawal unless—) is one explanation of the current fit of "Mansfieldism" as bluff aimed at making allies increase military spending, threatening them with a US military pullout from Europe unless they submit. Nunn, Kissinger and others are playing on the extreme right-wing "unilateralists" threat (one wonders how sincere) to withdraw completely from Europe. Ravenal writes that the "unilateralists" insist on withdrawal because they "are simply disgusted with European neutralism, nuclear pacifism, anti-Americanism, commercial opportunism and hocksliding on defense spending promises. These Americans threaten to dump Europe and to shift our defense to the sea lanes and to the Persian Gulf, but mostly to administer shock treatment to get the Europeans to come to their senses and make a larger and more docile contribution to an American defensive design."³

The threat to cut the US force in Europe is presented as a means of offsetting sentiments in favour of "withdrawal", which are alleged to be dominant in the United States but are actually exaggerated. Nunn stated the reason for his amendment (which was defeated) as follows: Mansfield wanted the Americans to go but he (Nunn) wanted them to stay. "Neo-Mansfieldism" is, in effect, a bridge between two lines of US strategy towards Europe: "withdrawal" towards a "maritime strategy" and a bid to Europeanise NATO under US control and on US terms.

There is something close to consensus on these objectives in Washington. John Oudenaren, a RAND Corporation expert, pointed to the need to "denuclearise" and "de-Americanise" the policy of "deterrence" (in the earlier, Kennanite sense of the term). "...De-Americanization," he wrote, "would not only spread the costs evenly between the United States and other countries, but it might over time make more of an impression on the Soviet leadership than would a further intensification of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry".⁴

A similar idea was expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, probably the most vigorous proponent of a new consensus. He is of the opinion that "the historic balance in Europe will be changed gradually in the West's favor only if Russia comes to be faced west of the Elbe rather less by America and rather more by Europe."⁵ The Washington strategists who expect to wear out the Soviet Union economically would like to increase the role of the European allies as a force compelling our country to divert resources for the defence of its border regions.⁶

It is also suggested how the United States wants to achieve its goal: "de-Americanising" or "Europeanising" its "deterrence" strategy. What is meant is that the United States should not only force its allies to spend more by threatening to reduce its military presence but step up military integration in Western Europe under rigid US control. There is support for, among other things, closer military ties between the FRG and

France, to the point of forming something of a Franco-West German directorate within NATO.⁷

In short, allies are expected to become an instrument of "deterrence" as effective as ever but less costly. When they cooperate in manufacturing arms, an activity in which they cannot avoid, if only technologically, dependence on the United States and its firms, Washington welcomes it. Washington also hailed the efforts for a revival of the Western European Union (WEU) in the eighties, almost the first sign of it being permission for the FRG to make missiles and long-range bombers. But when the WEU countries moved to work out a common position (on SDI) to the exclusion of Washington, they were pulled up short from overseas.

Washington also takes a jaundiced view of the West Europeans' aspiration to reach common positions as they consult together within the European Community. However, there is also a reverse trend pointing to a lessening of this kind of suspicion.

Henry Kissinger calls for both a build-up of the nuclear forces of Britain and France and nuclear cooperation between them. In urging his compatriots to stop suspecting West European military political integration and to back it, he argues that this development will ultimately strengthen the bonds of Atlanticism.⁸ True, it is unclear how. As likely as not, the aim is to reassure those among the Atlanticists who are fearful of losing even part of their control over allies.

Kissinger, Brzezinski and other advocates of an American-style "Europeanisation" of Europe are not very worried about a possible slackening of US control. They expect this to be fully compensated for by a strengthening of the general positions of the West that should enable the United States to wield stronger influence on the world outside Europe. "For the United States", Brzezinski writes, "the gradual emergence of a more self-reliant Europe would be a geopolitical boon."⁹

As for Kissinger, he advances plan after plan for "Europeanising" the defence of the continent and politicising Atlanticist relations. He adds to the traditional idea of placing a heavier burden on allies a proposal for putting the NATO armed forces in Europe under the command of a West European and for entrusting Western Europe with the direction of arms reduction talks with the East. Ex-president Richard Nixon, for his part, recommends making West Europeans accountable for disarmament talks without exempting them from US control, needless to say. "Europeans should be put in charge of the negotiations for arms control in Europe. That does not mean the United States would abdicate its responsibility. As long as the United States risks the lives of its troops in Western Europe, it must have a major voice in shaping the East-West agreements affecting their security".¹⁰

A further politicising of NATO and inner Atlantic relations and the transformation of this military alignment into a political alliance may, of course, yield some positive results. But I feel that behind these plans there was a dangerous intention which also found expression in real politics, a bid to further militarise inter-European relations by politicising inter-Atlantic ties.

Currently the main responsibility for military processes in Europe rests with the United States while West European countries are trying to manoeuvre in the political and economic spheres, which offer greater opportunities for cooperation with the East. Whereas Soviet-American relations, including those bearing on Europe, are dominated by military factors, priority in East-West relations on the European continent goes to political, economic, cultural and other ties. American conservatives expect a politicising of NATO to increase the role of the military, confrontational factor in inter-European relations. It is apt to slow down détente processes in Europe.

To judge by the discussion of recent years, the US conservatives apparently visualise an optimum scenario for the evolution of the situation in Europe as follows:

The vacuum in US-West European relations which would result from the Soviet Union's neutralisation of the nuclear advantages of the United States would be filled by a Western European build-up of conventional armaments. The system and level of military confrontation on the continent would not change. The only change would come about in its Western component, with the role of Western Europe increasing also in the area of conventional weapons.

There is no question of lowering the level of military confrontation. It is proposed that the whole system of confrontation, its refurbishing and hence perpetuation, be updated.

Also, psychological dependence on US "nuclear guarantees" would remain. It could even increase, for the race in conventional arms is likely to make people more nervous and suspicious and to maintain military strategic instability in Europe. In this situation the West Europeans' dread of war and their need for the United States to inspire them with confidence by nuclear means would inevitably grow. While allies play a somewhat bigger role in NATO, the key positions would still be held by the United States.

Thus the chief purpose of the suggested plan is to preserve the confrontational structure which has existed in Europe for 40 years, to modify it only in part and maintain the military split on the continent. This is precisely what Washington sees as the basis for its influence in Europe. And while influential Americans threaten to "withdraw" from Europe because they are annoyed or are pursuing demagogic aims, most of them consider, according to *Foreign Affairs* Chief Editor William G. Hyland the alliance with Western Europe and Japan the mainstay of the US international positions.¹¹

Former US Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer has expressed the same idea even more frankly. NATO, he said, should be strengthened by all means, and not weakened, because "the United States' greatest remaining strategic advantage over the Soviet Union is that it is blessed with many rich allies, whereas the Soviets have only a handful of poor ones".¹²

This explains why, notwithstanding the shift in favour of a "maritime strategy" and the effort to ease its military burden in Europe, Washington has no intention as yet of revising the main aspects of the existing system, let alone winding up its military presence in Europe.

DOES THIS IMPLY that the United States is not able to better its unconstructive position and will actively obstruct a stabilisation and considerable lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe and progress towards building a common European home? An analysis of the situation developing in Europe and the USA, as well as the latest moves of the US leadership show that a pessimistic answer would hardly be justified.

In Europe and the world there now exists an unprecedented combination of objective and subjective opportunities to advance step by step to ending the military split and establishing a new, more durable and humanist security system. In other words, we have a new political reality in the making. It is the historical memory of European nations, who are more aware than anyone else that a new war is impermissible; Europe's vast political tradition; the fact that European countries have a more correct idea of one another than is the case in any other region; an

uncommonly developed system of bilateral and multilateral talks, consultations, treaties and contacts on all levels but primarily the Helsinki process; the continent's tremendous economic, scientific and technological potential and its experience of economic cooperation.

Lastly, "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" is both a historical and a cultural entity united by common legacy of the Renaissance and Enlightenment and the great philosophical and social efforts of the 19th and 20th centuries.

I could list many other real opportunities of effecting a sharp turn in European politics. For a long time now, Europe has been in a situation where the objects sought by nations in East and West during the cold war have been reached and the cold war itself is largely an anachronism.

Ruling quarters in the West need not fear either now or in the foreseeable future the assumption of power by class forces alien to them. Fear of such a development was admittedly one of the main reasons for starting the cold war.

As well as pursuing this aim, bellicose forces in the West hoped to "roll back" communism and deprive the Soviet Union of the "buffer" of countries friendly to it by exerting pressure. These aims proved unattainable, and so, from the sixties on, they drifted towards "peaceful penetration" and efforts to strengthen their influence through detente. The Helsinki Final Act marked the definitive miscarriage of the policy of "rolling back" communism. It legalised the territorial and political status quo in Europe and put it on record. This enabled the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to accomplish the tasks they undertook in the cold war years: dashing hopes for a forcible "roll-back", defending socialism and reaffirming postwar territorial and political realities.

Military confrontation is no longer the primary area in which the destiny of socialism is being decided. The fortunes of the system depend on whether the socialist countries can restructure their societies and economies in a way effectively meeting today's challenge.

In Europe there are apparently no politically significant forces now that could deliberately start a war. Nor are there any differences that could make the West go to war with a view to resolving them, especially in the conditions of the present power balance. Nevertheless, the system of military-political confrontation born of earlier fears and contradictions persists in Europe. It is the main source of antagonisms and distrust between East and West, a "thing in itself".

Both in level and significance, current military preparations and confrontation are plainly out of all proportion to the social, political and state-to-state contradictions lingering on the continent. The peoples of Europe are realising more and more that the situation is unnatural. This is a major reason for the falling support of military expenditures, for efforts to reproduce the system of military confrontation.

Coming to power in European countries today is the "generation of heirs", who are less committed to old dogmas and free from earlier fears. The position of the forces having a stake in the preservation of the status quo is also made difficult by the "democratisation of security policy" typical of the last decade, that is, by a notable expansion of the spectrum of influential leaders and political forces involved in its framing and by heated political debates on the problem both in the East and the West.

The political situation in Western Europe in the late seventies and early eighties changed substantially due to a rift in pronuclear consensus among the rulers of leading countries. More and more often, the main opposition parties of a social democratic or centrist orientation in West Germany, Britain, Italy and some small NATO countries question many aspects of the bloc's military strategy. Anti-nuclear sentiment is mounting

among both the public and the "elite" in the majority of West European countries.

Furthermore, the democratisation of the debate on defence problems in socialist countries has begun to bear fruit. I mean the ongoing revision of ill-advised operational concepts, the restructuring of armed forces on defensive principles and the elimination of superficial armaments.

The ending in the seventies of the advantages of the United States, first at the level of strategic offensive weapons and then at the level of the nuclear balance in Europe, depreciated the NATO concept of "flexible response". As a result, the military basis of the old security system in Western Europe found itself greatly weakened. Countries in the region are searching intensively for new ways of safeguarding their security. They now have an unprecedented opportunity to join in this process so as to seek greater security by reducing armaments and demilitarising the European politics.

Certain prerequisites for curbing and reversing the arms race in Europe are also provided by a marked intensification of West European economic integration. The real prospect of creating a single EEC international market after 1992—a prospect now in sight—has helped erode what is known as "Europessimism". West European countries feel confident again, and it is harder now to impose a confrontational policy upon them from without. This, in turn, restrains the forces having a stake in such a policy.

In nearly all West European countries and even in the United States there is no more political will to increase military spending, and indeed, some leading countries are reluctant to keep it at the present level. Many military programmes are being reduced or put off. This tends to slow down the implementation of NATO plans for the introduction of a new generation of offensive weapons and provides more opportunities for disarmament. There is also the fact that West European military and political quarters are increasingly uncertain of the feasibility or even advisability of such plans. Economic limitations play their part in making cuts in armed forces, including the US force in Europe, the order of the day.

Our internal perestroika and the ongoing democratisation of our social life, which we are cleansing of Stalinism, are a further important prerequisite. Distrust for the Soviet Union is being eroded. World opinion is coming to see our country as more humane and peaceful than before. The relaxation of ideological confrontation is creating an atmosphere favourable to progress on all lines of East-West cooperation.

Developments in the Soviet Union, the humanisation and increased openness of our society, our aspiration to demilitarise policy objectively meet the interests of the world community, Western countries included, even though these developments are making our country an "inconvenient" partner for those accustomed to the earlier, pre-perestroika image of the Soviet Union, which made it possible to keep up confrontation without any particular effort.

There is no doubt about the tremendous importance of the fact that the Soviet Union has demonstrated in practice its determination to dismantle the confrontation system. Our unilateral reductions in conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons have shown that no useful purpose can be served by imposing continued confrontation and blocking progress in East-West talks while using them as a cover to push ahead with the arms race.

In the qualitatively new climate now emerging, the old policy of reproducing military confrontation is becoming ineffective and politically unprofitable for Washington conservatives and forces close to them. This invites the conclusion that military confrontation in Europe has reached

a degree of saturation where existing political, economic and other prerequisites make it possible to begin lowering its level.

As a result of the changed military balance in Europe, the increased independence of West European countries and the failure of US attempts to wreck European detente in the early eighties, Western Europe as an instrument of pressure on socialism is losing in value for Washington. The unwillingness of the nations in the region to build up their offensive capability—a mood encouraged by the Soviet Union's bold political initiatives—adds to realistic sentiments in the United States and prompts Washington to "write off" Europe as a front for pressure on the Soviet Union and to raise fewer obstacles to the stabilisation and lowering of military confrontation in Europe while hanging on to the positions held by America on the continent.

In the final analysis, this line is in keeping with the interests of the United States itself, for it is compelled to spend a substantial part of its military budget on maintaining military confrontation in Europe. After all, everyone now recognises that America's excessive military spending is a major reason for the weakening of its positions in comparison with other capitalist centres. It is obvious that an appreciable lowering and stabilisation of military confrontation in Europe help reduce expenditures for the armed forces stationed in or intended for assignment to Europe.

This would eliminate one of the main reasons given for the race in strategic arms, for the need to make allies support the concept of "extended deterrence", or an American "nuclear umbrella" over Europe, which is hardly seen as credible any longer by anybody.

Some conservatives have set out to reconsider their approach, doing it on the strength of an analysis of the realities I have mentioned. Worthy of special note in this respect is the report "Gorbachev and the Future of East-West Security" by the chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States, former NATO commander in Europe, General Goodpaster.¹³ It proposes, given definite conditions, that the troops and armaments of both alliances in Europe be reduced by the middle of the next decade, to less than half their present level in NATO. Such a large reduction would undoubtedly bring about a qualitative change in the military political situation in Europe.

The report, which comes from a man having an impeccable reputation among conservatives and heading an organisation of the main Atlanticist forces in the United States, is bound to stimulate Washington's thinking. Those who are at one with Goodpaster but cannot bring themselves to say so publicly can now defend themselves by referring to his report. To be sure, the latter will make no difference in the period immediately ahead as far as the policy of Washington is concerned. But it will enliven the debate on the possibility of departing from this policy, which dooms the United States to immobility.

The above realities have already brought about substantial, though not yet radical shifts in the present US administration policies. These realities: the need to respond to the Soviet policy and to prevent a loss of the US prestige and weakening of the allied unity, prompt the administration to move, despite its original intentions not to offer any far-reaching proposals. This is proof of the effectiveness of the Soviet line.

At the NATO Council's 40th session President George Bush made public a package of ideas aimed at reductions in armed forces and conventional arms, which is (though not without some evident defects — it is not radical enough, to my mind) quite constructive. It is close to or coincides with our position. So it is a serious step towards elimination of the military split in Europe.

There came up new and important elements in the Declaration of the heads of states and governments who took part in the NATO Council session. One can but welcome the appeal to assert a new model of East-West relations which calls for confidence, cooperation and peaceful competition to replace ideological and military antagonisms. It is particularly welcome because of shifts in real policies that are in the Declaration backdrop. Prompted by new international realities, by the new Soviet Union, new political thinking is emerging in the quarters traditionally considered bulwarks of old thinking.

The ongoing shifts of Western policies tend to show, to my mind, that these policies can be influenced with a reasonable effect, and that the world is not doomed to endless enmity and confrontation.

It would be logical to expect that lower levels, squeeze-out and ultimate elimination of the military blocs' confrontation, with the setting up of a reliable and humane system of security envisaged in the European home concept, would further erode the feeding grounds and limit options of the hard-core factions of the ruling quarters in the West, the USA included.

The United States would be expected to take up a fitting place in a peaceful, demilitarised common European home, for historically, culturally and politically as well as from the point of view of religion, America is part of Europe if a distinctive one. In the economic sphere, it is linked to Europe—its western region—more closely than ever. The nuclear age and advances in means of warfare have tied America to the European security system. In terms of security, the Atlantic may now be described as no wider than the English Channel. The United States is as close to Europe as England was in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

America's ties to Europe are important enough also in terms of its continued interest in stability and peace on the continent. Besides, we know from history that US dependence on European security and the influence of the West European allies have repeatedly been a restraining factor for US foreign and military policy. This influence should evidently be preserved.

Lastly, there is no denying that the US presence in the European security system has not only tended to whip up the arms race but exerted a certain stabilising influence and neutralised long-standing distrust and friction between some West European nations. Besides, the opportunity to rely on US power has diminished the West Europeans' fear of the "Soviet threat" and hence persuaded them to spend less on militarising their societies and policies.

The situation in Europe today has two aspects: on the one hand, the possibilities of escalating the arms race are dwindling, with military confrontation tending to ease, but on the other hand, both Western and Eastern Europe are entering a period of rapid change fraught to a degree with destabilisation. This adds to the stabilising function of the US presence in the European security system. Without it the gradual transition of Europe to a new security system based on the concept of a common European home, that is, on political guarantees and European institutions and not on military confrontation, could be more difficult.

Apparently, the United States ought to realise that constructive participation in the formation of this new, demilitarised and humanist system would be more in keeping with its long-term interests than attempts to preserve the status quo. Ultimately such participation would enable it not only to hold its positions in Europe but to put them on more solid political foundations than are provided by the residual rights of a victor power or the rights of a country guaranteeing the security of one of the parties to a confrontation system on the continent that is clearly becoming obsolete.

Advancing together with these unquestionably overdue changes (and with allies who see them) would, I believe, help head off new crises in the Atlantic alliance.

But why should a Soviet author want no crises in the other alliance? Because it would be much easier to bring about positive and lasting changes by joining efforts with the other side. Crisis phenomena in West and East would merely slow down this process of creating a healthier international political climate.

¹ Earl C. Ravenal, "Europe Without America: The Erosion of NATO." *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1985, p. 1025.

² *Discriminate Deterrence. Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy*. Washington, 1988.

³ Earl C. Ravenal, *NATO: The Tides of Discontent*. Berkeley, 1985, p. 55.

⁴ *U.S.-Soviet Relations. The Next Phase*. Ed. by A. Horelick. Ithaca and London, 1986, p. 53.

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Future of Yalta." *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1984-1985, p. 294.

⁶ E. Cohen, "Do We Still Need Europe?" *Commentary*, January 1986, p. 34.

⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan. A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest*. Boston-New York, 1986, p. 205.

⁸ Henry Kissinger, "A New Era for NATO." *Newsweek*, Oct. 12, 1987, p. 22.

⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan*, p. 207.

¹⁰ Richard Nixon, *1999. Victory Without War*. New York, 1988, p. 215.

¹¹ W. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals. Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. New York, 1987, p. 256.

¹² *NATO—The Next Generation*. Ed. by R. Hunter. Boulder, 1984, p. 135.

¹³ A. Goodpastor, *Gorbachev and the Future of East-West Security: A Response for the Mid-Term*. Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, 1989, pp. 1-17.

DIPLOMACY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Yuri BORISOV

THE 14TH OF JULY, 1789. Two centuries separate us from that memorable date which has left a deep imprint on the minds not only of the French people, but of all humanity as well. Each century has its own inimitable image, its own "historical" price and its own place in the onward movement of social progress. However, it is indisputable that the major events of world history in the two hundred years since the outbreak of the Great French Revolution have in various ways and various forms reflected its democratic and humanistic ideals and the common human moral values proclaimed by it.

However significant might have been the ideological and political dissimilarities between the incorruptible Robespierre and the mercenary Mirabeau, ever consistent Marat and ever inconsistent Danton, the uncompromising Hébert and the day-dreaming Babeuf, all these tribunes of the popular revolution were united by an ardent desire, if differently interpreted, to bring people liberty, equality and fraternity.

It was the huge and macabre royal fortress prison of the Bastille that sort of embodied all the multiform evil and injustice of their life for the insurgent workers and artisans of St. Antoine, a suburb of the capital of France, and, indeed, for all of her defranchised working people. Built in the late 14th century, this bastion of French absolutism, oppression and violence seemed altogether unassailable. The fortress and its eight high towers bristled with artillery pieces. Two deep moats with hoist bridges barred all approach to it. Yet none of all that deterred the ill-armed sansculottes who stormed the Bastille. The formidable fortress fell under their impetuous onslaught.

That was not a spontaneous rebellion. It was a deep-going popular revolution that broke out after having been long in the making. In the space of several years, it disposed of the royalist feudal system, swept France clean of all lumber of medieval laws and ways and opened up the road to her bourgeois development. "It did so much for the class that it served, for the bourgeoisie, that it left its imprint on the entire nineteenth century, the century which gave civilisation and culture to the whole of mankind... In the nineteenth century what they [the great French bourgeois revolutionaries], had begun was continued, carried out piecemeal and finished in all parts of the world."¹

This assessment of Lenin's referred, of course, not only to the process of one-way onward movement. Certain elements of the feudal social-economic order and of the estate system are known to have been restored in consequence of the Thermidorian counter-revolution, in the periods of the Directoire, the Consulat, and the Napoleon Empire. The democratic institutions, born of the Revolution, were in most cases whittled down, substantially modified and even abolished. However, the leading

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trends of bourgeois development survived and gained in strength. Besides, the Revolution opened a new chapter in the history of the foreign policy and diplomacy of France and Europe. Its record and lessons still deserve the closest attention.

NOT A SINGLE REVOLUTION in history has been a godsend. Each, depending on country and time, had its own specific social-economic, political, cultural and intellectual prerequisites. The ground for the foreign policy and diplomacy of the revolutionary times in France had been laid by its ideologues and "godfathers". The great French Encyclopaedists, Voltaire and Montesquieu, Diderot and Rousseau, Helvetius and Condorcet, Mably and Turgot came forward with all-round criticism of the home and foreign policies of absolute monarchy and its diplomacy.

The root of the evil, as they saw it, was the ambition of the monarchist regime in France to keep the entire system of European international relations confined within the narrow and tight framework of dynastic family connections, marriages between the members of the families of the kings, princes and dukes, and reduce it to inter-family treaties and accords on the issues of succession, partition and repartition of territories, financial and commercial advantages, acquisition of colonial possessions. The diplomacy of the monarchs, Mably emphasised, is guided not by "great principles", but by "private motives, petty interests and whims of sovereigns".

Hence the principles of staffing the diplomatic service. Its members were recruited from among the court aristocracy, top clergy and generals. The King's diplomatic agents and official representatives feared public diplomacy more than the devil fears holy water. All negotiations were shrouded in mystery. The only way, if any, to break through the blank wall of secrecy was by the bribery of diplomats, interception of their correspondence and by political espionage.

The scathing criticism of monarchist diplomacy by the ideologues of French Enlightenment was spearheaded against the ineffective system of international political alliances of prerevolutionary France in Europe. The foremost among them was the Franco-Austrian alliance, sealed by the marriage of the dauphin, the later-to-be Louis XVI, with the Austrian Princess. But the Austrian bent did not save the French from their defeat in the Seven Years' War against England, which led to France losing Canada and other colonies. The second axis of French diplomacy in Europe, the alliance of the Paris and Madrid Bourbons, was also fragile and unstable. The bonds of "family diplomacy" proved to be powerless in the face of the real contradictions of national interests. In such a setting, the bonds of kinship offered no guarantee of mutual understanding and no respect for economic and political interests and honest cooperation.

Upon lambasting the anti-people essence of dynastic diplomacy, the Encyclopaedists substantiated the principles of new foreign policy. In those days, these principles seemed an illusion, but they have lived through the subsequent centuries, for in their essence they reflected mankind's long-cherished dreams of fair and safe international relations. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau put forward a project of eternal peace, of the total ending of all wars and of creating a federation of free nations and an all-European parliament to this end. He proposed establishing an international tribunal to resolve conflicts and disputes between states by means of negotiation. Neither did Rousseau rule out the possibility of international treaties and agreements on the issues of disarmament being concluded.

Of course, there were no requisite pre-conditions two hundred years ago for realising the foreign policy concepts of the ideologues of French Enlightenment. But the profoundly humanistic essence of the ideas of peace and disarmament has borne fruit. It had its imprint on international relations and sometimes deterred the parties concerned from dangerous extremes in the diplomatic struggle. It was the actual balance of economic and military forces that determined the European situation at the time. However, what seemed, at first glance, to be the abstract ideals of everlasting peace have for ever remained integral to mankind's priceless intellectual potential.

Incidentally, even in our time, some pundits strive to make those Encyclopaedists look as something like pipe-dreamers divorced from the facts of reality and wandering in some "intellectual void". That's absurd! The heralds of the French Revolution thought in quite earthly terms of national independence and sovereignty of the people, human rights and liberties in the context of democracy and public diplomacy, having broken with self-seeking dynastic interests. They were the god-fathers of the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen adopted by the National Assembly on the 26th of August, 1789.²

The Declaration was addressed, first and foremost, to the French people, yet it was one of the policy documents of international relations. It proclaimed the neglect of the "natural, inalienable and sacred" human rights: liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression as the only causes of social ills and decadence of governments.

Property, when it becomes an object of international relations, must not be alienated by force, although it can become an object of law-governed negotiations. It is likewise obvious that man's stable security can be properly ensured by the state only in the context of dependable general security. And, finally, individual freedom is indivisible: it rules out both "domestic", that is, social oppression, and violence by "external", that is, foreign subjugators.

In other words, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen is a single document with two "faces", one turned to the social order of France, and the other to her international relations. They are as inseparable as the two sides of a coin. This unity rests on national interests. The nation is the source of supreme authority. Hence the need for independent foreign policy of the State, upholding the interests of the nation and the people.

The ideas of the Declaration were embodied in a whole series of the foreign policy and diplomatic documents of the French revolutionary times. These included one of the first manifestoes of bourgeois diplomacy—"A Memorandum on France's Present Relations with Other States", prepared in 1792 by the former Bishop of Autun, Charles Maurice Talleyrand. By that time he had acquired considerable experience first as a member and, subsequently, as the head of the Diplomatic Committee of the National Assembly, and conducted important negotiations in London with a view to securing British neutrality in respect of France. The brilliant diplomatic career of the prospective Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Directoire, of the Consulat, of Emperor Napoleon and Louis XVIII was yet to come, but it was clear that the force of thought and the logic of analysis, as witnessed by the substance of the "Memorandum" had not arisen out of nothing.

A free people, Talleyrand stressed, cannot build its relations with other peoples "on the ideas and sentiments" of a despotic government. It must base "political actions on the principles of common sense, justice and common good". Hence the imperative of non-intervention in internal affairs and condemnation of aggression. It is not, the author felt, the acquisition or conquest of foreign possessions, but the proper use of

one's own that makes a state as well as an individual "actually rich". Land-grabbing by "force and skill" are "cruel games of political insanity and false calculations of power".

France, Talleyrand concluded, must develop "a new system of her external relations, totally analogous with the ideas and interests generated by the new situation". This suggests a fundamentally novel approach to the problem of political alliance which can be a fair and sensible act only if "it boils down to a mutual defence treaty". At the same time, as the author of the "Memorandum" suggested, not all states were capable of being French allies. Some of them, because of their geographic location, or different principles of government, had no means for "joint defence". So what France could conclude with them were "not permanent treaties of alliance and fraternity, but only interim agreements involving political and commercial interests, to meet particular circumstances".

Under any circumstances, Talleyrand believed, "France must remain within her own frontiers: she must do so because of her glory, her justice, her common sense, her interests and those of the peoples she has liberated". It was a paradox of history that these noble and humane ideas should have been those of a man who, subsequently, spent much of his long life in the service of aggressive diplomacy designed to justify the subjugation of the peoples of Europe and colonies.

The committed approach of the author of the "Memorandum" to the colonial problem and to the issue of international trading and industrial connections which were building up at the time became a kind of sign of the new bourgeois epoch. Talleyrand considered prospects for concluding an Anglo-French convention granting independence to the colonies of both countries which would have enabled them to get actively involved in the system of international trade. In so doing, he referred to the restoration of American-English trade links upon the declaration of national independence by the United States. He also urged freedom from foreign rule for the Spanish colonies in Latin America.

Such ideas were profoundly foreign to the diplomats of the "old school" who despised "low affairs"—the development of industrial, economic and commercial ties. It is undeniable that the "Memorandum", an official diplomatic document of revolutionary times, was distinguished by an innovative mode of thinking and a sense of political realism. It must certainly have been written under the influence of the Declaration of the Right of Man and Citizen and reflected what were, at the time, the new requirements of bourgeois diplomacy.

The universal, common human significance of the foreign policy principles advanced in the very opening stages of the French Revolution, is beyond question. The most essential point of the historical process is just that it does not put time out of joint. Therefore, it is only logical for the contemporary epoch to have inherited the ideas of national independence and national sovereignty, the people's superior authority in every area of public life, including foreign policy, negotiation instead of the use of force, total non-intervention in internal affairs, and defensive priorities of international alliance.

It would, beyond dispute, be rather naive to draw any direct analogy between 1789 and 1989. Although the continuity of basic foreign policy principles is obvious, the scale of their application and the scope of their operation have changed cosmically, indeed. For the first time throughout the existence of humanity, it is impossible to choose between peace and war. Nowadays, there is no reasonable alternative to universal peace, nor to security through disarmament. To live at the close of the 20th century means to be able to come to terms with one's neighbours, both far and near, respecting each other's interests, and to cooperate, while recog-

nising everyone's imprescriptible right to choose one's social-economic order and one's mode of living, thinking and acting.

THE PROBLEM of war and peace was vitally important for the destinies of the French Revolution at every stage of its development. The deep-going political and social-economic change-over in France excited all European nations. And for a number of years, monarchist Europe, overcoming its internal contradictions, was girding up its loins against France. The anti-French conspiracy was masterminded by the Head of the English Government, William Pitt Jr., who had determined as early as 1789 that it was inevitable and necessary to go to war against insurgent France.

That was also the view of the Russian Empress, Catherine II, who wrote to the French leaders in exile: "Consider me an unselfish and sincere friend of the princes, the King's brothers, and a constant supporter of any loyal servant of your monarch".³ There was a readiness in Petersburg to incur major expenses for aid to the Bourbons, but the actual subject of direct armed intervention in French affairs was raised only when the long-lasting Russo-Turkish war ended in the signing of the Jassy Peace Treaty leaving Russia in possession of Ochakov and the Black Sea coast between the Bug and the Dniester rivers. It is at that point that the Empress unequivocally called for armed intervention: "To my mind, there is only one thing that has to be done to save France, and that is to restore the power of the King, and the only way to do so is by taking up arms."⁴

English diplomacy was active in promoting Austro-Russian reconciliation, under a variety of terms, including the restoration, by force of arms, of Austrian domination in Belgium, where revolutionary events had unfolded under the influence of the French example. Now, under the terms of a military alliance concluded between Austria and Prussia in February, 1792, the monarchs concerned undertook to field a 100,000-strong army against France. That was how the first anti-French coalition was created.

The idea of suppressing the Revolution through violence obsessed Louis XVI and his entourage, the French emigration led by the King's brother, Count d'Artois, centred first in Turin and then in Koblenz. The counter-revolutionary undertakings were funded out of the secret treasury of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and subsidies of European monarchist regimes. Waging the struggle against the Revolution were royal diplomatic representatives and agents in Vienna, Petersburg, Berlin, Madrid and Stockholm.

The invading armies stood poised on the borders of the French Republic. But was it in its interest to precipitate the opening of hostilities on its own initiative? No, the country's internal situation required the longest possible "delay". None of the major objectives of the Revolution had yet been completely achieved. Nevertheless, on April 20, 1792, the Legislative Assembly declared war on the King of Bohemia and Hungary—the Austrian Emperor.

The French initiative changed nothing about the character of the war. As far as France was concerned, it remained a just and defensive war to save the Revolution against the combined offensive of the European monarchies. At the same time, it was the first major attempt in history at conducting a revolutionary war, under liberation slogans, which was, as a matter of fact, a continuation of the internal policy of the Legislative Assembly in the domain of international relations for the "export of revolution" to Europe.

The subject of the "export of revolution" is still a relevant one. For in the course of the last two centuries, down to this day, the ideas of revolutionary war have been more than once discussed in the working-class and Communist movement and actually applied in some cases. But all attempts at making other nations "happy" by the "export" of revolution or counter-revolution invariably ended in failure. That is why the 1792-1793 experience of France is still instructive in many ways.

The Girondists, who formed a government on the King's instructions in the spring of 1792, were strongly committed to revolutionary war. One argument used to explain the political line of the Girondists was that they represented the Republican-minded commercial-industrial and land-owning bourgeoisie of large cities of the South and South-West of France, anxious to have an outlet to the markets of Europe. The Girondists also relied on the enthusiasm of patriots ready, arms in hand, to strike back against the combined forces of emigrants and foreign invaders. Reflecting that popular sentiment, one of the leaders of the Girondists, Jacques Pierre Brissot said in the Legislative Assembly on December 29, 1791: "War at the present time is a good deed for the nation."

Many Jacobins, expressing the interests of the revolutionary democratic bourgeoisie, which acted in alliance with the peasants and the urban low classes, favoured revolutionary war. In February, 1792, the Jacobin Club in an address to its members declared that "the nation desires war" and that it longs for the moment when the great dispute of peoples and kings will be decided on the battlefield. In the meantime, this dispute was already on as revolutionary ferment had enveloped a number of European countries under the influence of the French example. In Belgium, a revolution against Austria rule was suppressed by Austria in cooperation with Prussia and England. There was an anti-feudal movement in Switzerland, Nice and Savoy. Hungarians, Czechs and Poles were up in arms for liberation. In Petersburg, the news of the fall of the Bastille was greeted by democratically-minded people with enthusiasm.

The situation in Europe seemed to favour the partisans of the "export of revolution". The troops of the Republic occupied Savoy and Belgium in the autumn of 1792. On November 19, the Convention declared in its decree on behalf of the French nation that it offered fraternity and assistance to all nations anxious to gain freedom and called on the generals to defend the citizens who had suffered or could suffer in the cause of freedom. There was a provision for translation of the text of the decree into the languages of the countries where French troops were stationed.

A few weeks later, the Convention passed another Decree which determined the organisation of power in the French-held regions. It proclaimed the principles of the sovereignty of the people, peace, fraternity, liberty, equality and abolition of privileges. All the existing institutions of power were abolished. They were replaced by provisional elected administration. The Convention resolved to send its commissars at once to wherever necessary to fraternise with its representatives.

However, the ways brought over from Paris by force of arms, if with the best of intentions, could not strike root in what was foreign soil for them. Belgians, for example, rejected the new system of power suggested by the Convention. The "export of revolution" did not produce the results the Girondists had counted on. Besides, the military fortunes were fluid. In the summer of 1793, foreign armies were already on French soil. There was an immediate threat to Paris. The new situation compelled the Girondists to change their tactics: they came out for peace.

So the policy of revolutionary war came to grief. Maximilien Robespierre, the leader of the Left Jacobins, the actual head of the revolu-

tionary government in 1793, foresaw such a turn of events. It would seem, of course, that he should, rather than anybody else, have actively contributed towards fanning up the flame of liberation in Europe. However, Robespierre was determined to defeat the internal enemies of the Revolution, consistently carry out its social and economic reforms, totally eliminate feudal duties in the countryside, organise the food supplies for the army and the cities, and reorganise the forces.

He considered resolving those objectives to be indispensable for defeating the combined forces of monarchist Europe. "You say we have to march on Koblenz, on Koblenz, you say", Robespierre turned to Brissot. "As if representatives of the people could carry out all their commitments by presenting the people with war. Does the danger come from Koblenz? No, Koblenz is by no means a second Carthage, the root of the evil is not in Koblenz, it is among us, it is in your fold."⁵

The Girondists toyed with war. It was a dangerous, lightminded and, at the same time, criminal game. That is how Robespierre viewed it. He said: "The nation does not refuse to go to war, if it is necessary in order to gain freedom, but it wants freedom and peace, if it is possible, and it rejects any plan of war aimed at destroying freedom and Constitution, if even under the pretext of defending them."⁶ Robespierre emphatically objected to the Girondist argument that the French soldiers would bring freedom to the European peoples by force of arms. He considered that all that an armed invasion of foreign lands would do was to turn France's neighbours away from her, rather than convince them of the need to support the French Republic.

One idea that was stated and restated by the Jacobin leader was that no nation could be "made happy" by foreign revolutionary violence. "But suppose the foreign nations, the soldiers of European states turn out to be not so philosophic and mature as you presume them to be for a revolution like the one you are finding so difficult to bring off yourselves? Suppose they find that their primary concern must be to repel an unforeseen attack, without considering what stage of democracy the incoming generals and soldiers were in?"

Those words of Robespierre prompted the conclusion that the "export of revolution" would produce its enemies, rather than friends. It was Jean Paul Marat, one of the Jacobin leaders, the publisher and editor of the *Friend of the People* newspaper, who alone shared the view of the "Incorruptible", reflecting as they did not a temporary, transient or purely French, but a universal law of the historical process, subsequently confirmed over and over again by the experience of various nations and many peoples.

Can we today consider it settled for good and all, both in science and in practice, whether the "export of revolution" is useful or harmful for the social and national liberation of the peoples, and for the progress of humanity? The lessons of history prove that no "prompting" of a revolution can replace its own internal driving forces or compel a stable course for which there are no requisite conditions as yet.

One should not confuse, in this context, the influence of a revolutionary example with intervention in the internal affairs of a peculiar nation. The victory of the October Revolution in Russia did certainly inspire an upsurge of the liberation movement in many countries of Europe and Asia. But the external factor could not substitute itself for the independent development of the political situation of some nations. The concept of a world revolution, which gave rise to so much debate and controversy back in the 1920s, has been, as a matter of fact, disproved by actual experience.

Now, look at the intensity and, sometimes, fury of the dispute that raged and is still sometimes raging over the assessment of the political

events in Eastern Europe after the end of the Second World War! One argument that has been for decades forced down the throat of the general public in the West is that it was the Soviet Army that "brought" the East-European states their political regimes. That is an unfounded accusation! Beyond dispute, the every presence of Soviet soldiers did stay the hand of those who would have restored the pre-war order in Eastern Europe. But the peoples of that region did have their sovereign right to decide their own destiny, even though that right was limited by the interference of Stalin and his associates in the internal affairs of some socialist countries and by the stagemanaging of political trials which meant repression of some prominent statesmen and party leaders. That criminal practice contradicted the principles of democracy and socialism.

So it was 200 years ago that the concept of revolutionary war and "export of revolution" proved to be inconsistent. Robespierre and Marat were strongly opposed to it. Even at that time, they put forward and argued the principle of the freedom of each people to choose their political and social system without any outside interference. That is a universal lesson of history. The freedom of choice is the royal road of modern societal development.

THE FOREIGN POLICY of revolutionary France was not, nor could it be identified in black-and-white terms. There was an intense political struggle between different political groups over various issues of international affairs. It was not only the Girondists who championed the idea of revolutionary war. Among those who demanded the "deposition of tyrants" in feudal Europe was Jacques Hébert, the Vice-Public Prosecutor of the Paris Commune, and his followers. The idea of the "export of revolution", revolutionary propaganda abroad and the implantation of a republican form of government by force in European countries were opposed not only by the Robespierrists but also by the political forces that supported Georges Jacques Danton, the leader of the Right-wing Jacobins. True, that was about the only factor that the foreign policy positions of Robespierre and Danton had in common.

Naturally, the reality of the slogan of revolutionary war was in direct dependence on the situation in the battlefields of the French Republicans with the united forces of European monarchies. The execution of Louis XVI on January 21, 1793, further stimulated their consolidation. England, Holland, Spain, and certain Italian and German states together went to war against France.

A counter-revolutionary rebellion broke out in Vendée. The reins of power in sixty out of the eighty-three departments of France were in the hands of the rebels. Foreign forces intruded into French territory from various directions--from the North, North-East, East, South-East and South.

Some say there are no miracles. But revolutions do work wonders. One occurred in France. The Jacobins, having come to power in the summer of 1793, decided on and carried through agrarian legislation, as a matter of urgency, which completely liberated the French peasants from feudal dependence, making them the free owners of the land they had received from the Revolution. Emancipated peasants, full of enthusiasm, displayed an unbending will to achieve victory.

The English, Austrian and German troops began to retreat along the Belgian frontier and on the Rhine, and so did the Spanish troops in the south of France as early as the autumn of 1793, several months after the installation of the Jacobin dictatorship. Savoy, Lyons and Toulon were liberated. The Chouans in Vendée suffered a series of defeats. Fourteen Republican armies, which had sprung up as if out of nothing, equipped

with what were modern weapons by the standards of the day, led by illustrious commanders, who applied new tactics of warfare, smashed up the invading forces. The decisive victory was scored by the French at Fleurus on June 26, 1794. The intruders had to evacuate the French territory they had seized.

By that time Danton had already been guillotined on charges of counter-revolutionary activity. However, the theory of natural frontiers he had advanced lived on. "I maintain that it is futile to try and instill fear of an excessive enlargement of the territory of the Republic. Its frontiers have been drawn by Nature. We will achieve them, reaching all the four points of the horizon: the Rhine, the Ocean, and the Alps: it is there that must end the confines of our Republic, and no power in the world can ever prevent us reaching them."⁷ Danton's views gained wide currency. They had and still have both supporters and opponents. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine something different. The concept of natural frontiers has more than once served as an excuse for land-grabbing in the history of France and Europe. It has been invoked by many statesmen. We shall name but one—Napoleon Bonaparte.

Now, should one approach the problem of natural frontiers in a negative and prejudiced manner today? It would be a mistake to do so. Nature cannot be disregarded either in ecology or in diplomacy. But one-sided solutions, adopted by one state to the detriment of others, which have always engendered political and even military crises, must be altogether excluded in modern conditions. After the Second World War, for example, the problem of frontiers in Europe was resolved by means of peaceful political accommodation. Frontier posts were put up in strict compliance with the national interests of individual countries and general peace on the continent. This truth has been recognised in all the documents signed by the 35 participating nations of the Helsinki process.

But let us turn back to Danton's views. After an agonising search for a political line for the Republic to follow and after some rope-walking between the proponents and opponents of revolutionary war, he went all-out in the winter of 1793-1794 to seek peace—at any price, as a matter of fact,—first of all, with England. The Dantonists were prepared to cede Bavaria to Austria, the Antilles to the English, Milan to Sardinia. Plans were afoot even to call a peace conference in Switzerland, but they never materialised. Danton's excessive pliability worried Robespierre. The two Jacobin leaders differed in their diplomatic tactics as well: Robespierre, as distinct from Danton, ruled out reconciliation with England, but considered it realistic to have peace with Prussia and Austria.

IT IS THE SOURCE of modern democracy that we trace back to the fall of the Bastille. We see its origin and development as inseparable from the names not only of Voltaire and Rousseau, but Danton and Robespierre as well.

Unfortunately, this appraisal is far from always accepted in the West. The comments made on the bicentenary of the Revolution have comprised both some praise of its democratic gains and some scathing, sometimes even malicious criticism of Robespierre as a "leader of terror", "bloody despot", "implacable tyrant" etc. It is as futile as ever to try and find a Robespierre street, or boulevard or even small square in Paris; there are none! His ideological opponents have sort of crossed the "Incorruptible" out of history.

And yet Robespierre was a man of outstanding erudition and ability. He made a sizable contribution towards establishing and substantiating the common human democratic principles, including some in the domain

of foreign policy and diplomacy. French Republicans of 1789-1793 put forward remarkable humanistic ideas which still inspire millions of human beings—the ideas of equality and fraternity of nations, their all-round and mutually beneficial cooperation, universal security, condemnation of aggression and seizures of territory, and non-intervention in the affairs of one's neighbours, far and near.

Robespierre more than once spoke in the Convention on various problems of international affairs and diplomatic activity of the Republic. He emphasised that "the French people is the only one in the whole universe to be fighting in the name of a common cause" and that its interests coincide with those of all other peoples. The European war is a result of the intrigues and perfidy of monarchist states seeking their own goals of aggrandizement.

The Head of the Jacobin Government condemned the forcible "liberation" of peoples. As he put it, "the French are by no means consumed with a craze to make any nation happy and free other than at its own will"; therefore, revolutionary ideals should be propagated by a "domination of reason" rather than by force of arms. The force of reason instead of the force of arms, these words might have been uttered today! So it is indeed not from scratch that the new political thinking has been built. It has its own deep roots, one of which can be traced back to the democratic values of 1789.

The principles of Jacobin diplomacy were recorded in the 1793 Constitution which anchored the gains and ideals of the revolutionary epoch. The fundamental law of the Republic declared it to be an ally of all free nations and formulated the principle of non-intervention in any nation's internal affairs. Even with Jacobins in power, France was granting refuge to freedom fighters but denied it to tyrants. The Constitution precluded any peace with an enemy occupying French territory.

So it is 200 years ago that the ideas of democratic diplomacy we are true to today were advanced. Of course, continuity in history is a notion that is limited, both in terms of substance and form, by the bounds of a particular epoch. Two centuries ago, the principle of non-intervention represented a hope or a good intention, rather than a reality. In the present conditions, it is a standard of relations between governments and peoples, having the force of law under international treaties and recognised virtually by everybody. Are there any cases of it being circumvented? Yes, there are, but these are exceptions, rather than a rule, and those exceptions are invariably denounced by world opinion.

Continuity means not only a creative perception of the past experience by those coming after it, but a critical attitude to it as well. Indeed, can you justify the fact that neither the Constituent nor the Legislative Assembly abolished slavery in fear of hurting the interests of plantation owners and slave traders? It was as late as 1794 that the Convention members representing the Island of Santo Domingo (Haiti) secured the abolition of slave ownership in all French colonies and the granting of the rights of French citizens to their residents. It was Danton who pleaded for the relevant Decree to be adopted, while Robespierre and Saint-Just, although they did not support the demand for the abolition of slavery, did not object to it either. Some say silence gives consent, if that is so, it means enforced consent in any case, at least in politics.

In his activities, Robespierre quite often showed himself to be impatient. He was rash, tempestuous, and often uncompromising, even when there was no need for it, in our judgement. Here is a case in point, worthy of noting.

Speaking in the Jacobin Club on December 12, 1793, the "Incorruptible" castigated the outlook of Anacharsis Cloots, the son of a Privy Councillor of the Prussian King. He studied at Plessis College in Paris

and then stayed on to live in that city and was elected to the Convention from the Oise Department. "A German baron," Robespierre said, "cannot be a patriot, a 'Prussian' cannot be a worthy French citizen. Can there be any imaginable mutual understanding between a sansculotte and a man having an annual income of 100,000 livres?" Having put the matter this way, Robespierre declared Cloots a foreign spy. He was immediately expelled from the Jacobin flock and then from the Convention.

Now, what were the views that Cloots preached? Utopian, beyond question. He dreamed of a world republic and of mankind getting united within a single nation with common laws to obey. He spoke of all men being brothers working together to implant an ever lasting peace on Earth. Now, here is how Cloots' ideas were assessed by the leader of the Socialist Party of France, Jean Jaurès, a fiery pacifist, murdered by French chauvinists on July 31, 1914, just before the outbreak of the First World War. "I dare say", he stated, "that history whose infinitely complex work seems to have so little in common with Cloots' simple scheme develops just in this direction: by spreading democracy, by the expanding network of international accords and the uniting action of the growing political force, that the world proletariat is; it is indeed striving to establish, for all the apparent distinctions of nations and unmitigated intensity of contradictions, a Single State, a Common Human State, an expression of common civilisation."⁸

The words of Jean Jaurès are also a mixture of reality and a dream: reality is about implanting democratic principles in world affairs; and the dream of a common human state. But even this dream has a certain prospect ahead for it in our time: one of establishing common human values, ideas of a secure peace, universal security, disarmament, humanism, and social justice.

A CONTEMPORARY French philosopher, Jean Marie Benoist has said: "The bicentennial is more an occasion for mourning than for celebration." This assessment appears to have been shared by the producers of the TV film about the execution of Louis XVI. Their opinion about the film has been expressed by 116,000 French TV viewers; 72 per cent of them objected to a deposed monarch being guillotined.

The *Time* magazine said in its article last May that with 200 years gone, the French were still arguing about the sense of the Revolution. It sketched out some of the episodes of those days, with heads of pikes, hungry mobs storming Versailles, women knitting and jeering before a scaffold, Marat stabbed in his bath, hundreds of martyred priests, Saint-Just railing a hoarse voice "There is no liberty for the enemies of liberty!"⁹

So the problem is one of revolutionary violence. The Jacobine terror, as conceived by its organizers, was the extreme means of defending revolutionary gains. At the same time, there is no denying the numerous facts of abuse of power and authority in those days, conviction of innocent people, including children, women and old folk, and official misdeeds. But, by and large, history judges political leaders by their contribution to social progress, without excusing their mistakes and misconceptions. And, in a larger perspective, the balance is certainly positive for the tribunes of the French Revolution, most of whom are known to have also ended on the scaffold.

In history, as a rule, revolutionary upheavals involve not only the use of force, but its grave abuses as well. In present-day conditions we are not immune either from flare-ups of violence. The lessons of historical experience, even if confined to national or state bounds, are of universal value, to a greater or lesser degree, on all occasions. Therefore, it is only.

natural for us to imagine, in our mind's eye today, a bridge to span 1793 and 1917.

Our October Revolution, which began as a virtually bloodless revolution, led to a Civil War which claimed numerous casualties and caused innocent victims. The Romanovs, as a dynasty hostile towards the people in a large historical perspective, were guilty in front of them. But was there really any need for them to be physically destroyed? The rampant Stalinist reign of terror was an outright betrayal of the cause of the October Revolution. While in the course of the French Revolution, the escalation of violence with all of its errors and abuses of power still had some historical grounds to explain it, there is none at all to justify the wholesale repression and crimes of the Stalin period.

...The views of A. Cloots, a dreamer and humanist, cost him his head cut off by the guillotine. But he left behind a testament: "Yes, citizens," he addressed himself to his contemporaries, "the day will come when the world will yearn for the unity of the human race just as you yearn for the unity of France today."¹⁰ Has that day come? Of course, not. And it will evidently be long and hard in coming. But progressive humanity will never forget the immortal behests of the revolutionaries of 1789-1793. The overriding and decisive upshot of the French Revolution is its priceless contribution towards the establishment and development of democracy and all aspects of civilisation without exception.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965, p. 371-372.

² On June 17, 1789, the States General on behalf of the Third Estate declared themselves a National Assembly, the highest representative body of the French people. On July 7, it was reorganised into a Legislative Assembly.

³ *Collected Proceedings of the Russian Imperial Historical Society*, Vol. 42, 1888, p. 206.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

⁵ *Oeuvres complètes de Robespierre*, Vol. VIII, Paris, 1953, p. 67.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁷ Jean Jaurès, *A Socialist History of the French Revolution*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1983, p. 149 (in Russian).

⁸ See Jean Jaurès, *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁹ *Time*, May 1, 1989.

¹⁰ See Jean Jaurès, *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

RISK ZONES IN THE THIRD WORLD

Andrei KOLOSOVSKY

ANALYSTS of the present-day international situation and its development outlook still exhibit a marked tendency to examine issues chiefly in terms of East-West relations in the current understanding of the military, political, ideological, etc., rivalry between the two sides. It cannot be said that the Third World is fully ignored here. However, the developments and processes, apace there are studied above all from the standpoint of their possible influence, be it positive or negative, on the state of affairs between the two blocs.

From the viewpoint of the military and economic potentials the two alliances have accumulated and the experience of confrontation between them, experience that is negative for the whole world, this approach is explicable. And yet, a structure of East-West relations has developed over the past few decades which makes a direct military conflict or an uncontrollable development of a crisis improbable.

However, forecasting events in the Third World and its relations with the two other worlds is a task with many unknowns, and failure to determine any of them correctly is fraught with danger.

What we call the Third World is the greater part of our planet, a huge conglomerate of people, countries, political, religious and other movements which, unlike the West, above all, have not taken shape and, we believe, are unlikely to take shape in the foreseeable future as something stable, predictable and having developed mechanisms for overcoming conflicts. Turbulent processes of modernising, of moulding a society capable of stable development continue there. However, the Third World is even now a part of the interdependent international community and is capable of exerting a decisive influence on its common destiny.

When talking about the Third World it is important to keep in mind that it is far from a united world. It is a totality of very heterogeneous countries and peoples with different pasts, different levels of development, and different national, cultural, religious and other foundations. They are also greatly diverse in their socio-economic and political systems and foreign policy and external economic orientations. Nevertheless, "Third World"—if we do not forget this heterogeneity—is a rather suitable term for denoting the group of countries, the economic, technological, etc. level of development of most of which is much lower than that of the Western countries and which are experiencing similar internal and external economic problems. Almost all of them, albeit in different periods, had a colonial past or something similar to it, and a different degree of political dependence on Western powers, which created a nutrient medium in these countries for nationalism and anti-

Western sentiments. They are also united by their non-involvement in the split of Europe that took place after the Second World War, which, however, does not keep many developing countries from strongly gravitating to either alliance.

We believe that the features according to which the Third World is traditionally defined are largely a mechanical transfer of political, economic and social parameters developed in Europe which do not quite adequately reflect the fundamental historical processes that are taking place in the Third World and in its relations with the socialist and capitalist states.

The postwar split of Europe and the lengthy concentration of international political life around it have somehow pushed into the background the past division into "East and West" as expressed by Kipling as a reflection of the objective existence of European and non-European civilisations on Earth.

Historically, it was European civilisation that developed what is to date the most effective mode of production by creating the market model of industrial economy. In other countries production was organised differently, at times creating great values and attaining astonishing breakthroughs. However, these modes of production, which are customarily called traditional, have failed to develop a mechanism of self-development similar to the European one and to tap the potentialities of science and the individual.

The partial export of European economic management methods to other continents began back in the colonial period, but it was of a very limited and forced nature at the time. It was only to North America, Australia and New Zealand that it was brought more or less in its entirety by European settlers.

The process of introduction of the European mode of production in other, non-European, societies became more active beginning in the 20th century, and it greatly sped up in the 1960s, when the old system of colonial relations in effect disintegrated entirely. The scientific and technological, and now the information, revolution, the development of transport and communications, and the transition of the Western economy to a new level, when the formation of an integral voluminous world market has become more important and profitable than mere access to cheap sources of raw materials, have made this process rather turbulent and in many respects the determinant of the age.

Today we are going through a historical stage of the formation of a world that is truly integral above all economically, a world based on the development model elaborated by European civilisation. Inexorably propelled by the needs of development, this process is moving ahead painfully and will continue to do so. All the more since the formation of an integral world cannot take place only on an economic basis. The problems of security and political relations should be reduced to some common denominator; at least a similar understanding of many values should be worked out, which is extremely difficult for societies having entirely different historical, religious and cultural roots.

The economic successes scored by Europe and North America are inseparable from all the other components that are customarily included in European civilisation. They are notions of morality and the purpose of man based above all on Christianity and its reformed branch, and age-old principles of democracy. They were not only the historical underpinnings for the creation of the modern Western economy but also the environment which constantly nourishes it and creates the most favourable conditions for its development.

There should be no delusions about European civilisation with its numerous episodes of ruthless mass destruction of people and diffe-

rent types of dictatorships. But the main lesson which Europe has drawn from history, including such dark chapters of the 20th century as fascism and Stalinism is that a democratic structure of society with respect for the rights of the minority and of the individual is not only the most humane path, but also the most rational one from the standpoint of meeting the needs of development.

The countries and peoples of the Third World emerged from other civilisations which have their own logic of cognising societal life and their own 'age-old notions of the universe, values and morality. They contain much that is wise and humane, but historically, most of them have lacked an understanding of democracy and rights and freedoms that is similar to the European one.

Much is being said today about the affirmation of the priority of universal values in world politics as one of the ways of building a secure world. For us this slogan means that we are stating our readiness to accept anew the values of European civilisation, many of which we vigorously rejected over the past 70 years, alluding to class interests. And for us this will indeed be a great step towards peace with those who are customarily called the West today and will become the only solid foundation on which to restore trust between the two poles of a split Europe. However, as far as fostering peace on the global level is concerned, it can give but little thus far, since although humanity as the totality of nations has much in common, it has yet to elaborate a universal understanding of even the most basic values.

What common values can there be when in some states a person is free to express his convictions and ideas in print, and in others it is considered possible to order the murder of a foreign writer whose book is not liked.

It is not difficult to adduce other examples. It can be said, of course, that at the level of international law and the documents passed in the UN a universal consensus of sorts has been reached regarding the fundamental norms of political life, political morality and the legal protection of the individual. However, the policies of countries and, to an even greater extent, the realities of the societies comprising them have shown that these norms and decisions frequently mean no more than a reluctance to publicly speak out against the values that have been brought to the international arena by European civilisation, and an understanding of the unprofitability economically, politically, militarily, etc. of quarrelling because of this with states that advance them.

The clash between European postulates and traditional ones is proceeding very differently. Japan has in effect set an example to the Third World by progressing from a backward closed society to a paragon of development, by adapting political customs peculiar to Western democracies and yet preserving its national uniqueness. However, it is still very far from a full dovetailing of European values and the values rooted in Japanese society, which, in principle is fraught with turns in relations between Japan and the West that are hard to predict. The example of India and many other big developing countries shows that Western technical and political culture can be assimilated if it encompasses only a limited segment without really penetrating society, with the old relations being preserved there. However, the phenomenon of Moslem fundamentalism has made us realise that superficial westernisation of a country even in combination with its notable economic development does not exclude in the least the reaction of aggressive rejection of European values.

The process of world integration, which is objective and is propelled by economic needs and a realisation of the global nature of many problems, should not only overcome fluctuations in development levels

but also accomplish the very complicated task of harmonising the values of different civilisations and the results of different historical experiences of nations. This harmonisation can be reliable and stable only if it affects not only the state machinery and ruling elites but also encompasses all strata and evolves an integral set of concepts for contacts not only between governments but also between societies. Our future and the dream of creating a secure world for all largely hinges on how successful and painlessly this is accomplished.

This understanding of the Third World's problems and the appropriate practical actions are greatly hampered by the tenet, one that was long established and still exists in our political consciousness, that the nature of our age, including in the zone of the developing countries, is determined by the conflict between capitalism and socialism.

Socialism was born as a branch of European civilisation. Its ideas took shape on the basis of an analysis of 19th-century European capitalist industrial production and were aimed at changing relations of property and the procedure for distributing it and at thereby making society humane and just, while preserving the advantages of industrial production. The different experiences of the application of these ideas—from the Bolsheviks to the present-day Social Democrats—have yet to prove that its economic effectiveness can be preserved in full. However, the history of this country and of the other socialist countries for that matter has graphically demonstrated that ignoring the inexorable natural laws of the market economy and discarding democratic tradition and norms of morality developed in the depths of European civilisation for centuries lead to a lag in development and have serious consequences for people's lives and freedom.

The strong Asian element in Russia, especially its political culture, was definitely instrumental to norms of societal life customary in Europe being rejected rather easily in our country. The rivalry between capitalism and socialism, or rather, between a normally developing market-economy system and the corresponding political superstructure, on the one hand, and the authoritarian model of society customarily called Stalinist, on the other, is all the same a conflict between the East and West of the same continent, between the "traditionalists" and "transformers" of the same civilisation.

In the early 1960s this conflict began rapidly shifting to the Third World, the two blocs promoting this. We considered it our duty to do all in our power to impede the development of capitalism in the emergent countries and impose upon them our model under the banner of anti-imperialist struggle. The West, for its part, was clearly inclined to explaining away the complex processes within the countries of the Third World and its own acute contradictions with it with the term "intrigues of Moscow".

As a result, virtually the entire Third World and the social upheavals and international conflicts taking place there were incorporated into the context of the conflict between East and West. This not only seriously complicated their relations; it hampered an objective analysis of the processes taking place in the developing countries. At the same time this greatly distorted the consciousness of the Third World states and taught them to speculate on the contradictions between the great powers and ascribe their difficulties and mistakes to them; it pushed them into individual and group egoism and promoted their involvement in conflicts and the arms race.

We have repeatedly stated directly or indirectly that a cessation of pitting ourselves against the rest of European civilisation and returning to its bosom is in our interests. It hardly follows from this that we are depriving ourselves of the right to choose our own path and

organise our society independently. This merely means that an understanding of a number of basic values and foundations of economic, political and moral life should be at least somewhat similar.

And end to our confrontation with the West should also correspond to an end to confrontation with it in the Third World and an understanding of the fact that we are to tackle jointly with it the complicated matters of relations with this part of the world and its integration into a united world, and to jointly take part in resolving its most formidable problems. As long as many of them still exist, one cannot speak of the creation of any reliable security, or merely, for that matter, of a rather stable situation, in the military-political, economic or ecological sphere.

Repudiation of confrontation in principle does not imply that we will not have contradictions or differences with the Western powers regarding the Third World, as there are a good many such contradictions even among themselves. This does not mean that we will not have a special stand on these issues, all the more so since in many parameters we are closer to the developing countries than to the industrialised ones. This merely means that we will have to scrap forever the reality-distorting confrontational approaches to the Third World and objectively assess the actions and stances of all the participants in this interaction. Confrontation with the West over Third World problems or a blind playing up to the developing countries, without an objective analysis of the actual state of affairs for the sake of this confrontation, merely conserves or even compounds these problems and makes them ever more difficult to solve.

Let us take the military-political angle, for example. Great efforts are being taken to lower the level of military rivalry, including its nuclear dimensions, between the two blocs, to prohibit chemical weapons and to limit conventional arms by placing all this on the only possible solid foundation of trust, which is inconceivable without constant, monitored observance of specific norms of international intercourse, and mutual openness and understanding. It is naive to believe, however, that it will be possible to make real progress in all these areas on the European continent while turning away from the fact that in most parts of the world the opposite process is apace.

Progress towards a nuclear-free world is being held back not only by the inertia of nuclear thinking, the absence of the West's confidence in the irreversibility of the changes in our policies, and by the lack of trust and a balance of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. The farther we proceed towards not only reducing but also eliminating nuclear weapons the greater the threat that they will be spread. Several Third World countries already have these weapons or possibilities for quickly manufacturing them if the appropriate political decision is taken. In effect all of them are involved in conflicts, some very fierce, with their neighbours, and they seek to dominate in their regions. Such internal processes are apace in many of them and such regimes exist that the use of these weapons in actuality cannot be ruled out. Under the circumstances the appearance or moreover, one-time use of these weapons will, quite probably, evoke an instantaneous and completely uncontrollable reaction of the spread of nuclear weapons in the Third World, since possession of them will become a foremost component of security and political weight.

If a nuclear arms race starts, the question of scaling it down on a contractual basis will not arise soon, the real danger of nuclear war will grow incalculably, and the dream of a nuclear-free world will turn into an unreal fantasy.

If the goal of reducing and scrapping nuclear weapons is approached in practical rather than propaganda terms, we believe that the

emphasis should be placed not on exposing the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and convincing the West that nuclear weapons must be scuttled immediately, but on elaborating with it in a businesslike fashion the conditions and gradual steps which would make this scrapping practicable. Foremost among them are safeguards of non-proliferation and, over the longer term, of non-resumption of the production of nuclear weapons.

It is a well-known fact that contacts regarding a non-proliferation regime are energetically maintained with the USA and other Western countries. However, what is needed here are not merely contacts, but real cooperation and the elaboration of a united policy of intolerance towards attempts to acquire, produce or spread nuclear weapons. The main thing is to fully remove the pressure of inter-bloc confrontation and the resulting double standards in approaches to countries from the point of view of their proximity to a given nuclear power. No considerations of "special relations", "strategic importance" or a reluctance to look bad in the eyes of the Third World can justify inconsistency in voting on the issue of nuclear-free zones, tolerance of plans, no matter what form they may take—be it repeal of the non-proliferation treaty, the development of nuclear technology in the military sphere, even within the framework of international law, softness in demanding that the IAEA norms be observed, etc.

The same is true in principle of the approach to the problem of the spread of another type of mass-destruction weapons—chemical weapons. No political relations, "anti-imperialist" slogans and actions, or financial gain, for that matter, should hamper us from clearly censuring all instances of the use of chemical weapons and from firmly impeding the acquisition of a chemical potential.

Only our consistency in these spheres will give us grounds for demanding the same consistency of the West and to establish extensive rather than selective cooperation in these spheres. Nor should we be afraid of a negative reaction from the Third World, as there are in this reaction many purely political elements injected from other contexts, and even a mere demagogical smoke-screen designed to conceal a reluctance to hamstring one's freedom of action regarding these weapons.

Of course, the efforts of those who possess nuclear and chemical weapons to reduce and eliminate them are creating an atmosphere that is more favourable for non-proliferation, although thus far there seems to be no visible link between success at disarmament talks and the restraint of potential possessors of mass-destruction weapons. The Third World countries should have access to the appropriate peaceful technologies for development purposes. However, real participation in the nuclear and chemical arms race will not solve these problems but will only lead to greater secrecy and more stringent restrictions in the technological sphere.

Closely related to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is that of the dissemination of their delivery vehicles, above all powerful ballistic missiles. They have begun to spread worldwide, so far armed with conventional warheads. However, even in such a version they are extremely dangerous weapons which are often used against the civilian population and seriously destabilise the regional balance of forces. Missiles are not only being supplied by the great powers, China included; they are already being produced by large Third World states. Attempts at bilateral and international regulation of the spread of missile hardware are at the initial stage. To successfully develop contacts in this sphere it also appears necessary to overcome the approach that is ideologised and aimed at obtaining political dividends, and to conduct an objective and pragmatic discussion of the regional

balance of forces and of security needs. Success here is hardly attainable without a consistent manifestation of restraint in national export of these weapons. It would not be superfluous to recall that a modification of precisely a Soviet missile was used in the "war of cities" between Iran and Iraq to intimidate and destroy the civilian population, and that through our agency the use of powerful missiles was for the first time made an everyday practice of civil war.

Restraint and repudiation of ideological bias are also imperative in tackling issues pertaining to deliveries of conventional weapons to the Third World. This is a hard problem to solve, since almost all arms producers seek to export their wares and extremely wide range of political and economic interests are involved here.

We believe that in today's international conditions it is possible to have effective coordinated regulation of deliveries of arms to the Third World countries that would keep them within reasonable limits while removing or at least lessening their destabilising influence on the regional and global situation. What is important, however, is not to attempt to take advantage of such talks for endlessly stipulating exceptions for ideological and political reasons and for reaffirming a status quo which frequently consists in the fact that while far from flourishing economically, our friends in different regions are much better armed than their neighbours. In providing for their security, they continue, not without our assistance, to subscribe to the concept that one should be much stronger than all one's neighbours and even comparable to the great powers in armament. This approach in no way accords with the establishment of a climate of trust and good-neighbourliness, pushes regimes into a hard line in domestic and foreign affairs and makes it possible for them not to show particular concern for development needs and for raising living standards.

Massive deliveries of weapons and the existence of large amounts of them in certain countries are rapidly becoming a factor in regional conflicts that is self-sufficing and has its own logic, a factor that is greatly hampering a change, vitally needed as that may be, in stands and approaches. A great deal has been written about the importance for global security of settling regional conflicts and the necessity, for the purpose, to purge them of ideological notions, to diminish rivalry between the USSR and the USA, and there is no need to dwell on this in detail. It is important, however, to note that the first experience in applying our new thinking to regional conflicts has shown that the arms deliveries issue is the touchstone which reveals the true extent of novelty in policies and at the same time it is the most stable element of the old approaches, which lends itself to transformation with difficulty and has a strong capacity to reproduce the former, confrontational, mode of thinking and acting. Revealingly, arms deliveries, military aid and the armament level are figuring more and more prominently in discussions of conflicts, including those linked with indirect Soviet-American rivalry.

The problem of economic development and the related social situation in the Third World pose a danger to world stability and the future of humanity that is as great as or greater than military-political processes. Many dark shades have been used to describe the plight of many developing countries, their penury, the widening gap between them and the industrialised world, and the structural, financial and other problems existing in international economic relations. We believe, nevertheless, that the experience of the successful and rapid development of many countries in Asia, Latin America and in Africa for that matter, and the astonishing progress achieved in solving the food problem in such den-

sely populated countries as India and China debunk the apocalyptical view of the world economy as being in a deep crisis.

The record has shown that skilful use of economic laws and suitable technologies and a sensible economic policy can ensure successful development. The view of the West as a shameless plunderer of the developing countries, a view that is deeply entrenched in the USSR, is incorrect as well. Of course, the inertia of the colonial times is there—a reluctance to reckon with the specifics of the weak economies of the developing states, and the resultant practice of trying to squeeze maximum profit out of the Third World. However, both Western policy-makers and business interests increasingly realise the fact that the economic plight of the greater part of the developing world is a global problem, and it is imperative for the West that it is solved, which requires considerable efforts and resources from it. At the same time, on the basis of their own experience and the experience of the successfully developing Third World states, people there are deeply convinced that economic policies must be pursued by economic methods and that they can be successful only when they are grounded on economic laws and not political slogans and draw on present-day economic realities and not on speculative schemes of the future.

Political and military methods of attaining state independence, familiarisation with our practice and, most importantly, many years' involvement in acute military-political confrontation between East and West have engendered persistent actions by developing countries in favour of a political solution to their own and world economic problems, a solution based largely on abstractly egalitarian demands for justice. In their domestic economic policies and bilateral relations with industrialised countries many developing states have long been guided by another, pragmatic, ideology. However, when they gather at multilateral forums, they continue to call for a political, willful overhaul of world economic relations and the establishment of a "new economic order", forgetting that the world economy is first and foremost the totality of the economies of individual countries and that a voluntarist or simply ill-considered economic policies of governments are more often than not the reason for the catastrophic state of their economies.

We have seen from our own bitter experience what political domination of the economy leads to. On the international scene, however, we continue to support the "new economic order" slogan, patently paying tribute to the old logic of using the Third World for gaining points in the confrontation with the West. Fortunately, the world is not subordinate to decrees, even those passed by a majority vote, and a "new economic order" will hardly be established. However, this slogan is also hampering and will continue to hamper a productive discussion and solution of world economic problems, leaving them in the context of political rivalry.

Our possibilities for taking part in the development of the Third World are limited compared with those of the West. Our standing on the economic ladder is unique, too. As an industrialised country, we carry out operations with many developing states that are analogous to Western ones. And yet, in many parameters of the level of development we are closer to the developing states; we do not have national convertible currency, and with the energetic broadening of economic cooperation with the West we will probably come up against the same problem that the developing countries are facing. Nevertheless, by altering our approach to international discussions of economic problems, the USSR can play a decisive role in extricating economic problems from the maze of political slogans aligning them with the existing economic realities. No one expects that dialogue to be a simple one, devoid of the quite natural

acute clashes of interests and stands. But it will be conducted in a language associated with economic reality, and only in this way can it be productive.

The state of affairs in the developing countries in the ecological sphere will also exert, and is already exerting, an enormous impact on the world situation. Recognition is being given even now to the worldwide importance of the problem of felling tropical forests and of the potential danger posed by the spread of "dirty" technologies there. As is the case with the economy, the approaches to this problem are rather ambivalent. Western countries tend to move ecologically dangerous facilities and the development of their resources to other countries without taking into account the consequences for the environment. But they are aware of the situation and are taking practical actions to stimulate measures to protect and restore the environment in developing countries. Beginning to worry about the state of the environment, but often lacking the requisite skills and the resources, for that matter, to carry out environmental protection measures, the Third World itself often displays a politically accusatory and categorical approach.

Ecology is a relatively new sphere of international cooperation which does not bear the burden of confrontation. It is unquestionably of a global nature and, despite all its complexity, can become a model of constructive and businesslike collaboration among all groups of states, if it only becomes possible through joint efforts to avoid its becoming an arena of ideological and political speculation.

Many of humanity's diseases can be cured only by establishing cooperation between the industrialised and developing countries and by their common understanding of the existing problems and the basic parameters for solving them. The spread of narcotics, for example, can be controlled only if the user-countries and the producer-countries are equally intolerant of this evil.

At the present juncture the Third World is the main source of another bane of our times—terrorism. It not only brings death to innocent people; it is capable of triggering off acute international crises and impeding the efforts to settle major conflicts. The Third World peoples greatly suffer from terrorism themselves, but there is also an aspect of it, one which is the most destabilising for the international situation, which deliberately targets acts of terror against the citizens of industrialised, mostly Western, countries.

Clearly, terrorism is nourished by the natural nutrient medium of the enormous number of acute political, national and other problems and can only be uprooted fully if they are resolved. However, even now it can be greatly controlled if all states declare war on it, if it is outlawed everywhere in deed as well as in word. Terrorist groups cannot, especially in our age of technology, last any length of time and all the more so function without the encouragement or at least pandering from without. Terrorism is widely condemned; nevertheless, it is common knowledge that there are forces, including those on the state level, that consider it an admissible and justified instrument of politics. As long as this situation remains, international terrorism will not be stopped no matter how many resolutions are passed to the effect. The only correct thing that the international community can in effect do to keep acts of terrorism from becoming a constant nightmare of our day is to develop a stable reflex of intolerance towards terrorism and especially to state policies favourable to it. A great deal here, as in other matters affecting the industrialised and developing countries simultaneously, hinges on our stand. One would like to believe that the firm statements censuring terrorism and expressing a readiness to cooperate with the West in this sphere in fact spell a departure from the past practice when we were gripped

by the mania of confrontation and were prepared at least to close our eyes to terrorist activities if they had merely a semblance of "anti-imperialist" and anti-American overtones. Like any crime, terrorism must definitely be countered. Therefore, silence or an emphatically underplayed reaction to manifestations of it, and especially outright calls for it at the state level cannot be interpreted either by those who carry out acts of terrorism or those who are victims of it as anything but encouragement of a policy that recognises terrorism as a legitimate tool.

Human rights, political democracy and the closely related issues of openness are among the most difficult problems in the relations with the Third World which are nonetheless of fundamental importance. They are hard to solve since they affect not only the most vital interests of ruling regimes and powerful political and economic forces but also encounter the resistance of historical experience and the value systems of the societies comprising the developing states. However, without progress by Third World countries in this sphere it is difficult to visualise how barriers can be broken down in the efforts to solve political, military and economic problems and how a stable model of global security can be built even somewhat successfully. Reliable settlement of regional conflicts, cessation of regional arms race, and establishment of a minimal level of trust among states are hardly attainable without democratic control of the government, without the requisite freedom of information and the corresponding freedom of speech, without elections under a procedure that no one would call into question. It is with good reason that more and more crisis settlement schemes include international monitoring of the domestic political structure. The openness endemic to the democratic system is likewise needed for solving economic, ecological and many other problems.

Theoretically, we have accepted all this for ourselves by recognising the interconnection between democracy and development, between openness and disarmament, and between trust and cooperation with other states. We agree that human rights are a legitimate subject of international dialogue, and we will energetically discuss this topic within the context of East-West relations and are even receptive to criticism levelled at us.

Although we have set about deideologising this topic on the European continent, we still continue to a certain extent to use the old double standards, standards based on a confrontational approach, in examining internationally human rights violations in the developing world, being reluctant to see obvious violations, as the voting at many international forums shows. Nor are the Western countries, especially the USA, faultless in this respect. However, the fact that the State Department has for the first time considered it necessary to condemn human rights violations by Israel clearly points to the real possibility of a repudiation of the double standards enmeshed in confrontation.

Many Third World countries, including big ones, do not like talk, especially pointed talk, on the topic of democracy, human rights, confidence-building measures and openness, as they have well mastered our former argumentation to the effect that this is either interference in internal affairs or espionage. Naturally, developing societies of the Third World cannot be made either democratic or open forcibly, and it would be extremely dangerous to set oneself this task. Nevertheless, our political and moral stand on this issue should be unequivocal and cogent, and showing an understanding of the fact that democracy and openness are not forced reverence to the West but the foundation of development and security throughout the world.

Repudiation of a confrontation approach and a subjective assessment of stands and approaches will become irreversible and truly

productive only if it is fully applied to all the problems and all the states of the Third World. Declarations are not enough here. Ideological confrontation has created a remified, already largely self-reproducing infrastructure of stereotypes, alliances and lies in the Third World which cannot be dismantled without persistent unilateral efforts and, in a number of cases, parallel efforts with the West. Not everything here can be done overnight, but it is important to be consistent, since enclaves of confrontation are no less dangerous than cancer cells.

Arguments to the effect that the Third World is a reserve of our influence cannot, given the present state of our economy, be deciphered as anything but the fact that our reserve is the preservation of a readiness and capacity for military-political confrontation with the West in the zone of the developing countries. In actuality this implies a refusal to dismantle the ideological, military and other components of the confrontational infrastructure, which will inevitably become an insurmountable impediment on the path to sweeping changes in our relations with the West, and will keep pushing us back to our former policy models. In effect this platform differs little from the previous one, which boiled down to the conviction that the Third World was the reserve of socialism and sooner or later would return us to the "class struggle" in the international arena in all areas with the baneful consequences for us and the rest of the world.

The Third World is not an arena for an East-West showdown. Nor is it in any way our common enemy. There are no a priori right and no a priori wrong here. New political thinking can be effective only if its principles and values are applied universally both in terms of problems and in terms of countries, and if ideological considerations and the struggle for influence are not an excuse for retreating from them. This is how the age of confrontation can be made a thing of the past, the problems of the developing countries overcome, and a truly united and safe world built.

THATCHERISM

Leonid ZAMYATIN

IT IS TEN YEARS since Margaret Thatcher took office. Whereas in the past the Conservative and Labour parties would take turns briefly replacing one another at the helm of government, today, for the first time in 20th-century British history, the Conservatives have managed to halt the swinging of the traditional two-party pendulum for such a lengthy period.

For all the contradictory nature of the developments of the past decade, one thing is obvious -- Britain has managed to break out of a rather dangerous socio-economic crisis, when it was called the sickman of Europe, to consolidate its standing among the five most industrialised countries of the capitalist world, and to enhance its prestige and role in international affairs.

These results are to a great extent linked with the work of Mrs. Thatcher and with the tendency in conservative philosophy and politics which she represents. The term "Thatcherism" has become firmly entrenched in British political life; it is used to characterise certain political, ideological and moral goals which she pursues and also her specific style of leadership. Hardly everything about Thatcherism is new: many elements of the philosophy which Mrs. Thatcher subscribes to were manifest in the political thinking of the Conservatives in the past as well; however, Mrs. Thatcher was the first to try to combine them in an integral conception and, most importantly, is implementing them cogently and persistently. What is more, in marking the tenth anniversary of her stay in office, she has directly expressed her intention of carrying further her course of right-wing radical reforms and a wish that others continue tackling the tasks which she has advanced. These statements by Mrs. Thatcher are interpreted here as an intention to provide conditions to render her reforms in a way irreversible and to implant her philosophical conception in British society.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THATCHERISM

THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS of Thatcherism are comprised of a number of elements. It is an apology of free enterprise, personal initiative, and extreme individualism. Mrs. Thatcher does not conceal the fact that she considers direct material profit, striving for independence and a desire to order life as best as possible for oneself and one's family to be the main incentive. This is the human factor as Mrs.

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Thatcher interprets it. She not only has no compunctions about this individualistic philosophy; she stubbornly propagates it, contending that it appeals to the best that is built into human nature.

Motivation of human activity is one of the centre-pieces of the Thatcher philosophy. The idea of the need to encourage a desire for getting rich runs throughout it: There is nothing bad about creating wealth; only a passion for money for the sake of money is deplorable. Mrs. Thatcher publicly displays particular favour towards businessmen who have managed to attain major financial success.

The Thatcher philosophy is candidly anti-egalitarian. The pursuit of equality is a mirage, she states. Opportunities mean nothing if they are not backed up by the right to inequality and the freedom to excel.

In effect she is waging an unending stubborn struggle with socialism, pitting her individualistic philosophy against it. In her philosophical argumentation Mrs. Thatcher claims that socialism runs counter to the natural character of a nation, that it is a doctrine of intellectuals who haughtily believe that they know better than any person how he should live. Turning to the experience of the British Labourites, Mrs. Thatcher accuses them of "buying" the trust of the constituents deceptively, by promising them all sorts of benefits without particular effort.

Defence of free enterprise and appeals for the liberation of the individual from shackles of "state bureaucratism" are presented by Mrs. Thatcher as part of the overall strategy of the attack on socialism. She was the first postwar Conservative leader to have frankly stated her intention to "uproot socialism in Britain".

It is with the so-called socialist policies of the Labourites that Mrs. Thatcher links the economic decline and exacerbation of social problems in her propaganda. Instead she is proposing a system in which, as she puts it, the state would not dominate over people's lives and would not penetrate all their aspects, and would not be a substitute for personal responsibility. It is personal responsibility, personal aggressive enterprise, and the principle of "each man for himself" that is the main ideological premise of Thatcherism.

To understand Mrs. Thatcher's world outlook it is important to be mindful of her social origins. She does not belong to the traditional British establishment but comes from the petty bourgeois and has preserved her solid affection for this environment. This largely accounts for the fact that the Conservatives' proclaimed return to "Victorian moral values", such as respect for the family and religion, law and order, thrift, thoroughness, industry, independence, the primacy of the right of the individual, and so on, has become an important element of the ideological conception of Thatcherism.

Mrs. Thatcher perceived the sentiments of certain strata of society when she advanced the "patriotic" slogan: Let's return Britain its grandeur. Its attractiveness to many Britons was graphically manifest during the British-Argentine conflict over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Nostalgia for the imperial past made itself felt. The great-power chauvinism typical of Englishmen also largely accounts for the success of Mrs. Thatcher's propaganda in favour of preserving Britain's nuclear potential, "nuclear power" status.

At the current stage—after Mrs. Thatcher's third victory at the 1987 parliamentary elections—opinions began to be voiced in the party regarding the need to act more carefully and circumspectly and to augment what has been achieved and not rush into new radical reforms. In her closest circle, in the Cabinet of Ministers, she almost fully rid herself of "conservative Conservatives", leaving close to herself only those who fully share her approach and espouse her views.

A distinguishing trait of Mrs. Thatcher is persistence and even uncompromisingness in pursuing her line. Once shaping a policy she seeks to conduct it at all cost, without retreating. She sees the political importance of this line to lie in the fact that confidence in the constancy of the main orientations of Thatcherism is being instilled in broad strata of the population.

Mrs. Thatcher unquestionably seeks an independent role in the formation of key aspects of East-West relations. She is laying claim, not without cause, for the role of political leader of Western Europe. This claim is based not only on her personal prestige as a statesperson but in no small measure on the new weighty economic position of Britain in the world and on the stability of its industrial growth.

Since I have touched upon the topic of her personality, I would also like to relate my observations. From my numerous official contacts with Mrs. Thatcher I have arrived at the firm conviction that she possesses many qualities, irrespective of her political posture, which characterise her as an exceptional leader. She is an interesting conversationalist. She knows how to concentrate on a specific problem.

I have often been at 10 Downing Street, the Prime Minister's residence, at Moscow's instructions. Talks are usually held in the blue hall on the second floor, where two small couches—one for the host and the other for guests—stand by a hearth. Mrs. Thatcher likes to sit in the corner, leaning on a small pillow, her head inclined slightly to one side. She speaks in a fine soft voice. She exhibits logic, simplicity and clarity of argumentation, and facility in adducing concrete facts.

If an ambassador has come with important news, I know from my own experience that it cannot be put off until the end of the talk. It may transpire that the protracted protocol part which does not deal with the heart of the matter may simply lead to a situation where you don't have time to get to the main point and she, guiding the course of the talk, interrupts it. Some journalists believe that she lacks the patience to hear out an interlocutor's opinion which she does not agree with. This, to my mind, is not the case. She, an industrious and very rational person, is exasperated by idle talk. I would even say that she likes the debate, but she does not like to lose in one.

I can recall one of our talks during which the question of the British nuclear deterrence conception was touched upon. After exhausting her arguments, she rose, resolutely walked over to a flower display, picked up a large vase and put it in front of me and said, "This is your nuclear stockpile". Then she pulled towards herself a flat cut-glass ashtray and stated affectedly, "This is the British nuclear stockpile. You have a patent disproportion". Her eyes were literally shining with rage. In short, at that moment of annoyance another character trait of the Prime Minister's came to the fore—a lack of tolerance and, if you will, of flexibility.

I would not want my words to be perceived as other than my personal observation. I am far from giving a characterisation of a person, all the more so a major politician, whom I meet in my official capacity as an ambassador.

I cannot, however, fail to relate another encounter. One night last December I received instructions from New York to contact the Prime Minister immediately and tell her about the postponement of Mikhail Gorbachev's planned visit to Britain. We all remember those difficult days after the earthquake in Armenia. The head of the Soviet state had taken a decision to immediately return to Moscow from New York.

In such a situation the words "confirm implementation immediately" meant visiting the Prime Minister early the next day in London. I phoned the Prime Minister's residence and explained as delicately as I could that I wanted to see her. The response was immediate: "The Prime Mi-

nister will receive you at 7:30 a. m." That's the way it was. When I arrived at the dark brick building in Downing Street, I was greeted at the door by her aide. This time I was taken to her personal office in her flat (this is in the same building, but in a different corner). Mrs. Thatcher greeted me with the words: "What a tragedy. I heard about everything on the radio and have expressed my sympathy to the Armenian people in a brief interview to the BBC".

This was the first time I was in that office. It is a modest room with a small desk. By the window stands an armchair with a back similar to an elongated nutshell. When the Prime Minister sat down in it, I got the impression that she had "hidden" herself from everything around her. When she noticed my questioning glance she said: "I like sitting like this and working. You have privacy and you can think better."

The Prime Minister carefully heard out the text of the personal message of Mikhail Gorbachev. She immediately dictated a reply and asked that I say that she was already considering how to help the victims in Armenia. At nine o'clock in the morning all the members of government would gather, and she decided to discuss the matter with them and allocate five million pounds for the Armenian relief fund, render emergency medical aid and send British rescue workers.

When the talk was over Mrs. Thatcher and I went out onto the porch of her residence and proposed jointly answering questions by TV and newspaper correspondents who were waiting outside.

The reason I brought this point up is that I saw another facet to the character of this complex person: compassion, unconcealed religiosity and belief in human good.

Incidentally, I asked Mr. Powell, a Thatcher aide, when the Prime Minister's work day began since she was able to receive me at such an early hour. Mr. Powell said that she usually begins looking through her papers over a cup of coffee at 6 a. m. and works well past midnight. It is hard to get her to take a vacation in summer, if even for a week. She knows how to restore quickly her physical and mental energy. She is always elegant and is able to comport herself with dignity and, when she so desires, to emphasise her femininity. Wrong are the Soviet journalists who in their essays and articles depict the Iron Lady wearing the "usual blue suit and patent leather shoes".

The prominent British writer on social affairs Peter Jenkins once told me that Margaret Thatcher's personality has a special dimension: she behaves alternately, depending on the circumstances, as a defender of the taxpayer against the financial inspector, of the worker against the trade union boss, the tenant against the landlord, the citizen against the state. Perhaps all this, Mr. Jenkins said, explains the popularity of many of Mrs. Thatcher's ideas in the middle strata of society, for which she holds the warmest spot in her heart.

She advances to the forefront simple slogans which everyone can identify with: preservation of law and order, income in keeping with one's work, and so on.

THE THATCHER ECONOMIC PERESTROIKA

MRS. THATCHER HERSELF states not without pride that she has carried out a perestroika in her country, and she sometimes uses this Russian word. Although the ultimate aim of Mrs. Thatcher's perestroika is unquestionably to consolidate the positions of ruling classes, its practical content is to set all levers in motion to make the British economy more efficient and dynamic and to raise it to a higher technical level.

First of all, Mrs. Thatcher has scuttled the old model of state regulation of the economy and has tried to introduce a new one, her own.

She has arrived at the conclusion that the methods of direct state interference in economic affairs, which played an important political role at a certain stage, have become outmoded. They have resulted in an extensive bourgeoning of the state apparatus and its being involved in purely business tasks, and authoritarian methods of economic management. Today Mrs. Thatcher is, by and large, concluding the dismantling of this old system. She is making relations between the state and capitalist enterprises more effective, decentralising economic management and scaling down the state apparatus. The central ministries have been culled to a minimum; they number only 16, and there are, in fact, no sectoral ones among them.

One of the chief elements of the Thatcher reforms is the privatisation of the socialised sector, which in the British economy had composed its bulk at the moment the Conservatives took office. In the nationalised branches over 10 per cent of the GNP had been created, 25 per cent of all investments in industry had been made, and over two million people had been employed. Aside from the traditional spheres—railways, the coal industry, power engineering and water supply—the state economy had incorporated the aerospace and nuclear-power industries and a number of monopolies in the automotive, machine-tool, electronic and other branches of industry. A network of major state corporations had taken shape. Today Mrs. Thatcher is energetically breaking down this system. The petroleum, gas, aviation, telecommunications and many other industries have been handed over to private business, and Parliament is drafting bills to privatise power- and water-supply systems.

We are of the belief that British political practice refutes the established postulate that the state monopoly model is the highest form of capitalism. Is Mrs. Thatcher in fact scrapping the highest form in favour of the lowest—private enterprises? In reality this is not the case. The state sector, which in its time played a substantial role in the economic balancing mechanism, had made it possible to modernise and introduce scientific breakthroughs at state expense, and has increasingly come to be perceived in Britain as a brake on the development of the productive forces at the new stage of the scientific and technological revolution. The main arguments which neo-Conservatives advance against state-owned enterprises is their inflexibility, delayed reaction to the constantly changing market needs, and an inborn tendency to stagnate.

This is explained by the argument that such enterprises do not have strong enough incentives to enhance their efficiency since they are maintained by the state and do not need to worry about their survival.

Mrs. Thatcher regards the practical purpose of privatisation to lie above all in deregulating and releasing enterprises from the "dictate of the state", granting them complete freedom on the capitalist market, yet imposing on them full responsibility for their performance.

The new line in the economic policy was the British Conservatives' response to the problems advanced by the present stage of the technological revolution, problems which Mrs. Thatcher, frankly, perceived more quickly than her political rivals in her own Conservative Party as well as in the opposition parties. She unwaveringly tore down old stereotypes and responded to the important needs of the economy, which had entered a phase of radical technological transformations and a structural reorganisation of social production based on science-intensive technologies, microprocessor engineering, informatics, and automated management systems.

Entering this stage of the scientific and technological revolution required new levers of stimulating technological advance, and Mrs. Thatcher has found them in creating the most favourable conditions for private business, above all for raising the profit rate. As a result of her

measures—tax reductions and limitations on inflation growth—the profits of British industrial and trade corporations have been rising more rapidly than those of their main rivals. In 1988 the increase topped 18 per cent, and this year it is expected to hover between 10 and 12 per cent. This in turn is leading to a considerable growth in investments.

The state-owned companies which have yet to become an object of privatisation are also undergoing a reorganisation. They have been granted extensive economic independence and financial autonomy, and relations between the state and these companies are increasingly being based on contracts. State enterprises have been removed from the artificial system of favourable climate they used to be in. Specifically, the prices for the goods they produce and the services they provide are no longer supported by special measures, but are completely determined by the market conditions. Mrs. Thatcher is striving in every way to make "healthy competition" a universal principle of economic progress, and this competition is increasingly shifting to the pricing sphere, where the rivalling companies are forced to lower prices.

Another important element in her approach is the emphasis on the development of small- and medium-size business. Mrs. Thatcher is displaying particular care for it. Manifest to a certain extent are her social origins and sympathies and also ideological and political calculations, of course. It is the middle strata of the population that are the traditional mainstay for the Tories. However, we believe that the underlying reasons for such a turn lie elsewhere. Small- and medium-size business has become a new force in the structure of Britain's capitalist economy. It is successfully getting along with major monopoly groupings and in a number of instances is complementing them even in the advanced sectors and also in the service industry. Small, well-equipped firms have proven capable of flexibility reacting to changes in the economic situation. Mrs. Thatcher is resolutely continuing the course she has plotted from the outset for supporting and encouraging small- and medium-size business.

A peculiarity of the Thatcher brand of privatisation is that it is being accompanied by extensive sale of stocks to small-scale owners. The number of stockholders has grown from one million to nine million over the years of Thatcherism. This line is making it possible to introduce many ordinary Britishers to the philosophy of private ownership and, politically, to consolidate the base of Conservative support.

Thatcherism proceeds on the premise that the interests of the British state and British capital are no longer identical. The point is that Mrs. Thatcher tends to protect and advance the general positions of international capital and transnational corporations, in which British capital plays an important role, of course. This conclusion is borne out by the following fact. In no other major capitalist country has the economy reached such a high degree of "internationalisation" in the leading sectors of production as it has in Britain. In essence, only a few spheres of the British industrial production are based on a sound domestic market and have a high level of capital investment and an advanced research and development structure. They are the chemical and aerospace industries; the rest are to a greater extent linked with international corporations. As a result, the country's economic growth over the past eight years of 3-4 per cent a year is higher than that in other West European countries. Five hundred new firms are set up each week. On average, labour productivity in the British economy has grown at 2.5 per cent a year during the 1980s—an indicator topped only by Japan. The capital output ratio is still more convincing. Aside from Japan, Britain is the only industrial country where this index has grown in comparison to the 1970s. On the whole Britain today is the only leading capitalist country where the overall production efficiency index has increased over the past

ten years; in other countries it has either not changed or has declined.

However, the Thatcher economic reforms are hardly problem-free and sometimes cost dear to the country. Social polarisation is increasing. One of the main goals of Thatcherism is to force the working people, by bleeding white the social funding system and stringently controlling wages and salaries, to "live according to their means", and enterprises to tighten up by culling the work force and intensifying production. This is how Mrs. Thatcher is seeking to ensure the dynamic British industry she wants. As a result, the average real per capita income has grown by 23 per cent over the past ten years, while some 20 per cent of British families have an average income of less than 4,000 pounds sterling, which is the bare subsistence level.

Mrs. Thatcher is responding to the new problems by merely toughening her economic course. What is more, she is declaring it universal of sorts for other countries. In connection with the formation of a single EEC market by 1992 the British Conservatives have plotted a course for pushing their own politico-economic doctrine within the framework of this market, too. They do not conceal their ambitions of attaining a situation where, as Geoffrey Howe put it, there would be no socialism, no collectivism left in Europe, and of all the "isms", only one—Thatcherism—would remain.

The emphasis being placed on market forces, free enterprise, individualism and a minimal role for the state is coming up against the conviction, one deeply ingrained in the British mentality, that the state is "obliged" to ensure a certain set of social guarantees to absolutely all its members. In effect the "welfare state" conception, which was based on the high tax level and included such components as free education and medical care, a system of state pensions, etc., was shared by all the postwar British governments, Labourite or Conservative alike.

The Conservatives realise that this sphere is on the boundary between the politico-economic and socio-moral domains. A breakdown of the system of social guarantees "for all" is possible only if society as a whole accepts the individualist "every man for himself" scale of values that Mrs. Thatcher is imposing on it.

This moral and political climate in the country is in large measure determined by the rather sweeping structural changes in society itself. The reduction of the working class engaged directly in production, the greater employment in the service industry, the growth of the stratum of owners of small-size, including family, business, and the appearance of a social group of high-paid middle-level managers have led to a situation where most British voters in the 1980s consider themselves as belonging to the "middle layers". Today 64 per cent of Englishmen have their own homes, over 70 per cent, cars, 46 per cent, videocassette recorders, and over half can afford private education for their children. It is of this population group, for all the diversity of its group and class interests, that the ideology of individualism, of striving for personal independence, above all from the state, and a personal enterprise, is typical. It is to it that Mrs. Thatcher is addressing her philosophical concepts. What is more, all major political actions by the conservatives include elements that were geared to enhancing this group qualitatively and quantitatively.

The mounting debates around the degree to which Thatcherism is applicable to the social sphere has prompted many observers in Britain to draw the conclusion that Mrs. Thatcher may have gone beyond what is admissible in British politics. However, it is believed that Mrs. Thatcher may manoeuvre here, and not push into market relations those social spheres in which she can encounter formidable opposition.

FOREIGN POLICY

THE ECONOMY is now serving to bolster the country's standing internationally. Mrs. Thatcher has characterised this process as follows: Britain has regained its confidence, strength and trust. It has become more authoritative and weighty in world affairs. The reasons are that our economy has become more developed, competitive and enterprising.

After Mrs. Thatcher took office in 1979 she was not able to attain notable changes in the economic sphere right away and, as is rightly pointed out here, foreign policy problems did not figure prominently among Mrs. Thatcher's priorities at the initial stage of her activity. At that time she came in for criticism not only for her lack of experience in foreign policy making but also for an inadequate taste for foreign affairs.

Developments on the international scene, however, demanded that London take a stand rather quickly on a host of pressing problems, including the neoglobal course of the American administration for rivalry with the USSR, the exacerbation of contradictions in the European Economic Community with regard to budget policy, and a Rhodesian settlement, which was the first important test for the Thatcher government on the international scene. Skilful manoeuvring in resolving the Rhodesian problem and ensuring British interests in Zimbabwe in the new conditions showed that British pragmatism, flexibility and an ability to adapt to changing conditions are peculiar to the new British government alongside its tough and at first glance even uncompromising style.

Mrs. Thatcher's quality of firm resolve was particularly manifest during the most serious trial which befell her over the past ten years—the Falkland crisis, when, despite vacillation in the Foreign Office, she unhesitatingly staked on a military decision which entailed not only manpower casualties on both sides but also politically negative side effects in the form of strained relations with a number of Latin American countries. The uncompromising course during the Falkland crisis and also the hard line in tackling budget issues in the EEC which threatened to isolate London in the community gave a number of observers cause to claim that Thatcherism with its authoritarian style have become the overriding features of British diplomacy of the 1980s. It is forgotten, however, that aside from the Rhodesian settlement, the Thatcher decade has witnessed an important agreement with China regarding Hong Kong, which was reached thanks to the art of classical British diplomacy with its pragmatism and ability to strike a balance of interests.

It is these qualities that have enabled Mrs. Thatcher to gradually depart from what was initially an unambiguously negative line vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and to reassess, in 1983-1984, approaches to the main problem—the entire set of East-West relations.

Conceptually, of course, adherence to close, "special" relations with the USA and to the main NATO military-political doctrines remains the underpinning of the Thatcher foreign policy. This alliance is a constant braking factor in the development of Britain's own positions, whether with regard to arms control matters or regional problems. Often, it has either been a direct participant in American adventures, such as the raid on Libya, or it has closed its eyes to such incidents as the invasion of Grenada. London's current stand on tactical nuclear weapons modernisation issues leaves no doubt about the tightness of the Anglo-American link-up on key problems of international policy. This does not mean, however, that beyond the wall of "special" relations with the USA Britain has lost sight of its own interests, which do not always coincide with American ones. People here well remember Mrs. Thatcher's strong protest against the USA's attempts to spread its jurisdiction (sanctions) to

the activity of British companies cooperating with the USSR in building the Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline.

These interests are also manifest in the fundamental changes that are taking place in the British leadership's approach to relations with the Soviet Union as a whole. Some five years ago Mrs. Thatcher saw for herself the futility of the purely confrontational approaches of the USA towards the USSR and other socialist countries and began advocating dialogue with the Soviet Union. She arrived at an understanding of the need for it earlier than the American administration and tried to find her own role in establishing this dialogue. The changes in the course of the government of the Conservatives and their solid posture on dialogue with the USSR are based on the influence of perestroika in the Soviet Union and its perception by Mrs. Thatcher as a long-term factor for stabilising the international situation. The British leadership has drawn the conclusion that the restructuring processes accord with the interests not only of the Soviet people but of the entire world community. It has arrived at a deeper understanding of the essence of the restructuring drive and the orientation of the processes sweeping the country for creating a "freer society based on legality and respect for human rights".

Mrs. Thatcher continues to voice sharply negative judgments of socialism as a theory and a system. However, new elements have appeared in the Thatcher approach of late. She has admitted that her perception of socialism can change as a result of the Soviet perestroika. The fact that we are viewing the possibilities of such a change in the Soviet Union is an enormous step forward, she has said. Mrs. Thatcher has expressed confidence that Gorbachev will unquestionably continue the line for reforms persistently and stubbornly. In these views of hers she displays a certain consistency, and for all the differences with us on a number of matters of principle she nevertheless tries to build Soviet-British relations on a businesslike and more realistic basis with due account for the shifts taking place on the world scene.

A great deal has been done of late to develop Soviet-British relations. The dialogue has advanced so far that the leaders of our two countries have made frank and pointed discussions of all major issues common practice, different as our stands are.

However, Soviet-British relations became strained recently. A month after the summit, where all issues could be discussed and were, the British government took a step which in essence ran counter to the present level and state of relations between our two countries. It boils down to the following: the Political Director of the British Foreign Office summoned the Soviet Ambassador and levelled accusations at Soviet institutions for supposedly engaging in "impermissible activity" on British territory. Among these persons were three leading Soviet journalists, three aides of the military attache, and staff members of the Soviet Embassy and Trade Delegation.

No proof was adduced; it was merely stated that "the government has irrefutable evidence". But if this is the case, why not present this "evidence"? This activity, the Political Director of the British Foreign Office told me, is inappropriate in the period of perestroika, a period when there is an unprecedented degree of contacts between our two countries, when so large a volume of information is quite accessible. Citing these words, I want to emphasise how contradictory and unfounded this entire act against Soviet institutions in London was.

I immediately replied to the Political Director that, as Ambassador, I could only regret that the Thatcher government had decided to take such a step, one that was turning our relations backwards and raising suspicions. I told him then, and I want to repeat now, that it is my conviction that this action was planned on the eve of the May session

of NATO in Brussels, where the NATO leaders were to decide two matters—modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons and talks on limiting them. As is known, there is no consensus among the NATO countries on these issues. But it is also a known fact that the British Prime Minister has taken upon herself the mission of having a military decision, one that would accord with the interests of its leadership, being adopted at this session.

I can remember what Mrs. Thatcher said during one of her talks with me: There will be no third zero. They do not need talks for this... Tactical nuclear missiles are a part of their "flexible response" and "nuclear deterrence strategies".

Upon closer scrutiny, it will become clear to any analyst that a situation of tension had to be whipped up just before such decisions were made. Evidently, this was the goal behind the unfriendly British step.

Under the influence of a dynamically developing world scene, the foreign policy of the Thatcher government has become more energetic, and its approaches to key problems, more flexible. Without departing from its traditional orientations of adherence to the nuclear deterrence concept and of consolidating NATO unity on the basis of dovetailed US-West European interests, the British government is attempting to influence in its own way the parameters and concept of East-West dialogue. It is viewed in London as a broadening mechanism of contacts and possible cooperation on a wide range of problems. Shifting the dialogue from a mere exchange of views into the dimension of concerted action with us, including in the UN Security Council and at other forums, provides Britain additional opportunities for enhancing its prestige and influence in world affairs in tackling disarmament issues, regional conflicts and universal and humanitarian problems. It intends to energetically tap these potentialities as is evidenced by its patent interest in cooperation with us on such problems as the Iran-Iraq conflict, settlements in Namibia and the Middle East, and the situation in Lebanon.

Politically, Mrs. Thatcher has outlived the other Western leaders. This circumstance has given the Prime Minister's apparatus reason to speak of her as the "most experienced" leader of the Western countries. What is more indubitable, however, is the fact that during her stay in office, and especially after the Falkland developments, the Prime Minister has come to play a greater role personally, and not only in the shaping of foreign policy but also in its conduct, and she has displayed an undiminishing day-to-day interest in international affairs.



AN ANALYSIS of the results of the Conservatives' performance over these years shows that Thatcherism has proved to be rather effective as applied to the specific conditions of the Britain of the 1980s. The country has changed considerably. Thatcherism as the British model of neo-conservatism is reaffirming the fact that capitalism at the current stage is still able to adapt to changing socio-economic realities. In the Thatcher version this is manifest in a blend of stringent methods of the political domination of the bourgeoisie, the creation of most favourable conditions for private enterprise and yet the advance of populist slogans of "people's capitalism". The inner dynamism of the Thatcher approach is still capable of continuing its rightist-radical course.

PRIORITY TO POLITICAL MEANS

THERE ARE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS whose dimensions and significance you can gauge immediately, for you sense their radical character at once and almost as physically as you might the gusts of a refreshing thunderstorm. The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was a development of this nature. It constituted a watershed marking our country's entry into a new democratic stage.

The Congress provided much food for thought and generated many ideas. Considerable importance is attached to the international dimension of the processes taking place in our country, to how democratisation helps increase international confidence and what new problems it raises for us. It is beyond question that confidence in Soviet policy has grown. We owe this primarily to a sharp turn in domestic policy that has found adequate expression in foreign policy. The far-reaching change in our foreign policy line is a logical effect of perestroika.

Prompted by new political thinking, the Congress approved principles which our state is to follow in international affairs:

- Our national security must be ensured primarily by political means, as part of universal and equal security, in the process of demilitarising, democratising and humanising international relations, building on the prestige and possibilities of the UN.

- Nuclear weapons must be eliminated as a result of talks aimed at bringing about disarmament and limiting the defence potential of the state to the level of reasonable sufficiency.

- The use or threat of force as a means of achieving political, economic or any other objective is impermissible. Sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity must be unfailingly respected in relations with other countries.

- Dialogue and negotiations, directed towards establishing a balance of interests, not confrontation should be the only method of solving international problems and settling conflicts.

- The Soviet economy should organically join the world economy on mutually beneficial and equal terms and take an active part in the formation and application of up-to-date rules for the international division of labour, scientific and technological interchanges and trade.

The emphasis on political guarantees of security naturally necessitates reductions in purely military ones. The Soviet Union's national security today is safeguarded, not only by an adequate and reliable defence potential, but by the fact that no force in the world really poses a threat to our security. We categorically deny the myth of a Soviet military threat, for it is as far from reality as any other myth. We believe the time is ripe for burying its mirror reflection as well, the myth about a military threat to our country from the Western powers. It is hard, if possible at all, to build bridges of confidence, extend cooperation between countries with different social systems and open routes to the future while at the same time leaving this kind of myth-making intact. The Soviet Union is an important part of the new international community of nations, not a besieged fortress, as canons of the "camp" thinking of the

past had it. Clinging on to these notions, whose roots go back to the Stalinist period, would be all the stranger.

In the context of this conception and appraisal of the present international situation, it was by no means accidental that voices were raised at the Congress of People's Deputies, possibly for the first time in our history, calling for cuts in military spending as well as in expenditures of all sorts motivated by reasons of prestige—to the detriment of pressing requirements of the country's development. Experience has shown that unjustified and hence unnecessary military expenditures do not contribute to national security and, indeed, are apt to undermine it, for national security is not made up of military components alone. Military spending, unless calculated most carefully to meet real defence needs, puts an unsustainable burden on the economy and undercuts living standards. The economic component of national security is a prime quantity, and ignoring it may have the most serious consequences, as life has revealed.

We know from history that closed societies cannot count on widespread international recognition, cannot expect to be shown proper confidence by others. The very nature of such societies arouses wariness and distrust. It was not on the basis of isolation from the rest of the world that socialism came into existence in our country; isolation was imposed by Stalinist distortions of the new social system and caused serious damage to it, being a virtual negation of the international ideals associated with socialism as a truly open society. While the transformation of Soviet society into an open society in a short time has not yet removed many problems in relations with partners in East and West, it has made them solvable.

It is not in an atmosphere of alienation that socialism as a new social system can function but in cooperation with other social structures in today's world, and this on the principles of complete equality. The logical inference is that socialism's international ideals and goals will lack appeal until rid of any hint of messianism, which is so alien to the spirit of this age. What determines the more important trends in world development is neither the image in which this or that social system casts itself nor its social ambitions. Messianic elements have largely distorted and deformed the image of the new social system and detracted substantially from its prestige, for they often gave our opponents grounds to accuse us of trying to disseminate the ideal of social equality almost by force.

Perestroika is thoroughly changing our attitude to the outside world. We are now open to the world and willing to cooperate with anyone who sees human life and dignity as the highest values, and we expect reciprocity. "There is no point in turning international relations into a battlefield of ideological war," the Congress stressed. "It is a crime to exhaust the world economy through the arms race and through neglect of man's physical environment. Whatever the barriers separating us, we are all children of Mother Earth and have a common destiny."

One other thing.

The idea that the West as a whole is our potential enemy remains a reality which puts its stamp on public opinion and social consciousness. For instance, some Soviet people are concerned about the circumstance that our ideological adversaries, leaders of bourgeois parties, speak favourably of perestroika. They say this reminds them of the need for stopping to think every time the class enemy praises them.

This approach seems logical, at least in terms of the idea we have been accustomed to from childhood, that if the enemy praises you, you must have made a mistake somewhere along the way. Yet both this kind of logic and the very thinking leading to it are marked by a narrow-mind-

ed approach squeezed into an old, rigid framework ignoring basic universal principles and criteria. In pursuing our perestroika, we are freeing ourselves from the terrible legacy of Stalinism, taking real steps to combine socialism with democracy and putting an end to all that had tended to discredit socialism. If spokesmen for bourgeois parties welcome progress towards democratising our system because they see in this process opportunities for achieving greater mutual understanding and overcoming hostility to the new social system, what is there to be afraid of? One should appreciate the general democratic, universal, profoundly moral substance of perestroika, which is precisely what realistic-minded bourgeois spokesmen hail.

Adherents of the formula "If the enemy praises you—" do not really differ much from those from supporters of another formula, "Those who are not with us are against us". In today's world, at a time when political compromise is becoming not merely a necessity but mainly the only means of solving international problems, and when we recognise the indisputable primacy of universal over class values and interests, to stick to old truths that in the past were guidelines for class thinking pure and simple is tantamount to constantly looking back while striving to advance. The period we have entered dictates a different choice.

THERE IS EVERY POSSIBILITY IN GREECE FOR A FRUITFUL PARTNERSHIP

Petros DOUSKOS

OVER THE PAST DECADE, the problem of economic efficiency has gained in urgency in various countries and regions and the world as a whole. Currently the approach to it differs both quantitatively and qualitatively from what it was in the past, when it was dealt with by extending production and restructuring it, chiefly through further industrialisation.

The traditional policy of capitalist industrialisation and other forms of development dependent on shots in the arm from without, that is, on usurious loans, war reparations and a policy of plundering other nations, can no longer be used. As for the policy of self-sufficiency, whether intentional or prompted by necessity, as in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at a certain stage in their development—it has turned out to be too input-maximising and, what is more, holds no promise for the future. Extensive development has plainly reached its limit, having come up against ecological crises and a relative exhaustion of natural resources.

Today our planet is betraying its inability to go on endlessly supplying resources, meekly carrying the huge ecological burden put upon it by the productive forces. Humanity has lost its immortality, being faced with destructive forces in the form of nuclear weapons brought into existence by itself. It can make no more progress in the prevailing atmosphere of disunity and confrontation between its two components.

The reason for this is not only fear of the prospect of a nuclear holocaust but humanity's obvious inability to make judicious use of its productive forces, whose further growth requires ample investments and technical facilities, primarily in view of the increased cost of R & D. Today's national or regional framework is too narrow for normal production, which now necessitates management at global level. And as the economy is fragmented, reorganising it to bring it into line with the present development level of the productive forces is a difficult task.

The present crisis situation makes itself felt throughout the world economy, in both the socialist and the capitalist systems. Some of the problems facing them, such as their fate in the event of nuclear war, are equally acute everywhere while others have distinctive aspects.

The socialist system cannot eliminate the threat of nuclear war nor perform its defence functions by itself, for the concept of security has lost its earlier, classical meaning and become comprehensive and indivisible. Under present-day conditions, it cannot maximise the rational growth of

its productive forces, cannot combine the potentialities of socialist production relations with the ongoing scientific and technological revolution, demonstrate the historic advantages of the socialist mode of production or guarantee the operation of its fundamental economic law to a satisfactory degree.

The same applies to capitalism. Not one of its strategic doctrines, such as "Atlanticism", "Europeanism", "extended Atlanticism" or "trilateralism", can guarantee the system's survival. Furthermore, not one of its economic concepts, such as Keynesianism, neoclassicism, neoliberalism or neoconservatism, is an earnest of the reliable operation of its fundamental economic law, that of surplus value.

These serious, increasingly palpable difficulties objectively require new thinking and a new mode of action. A generalised analysis of contemporary realities has given rise to a new concept of unity: man—society—nature. In turn, this has led to the demand that society thoroughly review the earlier axioms of prenuclear logic incompatible with the nuclear era and evolve new criteria of economic and social progress and a new concept of social well-being, taking account of the peculiarities of both components of the world community, its common historical roots and its present interdependence and joint advance to the future.

Perestroika as a socio-political category originated in the Soviet Union. But the term was soon included in the political vocabulary of all countries of the world, for it reflects situations and processes typical of both the Soviet Union and the world community. Perestroika has vast dimensions. It covers every aspect of the life of the world community, primarily its decisive sphere, the economy. Trading and economic interests are among the world political factors that have led to a painful maturing of the prerequisites for perestroika and to its inception. This is a fresh confirmation of the universal truth that the pursuit of gain is a far more powerful factor than various political prejudices. "Economic diplomacy", is in the heart of the world's development processes. Naturally, "economic diplomacy", or business activity, seeks to benefit from them.

THE RISE of national and regional economies to a global level is extending its traditional key lines and creating entirely new ones. At the same time, it is creating a basis for the emergence of new productive forces and advanced lines of scientific and technological revolution. The main processes of our times and all the manifold production relations and economic interests are thus gaining in dynamism, including those of them which in the past were denied the right of existence due to ideological preconceptions or as a consequence of their deliberate, selfish deformation. (We find many of the ideas of perestroika in NEP and the conclusions made by the 20th CPSU Congress and largely retracted after 1965.)

The invigoration of commodity-money relations, which are inseparable from the historical ties between the two world systems, is a further spur to the growth and functioning of the productive forces at global level. This, in turn, is paving the way for joint activity by capitalist and socialist partners. The current qualitative transition, which is closely linked with the future, is raising prognostication to a new plane. I mean forecasts of both scientific and technological development processes on whose basis guidelines are formulated for economic growth and organisation and socio-political trends taken into consideration in framing policy.

In step with the transition to a global economy, all that disunites the two world systems is receding while all that unites them is growing stronger. The new qualities of social production—its scientific character and humanism—are becoming more marked, thanks primarily to its de-

militarisation. It is increasingly emancipated as all sorts of political hurdles and prejudices are removed and social production is adjusted to global proportions. Increasing demands are now made on industrial enterprises, which are being geared to achieving higher efficiency to strengthen their positions in the world market, as well as on employers and employees.

The trend towards global processes stems from and is realised through separate national and regional economies. This is an imperative of today. And while it is a difficult task occasionally necessitating compulsion, it is constructive. To join together economies within the framework of the world economy requires unprecedented development of the so-called vascular system of production and its rationalisation at world level given direct and growing entrepreneur interest in it.

The renewal of individual economies is becoming universal, spreading to every aspect of both socio-economic systems and to relations between them. This is true primarily of the productive forces, which are acquiring scientific substance and becoming internationalised. The techniques and technologies of social production are undergoing a radical transformation. Losing their discreet character, they are becoming progressive technologies of mass production and closed cycles on a planetary basis and scale.

This is exemplified by telematics. Scientific information stored in definite data banks on earth can be transmitted by optico-acoustic means, through a satellite communications system, to aircraft, ships and stationary laboratories situated anywhere on the globe. The framework of national or regional economies has become too narrow for productive forces of this kind. They are trying to overcome such limiting factors as the class division of the world economy and the resultant territorial barriers.

The development of social production has repeatedly encountered technological and socio-economic obstacles in the past as well. It has invariably overcome them through technological and socio-economic revolutions. But since the mid-1950s, an entirely new process has been unfolding. Known as the scientific and technological revolution (STR), it has made possible a breakthrough in social production in three key directions: one, the substitution of composite for natural raw materials on the basis of achievements in chemistry; two, the creation of alternative sources of energy on the basis of achievements in microcosm and macrocosm physics; and three, man's intellectual activity as a result of progress in automation.

A similar situation arose in the mid-1980s. The development of social production met still greater obstacles involving its very basis, the Earth, which finds itself in grave nuclear and ecological danger. And so, once again, the STR is called upon to remove roadblocks, this time by giving priority to the social sciences borne on the wave of new political thinking. Today this is taking place at global level thanks to the gradual realisation of the concept of comprehensive international security.

Renewal necessarily extends to the dialectical unity of the productive forces and relations of production. The global scope of the former makes for the comprehensive character of the latter. Intensifying commodity-money relations between the two socio-economic systems play a special role in this. They are creating considerable incentives for the restructuring of the world economy, especially in regard to commodity-money relations. The ultimate goal is to devise a new economic mechanism with a world range.

Progressive in content and mobile in form, this mechanism meets the requirements of life itself. It combines objectively law-governed and subjective principles, class, pandemocratic and universal parameters and

individual vital elements of the prenuclear period with characteristics of new economic and political thinking.

Renewal dialectically encompasses man's whole world with its superstructure and basis. Once divided and torn by conflict, this world is becoming more and more interdependent and cooperative. It is turning from a kingdom of reckless wastefulness to a kingdom of thrift and rationalism seeking to save resources everywhere according to new criteria that are being introduced thanks to new economic and political thinking and to progress in science and technology.

As for the principles of new rationalism, they are classical and time-tested. They are a political approach to any problem, the unity of theory and practice, centralisation and decentralisation.

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THE FOREGOING fully applies to the industrial enterprise as the chief echelon of today's economy. Essentially innovative changes are now taking place under both capitalism and socialism. A search is on for what could help organise cooperation between socialist and capitalist partners in developing new models of joint production at national, regional and, above all, global level.

The growing political and economic realism of influential monopoly circles is indicative. Realising that the classical opportunities of reproducing capital are gone, the leading elite in the West is contemplating steps to draw on a reserve which it has used little so far, namely, cooperation with socialist countries or, in other words, utilisation of the interdependence of the two world systems.

Thus a search is going on for a way out of the impasse in this period of transition unlimited in time. Competing peacefully, either of the two different systems, like every capitalist, socialist or mixed enterprise, will derive all the more profit the more effectively it uses the productive forces, the business situation and other foreign economic factors.

It is urgent that a qualitative change be brought about by restoring and renewing commodity-money relations and the related function of the law of surplus value, which must, of course, be rid of deformations stemming from the extra-economic basis of this law under state monopoly capitalism. Objectively this means going further in democratising the international activity of capital in the sphere of production and management.

For all the contradictions of the current trend of development, it is generally progressive. As early as the 1930s, monopoly capital engaged in partial cooperation with the state within the framework of state-monopoly capitalism (which set in somewhat earlier in the socialist state), and after the World War II it moved on to increasingly extensive cooperation. The mid-1950s saw the state sector begin expanding in developing countries. Capitalist firms set about establishing business ties with socialist countries and enterprises. This process has peaked by now, and the socialist character of these enterprises is going deeper in the context of perestroika.

A significant milestone in the democratisation of the international activity of monopoly capital was reached with the signing in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act as applicable to trading and economic relations between the participating states of the CSCE.

The present qualitative change understandably involves the organisational form of industrial enterprises. This is an area abounding in contradictions and difficulties that must in no circumstances be misinterpreted, let alone underrated. There is, among other things, a coordinated effort to wind down the state sector of national economies and revert to private initiative. It is an attempt to close through a standard procedure

the historical cycle of owner—state—transnational monopolies and institutions, as in the case of EEC structures.

Let us, however, look into the underlying dialectic of the problem, into the connections between subjective and objective factors, between internal progress and the transitional character of the phenomenon. There is a fundamental contradiction between capital and state as entrepreneur but this contradiction is being overcome, relatively speaking, and a historic compromise, cooperation between capital and the state sector, is gaining in scope.

The renunciation of state control, or direct forms of economic management, the assumption by industrial enterprises of the task of internationalising the economy and the strengthening of indirect levers of management (consideration of cost, prices and so on) are forming particularly flexible subjects of internationalisation. These are emerging as the most suitable partners for socialist enterprises in their present organisational form born of perestroika.

While hastening the disintegration of national markets, which inevitably entails social sacrifices, this process is also increasing the interdependence of the world and encouraging economic cooperation. This dialectic of social progress has a most painful effect on antagonistic societies. Nor has it spared a wide range of national industrial enterprises.

The problem is particularly acute in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises as subjects of internationalisation and capitalist integration involved in East-West cooperation. Damage is often sustained by the state, too, as an independent participant in these processes or the mainstay of small and medium-sized industrial enterprises, which have great difficulty in gaining access to the latest scientific and technological achievements.

As distinct from them, large enterprises using these achievements and participating in technological integration contribute to the formation of transnational mechanisms and multibranch corporations, a process in which industrial capital merges with ownership of land and small and medium-sized enterprises are absorbed or lose their independence.

To accelerate the formation of a competitive and dynamic economy geared to supplying the foreign market, the EEC is doing its best to promote concentration of production and capital. And while it is hard to defend historically obsolete small-scale production, there is no denying the promonopoly, hostile attitude of the EEC to small-scale production and those engaged in it.

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES are being renewed on a large scale under socialism as well. The laws on state enterprise, cooperatives, self-employment, work collectives, the reform of the economic mechanism, and so on, are inspired by a qualitatively new approach. They help carry the socialist socialisation of production deeper, with property belonging to society as a whole while management and control are within the competence of the employees.

Technological integration is being effected in a new form known as research and production association. The principle of self-financing is being vigorously introduced, steps are being taken to improve planning, democracy and glasnost are developing. In short, the quantitative aspect and forms of organising industrial enterprises are being thoroughly renewed while excesses, primarily the assignment of too big a role to the state in socialist socialisation, are being done away with.

The search for optimum capacities for socialist industrial enterprises goes hand in hand with extending their autonomy both in the various

CMEA countries and within the framework of the international division of labour. They are becoming largely similar to their capitalist analogues. Both derive strength from the collective effort of previous generations even though they are based on dissimilar types of production relations. Their growing similarity is seen in the strengthening of certain indirect levers of economic regulation and the possibility of socialist enterprises failing in the conditions of self-financing and relative competition between them. These factors are objectively extending the basis for joint activity, facilitating cooperation between enterprises of the two types and providing more prerequisites for the expansion of business interchanges between partners belonging to two different systems.

WITH REGARD TO THE PROSPECTS of joint East-West ventures in the light of new political thinking, it is safe to say that any attempt to describe or classify them would be defeated by reality. I will therefore confine myself to a few brief concluding remarks.

I think the starting point in setting tasks for the future should be realisation of the utter absurdity prevailing in today's world, specifically in the world economy. Awareness of this inevitably leads to the conclusion that historical optimism, while very valuable in itself, risks remaining a romantic kind of Utopia. To avoid this, it is essential to combine optimism with political realism in view of the tremendous difficulties to be overcome.

Strange as it may seem, there are very few scientific, technological and cultural exchanges between the Soviet and the American peoples, who account for half the research capacity of the world and a huge proportion of the world social product. The situation is absurd in Europe, whose capitalist half commands a fast-growing economy equal to absorbing an additional influx of skilled labour while the socialist half has labour power which is not yet being used to the full within the framework of the international division of labour.

Still, the greatest absurdity is undoubtedly the continuing production of nuclear arms whereas it should be obvious that the larger the nuclear arsenal, the lower the security level of humanity and needless to say, of any country manufacturing such weapons.

However, we are now passing through both a critical and a bright stage in the history of our civilisation. The very logic of the latter's evolution inexorably suppresses absurdity and recklessness. The world has begun changing for the better. The current renewal of every aspect of life in the two world systems as well as in each particular country and the process of their drawing closer together and adapting to the exigencies of the contemporary economy are objectively progressive.

Long-distance power transmission, the transfer of water and other resources, the rapid development of transport and communications, the extension of production activity to space, the enormous growth of opportunities for scientific and technological progress all pose the problem of industrialisation in a new way. What is being translated into reality today is, in effect, truly global and ecological characteristics of our times encompassing outer space. The question we must ask is how goal-oriented and controllable the process of transforming the world will be as it develops at each further stage, in accordance with the task of reducing time limits plus material and, above all, manpower expenditures to the minimum.

All this sets industrial enterprises a highly important historical task, allowing unprecedented scope for their operation and possibly promising a more profitable future. I therefore see an inexhaustible source of new powerful productive forces in searching for and making proper use

of these enterprises' components common to the two world systems in the area of industrial business, of optimum forms of organisation enabling enterprises to be run with due regard to their community. The emergence of these forces at the junction between national economies, which are becoming more and more homogeneous while retaining their progressive vital characteristics, heralds the formation of a future common global work team.

Let us return to the idea that the problem of efficiency is central to the economic policy of every country, except that its solution must be tackled from a fundamentally new position. Strictly speaking, socio-economic practice has already opened up a theoretical vista of the evolution of this process and indicated its likely trend. Economic efficiency will grow to the extent that the economy follows the most advanced models and offers the world market output in keeping with them.

Social production will place man at the centre of its activity as it wins increasing recognition and appreciation. This means that man will be in a situation where "his richness will depend on how richly man will display his merits". It is this alone that will become the "measure of all values", as Protagoras, the Greek philosopher, said as far back as the fifth century B.C.

An enormous amount of work has yet to be done to put new political thinking into practice. Success will depend on the contribution of every individual. If this task is accomplished great ideas will become the property and a material force of the people, whose historically legitimate heritage they are.

The early experience of setting up joint ventures involving socialist and capitalist partners is occasionally interpreted as internationalising Lenin's theory of state capitalism in the early postrevolutionary years in the Soviet Union and then in other socialist countries. Yet this concept was first advanced much earlier, in Marx's formulations of the law of surplus value as well as in the radical concepts of the bourgeois political economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. (Going further, we would arrive at Aristotle, whose theoretical studies constituted so important a part of his philosophical works that Marx said it was only the low level of scientific knowledge and the historical limitations of the time that had prevented what he called one of the most illustrious minds of antiquity from evolving a theory of value on scientific principles.)

Looking back, we can draw similar conclusions regarding the origins of democracy as well as of glasnost, information and knowledge. Political culture, which is so necessary now for a democratic restructuring of the world community, is unquestionably influenced by the spontaneous democracy of ancient Greece, the achievements of representative bourgeois democracy and, needless to say, the Great October Socialist Revolution, which ushered in genuine people's rule.

In this age of major changes and high speeds, knowledge of the outside world doubles once in seven or eight years. Some of it becomes outdated while the rest goes on serving its purpose for a time. It is important to see clear in what elements of this knowledge meet the exigencies of the current revolutionary transformation of the world and whether they serve a class, a country or the whole of humanity. I believe it is obvious that values acquired by serving universal interests come first. Commodity-money relations indisputably meet these criteria, for they promise well for enterprises and entrepreneurs alike.

Reflections of an American

Raymond GARTHOFF

THE REMARKABLE CHANGE in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union from the tension and hostility of the early 1980s to the present is clear to everyone, yet its significance may, paradoxically, be at the same time both undervalued and overestimated. Improvement in relations between our two great countries is an imperative of the time, and this fact seems to have been recognized by the present leaders of both countries. But the same fact was also true and also recognized in the early 1970s, and yet relations deteriorated and tensions grew from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, under several leaders of both sides. A necessity for reduced tensions is regrettably no guarantee of them. The absolute need to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war is unquestionably understood and accepted by all elements of the leadership in both countries. The limitations on pursuit of the whole range of one's own national objectives by means short of war, and the limitations accepted by the other side in pursuing its aims by means short of war, are not so clearly understood. While the underlying imperative is *objective*, as are many elements of the political scene, evaluations of threat from the other side and of actions perceived as necessary to counter such threats, as well as other permissible means in pursuit of one's own aims, are *subjective*. They are seen in different ways, and correctly or incorrectly, by different leaders and at different times.

What, then, are the prospects for the future of U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly with a change of leadership in the United States?

The four summit meetings of General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan represent, indeed, a historic development. The achievement is all the more extraordinary given the fact that a mere two years before the first meeting Reagan was calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire" (*New York Times*, March 9, 1983), and General Secretary Yu. Andropov was declaring that "If anyone had any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the policy of the present American administration, recent events have dispelled them once and for all." (*Pravda*, September 29, 1983). Something, clearly, has changed. But it is not the objective interests of the two countries, including their shared interest in survival. The change has been in subjective evaluations of a decreased threat and of possibilities for increased cooperation. It is good that new thinking in both capitals has led to a decrease in tension, important initial steps in disarmament, and moves to resolve several regional conflicts. But are those changes in thinking solid and irreversible?

I believe that there is crucial need for further new thinking on both sides, including not only exploration of new approaches (such as the

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Warsaw Pact's initiative on discussion of military doctrine, and the initiation of a continuing and expanding series of joint U.S.-Soviet high level military contacts), but also serious efforts on each side to reevaluate the differing perceptions of threat from the other side—and ways in which one's own actions may unintentionally appear threatening to the other side. We need, in short, a restructuring of both the underlying realities concerning military postures and also of the subjective perceptions of threats, as well as recognition of opportunities for cooperative endeavors. This process will be long and hard, but it is essential. Some steps can only be taken jointly, but some can be undertaken unilaterally, and much can be done in frank discussion between the two sides.

ONE ELEMENT OF NEW THINKING, on both sides, is an effort to base policy on *realism*. A realistic policy must, in the first place, be based on acknowledging realities of the world as it is, rather than as one would wish it to be; that is, it must be based on a realistic assessment. Beyond that, a realistic policy must entail pursuing policy objectives that take into full account this assessment, and that are compatible with one's fundamental interests, including security from a nuclear war.

Realism, in short, means subordinating ideological preferences to requirements of coexistence, or as it is sometimes put, to base policy not on pursuing class interests, but on seeking a balance of national interests among rival powers with different ideological positions.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two major powers in the world today, and they are rivals. The interests of the two powers are not identical, and indeed in many respects and instances they conflict. Nonetheless, the imperative of peaceful coexistence is that the common interests of the two rival powers (and of their respective allies, and the world as a whole), above all the bedrock interest in survival in the nuclear-space age, must prevail over conflicting interests—national (power), class (ideological), economic, and other. This obviously means avoidance of nuclear war, and because of the dangers of escalation, avoidance of any war, between the two powers (and the rival alliances of which they are the preeminent members). This is understood and accepted by leaders of both countries and has been for at least twenty-five years. But, while essential, this is not enough.

The passive avoidance of war, eschewing any attack on the other side, is not alone sufficient. There must be a much more active effort at *prevention* of war, and agreed constraints on the pursuit of conflicting interests around the world, to assure that war does not arise despite the absence of intentions to start one.

One path to reduce tension and the possibility of war is negotiation, in particular on arms limitations and reductions, but also on a wide range of political and politico-military issues. Negotiation itself, even apart from agreements, can be useful. It can, through contact and dialogue, lead to better understanding of the other side—not only in identifying areas of common interests, but also in clarifying conflicting interests. Negotiation can, however, under some circumstances contribute to misunderstanding and distrust, as one or both sides stake out—for bargaining purposes, or to reassure domestic skeptics, or for some other reason—positions that the other side sees as an attempt to acquire unfair advantage or even to apply pressure. Nonetheless, on the whole, negotiation seriously pursued by both sides can lead to better understanding of what can be done in cooperation, and can result in concrete agreements. Negotiations can dialectically provide a means for taking into account the interests of both sides, as each side defends and seeks

to advance its own interests and through the process of negotiation reach a compromise acceptable to both. Negotiation yields agreement when both sides see a compromise that serves its interests as better than the absence of agreement.

Negotiation as a means of reducing tensions and advancing the interests of rivals and adversaries has, however, been known and practiced throughout history. While there have been many agreements, there have also been many disagreements and wars. In recent times, President R. Nixon called for "an era of negotiation" to replace "an era of confrontation" when he entered office in 1969. The Peace Program adopted at the 23rd Party Congress in 1971 relied on negotiation between East and West. And the Soviet-U.S. detente of the 1972-79 period resulted. But that favorable development of events was not strong enough to prevent a deterioration of relations between the two countries in the late 1970s and a confrontational relationship from 1980 to 1985. Negotiation is an important diplomatic tool, but it is not a sufficient political policy.

RELIANCE UPON MILITARY power to prevent a potential enemy from attacking, or from succeeding in an attack if he is not dissuaded from launching one, is again as old as history. *Si vis pacem, para bellum*—if you seek peace, prepare for war.

The United States and the Soviet Union have each built up enormous military forces and nuclear arsenals to prevent the other from attacking, in the contemporary terms, military power for *deterrence* (sderzhivaniye), or if nonetheless an attack occurs, then for *defense* (oborona) as well as *retaliation* strike (otvetnyi udar). Yet, as M. S. Gorbachev rightly stated in the Political Report to the 27th Party Congress "The character of contemporary weapons does not leave any state hope of protecting itself by military-technical means alone, for example by creating even the most powerful defense." And, while the present state of mutual deterrence is more stable and effective than defense, "Security cannot indefinitely be based on fear of retaliation, that is, on doctrines of deterrence (sderzhivaniye) or intimidation (ustrasheniye)." And both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev jointly declared at the conclusion of their first summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985 that "any conflict between the USSR and the USA could have catastrophic consequences" and therefore they stressed "the importance of preventing any war between them, nuclear or conventional." While they also pledged "not to strive to achieve military superiority," they did not reject reliance on parity in military forces for deterrence (sderzhivaniye) and defense (oborona). Moreover, military and political leaders of both countries have continued to reaffirm both these aims of military policy.

The fears have declined somewhat with the improvement of relations since the four U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, but by no means have they gone away. The future of Soviet-U.S. relations depends critically on dealing more effectively with this problem in the future.

While the sources of this reciprocal suspicion are many and deep, one important contributing element has been the failure, on both sides, to understand the thinking of the other side. There is a high degree of skepticism over accepting the validity of statements by the other side denying pursuit of military superiority. Moreover, many statements are misunderstood and misconstrued—on both sides.

As an American, I am acutely aware of the fact that some long established statements of U.S. policy and strategy also have a long history of being misconstrued. I shall note two important examples. Beginning with a statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the Truman

administration in early 1950, American leaders have from time to time spoken of a need for the United States to create or maintain "positions of strength" (*siuatsii sily*) vis-a-vis the USSR. Originally stated in terms of a policy of "containment" (*sderzhivaniye*), American leaders have also referred to positions of strength in other contexts, including public avowal to negotiate on arms limitations and reductions from a position of strength.

To a Soviet reader, this means only one thing: the United States is openly asserting that it will pursue a policy of seeking an advantage in military power in order to gain political advantages either through direct political pressure or in negotiation. The fact that in a number of cases the United States has been perceived in Moscow as doing just that, and that some U.S. political figures have in fact wanted to do that, is believed to confirm that interpretation. To a Soviet reader, a "position of strength" for one side is incompatible with equality in the relationship, with stable coexistence, or with negotiation of agreements based on respect for the mutual interests of both sides. Finally, the very public avowal by the other side that it is acting or negotiating from a position of strength is taken to mean that one's own side is seen as being in a position of weakness and readiness to accede to terms disadvantageous to itself. The natural reaction is to reaffirm one's own strength and to be wary of the intentions and proposals of the other side.

The expression "position of strength" as used by American leaders does *not* mean a policy of *diktat*. Rather than implying an offensive thrust (*nastupatel'naya napravlennost'*), it is meant to assert a defensive reassurance to one's own side that the United States will not act or negotiate from weakness. It is therefore not a challenge to the idea of meeting on a basis of equality, and is entirely compatible with negotiation of agreements based on mutual advantage and a balance of interests of the two sides. *Both* sides can, and indeed usually do, negotiate from "positions of strength." Who would advocate negotiating from a position of weakness? Particular negotiating positions of the United States (and of the Soviet Union) must of course be weighed and tested in negotiation, and some have not been fair, but the term "positions of strength" should not be interpreted as virtually precluding serious negotiation.

"Deterrence" (*sderzhivaniye*) is equally misunderstood and misrepresented. General Secretary Gorbachev, in his statement to the 27th Party Congress, argued cogently that for the long-term future a better basis needs to be found for security than present reliance on "doctrines of *sderzhivaniye* or *ustrasheniye*." In practice, in Soviet writings in the 1980s the American term "deterrence" is almost always translated into Russian as *ustrasheniye*. The term used in discussing Soviet military policy, however, is always *sderzhivaniye*. It is important that Soviet readers understand that whatever differences there may be in judging particular policies or actions, the *conception* of deterrence is understood by Americans to serve the purpose of restraint of possible aggression, prevention of war, and *not* intimidation. That term, *sderzhivaniye*, should also always be used to translate the American political-military doctrine of deterrence. Particular political actions of a country may be characterized as representing *sderzhivaniye pulem ustrasheniya*, or simply as *ustrasheniye*, but *not* the policy or doctrine of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Deterrence is basically a policy of seeking *prevention of war* through making clear that anyone tempted to seek gain from an attack could not count on being able to do so but would in fact receive a decisive retaliatory strike.

Deterrence is not ideal. I believe M. S. Gorbachev is right in arguing that building cooperative political means to assure security is desirable

and necessary in the long run, rather than indefinitely relying on military means, deterrence, to achieve security. But in the meantime, both the United States and the Soviet Union do, in fact, rely upon deterrence, and the comparative security of the 1970s and 1980s rests on mutual deterrence. But both countries should seek together to develop political means to gradually take over the function of providing security.

I HAVE STRESSED the importance of better understanding because I believe that the Soviet-U.S. detente of the 1970s failed ultimately because of misunderstandings on both sides as to the aims of the other side, above all exaggerated fears of a growing global political-military threat. And I believe there is a real danger that the same fate may within a few years befall the current relaxation of tension, despite what I believe to be a genuine desire by the leaderships and peoples of both countries for improved relations, reduced tensions, and arms reduction.

One problem in the past, now somewhat reduced but no means eliminated, is that concerns and fears have been stimulated by secrecy. The absence of information on existing or future elements in the military equation allows and indeed encourages exaggerated "worst case" assumptions, which may stimulate unnecessary military responses and negatively affect political attitudes and arms negotiations. *Glasnost* about military forces, compatible with more realistic and valid military security interests, can help to dispel exaggerated fears and their adverse consequences.

The recent initiation of reciprocal visits and discussions between senior military leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States is a very desirable and potentially important development. So, too, is the related beginning of discussion of the military doctrines of the two countries. Both can help to dispel misunderstandings and suspicions, although one should not expect too much in this respect. There remain not only divergent views and assessments, but also suspicions. Soviet suspicions about the purpose underlying the extensive network of U.S. military bases around the globe, and about the American purpose in pursuing the SDI, for example, remain. So do American suspicions about the Soviet purpose in building and maintaining large counterforce-capable ICBM forces, and extensive air defense and civil defense programs. Indeed, in some cases these suspicions have grown as statements about the impossibility of waging and winning a nuclear war seem to be belied by extensive preparations for the contingency of waging such a war.

Perhaps the deepest misunderstanding, regrettably widespread in both U.S. and Soviet thinking and writings, is that if the other side is planning and preparing for war that means it *intends* or wishes at some time to fight a war. Weapons are described as "first-strike weapons" if they have the *capability* for use in a first strike, but that does *not* mean that anyone actually contemplates their use in a first strike. When the other side "prepares for war" it is construed as meaning that it plans to launch a war at some time, under some circumstances, of its choice, whereas one's own side "prepares for war" only in order to prevent it by restraining or deterring the adversary or to give a deserved rebuff to an enemy attack. In fact, both sides today prepare for war *only* in that second, defensive, sense.

Similarly, the Soviet Union has declared that it will not be first to use nuclear weapons, and criticizes the United States for declining to make a similar pledge. The U.S. reason for not making such a pledge, and explanation of the circumstances when it might use nuclear weapons

first, is not adequately reported. The only case for which the United States reserves the possible first use of nuclear weapons is to stop a major enemy attack with conventional arms that cannot be halted with conventional arms alone. Yet some Soviet commentary ascribes a very different U.S. first use scenario, namely, in an American attack—and argues that that is the reason the United States will not make the pledge. Would those who hold (or at least argue) that case really be assured by an American declaration? I do not believe that the Soviet Union has any intention of attacking the United States or using nuclear weapons first. But those many Americans who do believe that possibility is real have not been reassured by the Soviet declaration that it would not be first to use such weapons.

SO FAR I HAVE SAID very little about the change in the presidency of the United States. I believe that now there is a very great opportunity, created both by the objective situation of approximate parity and common recognition on both sides of the dangers of war and of an unconstrained arms race, and by the readiness of the Soviet Union to take unprecedented major steps in arms control and disarmament. Interest in reducing the risks of war is equally strong in the United States, but suspicion and caution in arms reduction negotiations remains greater.

In practice, the SDI is very unlikely to yield a serious deployment of strategic defenses, but it does make more difficult, and can even frustrate, arms reductions by precluding new agreements that would ban that option. Thus while the new U.S. administration will undoubtedly continue negotiation for a fifty percent reduction in strategic arms, it will not be easy to resolve the question of reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty for a period of time, in effect postponing possible SDI deployment, there still remain substantial difficulties in resolving other issues—greater difficulties than I believe are realized in the Soviet Union.

If agreement is reached on completing the strategic arms reduction agreement now under negotiation, which would of course be an important and desirable step forward, there probably will be very great difficulties in moving on to greater reductions for many reasons, including the growing nuclear forces of China, Britain and France, as well as caution over the strategic impact of greater reductions. But even the fifty percent reduction agreement may not be soon concluded.

The major new arms reduction talks on European security that will supplant the failed Vienna mutual force reduction talks underway since 1973 represent an important new challenge and opportunity. These talks, of course, will involve directly many countries in Eastern and Western Europe in addition to the Soviet Union and the United States. On the western side a commitment to alliance consensus will, in practice, exercise a severely restraining affect.

The United States, under the new administration, will proceed only cautiously in these negotiations. One reason is a widespread suspicion in American circles that the Soviet Union seeks unilateral advantage, and that there exist minimum defense levels that preclude substantial reductions on the Western side. In my view these cautions are exaggerated but they are a political reality.

There are also possibilities for agreements banning chemical weapons, nuclear testing, and antisatellite weapons. President Bush, if he follows through on his election campaign promises, may give some priority to pursuing agreement on a chemical weapons ban. The main problem is the capacity of many other countries to produce chemical weapons, and the existence of active programs in a number of these countries, together with the great difficulties of verification. Some advance may be reached

on nuclear testing limitations, although not on a complete ban. A constraint on antisatellite weapons is unlikely for at least several years, but is not excluded. It would be an important step forward.

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THE DIALECTICAL INTERACTION between the Soviet and U.S. (Western) positions is complex. It may have an important bearing on the outcome. It is obvious that to a considerable extent the position that each side takes, both in negotiations and in the broader political arena, will be affected by the position taken by the other. If either side takes one-sided positions to its advantage and shows little readiness to take account of the interests of the other side, the other side is likely to reciprocate. On the other hand, a forthcoming and balanced position may encourage the other side in turn to be more forthcoming. Such an outcome, however, assumes recognition of a common interest and readiness by both sides to seek agreement.

At the present time, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have been advancing a number of major disarmament and security proposals. I believe these to be based on a genuine belief that such steps would serve not only Soviet and Warsaw Pact interests, but also those of the United States and NATO. Moreover, I believe agreements based on negotiation of these proposals could in fact do so. So do many others in the West. There are, however, many others in the West who have serious doubts as to whether the Soviet Union is sincerely interested in greater mutual security, and as to whether substantial reductions in arms and armies in Europe would result in greater Western security. The subject is also very complex, involving a much more complicated equation than did the nuclear medium-range land-based missiles or even strategic nuclear arms.

I do not present these considerations as a reason not to proceed with European arms and security talks. To the contrary, I think it is very important to do so. I also believe that new thinking can open up vastly greater opportunities than ever before for agreement on far-reaching measures in the security interests of all. But I fear that this result will not be reached for a long time. I believe the West needs to do more to explore fully the possibilities for agreement, but I think persuasion of Western governments, and the negotiating process itself, will take a great deal of time. I hope the Soviet Union will not only do its part, but also prepare for what may be a long effort.

Even in the area of strategic arms reduction, despite the fact that the Bush administration will seek to reach an agreement, the remaining difficulties (especially over sea-launched cruise missiles) are great, and the momentum of the medium-range missile agreement may not suffice. Again, I hope that there will not be a prolonged stalemate, but in the interests of realism I believe it is necessary to consider the possibility that major new agreements in strategic arms reduction, as well as European arms reduction and restructuring, may take considerable time to work out.

President Gorbachev's visit to New York in December 1988 was important in several respects. With regard to Soviet-American relations, it both symbolized and contributed to a commitment by both sides, including the new American President—George Bush, to contribution of efforts to build and improve bilateral relations.

Gorbachev's remarkable address to the UN General Assembly on December 7 was, however, the most significant initiative both for the general development of international relations and in the long-run also for Soviet-American relations. He strongly reaffirmed the need for a restructuring of international relations and turn to mutual political accommodation instead of political-military confrontation. But he succeeded

in gaining the attention even of skeptics in the United States by announcing the bold initiative of a major unilateral reduction over the next two years of Soviet armed forces by one-half million men, and large numbers of tanks, artillery and aircraft, including in particular six tank divisions deployed in central Eastern Europe. This was an effective demonstration of deeds as well as words, and gave an impetus to the new negotiations on reduction of conventional arms in Europe agreed to at the recently concluded Vienna meeting of the CSCE.

The CSCE follow-through meeting in January 1989 was the most important step forward in the development of European security and cooperation since the Helsinki meeting in 1975. It complimented the successful Stockholm meeting on confidence-building measures and covered a wide range of questions, including political, economic, military and humanitarian ones.

The remaining issues—especially in the area of conventional arms reduction in Europe, as well as the uncompleted strategic arms negotiations—will not be easily resolved. Nonetheless, the climate and momentum of efforts to move forward are now favorable.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION and the United States are of course much broader than arms and disarmament issues. Nonetheless, these issues are not only central to our respective security but also to the overall political relationship between the two countries. A wide range of contacts, cooperative activities, and commercial relations are developing. That is certainly all to the good. So, needless to say, is the political dialogue at various levels including summit meetings of the president of the United States and his counterpart as leader of the Soviet Union. This process should, and I am confident will, continue under the new American administration.

The settlement of existing regional conflicts around the world—Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Kampuchea, Angola, Nicaragua, indeed virtually all except the Arab-Israeli confrontation—is a hopeful sign. This trend evidently serves regional and world peace and security, and it also contributes to the further improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both powers have an obligation not only to facilitate settlement of those disputes, but also to help prevent new ones.

The prospect for U.S.-Soviet relations in the years ahead depends not only on the concrete policies and negotiating positions of the two powers, but also on changes in attitudes and perceptions. Such changes take time. They also require concerted efforts by each power not only through applying a new way of thinking to its own positions, but also through facilitating favorable changes in perceptions of the other. For the near run, the prospect overall is good for a continuation of the improvement of recent years, but with the possibility of a slowdown rather than a continued momentum of agreements. Efforts should continue, but expectations should be geared to less than aspirations. For the longer term, the objective possibilities for substantial improvement are there; their realization will depend on wisdom in both countries.

How Soviet People Abroad Vote

Pavel MOZHAEV

A GREAT DEAL IS SURE to be written and said about the role and place of the elections of People's Deputies in the USSR. One thing is already clear. The elections have legitimised and firmly introduced in our official vocabulary such notions as "electoral campaigns", "internal political process", "contest of election platforms", and a lot of other things that would have seemed seditious in a country of "monolithic unity" only a short time ago.

"Nationwide approval and support", a surrogate for the democratic procedure of harmonising diverse, often conflicting interests, is a thing of the past. Gone is the time when voting was a formal procedure and its results were known in advance. This confronts us with questions that formerly would have been regarded as pedantic and largely irrelevant. One such question is the participation of Soviet citizens abroad in the voting. How to enable them to express their will freely and democratically? It cannot be said that voting among Soviet people who for various reasons find themselves abroad is provided for in the Law of the USSR on the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR. Its Article 19—The Formation of Election Districts—reads: "Election districts may be created on Polar stations or, if the necessary conditions exist, at Soviet institutions abroad". The words "may be" and "if" are probably justified when talking about expeditions which man our Polar stations. But one need hardly argue that the bulk of the Soviet people working abroad are not Polar explorers. Naturally, one would like to see more certainty on that question. Of course, "global coverage" of all our citizens by the electoral campaign can hardly be achieved (Soviet diplomatic missions operate in more than 120 countries, this not to speak of Soviet consulates), but the first step, a "democratic breakthrough" is necessary in this matter.

It was bound to happen: life and the inherent logic of the policy of democratisation have invested with new content the legal norms which were apparently written as a legal framework for a hypothetical situation. At present about 170,000 Soviet people are on business trips abroad at any given time and some 100,000 Soviet citizens permanently reside abroad. By the standards of the spring of 1989 this would amount to a whole constituency. Could its votes be discounted?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has asked the Central Electoral Commission to be allowed to hold elections among the Soviet citizens who work or live abroad. The permission was granted. The USSR Foreign Ministry and, more specifically, a working group set up within the Ministry were charged with organising the voting of our people abroad.

How did the voting go? Not all Soviet citizens abroad went to the polls. Conditions for voting could be provided in only 42 countries. Among them were 14 socialist countries, 9 West European, 8 Asian, 9 Af-

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rican plus the USA and Canada. On March 26, 134,000 people took part in the voting. Previously, elections were only organised by the Chief Political Board of the Soviet Army and Navy, that is, in the army units stationed in the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia.

But the most dramatic change is not the quantitative increase in the number of people involved in the nationwide democratic process. There have been momentous qualitative changes. Let me elaborate. For the first time in Soviet history the right to vote was granted to those of our compatriots who live in other countries but retain Soviet citizenship. For the first time they got a real opportunity to elect the supreme body of power along with the staff of Soviet institutions abroad, experts, tourists, Aeroflot crews, conductors of international trains, and seamen. This marks another small victory for perestroika.

I think a short lyrical-philosophical digression is in order here. We are reviewing many things, casting aside ideological blinkers, and are trying to see the world the way it is in reality—as a single whole, contradictory, but interconnected, and increasingly humanised. Our ties with foreign countries are changing, with cooperation becoming the dominant element. Joint ventures are developing, foreign investment is invited, and there is talk of special economic zones. This prompts the question: what should be our attitude to our foreign compatriots regardless of whether they carry a passport with a hammer and sickle or not?

I don't think there is clarity on this matter, certainly not in everyone's mind and not always. Is this the way to treat our unique human capital? We should always be aware of and properly react to the signals coming from Russians abroad. Commenting on the work of the Congress of People's Deputies, Vasily Leontiev, a Russian-American economist, made this statement: if perestroika in the USSR continues at this rate, Russian Americans would be prepared to contribute to the economic renewal of their historic Homeland with their expertise and their capital. But are we prepared for this? We know that overseas Chinese coming to the People's Republic of China enjoy certain privileges over "foreign tourists". They have the use of special hotels, the best hotel rooms and enjoy other kinds of preferential treatment. They are invited to lecture at universities, to invest in the economy and share their know-how. Why can't Russian emigrés enjoy extra attention on the part of society and the state? If we are restoring the normal attitude to such notion as "human rights" (which should be regarded as eternal and inalienable values that do not depend on official favour or disfavour), if we are returning to genuine and not fudged history, if we are rehabilitating innocents who have been convicted and executed, isn't there even more ground for restoring legality and justice with regard to those living?

The Russian emigré community is motley. But it has many people who sincerely love their Motherland. People who, in spite of alienation and insults, have gone on working for our literature, art and science, adding to their glory. Why not invite our compatriots living abroad—economists, scholars, managers and doctors—to lecture at our universities, to work temporarily at our research centres and laboratories? I think many of them would readily respond if they met with an unprejudiced attitude.

The last spring elections marked one step towards our potential partners.

Various lessons can be drawn from the election experience. We can ask ourselves, is our election law perfect? How to organise the voting of Soviet citizens to ensure that it is truly general and equal? After all, this is not the last election campaign....

Let me begin by saying that the procedure of voting in parliamentary elections by overseas constituencies needs greater elaboration in interna-

tional law. There does not yet exist a procedure that is universally recognised and observed by all countries as a kind of universal democratic human value. In other words, this problem is always treated on an ad hoc basis, within the framework of the relations between two specific countries. Let us take our national legislation. It does not provide for the participation of foreigners on Soviet territory in elections and referendums organised by other countries. On several exceptional occasions, however, their requests for having polling stations organised on Soviet territory was met.

We were confronted with a similar attitude and approach last spring. Initially it was planned to hold elections in 43 countries, but one of them—Switzerland—refused. The West German Authorities voiced some objections too, but withdrew them after appropriate clarifications from the Soviet side.

What conclusions can be drawn from all this? Our world is moving steadily, though, perhaps, not as fast as we would like, towards all-round humanisation and democratisation, public opinion carries growing weight and exerts an active influence on the relationships between the people and the authorities, asserting the idea of self-government. There is no doubt that in the not too distant future, no advanced society will tolerate the loss of at least one vote and will seek to give every citizen a chance to express his or her will. In view of the growing momentum of that trend the drafting of corresponding international legal acts should be speeded up. I see no reason why the Soviet Union, one of the "stars of democratisation" in the modern world, should not lead the way in this matter and submit a draft document to the international community.

Needless to say our own electoral legislation could do with some improvements. In this, we may find useful the long-tested democratic procedures existing in the West. What, specifically, do I have in mind? During the course of elections of People's Deputies of the USSR 281 election districts formed in Soviet communities abroad were attached to 24 election districts (16 territorial and 8 national-territorial districts of the RSFSR including Moscow and the Moscow Region), the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Thus, people voted not in their place of residence, which would have been natural, but in accordance with predetermined districts. In addition to the complaint of many voters that they had never met the candidates they were voting for, one should taken into account that the criteria of selecting the districts to which Soviet overseas communities are attached, may under certain circumstances which increase electoral tensions, cause doubts and discontent.

This was already apparent from the question addressed to the country's largest electoral district, the Moscow City National Territorial District No 1. The queries from the voters addressed to the Central Electoral Commission and to the mass media centered around two questions. Is it true that all the Soviet citizens currently living abroad are attached to this district? Is it true that all the Soviet Army units stationed outside the USSR borders are attached to it?

In both cases the worries were ungrounded. Only about 100,000 overseas voters were included in the Moscow district. The district included only those servicemen whose units are stationed in the capital which, incidentally, has 6,750,500 voters. Nevertheless the system of "attachment" to districts is rightly being questioned as it may engender various interpretations of the motives behind such decisions.

The practice in most developed countries is different. For instance, a West German citizen who finds himself abroad on voting day, can either be put on the list of voters in the constituency where he lived before going abroad, or he may send a request and be issued a voting certificate (Paragraph 17 of the FRG Law on Elections to the Bundestag). Under the

law of November 19, 1982, French citizens who are abroad during parliamentary elections vote by proxy. The "overseas" elector is registered with the community in his last place of residence (no less than six months). Alternatively, a voter can be registered in the community where his ancestors or their children were born. Britain has a similar procedure. Under the law of 1985 a Briton outside the United Kingdom is registered with the constituency in which he would be resident if he were not abroad. However, to be allowed to vote a British citizen must hand in the so-called overseas elector's declaration confirming his or her wish to take part in the elections. Voting can be by mail or by proxy.

A drastic overhaul of the current electoral procedure is hardly possible for objective reasons. For instance, if the registration of candidates is to end on February 23, and the elections are held on March 26 (which was the case this year), it is physically impossible within one month to have the materials on every candidate sent from the district, to allow electors to make their choice and receive their ballot by mail. Of course, this would present no problem if we had computer communications with the world. In the meantime, perhaps voting by proxy could be the answer. Be that as it may, the system of "attachment" to districts must be carefully looked at and the possibility of voting in one's place of residence should not be ruled out.

Some other measures should be implemented to streamline the voting procedure for Soviet citizens abroad. In the next election campaign they should be allowed to take part not only in the voting, but in nominating and discussing candidates for parliament. It is very important that the deputies should be able to meet their overseas electors. In this context one is struck by certain omissions in the law of elections. These omissions put some sponsor organisations in an unequal position compared to others. For instance, there is no indication of the minimal size of the collective that has the right to nominate a candidate for people's deputies. As a result, a person who represents ten people may compete on an equal basis with a candidate promoted by a thousand people. The law must specify the minimal size of a constituency. I suggest the following variant: enterprises and organisations with not less than 500 employees have the right to nominate a candidate for people's deputy. Strictly speaking, electoral districts and electoral commissions at Soviet Embassies abroad should be endorsed by corresponding executive committees of the local Soviet of People's Deputies on whose territories the districts are formed. Because there is simply no time to do this, the Central Election Commission has made an exception and given this right to Soviet ambassadors. Apparently, this prerogative should be sealed by law.

One cannot but agree with the numerous amendments and suggestions made by our "overseas" electors during the election campaign. They point out an unfortunate discrepancy between the USSR Constitution and the Law on the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR. If the CPSU, the party of perestroika and renewal, is the leading and guiding force in our society, the nucleus of its political system, why doesn't the law on elections refer specifically to the participation of party organisations in the election campaign? The mere indication of the party's quota of representation at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR cannot be regarded as an adequate definition of its powers and its place in forming the body of deputies. There must be a direct and unequivocal link between the role of the ruling party and its electoral vote.

Our electoral system needs improvement. But its political essence is not subject to revision—its underlying principle is, not the people for the authorities, but the authorities for the people. Every vote is important in this system, every voice has the right to be heard in a nation in the process of renewal.

What Is There in Store for Us in the 21st Century

THE DESTINY OF SOCIALISM AND CIVILISATION

Igor BESTUZHEV-LADA

BEFORE MAKING ANY FORECAST of socialism's future, I wish to define what is meant here, because the concept has several meanings. First of all, socialism is a particular social system (within a new socio-economic formation), being a transitional stage between capitalism and communism. Second, as a definition, it means a post-capitalist social system which must be as superior to capitalism as the latter is superior to feudalism. It must achieve this through social progress, by attaining the highest level of production efficiency, standard and quality of life, social equality, justice and other indices of the all-round development of the individual. Third, socialism is a certain trend of social policy, the totality of social guarantees which assume priority significance in government policy. The social democratic parties of many countries campaign in elections under the banner of precisely this kind of "socialism", and it is not accidental that their International is called "Socialist". A fourth, widespread meaning of socialism is the totality of countries having centralised economies and nominal or actual one-party political systems. These countries, which account for roughly one third of the world's population, are known as the world socialist system. Socialism has some further definitions besides.

It would hardly be right to touch here on the third or fourth meaning of socialism (given in my list), for this would necessitate an analysis of its specifics in, say, Sweden and Burma (Myanma), Albania and the USSR. They are very important and call for special examination in each particular case. I will restrict myself to the first two definitions—formational and normative—and probe into them with due regard to their close interconnection.

BECAUSE SOCIALISM is considered a transitional stage between capitalism and communism, it must obviously have characteristics of both. But which characteristics, to what extent and in what combinations? These questions have been agitating world social thought over the past one hundred and fifty years and are still highly controversial.

Originally (in the 19th and early 20th centuries), many of the more radical-minded Social Democrats held that socialist society would have

to eliminate the entire legacy of capitalism with all its characteristics, all its economic and political instruments, so that the only distinction between socialism and communism would be the fundamental principle: to each according to his work under socialism and according to his needs under communism but from each according to his ability in both cases. The experience of the 1917 socialist revolution in Russia showed this notion to be Utopian, for socialism is compelled to preserve the army, prisons, money and many other instruments of capitalism, at least initially and for many long years. And after the civil war, in 1921, it became clear that socialism could not survive without preserving commodity-money (market) relations and giving up the Utopian attempt to turn the peasants into a variety of factory workers. The resultant conclusion underlay Lenin's very effective New Economic Policy.

Unfortunately, the forces which in the late twenties won the upper hand in the party leadership as a result of a struggle for political power made another attempt to build a "marketless" and "peasantless" socialism based on rigid centralised planning and an authoritarian political system, mercilessly suppressing all dissent. This attempt, repeated afterwards in one or another form by practically all the socialist countries belonging to what is now called the world socialist system, was successful but produced some unexpected results. Indeed, these countries not only failed to outdo others in production efficiency and in standard and quality of life but also tended to lag increasingly behind the more developed countries of the world. Some of them, including the Soviet Union, China, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, found themselves in a pre-crisis situation, and to stave off crisis and catastrophe and stabilise the situation, their governments had to launch more or less far-reaching economic and political reforms. Nor was any one of these countries spared bitter inner political struggles, some of them in forms which certainly did not inspire world opinion with greater confidence in the socialist idea. It became necessary to give thought to "socialist pluralism".

I repeat that in every country which is socialist or is classed as such, the process in question has important distinctive aspects of its own. In some of them the political clock may be said to have stopped on March 5, 1953 (the date of Stalin's death), for the past 35 years have witnessed few real changes there whereas the characteristics of a materialised, grossly Utopian, grossly egalitarian, "barracks" socialism (which Marx and Engels warned against) are most marked. Other countries have made substantial headway from Utopian to truly scientific socialism, and this trend remains strong. In the case of the Soviet Union it is a question of society going over to a qualitatively new state. Hence to speak of socialism's future *from this standpoint* means, in effect, forecasting the social, economic, cultural and political development of each country concerned.

The ideology of scientific socialism has been the most significant and influential in world social thought throughout this century. And there is serious reason to believe that *without consistently and fully realising the ideas of scientific socialism and communism, as, generally, of all constructive ideas of social development whatever they are called and whoever puts them forward—humanity will be unable to solve today's global problems, to survive in the next century or even in its first decades.* To understand why not, we must look into the essence of contemporary global problems.

THE SET OF THESE PROBLEMS may be described in the most general terms as an objectively existing contradiction (which subjectively is realised more and more widely) between the present state of the

world economy, world culture and politics, including international relations, and the vast potential of furthering civilisation and improving the lives of billions.

The present situation at global level has the following characteristics:

—*The poverty of the overwhelming majority of the world's population* (75 to 90 per cent of the 3.5 billion inhabitants of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and 10 to 20 per cent of the 1.5 billion inhabitants of the developed countries), permanent undernourishment affecting at least one billion of these people, and excruciating hunger, virtually slow starvation to death, in the case of third to half a billion people.

UN demographers estimate that by the late 21st century the population of the planet will become stabilised at roughly 10.5 billion, including nine billion in developing and 1.5 billion in developed countries, provided the trend towards a declining birth rate in most of the world's major developing countries persists, that is, *in the most favourable of all really possible cases*. Even assuming that the present state of affairs does not change, this will mean permanent undernourishment for at least 2 to 2.5 billion people and starvation for at least one billion. Meanwhile the food situation in many developing countries is deteriorating. In other words, should the present state of affairs persist, the next century or even its first half would spell a global disaster of the kind we are now witnessing in Africa, except that it would be a hundred times larger in scale.

—*Highly insufficient health services, with premature deaths on a mass scale* from various diseases as a result, especially among children.

Nearly one third of those living in developing countries get no medical aid whatever, and nearly two thirds have no access to permanent sources of pure water. With millions and tens of millions crowded together in large cities, inadequate hygiene and the absence of water supply and sewage inevitably cause epidemics that take heavy tolls on life. And then there are AIDS and other "new" diseases which catch humanity unawares and can reap an even more abundant death harvest because medicine is helpless against them. Thus the present situation, unless remedied, is also fraught with a global disaster in this respect.

—*Growing water, air, soil, heat, noise, chemical (e. g., nitrate) pollution and radiation*. They vary from developed to developing country but as developing countries are getting industrialised in the sense of development, the cumulative effect of pollution may sharply grow and become irreversible. In short, for this reason as well, humanity runs a risk of a global catastrophe if it does nothing to alter the situation.

—*The developing countries' advance* along the road of developed countries will necessarily require generating and consuming many times more power than now. Yet the thermal power industry cannot meet this need, for several decades hence there will be a shortage of oil, gas and coal (with the latter shortage hitting *all* countries of the world). The use of atomic power threatens more Chernobyls. Even if humanity succeeds in the foreseeable future in controlling thermonuclear reaction, the use of thermonuclear power is bound to cause disastrous climatic changes and result in the level of the World Ocean rising by dozens of metres. It follows that this menace, too, is another reality demanding a qualitative change in the situation to head off a global disaster.

—The same goes for *the balance of raw and other materials*. The destruction of forests will impose a changeover from felling forests to rational forestry. The increasing large scale extraction of minerals, with billions of tons of wastes dumped every year is turning the surface of the Earth into a sort of lunar landscape and therefore demands qualitatively different approaches to the production of the necessary materials.

There exist *transport problems*. Highway accidents alone the world over result every year in the death of 2.5 million people and 10 million injured or crippled. As for developing countries, the next few decades may see these terrible figures treble or even quadruple and hence become comparable to a world war casualties. Furthermore, this toll will grow unless the situation undergoes a qualitative change.

—*The immense proportion of illiteracy* and, in general, the extremely low physical, social, political and intellectual levels of many people, which prevent them from comprehending the seriousness of the problems listed here, to say nothing of finding solutions.

—*The growing dimensions of anti-social phenomena* ("aberrant behaviour"), due in particular to "the unnatural concentration of vast masses of people in big cities" (Lenin), including organised crime that makes common cause with a corrupt section of the state apparatus ("mafia"), latent crime (the shadow economy) and drug addiction (the use of alcohol and narcotics proper). This situation, too, may develop into a global disaster. Suffice it to note that the opportunity exists for mafiosi- or irresponsible ruling cliques (it makes no difference which) to come by nuclear, chemical, germ and other weapons of mass destruction and use them as a means of blackmail.

—*Mounting unemployment*, which now affects about 750 million people and may increase several times over due to the emerging trends towards integrated mechanisation, automation and computerisation in agriculture, industry, construction, transport, communications, the health services, public education, culture, administration. This, too, may build up to disaster.

—*An arms race* which not only swallows an increasing share of human labour and its results, doubling every five years (the hundreds of billions of dollars being spent on armaments today may in the early 21st century exceed humanity's aggregate GNP, that is, bring on a global economic collapse) but is heightening the danger of mass deaths in a new world war. This poses the imperative problem of creating a "non-violent world", a world without weapons or armies, a world without wars.

—The persistence in vast areas of the globe of *crying social injustice* and inequality, of oppression and exploitation, of suppression of the individual, all of which is aggravating the aforementioned social evils and making the world more explosive. In the context of what is likely to come in the 21st century, social explosions are bound to succeed one another like avalanches.

Obviously, global problems cannot be solved in the absence of sufficiently effective international organisations. Yet their services to humanity notwithstanding, all existing organisations of this kind are still far from being effective enough; so this, too, necessitates a qualitatively new approach to the problem.

The foregoing invites the conclusion that the state of humanity in evidence today, particularly the trends of its evolution, promise no change for the better. They are leading to a cul-de-sac and may cause a global catastrophe in the next few decades. At all events, there is little chance of humanity surviving the 21st century unless it diverts from its present path. Hence the need to abandon this path so as to avoid a global disaster. Humanity must choose a different path, one making it possible to end the global problem situation I have described and to create an alternative, qualitatively new civilisation which can adequately deal with the social effects of the ongoing scientific and technological revolution, a civilisation assuring all people on Earth prosperity and peace.

Rather than attempting to advance civilisation by the method of trial and error, which history has shown to be too costly for humanity, it is necessary to have a scientifically valid social ideal, a social guideline for progress. Over the past centuries, world social thought has generated many ideas which it would be foolish to turn into dogma (especially in the context of the STR and the social transformations it is bringing about) and just as foolish to ignore, rejecting their constructive elements and trying to invent bicycles that would spell death for their riders or to discover Americas threatening to become Paraguays.

Let us take a closer look at this aspect of the matter.

THE MAIN FEATURES of the social ideal evolved by Marxist social thought in the 19th and early 20th centuries and known as scientific communism—though much of the following had been advanced by various progressive thinkers—may be listed in brief as follows:

—*The transformation of labour* from a mere means of subsistence into man's requirement. Contemporary experience indicates that labour cannot become a requirement unless he who accomplishes it—be he a worker, farmer, fitter, professor or cabinet minister—has the power to make decisions within the bounds of his profession and is free from authoritarian command from above. This definition is of key importance in the following series, which would be completely meaningless without it.

—*The highest productivity of labour* on the basis of integrated mechanisation, automation and computerisation of production. This will make possible the application of the principle "from each according to his ability".

—*Full satisfaction of man's reasonable needs*. I stress the word *reasonable*, for the issue is not enrichment or hoarding, but provision of the individual with opportunities for the fullest possible self-realisation and self-development.

—*Social justice* by bringing about harmony between the real significance of the individual or social group concerned and their standing in society, between their rights and duties, action and reward, labour and remuneration, crime and punishment, achievements and their recognition by the social environment.

—*Social equality*, not in the sense of the notorious wage-levelling on the principle of equal remuneration for all regardless of ability or social contribution, but in the sense of equal opportunities for self-realisation and self-development of the individual, of equal conditions, so to speak, for starting on a life.

—*Social homogeneity*, not in the sense of everything and everybody being the same socially, but of effacing class distinctions, of the impermissibility of singling out privileged classes, social strata or castes, any social groups elevating themselves in society by humiliating the rest. Distinctions consonant with the principles of equality and justice are evidence of the wealth and high cultural standard of society. As for distinctions indicating inequality and injustice, they must understandably be eliminated.

—*The creation of a single internationalist community of people*. A high-standard universal culture of the future does not rule out but presupposes the blossoming forth of a multitude of national cultures. To be sure, anti-human national traditions must be abolished but in so doing it is necessary to foster the humane, progressive traditions which every nation has. A vast variety of humane national traditions is an important part of humanity's intellectual wealth.

—*Abolition of the antithesis and essential distinctions between town and countryside.* However, this does not imply replacing both by something contrived. The aim is to assure townspeople access to nature, greenery, pure water and clean air, to enable them to walk to the places where they work, do their shopping or spend their leisure. As regards rural inhabitants, they must be provided with up-to-date homes, services and cultural facilities and, in general, given access to all the amenities of urban civilisation.

—*An end to the antithesis and essential distinctions between manual and intellectual labour.* It does not call for the replacement of both forms by a contrived third form but for the intellectualisation of manual labour and the rationalisation of intellectual work in a way preventing atrophy of the ability to do manual work.

—*High living and cultural standards, with women enjoying real and complete equality.* The household is therefore seen as a drop in the ocean of the national economy—the same high efficiency of labour on the basis of integral mechanisation, automation and computerisation, and the same high standard of labour, association and human relations in everyday life.

—*Solid family, with love and common spiritual interests as its basis.* A full-fledged cell of society, it is a lasting value, an entity having all the characteristics I have listed earlier—from equality and justice to a cultured everyday life.

—*Harmony between the interests of the individual and those of society.* It is an open secret that there is and always has been a contradiction between them, except that its extent and character vary. All the features of the social ideal listed above are intended to help reduce this discrepancy to the minimum and ultimately to do away with it.

—*Public self-government* is impossible without drawing the mass of the people into direct management of social production and society in its entirety. It is only self-government on a sufficiently large scale that allows special government bodies and the state itself to be dispensed with. Only by promoting such self-government is it possible to accelerate the withering away of the state. Experience has shown that practically the only effective way to bring this about is to steadfastly combat bureaucracy, to “debureaucratise” society. This means complete and real openness, the accountability of leading bodies to their electorates, permanent rotation of leading personnel, strict regulation of relations between those who govern and those governed plus effective legal protection of the latter from arbitrariness on the part of the former, and lastly, a complete and consistent separation of powers independent of one another: legislative, executive, judicial, moral and political pending their replacement by public self-government.

—*Minimising and completely eliminating organised crime, latent crime and drug addiction* (including alcoholism).

—*The unfettered development of the abilities of each.* None but a society offering opportunities for a “life start” equal to all, for the complete realisation of the abilities of everyone, makes it realistically possible to apply the principles “to each according to his ability” and “to each according to his needs”.

The crowning characteristic of the social ideal, one integrating all others as it were, is *the all-round development of the individual*, who should harmoniously combine vast knowledge, moral purity and physical perfection. This is a characteristic of the ultimate or even the only goal of social development. Everything else—labour productivity, abundance, equality, justice, and so on—is merely necessary for the all-round development of the individuality. Even service in the cause of society and

humanity as man's highest mission in life leads dialectically to the all-round development of the individual in harmony with society.

Just what is a fully developed individual? An individual taking an active part in social production (having a right to socially useful work) plus creative scientific and technological effort, social and political activity, amateur artistic pursuits and sports. All this requires relevant ideological, scientific, technological, social, political and artistic information (including sporting events) plus opportunities for associating with interesting people, in particular with children (not necessarily one's own), for acquainting oneself with nature and with other cities and countries. This is not to say that one must necessarily and daily devote an hour or two to these activities. Something may claim the lion's share of time while something else may be shifted to second, fifth or tenth place. He who excludes something altogether is impoverishing his life, and he who excludes many things is making the development of his individuality lop-sided and incomplete—a phenomenon we often witness nowadays.

Such is, in general terms, the social guideline, the desired direction of development. Are there objective prerequisites for advancing along this road? A study of the trends and prospects of humanity's current evolution shows that the prerequisites are there and, indeed, are "pushing" humanity in precisely this direction irrespective of whether the society in question is called post-capitalism, socialism, communism or something else. This humanity is inescapably faced with the problem of forming a qualitatively new society. However, let the reader judge for himself.

IN THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES of the world, feeding a worker's or office employee's family still necessitates hard work by eight or even nine peasant families, just as it did in most countries and in the case of all humanity decades and centuries ago. In the more developed countries, one farmer now feeds from 40 to 50 families, and one worker supplies all the necessary manufactured goods to five or six families. However, the revolution in science and technology is only just gathering momentum, with integrated mechanisation, automation and computerisation gaining ground in step with it. This means that ever fewer farmers, factory workers, drivers, builders, salespeople and other workers will be needed to supply the population with the requisite quantities of foodstuffs and other goods, to provide all the necessary services from supply or transport to medical aid or education.

Long-term scientific, technological, social and economic forecasts say that in the first half of the next century, the following proportions of people at work will be left in the more developed countries of the world, or in what may be called the forward area of the STR: not more than one per cent in agriculture and not more than five per cent each in industry, the service sector, administration and management (including credit and banking), with professionals in the health services, culture, public education, research and facilities used by science hardly exceeding five per cent. Of course, this applies to the "forefront" alone, for the less developed countries will be advancing to these indices throughout the next century and possibly beyond.

What about the remaining 80 per cent of the able-bodied population, or the remaining 80 per cent of society's working time to be exact? Kurt Vonnegut, the American writer, tries in *Utopia-14* to visualise what a society with comprehensively computerised production will be like if current development trends are carried through to the logical end. He believes that five per cent of technocrats (including their families, servants and guards) will be operating all-powerful, all-producing and all-

regulating electronics supplying everybody with everything while the rest—95 per cent of the population—will be divided into two nearly equal parts: a "labour army" doing useless work just to kill time, and a police force guarding these unfortunate people. This understandably leads to a revolt of the disinherited.

Are there any alternatives to this nightmarish prospect? I think so.

It is unwise of us to fully entrust the education of our children to professional teachers, for we have stopped "coexisting" with them, educating them from morning till night by force of personal example (as parents did for centuries and millennia). As a result, we have the "generation gap", youth "counterculture" and widespread demoralisation, with disastrous consequences looming large. The wise thing to do would obviously be to allow mothers and fathers more time for associating with the rising generation in the role of assistant teachers enjoying appropriate economic and social status. This could be done on the principle of, say, granting them fully paid leave during the child's first three years of life and permitting them to work half a working week with full pay for another seven years. Altogether it would not take up two or three per cent of society's working time as today but ten times as much. But then this would be a rational, well-justified application of energy providing millions upon millions of people with a real equivalent of work and making it possible to slave off the terrible danger of society's disintegration.

Experience has shown that to protect people's health, society does not need very many professional doctors and that it is far more important to provide them with proper working conditions. But patients need help from both doctors and female or male nurses who can care for them compassionately. Expert estimates indicate that to fully meet this requirement, society would have to use at least 15 per cent of its balance of working time, or roughly half as much as is needed for the proper education of the rising generation, and a hundred times more than today.

Experience has also shown that to slave off the danger of widespread demoralisation where people go over from recreational pursuits regulated on ritual lines as they used to be for centuries and millennia to the increasingly wide-ranging spontaneous activities (they have come to be in large cities and from there spreading out) society needs a dense network of amusement parks having appropriate facilities, but above all a network of clubs, each of them run by at least a dozen organisers per hundred members. This would claim at least 15 per cent of society's aggregate working time.

Lastly, experience suggests that something more is needed than mechanisation, automation and computerisation to save the planet's dying natural environment. Society also needs hundreds of millions of people serving in the army of nature conservancy to prevent every single plant or animal species from becoming endangered by the end of the 21st century. This means using not less than 15 per cent of society's working time.

Careful calculations may show requirements to exceed 100 per cent, which means that in advancing along this road, humanity would never be threatened with unemployment whatever the extent of automation and computerisation. What would we have as a result? Advance towards a qualitatively new, alternative civilisation under which the highest value in the system of values should be the all-round development of the individual, and hence the greatest attention would be devoted to proper education of and spiritual union with the rising generation, to the protection of people's health, to making their recreational activities worthwhile and establishing harmony between man and nature. It would be a civilisation under which people would not count the pennies they had spent

but the energy they had conserved, for the less energy used, the better for nature, for the planet and its people. Personal computers would help people reduce to the minimum business and recreational trips using motor vehicles. A rational diet and energy conservation in the home would make it possible to use solely the sun, water, wind and other reproducible non-pollutant sources of power. In short, it would be a civilisation under which the development of the individual would be an end in itself and hence there would be no need to seek profit at all costs, nobody would want to elevate himself by humiliating somebody else, nor would there be any discrimination of the individual.

It would be a world worth living in.

It is a future we should work to bring about.

How? I see in the answer to this the destiny of socialism in the coming century.

PROGRESS IN SOCIAL PROGNOSTICATION has enabled man to answer explicitly a question that had been tormenting him for centuries: What is the future in store for humanity? The answer—a strictly scientific one—is that our future will be, yes, what it will be if and when we have solved all the global problems facing us today. And we must remember that unless we solve them there will be neither a future nor a humanity.

We now know exactly that there is no solving a single global problem without solving the key problem of definitively easing international relations, ending the arms race and effecting complete disarmament. Unless we end the arms race it will put an end to us all long before the close of the 21st century. Confrontation between the two social systems in the world arena has become meaningless. The time is coming when it will be absolutely necessary for them to develop together, to engage in co-creation and close cooperation and to influence each other.

We are also just as certain that not a single global problem, including the problem of disarmament, can be solved without fundamental social reforms in all countries of the world. These reforms would follow different lines but they should all be in favour of peace, democracy and humanism. The destiny of socialism in the 21st century will depend entirely on the role it plays in these reforms. If it plays no role at all, if it sticks to the sectarian, scholastic dogmas of the past, it will inevitably have to leave the political scene long before the end of the 21st century like many diverse social Utopias of past centuries and decades. But if it takes the lead in the ideological movement for social change, for peace, democracy and humanism, it will remain the most influential social doctrine of both this century and the next.

We see political parties proposing concrete solutions to acute problems win a large percentage of the vote while those offering nothing but slogans and outdated quotations get a small fraction of the vote. True, votes cast in an election campaign are an inaccurate indicator of the real state of public opinion, let alone social thought, in the country concerned. But they add up to a definite hint, if I may say so.

As for everything else concerning the future of socialism, it will depend entirely on the wisdom and effort of Socialists.

ON CAPITOL HILL

Yuri IVANOV

A MAJOR STEP forward in our political reforms has been taken—the Congress of People's Deputies is behind us and the new USSR Supreme Soviet has been formed. A very great deal in the country's democratisation hinges on how the highest bodies of power execute their functions. The situation where the people's deputies gathered to rubber-stamp bills seems to be receding into the past. An obedient and vociferous majority opposed to dissent is ill-suited for serious work of forming a state committed to the rule of law. It is important to fashion a system of democratic norms of communication and of exchanging views, and of laws for drafting and adopting decisions within the representative bodies. For, as the ancients used to say, "one needs not only to possess wisdom but also to know how to use it".

It would be useful to take a look at the experience of the parliamentary institutions in other states. For a long time we fiercely rejected bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism and took an unconditionally sceptical view of procedural matters. Today it is clear that disregard for the rules of procedure only plays into the hands of those who were and are frightened by the development of true democracy and the effectiveness of the lawmaking process. Is not this part of the reason for the hitches that initially plagued the congress?

A COMPLEX BUT EFFICIENT SYSTEM

IN MANY LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES across the world procedural norms are very complex, as they bear the imprint of centuries of intensive political struggle, traditions and precedents. In the US Congress, for example, the House of Representatives and the Senate have the post of expert (not from among the members of Congress) who can upon demand formulate a competent opinion and name suitable precedents on any procedural dispute. However, these rules are rather effective.

The specific preparation of legislative texts is concentrated in committees set up by the House of Representatives and the Senate. There are standing and ad hoc commissions and committees set up for a comparatively brief period to accomplish specific tasks. There are also a few joint committees of both houses which, however, do not prepare legislative proposals.

The difference between standing and ad hoc committees is often purely formal; there are a total of 20 of them in the Senate and 27 in the House of Representatives. The numerical composition is different; as a rule, however, it does not exceed limits ensuring a capacity for work. This is usually between 14 and 20 senators or between 34 and 45 members of the House of Representatives, which number almost 4.5 times more than the former.

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The competence of the committees is strictly defined by the rules of procedure, and any bill submitted to the House or Senate is, depending on its content, immediately sent to the appropriate committee. There, in turn, they form from their members several subcommittees which specialise in still more narrow aspects of problems. A bill can be turned over to one or several subcommittees if it touches on the problems of each of them.

Work on a legislative proposal begins with a detailed discussion during so-called hearings. Not only the authors of a bill and officials of the respective government departments but also experts, scientists and representatives of public and religious organisations who subscribe to a broad spectrum of views are summoned to speak at them. This enables the members of Congress to compare in detail at times opposing viewpoints and elaborate their own stand.

Only then, if it is considered necessary to continue the preparation of a bill, do the bodies of Congress set about specific work on the text. Initially it is usually done by one of the subcommittees; as a rule they consist of not more than several persons. They shape the bill's initial version, which is submitted for consideration by the entire committee, where it is discussed in detail and amended.

Then the bill is submitted to the House for consideration. The committee compiles an accompanying report containing clarifications of the decisions adopted. Revealingly, the view of the minority—those members of the committee who did not agree with the majority—is usually expounded in the report.

This system of committees and subcommittees may seem excessively cumbersome at first glance. However, it is largely conditioned by the complexity and importance of the problems being tackled. Zealots of "Sturm und Drang" may descry in it an impediment to excessive law-making which eliminates a large part of the proposals being submitted. But if an authoritative group of legislators considers a proposal untimely or unnecessary altogether, perhaps there is good reason to listen to their view. The seeming shortcomings of this system are quite redeemed by its effective functioning. It allows a detailed study of legislative proposals at the initial stage, as a result of which some 90 per cent of the bills submitted by the committees are approved by the House and Senate.

Another merit is the fact that this system makes it possible to utilise in full the experience and knowledge of members of Congress working in the committees and subcommittees. New congressmen usually seek to occupy posts in bodies whose activities to the greatest extent touch upon the interests of their constituency or accord with their personal inclinations and qualifications, and to remain in them throughout their term in Congress.

The transition of a member of Congress to a different committee is a comparatively rare phenomenon. The longer he works in "his" subdivision the more rapidly grows his influence and his chance of ultimately heading the committee. Formally, the system of elections of committee chairmen according to "seniority" (i. e., when the person who has been in a committee the longest is elected its chairman) has been abolished, but in practice it has been largely preserved. Its positive feature is that it leads to leadership by people with lengthy experience in one congressional body or another and highly competent in the problems it deals with.

For example, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn has been working in the Senate for 17 years, and Les Aspin, the chairman of the analogous committee of the House of Representatives, has been there for 18 years. Dante Fascell, the chairman of the House

Foreign Affairs Committee, has been a member of Congress since 1955, and the respective Senate committee is headed by Claiborne Pell, who came to the Senate in 1961. Lengthy participation in a committee's work and then chairmanship in it give political figures certain advantages over the highest members of the government bureaucracy. Statistically, several secretaries of the respective departments are usually replaced during a person's chairmanship in a committee. Naturally, in experience, knowledge and competence, a department secretary is often inferior to the leader of a congressional committee.

THOSE WHO POSSESS INFORMATION POSSESS EVERYTHING

THIS MAXIM is being repeated more and more often in today's world. To successfully cope with the administration of a complicated state mechanism, a people's deputy in any country needs to draw on a broad information base and have an opportunity to quickly obtain reference material and consult experts at any moment. He should not be distracted by clerical, organisational and administrative concerns, he needs aid here as well.

How are such problems tackled in the US Congress? In the last century both congressmen and congressional committees worked without permanent auxiliary personnel. If someone had aides or secretaries he paid for their services out of his own pocket, it evidently being assumed that he was fairly well-to-do. However, those were times when the executive branch in the United States, too, got by with a numerically modest bureaucratic apparatus.

The situation began changing at the turn of the century. Lawmakers increasingly felt a need for qualified advice and aid, and permanent paid staff members appeared. After the Second World War there was a dramatic qualitative and quantitative leap forward, with congressional auxiliary personnel becoming more numerous, highly professional and permanent.

There were two major reasons for this. For one thing, the tasks of the highest legislative body had become far more complex. For another, the federal bureaucracy, which had concentrated under its control information and the knowledge of the finest experts, had burgeoned unprecedentedly. So as not to become a powerless appendage of this mighty machinery, Congress had to create its own information resources and expert commissions. In other words, it had to counter the bureaucracy of executive power with its own, but one which pursued other goals and was sort of critically oriented with regard to the former. It is hardly as big as that of the administration but it is just as highly qualified and readily meets the legislators' needs.

There are some 40,000 employees working in Congress and its committees and auxiliary bodies. This figure includes employees of the Library of Congress, the United States Botanic Garden, Architect of the Capitol's office, and so on. Each of the members of Congress is provided an office on Capitol Hill and funds to maintain a small staff of personal aides. This in no way means that he receives money personally and can spend it at his discretion. The appropriate services of Congress pay it out in the form of salaries to the aides and secretaries, whom the congressman selects. What is more, their number in the House of Representatives is limited by law. Hiring of persons who cannot fulfil the prescribed duties, relatives, etc. is considered unethical and illegal. In recruiting personnel, the member of Congress seeks to have the appropriate highly qualified experts, usually jurists.

Several years ago the 100 senators were served by 3,903 aides and office workers, and the 435 members of the House of Representatives, by 6,939.

Each congressional committee also disposes of its own staff. Their functions include preparing documentation, studying problems, preparing hearings, studying particular situations (additional part-time personnel is often hired for the purpose), as well as rendering any other assistance to a committee, subcommittees and individual members thereof.

The committees recruit personnel in keeping with their profile from among experts who used to work at government departments or other congressional institutions, in trade unions, the press, academic institutions, law offices or business. As a rule, they are very highly qualified specialists possessing analytical and organisational abilities. In 1985-1986 the House Armed Services Committee was served by 36 experts, and the Foreign Affairs Committee, by 65; the similar committees in the Senate had 26 and 24 experts respectively.

The aides of members of Congress and the experts employed with the committees have a very heavy current workload. However, when the committees or individual congressmen require highly expert assessment, they are able to seek the aid of the specialised services of the legislative body, whose activity is also financed from its own budget.

This is first and foremost the *Library of Congress*, one of the best in the world, which provides it with reference material. It is also open to scholars and the public at large. The *Congressional Research Service* functions formally within its framework but in effect, independently. It has departments specialising approximately in the problems of the committees and, in keeping with the requests of individual members of Congress, prepares studies and information. In addition, the Research Service conducts current research on the application of the existing legislation and constitutional and many other problems, publishing findings in special bulletins. The documents prepared by the Research Service usually stand out for their deep analysis and wealth of information. Upwards of 4,000 people, including many highly qualified experts, are employed in the subdivisions of the Library of Congress and the Research Service.

The *Congressional Budget Office* attached to the Congress has specialists experienced in forming the budget. Its functions include all-round consideration of the draft budget submitted by the executive branch, and also independent economic forecasting, evaluations and analysis of possible variants of the budget and changes in it and their short- and long-term consequences. There are some 200 people employed in the office.

The *Office of Technology Assessment*, with a staff of about 100, provides the bodies of Congress and its members with qualified analyses of different technical problems. It assesses the utilisation of particular technical designs in programmes considered by Congress, including military and aerospace ones, the possibilities for using the latest technological breakthroughs, feasibility of projects, etc.

The *General Accounting Office* holds a special and very independent place among the auxiliary bodies of Congress. Its functions include constant supervision of the spending of funds allocated by Congress. It entails not only monitoring the spending of money precisely for the above aims but also ensuring that it is spent effectively. The department carries out regular inspections of the financial activity of all government agencies and their relations with contractor firms. Usually their findings are brought to the cognisance of Congress and its committees and are made public. The department has a staff of about 5,200.

The *Government Publishing Office* should be mentioned among the auxiliary services of Congress. All congressional documents, official records of sessions of the House and Senate and committees, texts of

approved laws and many other official materials are published here. All this is done very promptly. Suffice it to say that the first copies of the records of the sittings of the House and Senate (and this is hundreds of voluminous pages at times) come out in print the next day or the day after; the working documents of the committees and House and Senate that are issued by the printing office in the traditional form are usually ready by the moment the sittings begin. Publication of the records of hearings in the committees sometimes takes one or two months, but this is quite a short span, considering the huge volume of the material put out by the publishing house. The Government Publishing Office has a staff of 8,500.

Naturally, the upkeep of the personnel and auxiliary services of Congress costs a great deal of money, which is allocated in accordance with a special law within the framework of the national budget. These allocations stand at over 1,000 million dollars a year. The well-structured legislative process is expensive!

VOTING ACCORDING TO ONE'S CONSCIENCE

IN THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET there is but one party faction—that of Communists. It constitutes an absolute majority of deputies. Consequently, if in debating and decision-making the faction just strictly fulfils the instructions of the central party echelons, the role of elective bodies of power can again boil down to the function of rubber-stamping, albeit not unanimously. The people expects much more of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

However, are pluralism of views and party discipline in the context of the Soviet one-party system all that incompatible?

In foreign multi-party parliamentary institutions there are great differences in methods of organising and observing norms of factional discipline. In most West European countries, for example, members of parliament who are part of a faction are duty-bound to observe discipline in it, and it in turn is subordinate to the party leadership.

The situation is different in the United States. In the House and Senate there are factions of the two major bourgeois parties, the Democratic and the Republican. The factions are totally independent of the national committees of these parties and are not bound by their political line, although many congressional figures play a notable role in them. The activities of the factions in the House and Senate are guided by the leaders and their deputies, who are elected at meetings of the factions. Organisational and the most important political matters are considered there. The factions have their own committees, which engage in organisational matters, as well as fund-raising for the reelection campaigns of congressmen.

A prime feature of the activities of party factions in the US Congress is that the notion of factional discipline is virtually lacking there. Neither the factional leader nor anyone else has the right to instruct a member of Congress how to vote or what stand to take. One can perhaps only speak of party solidarity. The leader of the faction and his deputies of course bring to the cognisance of each of its members the viewpoint they consider preferable, seek to convince him with their argumentation and accept criticism to secure his vote. They may also resort to pressure at times by promising support for the congressman's proposals or, on the contrary, by threatening to refuse it, by promising assistance in attaining personal goals, etc. Theoretically, however, each member of Congress, irrespective of his factional affiliation, is free to choose his own stand on any issue. If he does not vote in line with his faction this will not be regarded as "treason".

This hardly prevents the factions from usually voting unanimously on organisational matters, and, on the most important political problems, at least a majority of a faction rallies around its leadership.

For West Europeans, where parliaments have a plurality of party factions jockeying fiercely for influence and representing different class interests, this absence of factional discipline may seem strange. However, in the US Congress, where there are only two parties of one class, legislative activity is carried out successfully even without factional discipline.

In the USSR, where one party expresses the interests of the entire people, the greatest success evidently is promised by the approach where the party faction at the congresses of people's deputies and in the USSR Supreme Soviet is based on the principles of pluralism of views and maximum democracy of the legislative process, and factional discipline is reduced to a minimum. This will help realise the wish of Lenin, who recommended to the faction of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) at the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets: "All members of the group have the right and are bound to vote according to their conscience and not on the instructions of the CC."¹

VETO

UNDER THE US CONSTITUTION (Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2), a bill passed by the House and Senate becomes law only after it is signed by the president or if it is not returned by him to Congress within ten days (Sundays excepted). If a bill is not approved, the president returns it with his objections in writing to the chamber where it originated. This means that the president has vetoed the bill.

A veto is not absolute, however. The House and Senate have the right to revise the bill. If it receives a two-thirds majority in a vote by roll-call in the House and the Senate, the bill becomes law contrary to the president's objections.

Article 115 of the USSR Constitution says that a law of the USSR shall be deemed adopted when it has been passed in each chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by a majority of the total number of its deputies. Adopted it is, but will it come into effect? Article 121 states that the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet shall sign laws of the USSR and other acts adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

It is unclear now when a law comes into effect: after the voting in the chambers or after it is signed by the chairman. If the latter is true, this means that the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet is vested with the right of veto—he may refuse to sign a law if he does not agree with it. What is more, this is tantamount to him being vested with the absolute right of veto, since the Constitution does not stipulate the procedure for it being overturned and makes no mention of the chairman having to provide reasons for his stand. Possessing this right hardly accords with democratic principles.

"It is permissible to learn even from an enemy," Ovidius wrote. All the more so if it is not from an enemy but a competitor, we may add, and if one is to learn what is beneficial.

ON ETHIOPIAN SOIL

The decision came after lengthy consultations and discussions. The Western delegations, primarily those of Britain and the United States, made numerous reservations in an attempt to prevent a session in Africa. The Americans spoke of the need to economise while the British said they feared lest some international crisis should break out while the Council members were away, with nobody to save the world if it found itself in danger.

Nobody dared to object outright to a Council meeting on African soil. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) formally asked the UN to discuss African problems in one of the continent's capitals. Addis Ababa was a suitable venue because that was where the OAU had its headquarters as an organisation playing an important role in the promotion of African unity against imperialism, neocolonialism and racism.

The Council meetings opened in Addis Ababa on January 28, 1972.

ges of the UN. Panamanians were looking forward to the arrival of the Security Council members as well as delegates from many countries.

The session drew ten Latin American foreign ministers and a large group of ambassadors representing European socialist, African, Asian and Latin American countries. The Bulgarian and Czechoslovak representatives used their stay in Panama for active consultations. The result was an accord on establishing diplomatic relations between Panama, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. This provided a measure of moral and political support for the Panamanian people's struggle for sovereignty and independence.

On March 13, 1973, the Security Council opened its first sitting, with General Torrijos in the chair. A man with an aquiline nose and of soldierly bearing, he comported himself simply yet with dignity. He was in mufti and had a snow-white shirt on, with a bright tie to match.

After uttering a few introductory sentences, he took a sheet out of his pocket, with a text written by hand in large letters. "From this high rostrum," he said, "Panama declares that we cannot agree to the economic suppression of one country by another nor to political, economic and cultural intervention, since that is nothing but neocolonialism. In other words, it is a disguised and covert form of colonialism expressing itself in the terms of economic aid whose purpose is not the development of our country but the imposition of control on its people."

In conclusion Torrijos said: "We ask the world represented here today for moral support in this struggle, which will be crowned with success if helped by the conscience of the world. Our people are already nearing the limit of their patience." His emotional speech made a strong impression on those present.

During the debate, Foreign Minister Tack and Ambassador Boyd made even sharper statements, giving detailed arguments. They cited appalling facts of poverty in a country exploited by American monopolies.

In line with a Security Council practice, spokesmen for countries wishing to join in the debate were allowed to take the floor before Council members did.

The Foreign Ministers and representatives of Cuba, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador presented an in-depth analysis of the historical situation in which US imperialism had contrived to impose the shackling treaty of 1903 on the Panama Canal Zone. They revealed the legal indefensibility of the treaty as a document running counter to fundamental principles of international law and the UN Charter.

The socialist and Afro-Asian members of the Council supported Panama's legitimate demands.

"Panama's geographical location," said Jakob Malik, the Soviet representative, "which made it possible to build a shipping canal linking two oceans via the shortest route across its territory, is one of its more important, if not its most important natural resource. We therefore support the aspiration of the people and the Panamanian government to re-establish sovereignty over this natural wealth and use it for the good of the people and the country's development. We also support the striving of the Panamanian government to restore the territorial integrity of its country."

In the first days of the Security Council's work the Peruvian and Panamanian delegations submitted a previously prepared draft resolution on the main question—that of the Panama Canal Zone. This resolution envisaged abrogating the 1903 agreement on the Canal and the amendments which had been made to it and concluding a new agreement ensuring the reunification of the territory known as the Canal Zone with the Republic of Panama, having first terminated the existence of

the afore-mentioned Zone as an area under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Two more drafts were submitted concerning the sovereign rights of peoples to use national resources. Although these drafts did not directly name the Panama Canal Zone, they did imply it, since the speeches of the majority of delegations saw the Canal as Panama's main natural resource, which it had the sovereign right to administer.

The delegations of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Guinea declared support of the above drafts. But the United States and its allies—Britain, Australia and some other countries—made it clear that they could not accept the main draft concerning the Canal Zone. As usual in similar circumstances, the Council members proceeded to informal consultations. These began in Panama City and continued on the small island of Contadora, not far from the Pacific coast of Panama, over the weekend.

The Panamanians wanted the consultations to take place in a relaxed atmosphere. Their aim was to sound out the positions of the main delegations and secure the drafting of a document that could win a majority. At beaches and restaurants and on lawns, foreign ministers and ambassadors wearing light summer clothes or just swimming trunks and the broad-brimmed sombreros presented to them on arrival exchanged political news and opinions on possible final documents. Tack told me that the Americans threatened to veto the draft resolution submitted by Panama and Peru should it be put to the vote. He meant the main resolution which had actually prompted the Panamanians to seek a Council meeting.

Showing the requisite flexibility, the Panamanians moderated certain formulations while keeping the main demand, which said that talks on a new treaty should be held on the principle of recognising Panama's effective sovereignty over its whole territory. The American diplomats insisted on leaving out the words about guarantees of effective sovereignty. Talks and informal meetings alternated with recreation.

Meanwhile the Panamanian delegation completed its consultations and on March 20 officially submitted a new draft resolution containing, as I have said, demands that the 1903 agreement be annulled and Panama's effective sovereignty over all its territory be guaranteed. The co-authors of the draft were Guinea, Peru, the Sudan, Yugoslavia, Kenya, who were later joined by India and Indonesia. So when the vote was taken the draft would be supported by 11 or 12 delegations. Although the French Ambassador made a number of observations, he let it be known that he would not vote against the draft, while Scali, the US representative, insisted on the removal of the demand that Panamanian sovereignty over the Zone be restored.

The support of almost all Latin American, African and Asian countries as well as of the vast majority of Security Council members created a favourable situation for the Panamanians.

The decisive moment was drawing near. But the opening of the final sitting—on March 21—was delayed because the Panamanian and US delegations were still in conference.

Finally Tack came in and took the chair. His face expressed at once strong feeling and determination.

"We can give no more ground," he said to me. "The Americans insist on their amendment. We can't accept it. It would be an unwarranted retreat. We'd forfeit the respect we enjoy among peoples and would stop respecting ourselves."

The hall was full of diplomats, journalists and guests. The Council members were seated already, with the sole exception of the leader of the US delegation, John Scali. Afterwards we heard that he had tele-

phoned President Nixon to give him the lay of the land and that Nixon had instructed him to block the disputed resolution at all costs.

Scali came in when Tack had opened the meeting. Tack said: "We will now vote on the draft resolution moved by Guinea, Panama, Peru, the Sudan, India, Indonesia, Kenya and Yugoslavia. I ask the Security Council members to vote. Who is for the draft? Please raise your hands."

I counted 13 votes in favour of the draft, including one cast by Australia, a close ally of the United States.

"Who is against?"

Everybody looked at the US and British representatives. The TV cameras were focussed on their faces. After some hesitation, Scali raised his hand, seemingly doing so against his will, as it were. Veto.

A whisper of anger and bitterness swept the hall—the United States had foiled the adoption of an important resolution, thereby posing a challenge to the whole of Latin America and the world opinion.

"Any abstentions?"

The British representative, Colin Crowe, raised his hand. It meant that even the British Conservatives were wary of backing their overseas ally.

The meeting passed without objection a general resolution recognising the right of nations to use their natural resources as they saw fit. Tack read out a final statement reflecting the outcome of the protracted debate and the positions stated by the parties in its course. It was a document revealing the isolation of the neocolonialists.

Thereupon Tack spoke as his country's representative: "Panama has won a moral and political victory. It was supported by Latin American countries, as well as by almost all the Council members representing Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia. The American administration's frustration of a balanced and just resolution will encourage the Panamanian people to fight more determinedly for its rights. The fight is not yet over, but is only just beginning."

The meeting was declared closed and everyone got up from their seats. One after the other, the foreign ministers of Cuba, Peru, Costa Rica and Colombia and the representatives of the USSR and the African, Asian and Latin American countries went up to Tack. As though summing up the results of the Council's works, he said: "I think that an almost unanimous vote like this in the Security Council and, may be more importantly, the solidarity that all Latin America has with us mean more than the approval of a resolution which the USA will dismiss at the first convenient opportunity."

Tack told me: "We are content with the results of the session. It has shown the true face of American imperialism and opened the eyes of millions of people. Who, before this session, gave the Panama Canal serious thought, who knew of Panama and its struggle? This question has now been placed on the agenda of world politics. Our stance is shared by millions of people, and not only in Latin America at that. This gives us an opportunity to continue our fight for our rights."

The moral support given by the world community was an important political factor. Faced with a united front of Latin American countries and realising that it could not expect support from even the majority of its allies, the US government was compelled to start talks with Panama. The two countries signed a new treaty on the Panama Canal in 1977 and ratified it in 1978. It provides for the gradual transfer of the Canal to Panamanian control by the year 2000.

PAKISTAN. Twenty-Five Years Ago

Alexei NESTERENKO

FOR A NUMBER of internal and external reasons, Pakistan has lately attracted special attention as a country at the epicentre of an intricate and dangerous international conflict that, furthermore, directly affects our national interests. This calls for an examination of Soviet-Pakistani relations both in the context of current events and in retrospect, meaning the years when these relations promised a different course of development.

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IN THOSE YEARS—the sixties—I was Ambassador to Pakistan. We classed that country without qualification as belonging to the enemy camp. It had a military regime and an extremely underdeveloped economy. In view of these circumstances plus a most unfavourable climate, the fact that I was assigned to Pakistan came as a surprise and put me on my guard.

Shortly afterwards the East, which I had visualised as a faraway mirage while in Moscow, became a reality. To adjust to an environment unknown to me until then, I needed to rapidly acquire habits without which you cannot live, let alone work, in an Eastern country. As the rules governing the life of Soviet diplomats abroad were strict, I had to set about, without delay but not without difficulties, visiting official institutions responsible for accreditation as well as officials, members of the diplomatic corps and leading Pakistani politicians and other public figures.

What further compounded my work at the time was that the residence of the head of state and the government was in the small military settlement of Rawalpindi, near future Islamabad, while the actual capital was Karachi, a large port on the Arabian Sea, an industrial and trading centre where all the embassies and the Foreign Ministry staff were situated. A city of many millions, Karachi was the hub of the country's social and political activity. As in any other developing country, that activity was restricted to a fairly small section of political-minded Pakistanis whereas the bulk of the population was fully preoccupied with earning a livelihood and held down by the heavy burden of religious and ethnic bounds if not reduced to a state of unquestioning submission. This highly important peculiarity of the situation in the third world did not fit in with our illusions about it.

A real knowledge of Pakistani reality came with considerable difficulty due to the kaleidoscopic character of that reality and the Pakistanis' widespread wariness of Soviet representatives. In view of the unreasoning faith of the population in the absolute validity of religious dogma often

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coupled with ignorance, we were compelled to promote the idea of cooperation with the Soviet Union, a country of revolutionary transformations, against heavy odds in the form of incomprehension and often of outright rejection. Many Pakistanis looked on all that was Soviet as something alien and hence hostile to the East, and this raised quite a solid barrier to association. Contact was made difficult by the existence of numerous religious and ethnic distinctions which demanded a differentiated approach to various social groups. Oversensitiveness to the observance of a special etiquette not only made it harder to develop the necessary contacts but occasionally became an insurmountable obstacle, not to mention the impossibility of any manifestation of our habitual straightforward atheism. In these circumstances, it was only through practice that you could learn to get along with local people.

Prudence was called for even in the case of perfectly official ties. The office of doyen of the diplomatic corps was held in those days by the ambassador of an Arab state, who was also the leader of a most militant sect and a member of an ancient tribe revered in the East. To avoid complications, we kept conversations with him to as narrow limits as possible in conformity with certain fine points of ritual whose infringement was seen as blasphemy by himself and his followers. But it was contacts with any "infidel" by rank and file members of the sect that were regarded as the gravest violation of sanctity, from what he himself said. Afterwards it transpired that after each visit to the doyen by the Soviet Ambassador or his representatives, the host's staff would say a "purifying" prayer.

On the other hand, we were in a position to establish completely normal relations with Ismaelians, members of an influential and wealthy sect having its own concept of Islamic dogma. Many of them held important positions in business and readily engaged in business partnership without confusing it with religious problems. Some of them even invited us to their celebrations.

Along with this, the problem of "coexisting" with Eastern realities occasionally led to a somewhat uncommon approach. For instance, our Embassy was in contact with the owner of a neighbouring house, Nadir Shah, a tribal chief who had armed guards drawn from members of his tribe. The contact had been established on the initiative of our neighbour himself, who guaranteed the security of the Embassy in any contingency, including a raid by a gang. What made the deal original was that the guarantees given to the Embassy were confirmed by the military commissioner of Karachi, or the city's top official, who described them as far more reliable than the help which a weak police could have offered us.

Viewed against the background of religious heterogeneity and intolerance, Pakistan's ethnic problems seemed less acute. Nevertheless, they remained a trouble spot in the domestic situation, which was particularly tense in Baluchistan and the area inhabited by Pathan tribes. The Baluchis had been living under an emergency regime practically ever since the state of Pakistan was founded. Entry into their capital, Quetta, was generally not allowed and their movements across the country were restricted. Americans serving at their military base in Baluchistan told us that the only thing which kept the Baluchis from revolting was the utter indifference of world opinion to their fate.

The plight of the Pathans, who were divided between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was particularly painful and served as the source of a mounting border conflict. The dispute concerned the boundaries of their settlement, the rules of crossing them, the areas where they could lead a nomadic life. It often took the form of an armed clash which threatened to grow into an all-out war and added to mutual hostility. At the root of the latter were a struggle for a sizable territory and a major tribal for-

mation traditionally defending its identity arms in hand. As a result, diplomatic relations between the two countries were most unfriendly and strained, and the Pakistani authorities kept a jealous eye on all contacts between the Soviet and Afghan embassies. In that situation the United States and Britain proceeded much more actively and resolutely than we in defending their interests, taking advantage of financial transactions, traditional ties and other objective conditions.

Adjoining the area inhabited by Pathan tribes are Rawalpindi and Peshawar, in whose vicinity the Pakistani armed forces have their main bases. As the President's official residence was situated in Rawalpindi and his summer palace at the highland resort of Mari all the main embassies had summer subsidiaries in that small community. This helped form an idea of the overall situation in that part of the country but occasionally exposed us to incidents. One day, for instance, our car was stopped on a mountain road by a band of armed men who told us to get off. Nobody among us could understand the language in which the men tried to explain what they wanted. The situation became ominous, for the men almost dragged us out of the car and we heard blasts that set off rock falls. True to habit, we thought we were in for a provocation. But reality turned out to be very simple: repairmen were smoothing away a hillside. Their English-speaking superintendent, who arrived on the spot, said they were merely taking care of our safety and as for their arms, they didn't mean anything because Pathans never parted with them.

Pakistani reality sometimes surprised even the British in spite of their colonial experience. Neither they nor anybody else could imagine that a presidential decree imposing some restrictions on polygamy would bring objections from women. Yet this was what happened—the decree caused mass female protests which baffled the President himself. A women's delegation told him that with the demographic imbalance growing, they feared an increase in the number of those who would be unprotected economically. In that particular case, economic considerations outweighed moral ones, all the more so since the East has its own standards of marriage. And while the original reaction of the Pakistani press to the incident was somewhat ironical, the women's approach to the problem was recognised in the end as well-founded. Commenting on the unexpected situation at a meeting with the diplomatic corps, the President recalled the advice of a well-known British author, who had counselled the greatest circumspection in trying to apply criteria of another civilisation to the East.

The same remark might be about other Pakistani realities. At that time, the governor of West Pakistan was a big feudal lord who had shown himself to be a brutal administrator and became a sort of viceroy in the province. His fine appearance and carefully calculated manners made it difficult even for those who knew him well enough to realise that the man was actually a medieval satrap. His vast mountain estate was managed in strict conformity with the inhuman rules of oriental despotism, including slave labour, a complete lack of rights, downtrodden women and children, unquestioning obedience under the threat of cruel punishment. The governor himself spoke of his ways with some pride and when inviting you to his estate, merely recommended you not to be surprised at anything. The existence of that feudal retreat was an open secret in the country but nobody expressed either condemnation or anger. Well, we were in the East, weren't we?

Something similar existed in some semi-autonomous territories forming part of Pakistan and representing Eastern despotisms small in area and population. They were headed by rulers who exercised both legislative and executive power, treating their subjects as they pleased. I witnessed those social conditions so unusual today when I visited one of these ter-

ritories, Swat, using my personal connections with the ruler's family. The trip was like an oriental fairy-tale with all its attributes: strange-looking nomad camps, guards armed with museum weapons, and what not. True, you could see behind those picturesque settings—both in Swat and some other border areas—perfectly up-to-date weapons and fortifications at the disposal of Pakistan's allies.

But that was a different phenomenon. It went beyond conserving exotic scenery, being a peculiarity of the political structure imposed on Pakistan by one-time colonisers. It formed part of an international reality of the recent past, of the activity of military blocs involving Pakistan. Bondage to the Western military system contributed to the militarisation of the country regardless of its economic weakness, and permanent confrontation with India and Afghanistan made for a bid to reinforce the army by supplying it with up-to-date arms and training it on new lines. The advocates of this policy constituted a notable section of the top echelons of the army and relied on the US military and well-established mutual ties for support and were motivated by personal interest. During a conversation with one of them, General Shah, who was responsible for supplying Pakistan's armed forces, I heard him admit a certain ambition of the leadership. He was convinced that Pakistan was destined to carry the "green banner" high by continuing the "cause of a great historic past", that is, its religious dogma.

While stating his bellicose views without the least inhibition, the general went out of his way to stress his piety. He repeatedly broke off our conversation to pray. Throughout the flight during which we met, he held the Koran in his lap, quoting from it to support his utterances. Readily setting forth his general conception of the world order, he spoke of Islam as the true worldview and of the Shariat as a moral code of universal significance. He predicted a total retreat of heterodoxy and a religious renaissance in the Asian republics of the Soviet Union. And he said he was certain his country would grow stronger through spiritual unity and military power.

I could have left out that episode had not General Shah belonged, as I learned afterwards, to a fairly influential alignment now known everywhere as fundamentalism. This faction worked quietly but perseveringly and effectively to strengthen its positions and succeeded somewhat later in promoting a man like Zia ul-Haq to the post of head of state.

SUCH WAS PAKISTAN at the time, and such it still is in large measure. A most intricate intertwining of vestiges of medieval practices, manifestations of historical distinctiveness and religious intolerance and, along with this, the military political influence of the West make Pakistan a multicoloured and multifaceted country. Most of the problems which all this created for Soviet missions were hard to solve and often took an unexpected turn. However, my general description of the situation would be far from complete unless I mentioned an equally important aspect of it, namely, signs of entirely different sentiments, including a nascent interest in relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This was attested by expanding contacts with the leadership of the country, the top echelon of the administration, businessmen and intellectuals. An important role was played by the oil-prospecting agreement which we had signed earlier, evoking a wide echo across the country. The appearance in Karachi of a large group of Soviet specialists as well as of airline pilots, to say nothing of the Embassy itself, attracted public attention and was commented on by the press. It acquired political significance and prompted a search for paths leading to cooperation,

in particular trade. The outlook for more extensive cooperation was all the more favourable because the President himself, Marshal Ayub Khan, was for it.

His readiness for durable contacts with Soviet representatives helped us get to know him better both officially and personally. And it soon emerged how very trite and simplistic our notion of the President had been. He had nothing in common with the standard type of military dictator, of one who had become an absolute ruler by directly seizing power. A graduate of Sandhurst, the British military academy, he stood out from the Pakistani top military as an educated man possessing ample erudition. Adherence to Islam did not make that "Europeanised" leader a religious fanatic, a stubborn and submissive supporter of petrified dogma. Nor did it diminish his interest in the international situation, including the formation of the socialist world and the growing influence of the Soviet Union. He saw our country as a next-door neighbour and favoured balanced relations with it. He further satisfied himself of the need for this after visiting the Soviet Union and acquainting himself with the achievements of Soviet Central Asia. What impressed him particularly was that he, a professional soldier, was enabled to familiarise himself with some facilities of the Soviet Armed Forces, an opportunity which very few foreigners were offered at the time.

However, it was not easy for the President to decide to visit the Soviet Union, as far as I can say. Before making up his mind on this, he invited me to his office for a tête-à-tête talk which lasted over three hours. He asked me for detailed information about our country and its various religions, the population's likely attitude to him during possible contacts with it, and so on. He admitted that he knew little about us but would like to preclude "regrettable misunderstandings" during his stay in our country. He gave this as the reason for the curious question whether we expected our guests at official receptions to drink vodka by all means and how far our cuisine differed from its Western counterpart.

The political part of the conversation became a detailed dialogue during which President Ayub Khan said he was resolved to open a new chapter in Pakistani-Soviet relations and to come to terms with the Soviet leadership in this sense. He virtually admitted that his line was meeting serious resistance which largely tied his hands.

During another conversation, which took place after his visit, the President said that his impression had surpassed all his expectations and that the prospects of cooperation were greater than he had believed. He had seen in Uzbekistan many things which reminded him of his own country: a similar climate, the same agricultural problems, similarities in language, culture and religion. He also pointed out the two countries' territorial proximity.

The idea of Pakistani-Soviet cooperation was being vigorously promoted by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, included in the government on Ayub Khan's initiative and originally entrusted with economic problems. Bhutto did well as a hard-working minister, which set him apart from the President's entourage. He did not belong to the military leadership. Educated at one of America's most renowned universities and at Oxford, he had a sound knowledge of the humanities. He took an interest in socialist doctrines and was fairly conversant with them. His private library included writings by the founders of scientific communism. He was in the public eye thanks to both his forceful speeches and his uncommon deeds, including preparations for donating the sizable lands he had inherited to peasants. He was full of ideas about restructuring the state, in particular by doing away with its archaic traits. Bhutto declared for ending his country's unilateral dependence on the West, for rapprochement with the Soviet Union and China, for a bigger role for Pakistan among developing countries. He

was fast becoming a prominent politician and a leader of the new generation that was getting ready to take over from the military and landed oligarchy brought to power directly by foreign colonisers. In the context of Pakistani reality, he was certainly entitled to being considered a progressive, one of the founders of the mass movement for a democratic Pakistan. It was only logical that subsequently he became Prime Minister and President of Pakistan.

The progressive trend in political thinking was gaining ground in various forms, exerting a certain influence on civil servants and intellectuals. There was reason to consider that one of its supporters was Foreign State Secretary Dehlawi, who appreciated the idea of Pakistani-Soviet cooperation. He did his best to help put it into practice, overcoming difficulties over various problems. (Years later, he was replaced by Shahi, a frank saboteur.) Pakistani Ambassador to Moscow Marker did a very good job by fulfilling his duties with dignity and tact in a situation difficult for his country. Former commander of the Air Force Nur Khan, who afterwards became Director of PIA (Pakistani International Airlines), never shunned contacts with Soviet representatives. A man of great administrative talent and resolute action, he wielded considerable influence in both military and civilian quarters. There was also a family of big Ispahani businessmen who showed interest in expanding trade with the Soviet Union. No progress was made in either case due to the complete indifference of the Soviet government departments concerned. Yet I could add further names to the list.

Cooperation with us was favoured by many intellectuals, journalists and other people. They occasionally said so openly if somewhat timidly, but some of them, such as the poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, spoke out without hesitation. Our approach to ethnic problems drew the attention of Pakistani minorities, in particular the Baluchis. Be that as it may, a change was coming about in the attitude of both the public and the top leadership. It found expression, not only in the President's visit to the Soviet Union, but in several trips to Moscow by Bhutto as Foreign Minister; a visit to our country by a large parliamentary delegation representing a wide spectrum of opinion; frequent consultations at the Pakistani Foreign Ministry and its proposal for putting them on a regular basis and on the level of the two ministries' leaderships (the Pakistanis regarded Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin's visit to Karachi as a first step in this direction); the establishment of contacts with the Uzbek SSR; extended activities by the missions of the Novosti Press Agency and the Union of the Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations; steps towards organising cultural ties; the Pakistani government's consent to the opening of a Cuban embassy and to preparations for the opening of embassies of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary and to stepped-up activity by these countries' trade missions. As a result, Pakistan may be said to have opened a window looking on the socialist world. For its part, the latter was offered prospects for friendlier relations with one of the leading states of the Moslem East.

While Pakistan's real potential for cooperation with socialist countries had yet to come into its own, its existence was evident already and promised a further extension of the area of mutual interest and benefit. Reality turned out to be somewhat different, however. Many initiatives were not fated to become reasonably effective factors for development, and part of the blame for this must be put on us. We allowed no geopolitical approach, condemning it as a manifestation of thinking foreign to our system. A fairly important circumstance was that at that time we looked on every step towards Pakistan solely from the standpoint of Soviet-Indian relations. We made uncalled-for explicit statements about the Kashmir problem, expressed unduly outspoken opinions on developments in

the then Eastern Province and made tactless remarks on some other occasions. The orientation of our media was out of keeping with reality: in commenting on the situation in Southeast Asia, they went on using criteria that, while firmly established, were becoming obsolete.

The idea of Soviet mediation in the settlement of the traditionally conflict-ridden relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the dispute over the Pathan problem, which threatened unpredictable consequences, was hopelessly blocked because of our red tape. A number of useful proposals made by Bhutto during his terms of office as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister found no response. Our scientific community turned a deaf ear to the Pakistanis' call for joint measures to combat salinisation. The indifference of our foreign economic agencies, primarily the Ministry of Foreign Trade, became an insurmountable barrier to improving economic relations with Pakistan. We constantly infringed the terms of deals and delayed deliveries of equipment, whose quality was not merely low but such as to make its use in tropical conditions downright impossible. These shortcomings were set off by the fairly successful commercial activity of the missions of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, which entered the Pakistani market for the first time like us but showed an enviable flair for business. People were surprised at our lack of initiative—indeed, our own trading officials found it hard to understand. The requests they directed to their departments were ignored, and this tied the hands of the fairly large and competent staff of our trade mission.

Nor were the Pakistani side's persistent requests for improving the working mechanism of the oil-prospecting agreement to receive proper attention on our part although similar requests came from our own geologists who were doing their duty in Pakistan conscientiously and professionally but were badly in need of better technical facilities. For a long time, our country refused to respond in any way to a request for the construction of a steel plant. And it was only extreme circumstances that compelled Aeroflot to stop offering PIA unequal terms at talks with it on our using Karachi airport.

At a certain juncture in that period of Soviet-Pakistani relations, the situation as a whole could have changed sharply but did not. The point is that during its visit to the Soviet Union (fall 1964), the Pakistani parliamentary delegation was received at the Black Sea resort of Pitsunda by Nikita Khrushchev. The meeting, which lasted long, was lively and aroused interest on both sides. When it was over Khrushchev asked the Foreign Ministry officials present to stay and declared for steps to vitalise Soviet-Pakistani relations. Warming up as the discussion, which was interesting, went on, he condemned the Ministry's tendency to proceed with "unjustified sluggishness and unnecessary caution" and said he wanted relevant draft documents to be submitted to him in the near future. But it so happened that no time was left for preparing them. The Pitsunda meeting took place just before Khrushchev was removed from the political scene, after which life took an entirely different course. The ex-leader's suggestions never translated into guidelines, and what is more, any mention of them was perceived as being out of place.

That attitude was particularly unwarranted at a time when, generally speaking, the bias which official Pakistani quarters as well as large sections of the Pakistani people had against the socialist world showed signs of losing ground. Besides, the world had stopped looking on Pakistan as a historical accident and was beginning to treat it in the same way as other third world countries similar to it. In Pakistan itself, forces willing to desist from absolutising the religious factor and seek stronger national independence had entered the political scene.

True, certain other internal forces stepped up their resistance. They were bent on preventing Pakistan from taking a new road and wanted it not only to stick to ties established earlier but to further them. Pakistani fundamentalism came to realise the growing influence of this trend in neighbouring countries and set about extending its relations with them, thereby receiving spiritual and material support from them.

Also, the prospect of closer Soviet-Pakistani relations, while still hazy, was distasteful to Pakistan's Western allies and unquestioning advocates of a pro-Western orientation for that country. It led to increased covert sabotage by the officialdom and the more conservative members of the religious community and landed proprietors. The latter were particularly alarmed by the Tashkent meeting in January 1966, which helped ease confrontation between Pakistan and India and their traditional religious feud fomented by reactionaries.

Ayub Khan's age and deteriorating health cleared the decks for political intrigue. It culminated in his resignation and the appointment of General Yahya Khan, a colourless man, to the presidency. The change of leaders, the secession of the Eastern Province, which in March 1971 became the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the worsened situation in Kashmir and certain other developments made for instability in the attitude of the public and the top leadership. The ultimate strengthening of the latter's extreme right wing led to the emergence of Zia ul-Haq, who showed himself to be a refined petty tyrant. His rule was characterised by the adoption of some of the most antiquated standards of the Shariat, the execution of Zulfikar Bhutto and harassment of his family and some other people who did not suit the dictator. As a result, Pakistan was thrown back to where it had started and re-joined the ranks of military reactionary regimes. Its government and state apparatus, including the Foreign Ministry, were reshuffled accordingly. Pakistan swung to the right among developing countries, a change which came out at the UN and other international forums. The military oligarchy recaptured its role in the country, being encouraged by the gains of the fundamentalists in some other Eastern countries in the context of a general upturn in the activity of international reaction.

AS FAR AS the present state of Soviet-Pakistani relations is concerned, the alignment of forces around the situation in Afghanistan is their surest indicator. The past may therefore be described on the whole as a period of missed opportunities and unused initiatives. What was in the making in Pakistan was, in effect, the same political process as brought Indonesia, Egypt and some other countries to the forefront of international activity in earlier years. That process was broken off. The regime was fast becoming a strike force readily resisting all progressive trends in world development whatever their form, a stronghold of the bellicose Afghan opposition.

What about the outlook? Restoring the basis for fruitful Soviet-Pakistani relations is a perfectly feasible task. Pakistani reality has undergone some changes. The recent appointment of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister was indicative of the extreme complexity and contradictoriness of the political situation shaping up in Pakistan, of a definite vitality of the left-wing opposition seeking to rouse the people to a more dignified life and a fitting role in the international community.

But if progressive forces are to succeed in this sense, it is important for them to be able to consolidate and to work out a short-term as well as a long-term programmes that could attract the people. For the time being, there is no force on the Pakistani political scene behind which patriotic groups could begin rallying and whose activity could serve as

a catalyst in the crystallisation of national consciousness and the emergence of new ideas appealing to the people. Without this the government formed recently is bound to remain in bondage to the fundamentalists and drift where they steer it. An indication of this threat was the recent visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister to Washington and the agreements reached there. If the outcome of that visit was what we know from available sources, then it promises no advance towards delivering the country from obligations disastrous to it and hence towards settling the South Asian conflict endangering peace.

Besides, the Pakistani right shows religious and caste unity and the kind of cohesion typical of the military, and enjoys fairly strong support from without. This encourages it to act as a mercenary strike force abroad. Its approach to the population is outspokenly reactionary but because it is also concrete and comprehensible to the bulk of the almost illiterate population, it can provide the necessary influence, as life has shown, all the more so since calls from the right still meet no adequate resistance. Whether the patriotic forces will embrace the concept of new thinking in the not so distant future and succeed in raising the political consciousness of sufficiently large sections of the population is a question of importance to Pakistan along with many other questions. At this stage, nobody can answer them on the strength of a strict appraisal of realities and without recourse to reassuring guesswork, any more than he can forecast with certainty the further trend development in Pakistan with its manpower and military potential.

It is clear, however, that Islamabad's foreign policy line in the period ahead will depend not only on the alignment of forces in the country but on the international situation, primarily the state of Soviet-US relations. Be that as it may, that country with all its peculiarities is now part of the complex reality that has shaped up on our southern border, and its policy is one of the most sensitive detonators in today's explosive world.

Extraordinary Mission in Moscow

Yulia PROSKUROVSKAYA

IN 1863, when the Civil War in the United States was at its height, Russian naval squadron called at the New York and San Francisco ports. Their visit was regarded as a major international event, causing wide repercussions in many countries. It was highly spoken of in the Lincoln government. The stay of Russian seamen in the United States was not only of military significance—it greatly influenced the diplomacy of the major powers at that time.¹

Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, who later became a famous composer, served as a naval cadet on board one of the ships during that visit. He wrote in a letter to Miliy Balakirev, a composer and conductor: "In New York we received a warm welcome, we were invited to dinners and dancing parties; visitors and fuss never ended". Letters and resolutions adopted at meetings expressing sympathies for Russia, addressed to the Russian squadrons, arrived from various parts of the United States.

Russian seamen struck up useful acquaintances. They were shown the latest weapons and were told how naval operations were carried out. Greeting the seamen after the long voyage, US Ambassador in St Petersburg Cassius Clay said Russia was a great power in the East and the United States was a great power in the West and, having no opposite interests, they should inevitably be guided by the laws of rapprochement. Different forms of rule do not necessarily cause antagonism, he went on. Ever since our birth as nations we have always been friends. This was in our common interest, he declared.

Apart from promoting greater understanding and cooperation between the two countries, the Russian seamen's stay in America caused an unprecedented growth in interest in Russia and everything Russian.

Many years passed and one of the seamen made this comment on the effect that visit had on the relations between the United States and Russia: "The Russian seamen have earned the historical gratitude of their people for the fraternal friendship they won in North America and brought home to Russia".

Two American squadrons paid return visits to Russia in 1866 and 1867.

IN THE LAST MORNING of July 1886 the St Petersburg newspaper *Nedelya* (Week; carried quite an unusual report—a US squadron had come to Kronstadt.

The decision to send a squadron to Russia headed by Under Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox had been made by the US Congress in May 1866.

Gustavus Fox (or John William Fox, as Muscovites called him) was a well-known and remarkable person. He was born in Massachusetts, joined the Navy in 1836 as a naval cadet at the age of 17, and took part

¹Yulia Proskurovskaya, a journalist, is an expert on the history of Moscow.

in the war against Mexico. He carried out dangerous government missions, transporting troops to Veracruz, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in 1851. He retired in 1856, married and took up commercial business. In 1861 he was again called to the colours by President Abraham Lincoln who appointed him Under Secretary of the Navy. His honesty and broad knowledge proved of great use to the United States. It was he who played a decisive part in the purchase of Alaska by America from the tsarist government in 1867. He occupied that post to the end of the Civil War. Then he visited Russia in 1866 at the head of the first special mission of the United States.

As soon as Russian diplomats reported to St. Petersburg from Washington that the United States wished to send a squadron to Russia, preparations to meet it began. On May 23, 1866, an order was issued from Tsarskoye Selo: "Give them a cordial Russian welcome; for that purpose draw up a programme of reception, and all the money required for that shall be provided by the state treasury above the sum fixed by the credit." Rear-Admiral S. S. Lesovsky, the then chief commander of the Kronstadt port, was instructed to draw up a programme for the visit. The rear-admiral and his staff had been accorded a warm welcome in 1863, and now he had an honourable mission to "receive under your care our overseas friends and be their host".

The welcome ceremony took place, at last, at the Kronstadt port. The welcoming party was struck by Fox's modesty. "He was not wearing a splendid uniform, there was nothing in his clothes by which our public is used to recognise high ranking persons. He wore a grey coat and a grey hat, and he had a beard," wrote the *Nedelya*.

That was followed by a two-month tour of Russia. On June 27 the Americans were received by Alexander II in the Peterhof Palace and on August 9 the Russian emperor gave a dinner in honour of the Extraordinary Mission from America.

In St. Petersburg the Americans devoted much of their time to studying the Russian Navy. Nothing was hidden from them at the Admiralty on the Neva River—they were shown all the technical innovations in the Navy. In general, during the tour of Russia, wrote the *Pravoslavnoye obozreniye* (Orthodox Review), the envoy of the US cabinet and the other members of the mission tried to visit all places of interest—churches, state establishments and factories.

The reception of the "transatlantic friends" in the ancient Russian capital was most grand. Suffice it to say that the City Duma (council) allocated 10,000 rubles from "extraordinary funds" to it.²

At half past ten in the morning on August 12 the travellers arrived in Moscow. At the station they were welcomed by city mayor Alexander Shcherbatov and numerous representatives of the urban estates.

Of the thirty-two persons that had arrived in Moscow, twenty-one were deputies from Congress and ten belonged to the squadron commanded by Murray, the captain of "*Augusta*". The extraordinary mission was accompanied by US Ambassador to the Russian court Cassius Clay and Curtin, a secretary of the embassy. Besides, Rear-Admirals Lesovsky and Gorkovenko arrived with a deputation.

A military band played "Hail Columbia". The travellers were invited to go in open carriages to millionaire Kokorev's hotel on the Sofia Embankment (now the Maurice Thorez Embankment). People were lined up along the streets to greet the guests.

Kokorev's hotel, or the Kokorev Coaching Inn, as the Muskovites called it, was decorated for the guests' arrival with Russian and American flags, the national emblems of the two countries and the Moscow coat of arms. Kokorev allocated to the guests three entire floors of the hotel. He took no payment from the city authorities for that.

Kokorev's hotel was a remarkable place in its own way. At that time there was no other such hotel in Russia, and in Western Europe few hotels could rival it. The rooms were clean and elegant, with all the facilities the visitors could require. Suitably situated and comparatively cheap, the hotel was favoured by writers, artists and musicians who visited Moscow. Ivan Kramskoi, Ilya Repin, Peter Tchaikovsky, Anton Arensky, Dmitry Mamin-Sibiryak, Vasily Vereshchagin, Pavel Melnikov-Pechersky, and others used to stay there.

A picture gallery, the pride of the Kokorev Coaching Inn, was known not only in Moscow. About five hundred canvases by Russian and European painters were displayed there. In the early 1860s it was the only art museum in Moscow open to the public.

In the reading hall of the hotel a surprise lay in store for the guests: large portraits in gilded frames of Fox, Murrey and Beaumont. The portraits surprised them all right, for the men had not posed for the artist. It turned out later that at a party in St Petersburg architect Yevgraf Tyurin, unnoticed by the Americans, had made sketches, and then painted their portraits for Kokorev. "We have made 'copies' of you," said Kokorev, "knowing that we would have a sad moment of parting. So, your portraits will remain a pleasant memory of you for us."

The Americans walked about the hotel's courtyard, took a look into the storerooms and strolled on the boulevard along the bank of a by-pass canal. Then they were led up the hill from which they admired the sight of the Kremlin and the Vorobyovy Hills, amazed by the large number of churches there. The host explained that slightly to the right from where they were standing Napoleon I had admired Moscow, waiting, in vain, for the "key to the city"; and when he did enter Moscow, he found it deserted, doomed to be totally burnt down as a sacrifice to the ultimate salvation of the Motherland.

The first visit by the American guests was to the Moscow Governor-General, Prince Vladimir Dolgorukov (incidentally, in 1875 he was declared by the City Duma an honorary citizen of Moscow for his services to the city). The host greeted them amiably. Then, accompanied by the head of the city and the leaders of the Moscow estates, the guests went sightseeing, visiting the Kremlin cathedrals, climbing the Ivan Belfry, and were shown the Imperial Palaces and the Armoury. They were shown around the Temple of Our Savior which was then under construction. The ancient Russian capital greatly impressed the Americans; many of them saw such ancient monuments for the first time. They stood for quite long in the Ivan Belfry, admiring the large panorama of the city below them.

In the evening that day the Moscow Governor-General gave a dinner in honour of the American guests. The Governor-General's house in Tverskaya Street (the Moscow City Council is now there) was elegantly decorated with flowers, garlands and flags. The dinner was served in a big hall. During the dinner an orchestra conducted by Saks played Russian and American music. "There was no end of speeches," wrote Vladimir Odoyevsky who was invited to the dinner, in his diary, "which lost a great deal because the English speeches were translated into Russian and vice versa... When the Americans went out on the balcony, the people shouted 'Hurrah!'."

"However," wrote *Nedelya*, "the Americans were given the grand reception not by the Moscow population, but only by those who were the first in rank, of exalted station and wealth..."

That first night in Moscow the guests watched fireworks in the city Zoo. The firecrackers were shot from the boats in the middle of the pond, from its opposite shore, and went down in a rain of sparks and varicoloured stars, and the girandoles made a deafening noise.

The next day they went sightseeing around Moscow for the second time. They made a trip to the country in coaches driven by teams of three and four horses. The harnesses were decorated by pendants and bells. The Americans liked the harnesses which were totally new to them. They visited the historical former place of execution and the rows of shops known as Gostiny Dvor. After that they went to Petrovskoye-Razumovskoye through the Tver Gate and paid a visit to the Petrovskaya Agricultural Academy. They crossed the Petrovsky Park and went past the palace to the Khodynsky Camps, where an army choir sang Russian military songs for them. The Americans returned to the city through the Presnya Gate and visited the factories of Ganeshins and Guebner in the Maiden Field, and also the Maiden Convent, which still exists and is better known today as Novodevichy (New Maiden) Convent.

That same day the Americans were invited to dinner at the City Duma. Representatives of all estates arrived to treat the guests. The façade of the house in Vozdvishenka Street (now Kalinin Avenue 6) was decorated with the flags of the two countries. "The four halls of the General and Administrative Councils turned into splendid, refined salons decorated with flowers. The conference hall of the General Council, where the tables were set for the dinner, was most luxuriously decorated..." The dinner began at seven o'clock and continued until eleven. "Many, very many speeches were made and numerous toasts were proposed to the health of the Russians and Americans at the dinner, and a good deal was eaten and drunk..." The toast proposed in Russian by secretary of the North-American mission Curtin was especially pleasant: In Russia, he said, there is a city around which many great recollections of Russian history and Russian life are concentrated. In that city a radiant thought about the unity of the Russian state was born. When I recall, he said, that for several centuries the city was the stronghold of Russian power, and that in the hard days, when others lost courage, it didn't, and when I recall how it met its enemies, or when I feel how it receives friends, I can't help saying: Great Moscow, I bow to you.³

The medical inspector of the Moscow Military District said in his speech that the courageous American doctors who took part in the 1853-1856 Crimean War, helping wounded Russian soldiers should ever be remembered. "About 30 excellently trained doctors crossed the ocean to extend philanthropic aid to our heroes," he said. "They were stopped neither by the long distance nor by their ignorance of the Russian language and our administrative institutions, nor by typhus and cholera, those inevitable concomitants of war; they were led to us solely by compassion and the wish to be useful to the people, whose historical fate has so much in common with their fate!"

We now know that forty-three American surgeons arrived in Russia at that time. They worked along with Russian doctors and nurses, and knew no sleep and rest, nearly dropping from exhaustion. Many years later L. Reed, a surgeon from Pennsylvania, with pride recalled in the conversations with his colleagues that at that time his work had won him the approval of Pirogov, the 'wonder doctor'. Russian and American surgeons saved the lives of thousands upon thousands of wounded soldiers.

No less interesting was the speech made at the dinner by historian Mikhail Pogodin. He said: "Russia and America are close to each other, despite the immeasurable distance: America is within a stone's throw from Russia, they say! Telegraph has made our contacts faster, but there is a wire faster than the electric one and there is communication stronger than any metal or any diplomatic art can pass, communication in which, as a Russian saying goes, one heart sends a message to another. According to all scientific forecasts, a great future lies in store for Russia and

America, and we are entering this future with confidence and hope. So let the friendly alliance between Russia and America grow gradually from the area of ideals into the area of reality, so that we can walk side by side, so that in the American government, just as in the Russian one, the idea about the usefulness of cooperation on this glorious path to the certain progress of all mankind, of people of white, black, red, or bronzed colour, will blossom and bear fruit.

The Americans wanted much to see Russian rural life for themselves and to see the Russian landed estates, which were so numerous in the Moscow outskirts. Splendid palaces stood amidst luxurious gardens with greenhouses and all that the Russian gentry could fancy. During visits to Moscow the tsar's family stayed in these estates, which were the ancient possession of the Golitsin princes, the Sheremetyev counts, the Vorontsov-Dashkov counts, and princes Yusupovs and Naryshkins. Muscovites who rented peasant houses spent their summers there, and the villages were animated and lively.

Kuzminki, one of the most beautiful villages near Moscow, was shown to the Americans. Its owner at that time was Sergei Golitsin, a young officer of the Life Guard Hussar Regiment. After an hour's walk around the park the guests were invited to the dinner table served in the rotunda of a large house. The table was covered with numerous exquisite silver vases and girandoles. The orchestra, hidden from view on galleries, filled the hall with tunes of both nations. That was followed by the traditional fireworks, after which the Americans met with the local peasants. Gustavus Fox handed them an American flag. This is the flag of my country, he said, and it has the same colours as the Russian flag, only the colours are differently arranged. That flag had often been flying in battles, he said, but now it was a sign of peace and goodwill, and let the Russian peasant see in it a token of a friendly nation which sympathised with them in their noble efforts. "Tell your countrymen," answered the headman of the Kuzminki peasants, "that we value this friendship and that if any of you and us is faced with trouble, we shall defend each other against the enemy with might and main."

On August 15 the Americans visited the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, which served as a burial-vault for Moscow metropolitans and patriarchs. Also, military victories were celebrated and Russian tsars and emperors were crowned there. The guests visited the Education House in Solyanka Street—a home for orphans, foundlings and "illegitimate" children. (This house, luckily, has been almost completely preserved, and now houses the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy.)

The Americans walked along the most ancient streets of Moscow—the trade and business street called Varvarka (now Razin street). They observed the construction of business offices, huge for that time, of Russian capitalists who maintained commercial ties with their Western partners. They visited the former palaces of the Romanov boyars—a part of the group of buildings of the Old Court of the Sovereign which had been built in the 17th century. Then the guests were shown around the Moscow zoo and the botanical gardens. They showed the greatest interest in animals indigenous to Russia. In commemoration of their visit, they planted four American trees, which had been taken from a nursery. In the evening that day the American guests were invited to take part in festivities in Sokolniki.

No visit of Moscow was complete without a tour of Trinity St Sergy Lavra, a monastery so closely related to the ancient Russian capital. So a special express train left at 10 o'clock a.m. to take the guests to the Trinity Monastery. On the way Fox read a detailed description of Trinity St Sergy Lavra specially translated for him. Americans were met by the local authorities and after a brief rest they went to the Gethse-

mane Skit, a summer residence of Metropolitan Filaret who had said he wished to receive the "overseas guests of the Russian people". In memory of the visit, he presented pictures of Lavra and Skit to the ambassador. They also visited a wooden church whose walls were built of cypress wood, and the caves. When in Lavra, they visited the Trinity Cathedral, the famous sacristy, the tomb of Boris Godunov, and also the Assumption Cathedral, where the restoration of wall icon painting was nearing completion, the Moscow Religious Academy, and the school of drawing and icon painting.

On the last evening of their stay in Moscow the Americans attended a performance at the Bolshoi Theatre.

On August 17 they left Moscow for Nizhni Novgorod where they wanted to visit a local fair. After that they went on to Kostroma and other Russian cities.

After the American mission departed from Moscow, the Moscow City Duma announced this decision on August 25, 1866: "On the occasion of the arrival in Moscow, at the invitation of the city community, of the mission of the North-American States, and as a sign of special respect to Mr Ambassador Fox, through whom so vivid mutual sympathy between the Russian and American peoples has been displayed, the Duma shall recognise Mr Fox to be an honorary citizen of Moscow."⁴ The patent to the title of an honorary citizen of Moscow and the case in which it was placed are now on display at the National Museum of the United States. They had been handed over to it by Fox's widow, along with other gifts.

Those were real works of art. "The patent, drawn by Shervud, was decorated with ancient Russian ornaments, and the case was made under the supervision of Mr. Sazikov, one of the most famous silverware producers, with the use of purely Russian materials," wrote Alexander Shcherbatov, the Moscow mayor, to Admiral S. S. Lisovsky in 1871. In the centre of the paper sheet was the text framed by pictures of the Kremlin towers, under which the domes of the Kremlin churches and the monument to Minin and Pozharsky were pictured in medallions, and an ancient emblem of Moscow featuring a horseman piercing a dragon with a spear—St George Victorious.

The American seamen were enchanted by the country and the people who had expressed sincere amity towards them. Leaving Russia in September 1866, Gustavus Fox said that, like a bee collecting honey from flowers, they were gathering the sweetness of Russian cordiality, and now they would come back home full of sweet recollections of the sincere friendship of this great nation. We shall bring home with us the sweet burden of what we feel, he said.⁵ The Americans asked to convey to their numerous friends cordial gratitude and to express hope that they would soon be able to make a reciprocal move. To fulfil the guest's wish, the Admiralty used the services of the press, since the Americans "have left a large number of friends all over our vast country".

Next year, in 1867, the American squadron commanded by famous admiral Farragut was received in Russia with the same hospitality. That was a time in the history of both nations when they lived one life, and America shared its fears and joys with Russia.

Summing up the visits by the American missions to Russia, the Russian papers wrote then: "Now we are just beginning to know our overseas neighbours; the ties between us are rather weak yet, but they should inevitably grow strong, because Russians and Americans are natural friends and allies. Of course, no one knows the future, but the best

OPENNESS IN POLITICS

NEW POLITICAL THINKING is often associated with the activity of the Soviet state on the world scene over the past four years. It is an international phenomenon whose components include concepts advanced by thinkers and public figures of recent decades, the Russell-Einstein manifesto, Vernadsky, and other earlier thinkers.

What is new political thinking? Is it a concept or a code of principles complete in itself, an open-ended methodology of cognising the outside world or a mode of action on the international scene and inside the country?

These and other questions were discussed at our Guest Club by

Alexander Bovin, political commentator, *Izvestia*;

Alexander Chubaryan, Director, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History, and Corresponding Member of the Academy;

Professor *Vyacheslav Dashichev*, D. Sc. (Hist.), head of department, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System;

Professor *Fyodor Konstantinov*, D. Sc. (Phil.), leading researcher, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy;

Vladimir Pozharsky, chief councillor, Evaluations and Planning Directorate, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Victor Sheinis, D. Sc. (Econ.), leading researcher, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations;

Professor *Yuri Shishkov*, D. Sc. (Hist.), head of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations;

Sergei Sinitsin, head, Department of the Non-Aligned Movement, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

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Professor *Genrikh Trofimenko*, D. Sc. (Hist.), head of department, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada.

CATEGORIES OF NEW THINKING

Dashichev. Not so long ago, I read Helmut Schmidt's memoirs, *Powers and People*. They describe his meetings with Soviet, American and Chinese statesmen. Referring to the dualism of the nation-state and ideological components of Soviet policy, Schmidt writes that our country has carried forward tsarist Russia's tradition and that its foreign policy has been determined by old Russian trends and ideological considerations, the former accounting for two thirds of it and the latter, for only one third. Neither the character nor the content of the Soviet foreign policy concept would ever change irrespective of changes inside the country, even if perestroika were put into practice. Soviet policy would remain expansionist anyway. The West should reckon with this and frame its strategy accordingly. Schmidt's opinion is regrettably shared

by some other people prominent in the West, such as Henry Kissinger and, to an extent, President George Bush.

Dualism is a pivotal problem of our policy. In the early years of Soviet rule, Georgi Chicherin paid close attention to it. He wanted to separate nation-state interests from ideological ones. But I feel that subsequently, under Stalin, our policy shed its dualism and came to be pervaded by ideology. In other words, we moved from dualism to a complete unification and merger of nation-state and ideological interests. We equated the two groups of interests. I think the consequences were disastrous.

Trofimenko. What my doctor's thesis was to have dealt with originally was the theory of international relations. But afterwards I saw that this couldn't be done. It couldn't because in order to have a general theory, you must go on some universal entity, in this case the state, whose foreign political behaviour can be assessed by using certain universally applicable criteria. But such an approach was one of the question, say, ten years ago because at that time "we" were always good while "they" were always bad, and because "we" were peace-loving by definition while "they" were aggressive by definition. There could be no relations between us except a class struggle "to the victorious end". The theory of international relations could therefore be set out as only a theory of confrontation and conflict between the two systems, between the two blocs, and not as a theory of behaviour, of reciprocal communication between individual subjects of international relations in a multiform but basically integral world, with the main laws of international conduct binding on all.

Currently we hear in the course of debates that state-to-state relations are one thing and relations between societies something else. This is right. But look at how the case was put in the past. The state was said to embody the ruling class. Our state was described as proletarian and the Western state, as a bourgeois state serving solely the bourgeoisie. And therefore a class struggle was said to be going on in the international arena, taking the form of a struggle between states. Peaceful coexistence was declared a particular form of the class struggle. By now we've dropped this proposition from our theory. But many moot points remain. It is maintained, for example, that relations between states must be deideologised while international relations must remain ideologised. Yet more often than not, our politicians and theorists use the concepts of "international" and "state-to-state" relations interchangeably.

Chubaryan. A major task today is to rid well-known, old concepts of a standard approach, of a bigoted vision. But we can't simply get away from old concepts. We now say we must bring morality and law into international relations. It follows that we didn't have this before, didn't devote ourselves to it. Yet it is an ever-present aspect which we must now give a new content.

The same goes for the problem of contradictions between the two world systems and worldviews as a historical reality. The problem of ideology is another objective reality. The ideological aspect has always accompanied humanity. It's there, now as in the past. Our task is to evolve on the basis of new thinking a foreign policy concept exempt from our earlier, outdated stereotypes, from the imperial thinking that pervaded our policy, and to deideologise relations between states.

New thinking is also a method, if you will. We need to form new concepts as we renounce myths and emancipate our historical consciousness. But this is not to say that the categories we've now evolved have simply abolished others. What do we mean by saying that universal interests have priority over class interests? This is a perfectly definite

concept. But it hasn't eliminated class interests. It's a question of priorities. When we speak of deideologising state-to-state relations we imply, I think, that we are looking for new dimensions and a new content for international relations.

We should realise that the world is more diverse and the situation in it more complicated than we imagined before. Take, for example, the term *internationalism*. We used to interpret internationalism as a line of our relations with socialist countries. Yet it is a broader concept. We are now working out some new concepts and dimensions of internationalism, of the internationalist as something global unlike the national.

Konstantinov. When speaking of new thinking and perestroika, we often tend to reject all, or almost all, that we had in the past, saying, in effect, that everything was bad in the past, that we did everything the wrong way or did nothing but commit crimes, and so forth. To be able to promote and inculcate new thinking, we don't at all have to reject or blacken all that we had earlier. Today we are urged to fill the "gaps" in our history. We must fill them by all means. But it's wrong to take a negative view of all that needs clearing up, as some do. Unfortunately, we did many bad things and made many mistakes in the past. But we mustn't rummage endlessly in our past, mustn't put the blame for all our blunders and miscalculations upon it. The time has come to answer for what we are doing now. This is the first point I wanted to make.

Now for a second point. We often look at the past from the angle of our current potentialities and our present situation. This is also true of our foreign political contacts. But they don't depend on us alone—they also depend on our partners. After all, we were in complete isolation. We weren't recognised, were ignored and tested by resorting to arms and economic blockade. Some go as far as to say that there was no need for the revolution, for collectivisation or industrialisation, for a class approach. Here, again, it's a question of the period, of the conditions prevailing at the time. The fact that we can now give priority to universal values doesn't imply that we could have done so before. We've changed and so has the world, which now treats us differently. This means that we, in turn, must change our attitude to the outside world, in line with new thinking.

Creative development of our theory has an important part to play in spreading new thinking in our country and the world. Marxist-Leninist theory is now said—fairly often and rightly—to be experiencing quite serious difficulties. The reason is that some theorists dogmatically repeat certain propositions which have had their day. There is, for example, the one about the merger and abolition of nations. Try and mention it somewhere today to see the response. Or take the thesis about subordinating national to internationalist interests. It was widely used as a rationale for the diktat of central departments contrary to the interests of republics and led to negative developments in interethnic relations. And what about the issue of national and state sovereignty? Opposing sovereignty on the plea of upholding "internationalist", universal or supranational interests can hardly earn us credit. There's another way out. We must and can add a new important postulate to the concept of sovereignty. We must state that sovereignty implies, not only the right of every people to choose path they want their development to follow, their leaders, and so on, but the right to enter into alliance with other peoples, nations or states and maintain with them the kind of relations they consider necessary. This would allow scope for setting up diverse interethnic bodies without encroaching on the sovereignty of the people or state concerned.

Truly, nothing can be more practical than a sound theory. This is why we need so badly to carry forward the scientific theory of transforming human society on new social foundations in order to make widespread use of new political thinking and heighten the political culture of society.

Sheinis. I'm convinced that to criticise Stalinism today is to repeat what has already been said, at least in regard to scientific knowledge. To criticise Stalinism from the standpoint of the need "to return to Lenin, to the origins", means heading for a dead end, or so I believe. It isn't that I would like to equate Stalinism with Leninism, as the West occasionally does. Leninism is a complex and multiform phenomenon brought into being by a period of history. But some fundamental postulates of both Marxism and Leninism call for a review today. I fully share the ideas about the existence of parallel systems in today's world and wish to add something to it.

Ever since we took exams as students, we've been accustomed to regard human progress as a succession of socio-historical formations. This view is acceptable and helped bring out certain aspects of the past. But now that the 20th century is drawing to a close, we must recognise the existence of the different theoretical coordinate system in which the socialist revolution of 1917 will be seen as a form or an attempt to end a social and economic lag in line with the socialist doctrine by countries which advanced in the second echelon of a new period, seeking to solve their problems within a definite ideological framework. This was regarded as replacing the capitalist by the socialist formation. People thought so at the time but today something else is coming to the fore. In that way an attempt was made to overcome backwardness. At a certain stage, it helped in rapidly raising a mainly agrarian country using mostly pre-industrial production forms to an industrial level, if not the highest.

Experience has shown that further progress was blocked by precisely those modes and forms of organising the economy that allowed a leap to be taken at a certain stage. In this sense, the gap between our system and the West became qualitative once again. It may have been qualitative on the eve of 1917 or in the early postrevolutionary years but ceased to be qualitative in prewar and the early postwar years since both we and the West were at the industrial stage. It is qualitative again today, for if we leave the economy and social relations intact we cannot expect to rise to the level of scientifically organised industry.

Bovin. I think we Marxists should raise the question of a crisis of Marxism. We shouldn't fear the word *crisis*. It's a natural stage in the evolution of any science if and when it stops answering questions posed by reality.

Look at contemporary imperialism. You can't understand it if you keep to the five characteristics formulated by Lenin. Had these characteristics been valid, no disarmament or demilitarisation would have been possible.

Or take capitalism's current problems. The system has undergone a thorough restructuring since the war. We used to enclose the word transformation with quotation marks to shut off the essence of the transformation from ourselves. Capitalist leaders have actually borrowed planning, economic programming and the principles of social infrastructure from socialist and social democratic theory and practice and combined them with market principles and democracy far better than we.

And what about the crisis of world socialism, which is obvious now and involves practically the whole socialist world?

Seventy years after the revolution, we are asking ourselves just what socialism is. We are told that we must return to "Lenin's concept of socialism". A naive idea. That concept implies, unless we reduce it to some statements by the "latter-day" Lenin, a marketless economy, a maximum of regulation, no sharing of power. What we need to do is not "return" but advance in theory and practice and live as we see fit.

"Marxists"—we must use inverted commas this time—have written thousands of books and articles but life and history have largely been following a different course. We need a revolution in Marxism, such as would place it in a new historical orbit.

Here is an analogy. Early in this century, Newtonian physics was succeeded by the physics of Einstein and Planck. The latter didn't nullify classical physics but merely indicated the sphere of its application. This is apparently what we should also expect of the "non-classical" Marxism of the 21st century. It will not renounce the intellectual legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin but will go further, relying on this legacy yet bearing in mind the limitations imposed on it by its day.

Shishkov. In searching for a new foreign policy doctrine, we see an important task in ascertaining how correct it is to extend the class character of the interaction of the two existing socio-economic systems to relations between states. There is the thesis that class preferences and emotions should be kept out of these relations. But it's obvious that foreign policy can't discount the real nature of relations between socialism and capitalism as historically different production modes. If these relations are truly antagonistic in class terms, the states concerned cannot but express this character of relations between the two systems, cannot pursue a purely departmental policy of their own, for the state has always been and will remain a political weapon in the hands of the ruling classes of the given society. A state neutral in class terms is as much of an absurdity as, say, a peaceful artillery in the hands of two armies fighting against each other.

It follows that the character of relations between states belonging to different social systems can only change as the result of a change in the character of the totality of relations between these systems as such. As this tandem is inseparable, some analysts propose rejecting the very concept of the struggle between the two systems as an ideological dogma invented by Stalin. This is doubly wrong. First of all, the idea of the coexistence of the two property systems as a particular form of the class struggle was conceived by Lenin. In the 1920s, he said on more than one occasion that the policy of trading concessions and economic cooperation with capitalism "too is a kind of war, a duel between two methods, two political and economic systems—the communist and the capitalist". And he added, putting it still more explicitly: "While capitalism and socialism exist side by side, they cannot live in peace: one or the other will ultimately triumph—the last obsequies will be observed either for the Soviet Republic or for world capitalism".¹

Secondly, it's really irrelevant who said what, for the point is that early period of the coexistence of the two social systems was *actually* and completely taken up by a life-and-death struggle between them. The West did all it could in an attempt to strangle the new-born society in its cradle by resorting to armed intervention, economic blockade and political isolation, inciting Hitler to fight us, and so on. We in turn did everything possible to kindle the flames of a world proletarian revolution. Let's recall our inglorious march on Warsaw, the founding of the Comintern and the Communist Youth International, our vast propaganda effort, and so forth. Those are facts of history.

This "innate" hostility to each other has very definite social and economic roots. It was due to objective realities, not to political or

ideological mistakes on either side, even though the latter played a notable part. There is no "rejecting" this common past of ours; any more than the nightmare of Stalinist terror inside the country. Both arouse the historical memory of peoples, to say nothing of the memory of politicians and diplomats.

However, it isn't a question of the past alone. We can hardly consider that all objective reasons for class confrontation between existing socialism and existing capitalism have disappeared. Hence it would be thoughtless, to say the least, to simply stop looking on the relations between the two systems as class relations whereas the leading countries of either of them are permanently threatened with nuclear missiles by their historical adversary.

This ticklish situation can be ended by grasping two objective circumstances and by giving them expression in foreign policy. One of them is that the world is on the brink of nuclear self-annihilation and ecological collapse and faced with many other equally global if less disastrous problems affecting all countries. These universal interests are more serious and important than the particular interests of either one of the social system, no matter how progressive they consider themselves. John K. Galbraith has said that after a nuclear war, even the most fanatical ideologists would be unable to see any distinctions between capitalism and communism. The only way to defend the interests of a social system today is to couple their defence with that of the interests of humanity. In other words, while class priorities in foreign policy remain, they are subordinate to universal priorities.

On the other hand, confrontation between class priorities is losing in intensity, for by taking a more sober approach to capitalism, we've discovered that socialist elements are increasingly becoming part of life in capitalist countries. We've also discovered that real socialism is still a thing of the future for us, a goal we can only attain by using many "capitalist" elements in economic management and even in the sphere of property, such as joint stock. Looming ever larger, therefore, is the prospect of the two systems, which nervously eye each other, advancing in one and the same direction, towards a postcapitalist society, each following its own road. Growing awareness of this objective factor is bound to gradually reduce the contrast between the class priorities of the East and the West.

Thus the task is not to formally cancel the class character of the foreign policy of socialist or capitalist powers or to diplomatically "forget" them but to take a truly dialectical approach to historical realities and proceed accordingly.

Bovin. I agree that world development trends are changing. Indeed, the classical Marxist thesis is that capitalism outgrows itself and is succeeded by a new stage of world development, socialism. If this thesis is still valid—we still believe it is—then the antagonism between the two systems is an objective reality because one society inevitably forces the other out of the historical process. This implies that no matter how the share of universal values and interests grows or what we do to deideologise state-to-state relations, this reality remains an antagonism underlying politics.

And now let us imagine that the two systems join in the process in parallel with each other and not consecutively, finding themselves in "non-linear space" as it were, in which parallels do intersect. Could this process be off to a start, with both capitalism and socialism changing? Is it leading to a gradual synthesis of the principles of 1789 and 1917? Be that as it may, this non-classical formula shows no inherent logical contradictions.

The character of both classes and the class struggle is changing in the new, "non-classical" frame of reference. We are partly witnessing this already, for elements of a national consensus play an increasing role in class relations in developed capitalist countries.

We have reason to speak of the formation within this coordinate system of a kind of universal "deideologised ideology" of a global nature.

We may be living through a period of transition, with old trends still operating but gradually losing in significance while other trends are emerging but have yet to win a noticeable role in the world process. Taking place is a replacement of "paradigms", to use a fashionable phrase, and this process will last fairly long.

Stupishin. The criticisms we've heard here merely underline the importance of a foreign policy theory. There can be no doctrine in the absence of a theory, and without a theory an integral and adequate policy is unthinkable. To be frank, we still have a tremendous amount of work to do in reinforcing our foreign policy theoretically for all the advances made of late. This must be why our policy remains purely pragmatic in many areas.

We certainly need to criticise our past, meaning both theory and practice. But in doing so, we must build something new. This calls for scientific courage, breadth of vision and an ability to analyse reality from new positions. In other words, we need new approaches, and we have them already. Here is an example. Undoubtedly, the idea of a possible convergence of countries with differing social systems expressed in some of our recent periodical publications still seems very strange to many of us. But what if we approach the matter from the point of view of the European process developing in a way making possible integrational interaction of the two systems? I think there is a point in this approach, especially if it implies promoting relations between all who have been associated with our common European home in one way or another from time immemorial.

New approaches, new solutions and ideas often put people on their guard or even frighten them. It's an open secret that this was the reaction of many of our partners when we proposed "building" a common European home. They saw something incomprehensible in the idea because they believe they've had such a home for a long time. We've been living in this common home for at least 2,000 years. We quarrel, fight, make peace, do business, love, raise children, and so on, living in separate apartments but they're all in one house.

This is probably the starting point for weighing the idea. If we use it we're bound to come to the conclusion that we already have at least the foundations for a common home. Its real foundations are neither common interests nor even the Helsinki process. Common interests are a fine cementing material. But it's common values that must be seen as the blocks forming the foundations. They lie at the basis of common rules that should bind us all. The Helsinki accords represent the first code of these rules. The mechanism of evolving and applying them is the CSCE process plus bilateral cooperation. As for the foundations, they are made up of everlasting or at least lasting values—moral, intellectual, philosophical, cultural.

We can also find common values in the economy. They include necessity. Without these values there can be no serious integration of our economy into world economic structures. What we had until recently was that, say, many Soviet specialists who went abroad to work were unable to take realistic stock of the economic situation in the foreign country (even if it was a developing country) because all their knowledge came down to would-be theoretical propositions. We are now

beginning to recall at long last that competition, bankruptcy, profit and many other economic realities have technical rather than class significance. And we are coming to take an approach different from that of the very recent past to the concept of private ownership, which I regard primarily as a legal means of offering the individual an incentive to raise his labour productivity and manage the economy efficiently.

We won't learn to work productively until we see in all these economic and legal institutions the highly effective means which has enabled our West European neighbours to attain their present standard of living, and until we recognise these institutions, too, as common values, that is, values also applying to us. When this comes it will be much easier for us to get along with neighbours living in a common home with us or in other homes in various parts of the globe.

AIMS AND POSSIBILITIES

Chubaryan. There is an important concept which we mustn't overlook in evolving our foreign policy theory. I am referring to state or national interests. This is a very important matter. Theoretically, nation-state interests may clash with universal interests. Also, they may run counter to legal standards. The Foreign Ministry and our whole diplomatic service must therefore seek to harmonise nation-state with universal values and priorities. In the process they must remember that diplomacy is an area of collision between the most diverse state interests.

Our diplomacy is also faced with the problem of intimately linking the pursuit of our state interests to legal, moral and ethical issues. Before World War II and the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the absence of this link had dire consequences for Soviet foreign policy.

Diplomatic history abounds in infractions of moral and ethical principles, and our task now is to seek a new synthesis.

We also need an in-depth analysis of the interaction of home and foreign policy and should realise the dangers of a so-called double standard, of differing criteria for approaching domestic and international problems.

The reality of this interconnection is particularly evident now that perestroika and democratisation strongly influence our foreign political activity and that new thinking, which our country demonstrates on the international scene, also influences the solution of our internal problems.

Dashichev. I don't think we see deep enough into a highly important foreign policy principle which concerns every single country, strictly speaking. I mean the principle of correspondence between foreign policy goals and the possibilities of achieving them. It is this principle that we grossly violated throughout the postwar period, with the result that we had all other world powers opposing us. It was an unprecedented instance of both Russian and Soviet foreign policy practice even in the interwar period. Why did we do that? The main reason must have been the fact that ideological blinkers prevented us from pragmatically approaching foreign policy tasks. Prompted by the principles of internationalism, we worked to expand socialism's sphere of influence and to establish socialism in Eastern Europe after 1948 and then in the Third World. This was, strictly speaking, the basis of our policy. (Its conceptual principles were laid down before the war, and it was Stalin who did so.) We didn't stop to think of the likely response of the countries around us, particularly the great powers.

In pursuing our foreign political aims for many long years, we lost sight of the real opportunities for fulfilling them. Yet our possibilities proved very modest compared with those of the forces opposing us, with the result that we undermined our economy and confrontation with the West almost bled us white. I think this was one of the main reasons, not only for the input-maximising character of our policy, as Eduard Shevardnadze has pointed out, but for the present deplorable state of our economy.

Acting on the same logic, we advanced the principle of military strategic parity. We substantiated it by saying that, as a great power, we considered a power balance an incontestable law and must therefore maintain it.

This was a further infringement of the fundamental principle of correspondence between an aim and the real means of achieving it. What did we mean by insisting on military parity with all the forces opposing us? It was something both unnecessary and impossible. We only need forces that would enable us to defend ourselves, avert war and reject political blackmail. China has no parity with the United States and yet exists.

We, too, are now talking of reasonable sufficiency but we are unclear about it. Reasonable sufficiency is a departure from military strategic parity, as I see it. Nevertheless, our leaders often state that reasonable sufficiency is strategic parity but at the lowest level. But the West isn't going to lower this level, to make concessions to us. We must say clearly that reasonable sufficiency is a departure from strategic parity. We don't need parity, it's exhausting our strength without yielding any benefits because the West could raise the ceiling of military strategic parity in the event of a deterioration in relations, which means that we would have to try and reach that ceiling, thereby accentuating the input-maximising character of our foreign policy.

Trofimenko. I wish to touch on the problem of using various levers of exerting foreign political influence. It has been said here that previously we put a strong emphasis on the military lever. But we used it mainly as a psychological and ideological instrument. I would say that the dispatch of Soviet troops to Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 was ideological or psychological rather than purely military recourse to armed force. For the first time since the Second World War, we used our armed forces directly for combat operations when we moved them into Afghanistan.

In competing with capitalism, it was always we who chose both the main area of competition and the main criteria of success.

Originally that criterion was support from the masses. But the masses in capitalist countries didn't rise to accomplish a world revolution. And so we shifted the emphasis to social competition. "Everything for man, everything for his good"—such was the fundamental law of socialism as defined by Stalin. But we carried that competition so far as to start rationing soap.

When we realised that we had fallen behind on that aspect of competition we moved into the ideological sphere. We advanced the theory of the sharpening of the class struggle in the period of detente but used chiefly a crowbar in that struggle instead of arguments, and as for human rights, we always made a point of adding "so-called". All this was because, in line with the concept of an irreconcilable conflict, all of the country's forces found themselves concentrated on building up military potential. In the end we achieved strategic parity with the United States but it emerged that "parity" was just a further stage while the road of military competition is endless. If it ever reaches its end it will be the end of the civilisation we know, as the result of a

nuclear conflict. Had we shown greater respect for our scientific theory instead of reducing it to a set of slogans to be used at this or that juncture, we could evidently have avoided many mistakes.

Sinitsin. I believe the main shortcoming of our theoretical conception of Soviet foreign policy is a certain dissociation from objective world realities, with the emphasis on "negation" (renunciation of stereotypes, dogmas and dualism, of an anachronistic interpretation of internationalism, and so on) rather than on constructing a positive line of action with due regard to our national interests in the context of new political thinking.

We cannot build practical policy solely on our own concept of the world, on unilateral moves and concessions on our part, on "atonement for the past". We must take account of how other members of the world community—the more important of them—treat us in reality and not in words, what their aims are with regard to us, how far they are willing to reciprocate, on what terms they would agree to be our partners. We can hardly ignore in this connection persistent attempts by certain quarters in the West to weaken our international positions, "wind down" socialism in our country, separate some ethnic regions from it, disintegrate the socialist community, and so on. Of course, we shouldn't absolutise the significance of this circumstance, such as from the point of view of the need to persevere in promoting the detente process, but we must by all means realise that it runs counter to our national interests and therefore sets us definite tasks.

It would thus be a mistake, I suppose, to idealise or oversimplify the new stage which international relations have entered, or to divorce the aims of new political thinking from the actual conditions of their fulfilment. Seeing the overriding trend is one thing but looking at a particular historical juncture in terms of this trend and translating it into political action is another. The present stage is clearly no gift from heaven but a product of the previous stage and is still burdened with negative elements of the past, which certainly doesn't minimise the fundamental significance of our perestroika or Soviet initiatives as factors for an overall change for the better in the world.

And so I think it would be wrong to treat the exigencies of new political thinking and our national interests as mutually opposed in each particular case.

To cite an example, we've long called for dissolving NATO and the WTO on a reciprocal basis. Such a move would unquestionably be consistent with the spirit of new thinking. But it would be wrong to call for unilateral steps in this direction right now, that is, before reaching relevant accords with the other side. Doing so would be contrary to the national interests of the Soviet Union and other WTO countries. I don't think there is reason to regard statements by extremists in this or that socialist country concerning the Warsaw Treaty as a reflection of the national interests of the people in question. The same applies to certain declarations in some of our Union Republics, such as those of the Baltic, which are plainly prompted by nationalist sentiment and a desire to absolutise their constitutional rights while ignoring the interests of the country as a whole and the realities around us.

Or take the thesis about the Soviet Union's integration into the world economy. To be sure, in keeping with new thinking, we are restructuring the mechanism of our foreign economic ties as we seek more active and extensive participation for our country in the international division of labour. But in shaping a relevant policy, we must reckon with our actual potentialities and the fact that we still lag behind leading industrial powers on a number of major indicators and lines of development. Should we take a superficial approach to the problem,

this lag could further reduce our role in the world economy as a relatively weak partner, with all the ensuing economic and political consequences.

Sheinis. Many of us are positive that we are predestined by history, geography and what not to hold a definite place in the world by right and that we can't change overnight. We maintain that we have certain ties to certain forces which look to us for guidance, that we have various interests in the outside world. The question arises: What interests? It seems obvious that nobody today can really endanger our country's territorial integrity, form of government or anything else from without. There is no such threat although inside the country we are faced with a whole number of very serious dangers. It follows that what is meant isn't security interests.

Could it be the interests of our prestige? Such interests probably exist although I think they should be subordinate to other interests.

What about the interests of, say, economic growth, integration into the world economy, the acquisition of resources we need? Such interests do exist. But I would put the interests of perestroika first, for the fate of perestroika hasn't been decided yet. We still have to guarantee the success of perestroika, and the anxiety shown over this is well-founded. The main task of our foreign policy seen from this angle should, in my opinion, be to safeguard the interests of perestroika.

Dashichev. A word about the problem of relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. We have proclaimed the principle of free choice for every country. Mikhail Gorbachev has described this principle as universal. Hence it should also be applicable to socialist countries. But I feel that we still vacillate and don't seem to consider that this principle applies to relations in the socialist world. We ought to say, I believe, that it also applies to socialist countries, for the West sees our attitude to our East European partners as the touchstone of our foreign policy. If we were to state in no uncertain terms that this principle is also valid in the socialist world, this would end distrust and make it possible to improve our relations with Western powers.

I also think time has come to see the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia in a proper perspective. The Hungarians have already done so in regard to their country. What happened was a forcible attempt to suppress an aspiration to improve socialism, for we considered that all countries must adhere to a common model.

Speaking of the theory of socialist integration, I don't believe there can be any real integration without market relations. The market is the motor of integration, and as for the command methods of integration used in the past, they didn't help bring into being organic interconnections in the basic echelons of the economies of our countries. And so practice of the existence of the model of socialism that was evolved in the thirties and lasted until 1985 or is even still there prevented attainment of our main foreign policy aims and consolidation of the socialist countries. We'll have no integration for as long as there is no market of commodities, means of production, capital, labour and ideas.

Sheinis. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, I fully agree with Vyacheslav Dashichev, who says that we'll have to tell the bitter truth about the events of 1956 and 1968 sooner or later. In fact, the longer we evade issue, the harder it will be for us to put the pieces together. To allege that there's a fundamental difference between the reforms of those years and what is being said and done in our country today is an absurdity obvious to everybody, including those who say so.

I can't help mentioning the Third World. The situation there is fraught with great dangers, I believe. There is a tug of war going on—

I'm sorry to say we still can't give it up. This is probably a sphere in which we continue making mistakes. There is a state policy, of course, but it seems to me that we could defuse the situation to a degree by encouraging public opinion. This opinion expresses itself in, say, certain publications and shows very clearly that its stand on some complicated, involved issues differs from the official posture. I mean Iran, for one.

Trofimenko. To gain a correct idea of the problem of relations with our allies, we must go back to shortcomings in our theory. We went as far as to demote China overnight from the status of a socialist country to that of an "accomplice of imperialism" just because somebody in our country disapproved of certain aspects of Chinese foreign policy. Having no real political or economic reasons for it, we went as far to class this or that developing country as "socialist-oriented" just because its leader had spoken a few words in our praise to get credits or arms from us.

All our concepts relating to the social sciences are extremely ideologised. Nor is that all. Many of our alliances, for instance, are based on concrete international agreements. But we also have alliances, or quasi-alliances to be precise, with some countries which are based on purely ideological sympathy. Just because a Third World leader has declared himself a Socialist, we make him a *de facto* ally of our country, sometimes even in the absence of a treaty. The Americans drew earlier than we the conclusion that their allied commitments must be determined by the interests of their country and not the other way round. Yet our interests are often determined by nothing but our commitments, including purely ideological ones. This is why it's often difficult to tell our state interests proper from the real or alleged interests of our allies, who occasionally force their policy upon us.

We must revise our foreign political obligations. It might be useful to begin by putting our relations with allies on a stricter legal basis so as to be able to proceed from real and reciprocal treaty obligations and not merely from mutual understanding based on, say, relations between parties.

Sinitzin. With reference to the comments on the Third World made here, I think it would be wrong to base our policy on either "unreasoning internationalism" or a dry, culculated estimation of our limited material possibilities. In an integral, interdependent world, the pattern of our relations with the Third World mustn't be determined by economic factors alone, for all their importance. The truth is concrete, which means that in building economic ties with developing countries on the basis of equal rights and mutual benefit, we don't at all strip our relations with them, especially with those who need it, of the spirit of solidarity or, where necessary, political backing and material aid.

Our support for a progressive regime is occasionally described as an "unjustified investment". Yet the important social and political events which took place in the past in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and elsewhere were components of an objective process not started by us or the Americans but having primarily internal roots. Yes, we largely helped these countries defend their independence and sovereignty, and we know of their difficulties. But I don't think this means that new political thinking predetermines our "withdrawal" from these countries and a general winding down of our presence in the Third World. It's true, however, that currently the situation is more favourable to settling problems of such countries by political means, to removing them or lowering their intensity as well as that of our confrontation with the West. A case in point is the settlement begun in Southwest Africa and directly involving Angola, Cuba and South Africa as well as the United States

and the Soviet Union. I believe, therefore, that we'll go on developing friendly relations with these countries with due regard to their interests and ours and to general trends at regional and global level, without waiting for Uncle Sam's blessing despite the vast importance of Soviet-American relations.

Our varied ties and cooperation with the Third World are playing an important part in guaranteeing our international positions, which we must also treasure in the climate of new political thinking.

Chubaryan. The concept of a common European home implies, as I see it, that we must primarily come to look on ourselves as a component of European civilisation. Yet we maintained until recently that there was a thing like Europeanism which our socialist state had nothing to do with, a bourgeois cosmopolitan invention being promoted, moreover, by means of the idea of West European integration.

When speaking of the concept of a common European home, which is an objective reality, we mustn't forget that we live in a contradictory world. It's therefore impossible now to work out a new concept of complete interdependence and a complete vision of the world without encountering contradictions. The task is not to substitute a general prosperity euphoria for past struggles. When we set about evolving a new concept we must remember that there's the dialectic of contradictions. The main point is that we no longer want to interpret contradictions as struggle or confrontation. We must reach a synthesis or consensus making it possible to form a new mechanism of European community.

Pozharsky. I subscribe to what was said here about a European home and a European process.

For my part, I wish to call attention to the problem of disarmament and to join issue with those who overhastily class the theme among "exhaustible resources". That approach strikes me as too optimistic. Achieving in the near future the results we seek in the area of disarmament would be too much to expect. As for a world without weapons, it's rather a desirable but symbolic objective for us. I wish we could at least bring about a situation whereby both sides would be armed at a level enabling us to normalise our economy. Even our current military effort is too heavy a burden for it. The Americans, whose economy is more powerful than ours, consider even the present burden of armaments quite heavy, so what can anyone expect of us? We occasionally underrate this circumstance. Anything linked with disarmament that can be used to cut our military spending is most important. This line of our foreign policy should remain a priority.

The problem of dissuading our partners and opponents from casting us in an enemy image is closely linked with the problems of armaments, disarmament and a balance of armed forces. After all, our task is not so much to induce ourselves to adopt new thinking as to try and inspire others with it. The democratisation processes taking place inside the country belong in the same context.

Stupishin. I'm glad we have arrived at the problem of democratisation. The process under way in our country and the steps we are taking to create a law-governed state are bound to have a powerful impact on the international atmosphere. The subject is being discussed widely in our country today, except that the law-governed state is mostly identified with the judiciary and the existence of various laws. But the supremacy of law isn't enough. Nor is the supremacy of the rule of law, although there is no dispensing with it. Even a totalitarian state may consider itself law-governed (as did the Third Reich, for one), with the supremacy of totalitarian laws guaranteed by the entire power of a repressive system. Laws can be contrary to the rule of law even in a democratic state, including constitutional laws if they run counter to,

say, universally recognised principles and standards of international law.

We must advance to a democratic law-governed state from a civil society controlling the whole state machine. If we reach such roots or origins of civilian society as man's natural rights (some very important ones but far from all of them are reflected in the American Declaration of Independence, declarations of the French Revolution, and lastly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), we'll be able to build what I would call a democratic law-governed state. I wish to stress this because to talk about a law-governed state in abstract terms is to waste time. The idea has gone down in history. It may even be reactionary. I've already mentioned Hitler's games with a law-governed state. Earlier the same idea was put forward to justify monarchic rule. This is why I'm putting the emphasis on civilian society as a form of exercising people's sovereignty, which draws primarily on the natural rights of man and citizen for strength and legality. Civil society, in which human dignity and freedom of political choice as its concomitants reign supreme, is a society which limits itself by the rule of law and controls the state, specifying the latter's obligations to society on a treaty basis. The idea of social contract written into a constitution approved by the people isn't so very bad. People's sovereignty is exercised through the electorate and through deputies directly chosen by it. If we begin using real concepts of civilian society and natural rights we'll find in this area as well a great many general values very important to us. This is why we should look into the origins of man's existence, into the history of human society, into the positive experience gained by human civilisation over the centuries.

Pozharsky. My last comment concerns ecology. It's no easy subject for us. There are signs of a discrepancy between general declarations or even intentions made public at high level and what our government departments are doing day after day. We've lost much time in this respect. The environmental problem in our country is more acute than in practically all other developed countries for all that our territory is less densely populated. But while the problem is acute, we are doing little for the time being. By contrast, the United States, for instance, has ever since 1979 had a rule binding its citizens to equip their cars with catalytic converters. The European communities have adopted a similar decision and are carrying it out step by step. But with us such a thing is unthinkable for now.

We are not ready to support all the far-reaching initiatives in this field. But it's still unclear just how we are going to do it. And while it is our problem, of course, the manner in which we solve it will condition the impact of our international activity in favour of environmental protection. Meanwhile ecological problems are becoming more urgent all over the world.

Sheinis. A brief comment on the outlook, which has two aspects. First, we should realise that preserving civilisation in today's conditions is only one of the possibilities forming a package, for there are numerous threats to civilisation. I agree that the environmental danger must be put first. But regional conflicts are very dangerous, too. We may add to the list international terrorism, which threatens to trigger major cataclysms. We may also add the spread of disease and other things. From this point of view, there is a further outdated stereotype which wasn't mentioned here or was only mentioned in connection with some of its aspects. I mean the problem of national sovereignty. I'm not a science fiction writer and so don't visualise a world government which could solve all problems although the best solution in view of the complexity of the problems facing the planet would obviously be to

form a world government. This is plainly out of the question in the foreseeable future. But delegating to supranational bodies some functional bodies some functions involved in the exercise of state sovereignty is an imperative objective necessity.

Trofimenko. One other thing. Where are we going in international relations, after all? Do we really want to join the world system or are we seeking a respite to take care of our economy and military affairs so as to start on a new round? I think one reason why Western leaders—even those among them who are sympathetic to current developments in our country—are still so wary that they still aren't sure of the answer. I believe this is because we have yet to evolve a comprehensive theory of international relations even though some basic postulates of it are there already, such as the priority of universal values, an integral nuclear-free world or unity in diversity.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, p. 457.

EXTRAORDINARY MISSION IN MOSCOW

(Continued from page 117)

guarantee that it will never come to a serious conflict between us is the certain fact that peace will always give both of us innumerable benefits, while war can only bring misfortune..."

This idea, expressed over one hundred years ago, has lost none of its significance today.

¹ For details see: Robert Ivanov, "Russian Warships in North America", *International Affairs*, No. 8, 1988, p. 135.

² *State Central Historical Archives (SCHA)*, f. 179, i. 21, d. 122.

³ *Extraordinary American Mission*, Moscow, 1866 (compiled by S. P. Yakovlev).

⁴ *SCHA*, f. 179, i. 21, d. 122.

⁵ *Moskovskiye vedomosti*, Aug. 24, 1866.

ON ALEXEI ARBATOV'S ARTICLE "HOW MUCH DEFENCE IS SUFFICIENT?"

NOT AVOIDING WHAT IS NOT COMMONPLACE

I READ Alexei Arbatov's article "How Much Defence is Sufficient?" with great interest. To my mind, it is the most serious piece of writing on Soviet military policy in our press. The article is attractive above all for its boldness in raising, within the framework of a debate, a host of signal issues pertaining to the nation's defensive capacity.

Until recently it was normally believed that only career members of the Armed Forces could speak out on such matters, let alone the fact that they are the ones who shape military policy as such. Outwardly this looked logical: indeed, who if not professionals, in this case the men in uniform, know best the state of affairs in a specific sphere?

Regrettably, the uniform and even ranking-officer's stripes do not by themselves guarantee infallibility of the decisions taken in the strictest secrecy, without public involvement in such a vitally important endeavour. We, the "uninitiated", have not even been granted the right to know with what means, at what cost and how reliably our own security has been ensured. For 70 years the nation has given the army everything it could, even more. For decades we were brought up in the serene conviction that at least in the army everything is in order, that "our armour is strong and our tanks are fast". We believed in this contrary to common sense and a system approach. Meanwhile negative processes were developing in the army, albeit in a concealed form, that were similar to those taking place in society as a whole.

A sudden sobering effect came on the shameful day when an impudent West German lad landed his sports plane right on Red Square, having unimpededly crossed the Soviet border and penetrated the deeply echeloned air defence system. It was then that many people, both in the army and in society at large, gave matters serious thought.

The impenetrable wall of secrecy that surrounds the activity of our military department to this day is evoking growing concern on the part of public opinion that is awakening from its lengthy hibernation: Is the nation's security truly reliably secured? How much is being spent on defence, and is it being spent reasonably? Are there possibilities for greatly reducing armaments and armed forces without detriment to our defensive capacity? Do we need such a cumbersome and extremely expensive military machine, considering the crisis our economy is in? Lastly, does it make sense to switch from compulsory military service to, say, a professional army? How does the policy of extensive military exports to developing countries jell with the new political thinking? How is the officially proclaimed doctrine of adequate defence being pursued?

Regrettably, our military far from always provide convincing answers to such questions. One gets the feeling that the army is not used to

frank talk, that its officials react painfully to society's critical concern for the state of affairs in the military sphere, unjustifiably regarding this as all but an attitude of antipathy to the nation's defenders. I am convinced that no one in this country has, nor can have, a negative attitude to the army, the flesh and blood of the Soviet people. The same can all the more be said of this author, who grew up in the family of a career officer and fighter at the front in the Second World War, and who spent 12 years with him in military garrisons and cities. All I am saying is that the army should be helped in surmounting its historically shaped introvertedness and in finding through concerted efforts the optimal ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the military policy while simultaneously strengthening the defensive potential.

This is what I view to be the point of Alexei Arbatov's article, which may not have suited everyone since it openly raises a host of thorny issues of Soviet military policy in the light of the changes apace not only in our society but in international relations as well.

I can anticipate the first objections: Can a non-military person discourse on such things as military doctrine and strategy and delve into special questions where the military still consider themselves alone to be competent?

Essentially, this posing of the issue can not only and not so much be a manifestation of narrow-professional haughtiness but also that of the painfully familiar departmental approach typical of our stagnation-ridden past, the bitter fruits of which we will be reaping for a long time to come. The example of the Ministry of Water Resources, which is accusing scientists and writers of incompetence, should caution all of us against professional snobbism. The uncontrolled arbitrariness of "professionals" has cost the country too dearly.

First of all, we are talking here about the author, a prominent expert in international security and disarmament who has published a large number of serious writings. Secondly, one can allude to the example of the West, where most military theorists from the most authoritative research centres are ordinary civilians, which does not prevent them from having a fine grasp of the specifics of military matters. Lastly, it has long been said in all seriousness that war is too important an undertaking to entrust to generals.

Incidentally, in all civilised countries the post of minister of defence is occupied by political figures, not professional military men, which in no way lessens the defensive capacity of the USA, France, Britain or any other member of the Western alliance. There are, of course, national traditions, and here we are, regrettably, closer to the Afro-Asian model. By the way, in the number of marshals (even excluding the marshals of services) we are solidly in first place worldwide, even in our peaceful times. This highest military rank, after all, was initially conferred for successful handling of strategic operations during the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, even though there were some curious exceptions (Marshal Beria). As early as the 1950s-1970s the title of marshal had, in my opinion, become morally devaluated, especially after it had been conferred upon Leonid Brezhnev. And now, 44 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, when peaceful international relations are being established, conferment of the title of marshal merely for a post occupied looks like an unjustified anachronism.

Let us return, however, to the main theme of this article. Indeed, "how much defence is sufficient" and how much should it cost? I don't think that anyone could give definitive answers to these questions today. But the answers should already be sought if only because this is required by the proclaimed doctrine of defence sufficiency, that is, if people do not want to reduce it to another propaganda ploy.

Arbatov's article is a constructive contribution to the search for answers to the issues raised by the times. One cannot but agree with him when he states that reasonable defence sufficiency cannot be reduced to a simple decrease in a certain number of troops and armaments. The point should be a sweeping overhaul of strategy, operational plans and armed forces, including by way of reduction, revision of modernisation programmes, and redeployment—above all with the aim of extensively buttressing the country's defensive capacity over the long term.

I am fully in agreement with the way the author poses the problem of secrecy in the national security sphere. There is necessary and justified secrecy, and there is invented secrecy—not from a rather well-informed enemy equipped with sophisticated means of space-based intelligence gathering, but in effect from one's own people. In just the same way as there is national security and departmental, corporative "security", which is vigilantly protected by an 18-million-strong bureaucratic host. The army unquestionably has specific needs, but it cannot have interests different from the interests of society, of the entire nation, serving which is its overriding duty.

Any Soviet military expert or journalist specialising in international affairs can freely receive a rather complete idea of the long-term military programmes being undertaken in the USA or, say, in France (one merely needs to know the appropriate foreign language), as these programmes and the outlays for them are published openly in the press and are discussed in parliaments. Only Soviet society does not know about its own defence programmes, and has just learnt about the resources spent on defence. Nevertheless, the figure of 77.3 billion roubles announced at the Congress of People's Deputies, in my opinion is far from complete, especially in comparison with the US military budget of about 300 billion dollars.

There is no point in rehashing all the proposals for rendering our defence policy more efficient while simultaneously buttressing our defensive capacity that were contained in the Arbatov article. I find them rather convincing. The main thing that the author is proposing is to concentrate efforts on the main, most advanced, areas of military development that would take account of our strong and vulnerable points, and not to continue senseless (and totally unjustified, even from the standpoint of national security interests) dispersion of the taxpayers' money for dubious and ineffective programmes. The accent in military policy and production should be placed on qualitative rather than quantitative parameters. If the notion of cost accounting is applicable to the defence sphere at all, this accounting, as Arbatov rightly pointed out, should be manifested in maximum returns that would ensure truly reliable, guaranteed security of the Soviet people.

Implementation of the proposals formulated by the author of the article could in his opinion theoretically reduce our arms expenditures by as much as 50 per cent in as early as the next five year-plan period, with the nation's defensive capacity being qualitatively bolstered. Certainly a very alluring prospect, especially in the context of our extremely acute economic problems. It would be worthwhile to explore it in a more qualified way, and at the same time discuss Arbatov's proposals, but this should be done not behind closed doors, as we are accustomed to doing, but in an open and constructive scientific debate. We should not avoid discussion of national security matters, which is so unusual for us. The more open and fruitful the discussion, the more correct the choice of the optimal variants of maintaining the defence capacity at the level of reasonable sufficiency and the more successfully we can resolve our neglected economic and social problems.

One last point. We are increasingly learning of instances where military units are used to restore law and order in different parts of the country. It is my conviction that the Soviet Army should not be utilised for these purposes, which is fraught with the gravest moral consequences. It is one thing when the military help the people in times of natural disasters, as this is a humane mission, and it is quite another when they perform policing functions that are in essence not endemic to them. We are not, after all, living in a banana republic. There is the sufficiently powerful arsenal of the Ministry of the Interior, which incorporates the Interior Troops, and which is specially trained to maintain public order. The army, however, should engage only in its work—reliably ensuring the external security of the USSR.

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THERE AREN'T ANY PROBLEMS

I THINK THAT with regard to so principled and topical an issue as how much defence is sufficient you have let a person incompetent in this sphere contribute to your journal. The author is searching for an answer on the sidelines. As a result, he is basing it on dogmas of US Sovietologists, referring to their sources and presenting all this "in the light of the new doctrine and strategy", thus injecting his viewpoint into the formation of our military course. Probably the author should have been helped if it was he who was to write on the problem in question. I believe that you will allow experts, too, to speak out on the pages of your journal on the adequate defence issue. We readers will be provided an opportunity to compare views.

The essence of my criticism of sorts against you lies not only and not so much in the afore-mentioned. The fact of the matter is that Alexei Arbatov adduces Mikhail Gorbachev's words to the effect that "there is no roof on earth or in space under which one could take shelter from a nuclear thunderstorm should it break out". Further, he writes: "Surely statements by the head of our state and our Defence Council are a strategic guidance for all the military agencies concerned". How is this to be understood? As criticism with a hint at the military department's insubordination to the political leadership?

If this is combined with the author's statements to the effect that earlier "defence became largely exempt from control by society, whose interests it must serve" or "the problem lies above all else in the lack of glasnost and unclassified information on military matters", etc., then it is probably in this way that he should be understood.

What is more, he hints that the military department is concealing something from society. Where is all this coming from? From a lack of information? Hardly. Arbatov unquestionably knows that the Soviet Armed Forces have always been under the direct leadership of the CPSU and the government. He knows who heads the Defence Council and who commands the Soviet Armed Forces; he knows that political bodies function in them as bodies of the party, and that the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy has the status of a department of the CPSU Central Committee. Lastly, he knows that from one year to the next thousands of Soviet citizens serve in the Soviet Armed Forces as

representatives of society for whom there are no problems of a "lack of glasnost and unclassified information on military matters", just as there is no lack of it in our publications.

As a historian, Arbatov should also be aware of the fact that preservation of state secrets on defence matters is a necessary measure each country takes to enhance its defensive capacity. These are state measures, not departmental ones. So the questions arise: Why is the author acting in this way? Why is he attempting to oppose someone? What is his aim in doing so?

Please put these questions to him.

Lieutenant-General (Ret.)
Fyodor RYBINTSEV,
Moscow

STATING WITH A SOLDIER'S STRAIGHTFORWARDNESS

AFTER I FINISHED THE ARTICLE I, a career military man, was intrigued by it that I decided to reread it. I began with the words of Mikhail Gorbachev: "The problem is so acute that we will also have to take a look at our defence spending. A preliminary study has shown that we can reduce it without lowering the level of our national security or defence potential."

The words are well known, but after a second reading they produced a different impression on me. The first proposal, whether General Secretary Gorbachev liked it or not, prompted the idea that had not a (non-military) problem been so (sic) acute no one would even have considered revising military expenditures. Everything would have proceeded according to the Brezhnev scheme. To the question: How much are we spending on defence? Brezhnev himself would answer: "We're spending as much as we need to". At that time such a reply evoked wonderment at the leader's wisdom. And now, though much later, another question is being posed: "But how much is necessary?"

Gorbachev's second sentence enables us to look farther. If the level of defensive potential does not decline as a result of reductions in military spending, then it will even increase due to the transformations that will take place within the part of the Armed Forces that remains after the reductions.

I believe that it is high time to examine military-industrial and purely military matters at the Central Committee Plenary Meeting. The point at issue is not submitting state secrets of special importance for nationwide scrutiny but discussing the most vital problems which are not a secret to anyone.

I agree with Alexei Arbatov that the problem lies above all else in the lack—to put it mildly—of glasnost and openness in military matters. And the essence is not even that the defence expenditures figure is frightening. The official defence budget approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet previous convocation includes only expenditures for the upkeep of the personnel of the Armed Forces, matériel, military development, pensions and a number of others. Such weighty defence expenditures as financing research and development and also purchasing armaments and military hardware come under different articles of the USSR State Budget. For their part, with their greater share they finance research, testing and capital investments into production facilities and not arms purchases. The questions suggest themselves: Are we right when we say that the army consumes a lot of money? Isn't it high time to use a normal and

more exact word combination—the military-industrial complex, in which the industrial part has a much bigger appetite?

Why does the USA have two or three types of intercontinental ballistic missiles and we have more? Probably when different design offices were being formed and assigned the same tasks, good aims were being pursued—ensuring competition in work. Later, however, each of them, drawing on the levers and methods known to them, managed, and are still managing to push their creations through. As a result, we have in the troops not one best system, but several systems which cannot be identical in their fighting capabilities. Furthermore, because of this military schools are forced to train specialist officers with a much greater number of different profiles. Many officer graduates are assigned to new systems that they have not studied. When most officers go through service they sometimes have to change them a number of times. This also makes for difficulties in upgrading combat expertise, difficulties which are not always overcome in due time because of new appointments.

After pushing through its system, a military-industrial firm is not satisfied with this. As experts know, it immediately compiles a plan for field changes, which it then carries out, and at a high price. These field changes are astonishingly simple, but fabulously expensive considering all the expenditures, among them, travelling expenses and allowances for field testers.

The arms race is not profitable for the military, since it does not have a very good effect on their living conditions. At the present juncture they are such that fewer and fewer people want to enter military schools, and in some places there simply are not enough applicants. Commanders and political workers engage in recruiting candidates for these schools according to plans imposed from above. It is not hard to guess about the nature of this "recruitment"—just anyone is talked into entering, so long as the plan is fulfilled. Sometimes a soldier agrees to enter a school solely in order to diversify his not always pleasant service. Now imagine the graduate of a military institution of higher learning who got there by chance, and who, for that matter, studied things other than those he will be working with. Such situations are not rare in the army today.

It is not fortuitous that the forthcoming armed forces reduction is impelling many of the most capable and energetic officers, especially young ones who have a great deal to lose, to retire. True, what has thus far kept them from doing so has been their hope for serious governmental measures to improve living and working conditions for the military. And if such measures do not follow in the immediate future, we will be only talking about qualitative parameters of the personnel. The military do not count on additional expenditures by the country, but they see the reserves which can appear as a result of intradepartmental reforms that will ultimately lead to improvements in the armed forces.

To my mind, the overriding imperative is a revamping of the organisational structure of the services. It presupposes the elimination of intermediate, unnecessary and sometimes hampering echelons of management; a revision of the structure of units with the aim of precisely delimiting the functions of the fighting and auxiliary units, and abolition of posts at which people simply do not know what to engage in throughout the day!

It would be expedient to turn over to civilians posts not linked with running units and services. This applies above all to the teaching faculty and laboratory staff of military higher educational establishments in the general-education disciplines, medical and other service personnel.

Unit commanders should be given full financial independence and an incentive to save funds. His present position forces him to spend money

left and right in order to justify allocations on all budget items. I do not have to go into details—commanders know what I am referring to.

Military hardware should be ordered from different enterprises, its fighting possibilities and price stipulated, and it should be purchased on a competitive basis. Major purchases should have sanction of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It would be a good idea to introduce the principles of cost accounting in the army. This is a separate major issue, however.

Despite the fact that we are still unprepared for the transition to a professional army, it is high time to elaborate its concepts, since we will arrive at it sooner or later. We are frightened by the cash allowances paid out to the personnel of the US Armed Forces. But we do not have to pay soldiers as much as American soldiers are paid, or as much as people in other occupations are paid, until this becomes possible. Why then make such comparisons? And how long can one keep giving simplistic answers to enormously difficult questions? I propose that we engage in serious computations, without concealing them from a wide range of experts: How much will we actually spend in excess of what we have spent, and how much will we gain? We will gain in the political and moral situation, in combat expertise and combat capability. We will gain from reductions of expenditures which are now necessary but will become unnecessary. We will gain in the sense that professionals will not break so much very expensive hardware and other equipment, as today's soldiers are doing. We can continue for a long time, and this is necessary.

Alexei Arbatov raises chiefly matters pertaining to military doctrine and strategy. My considerations are of a different order and, evidently, do not apply directly to international affairs, but I believe that our armed forces and our nation are not indifferent to them.

Anatoly YURYEV, Lt. Col.
Orenburg

A FORUM OF NATO AND WTO

US analysts are following the reasonable sufficiency/defensive doctrine debates among Soviet military and academic specialists with great interest. Part of the discussion has focused on the need for a more candid exchange of data and analyses between civilian and military institutions.¹ In the essay that follows here, I would like to extend the logic of this argument and suggest that bilateral analysis is also needed to support "new thinking" between the major alliances.

Questions about national security within the Soviet Union today are as important to citizens of the US as they are to citizens of Europe. If my reading of what has transpired to date is correct, there seem to be three levels of concern about military forces. We might think of these as an analytical *matryoshka*,² a nested set of interests.

The first level is the matter of defining the problem. Here, there seem to be three related issues: What is reasonable?, What is sufficient?, and What is defensive?. The second level is the need to recognise, if not reconcile, the different "world views" or perspectives that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) bring to bear on these questions. The final level is the issue of what could be done, methodologically, about reconciliation when perspectives are different.

PROBLEMS

Political and military scientists in both alliances have studiously avoided the sufficiency question for years. Here President Gorbachev must be given credit for making all of us uncomfortable by raising the issue again.

The Western equivalent of the reasonable sufficiency argument is the question, "how much is enough?". The issue of "enough" is now further complicated by an apparent desire to define sufficiency in terms of defense, not offense. This suggests that what has been sufficient in the past is no longer reasonable and surely not defensive. Such judgements expose some unstated assumptions, i. e., both sides' military capabilities have developed to a point where respective forces might be irrational and overly offensive. While the Soviets seem to have framed these questions, there appears to be agreement in the West on the validity of the larger issues raised. If this were not true, the recent Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) agreement would have been impossible, and prospects for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) discussions would be bleak indeed.

Thus in general terms, NATO and the WTO seem to have solved the first part of the puzzle. Without pointing fingers of blame, the major coalitions have agreed on the nature of the problem, a large first step for future solutions. We have not agreed on the specifics of *sufficiency* nor the requirements for *defense*, yet we have agreed that existing forces are unreasonably offensive and not sufficiently defensive.

This conclusion is unavoidable in light of conceptual approaches outlined by alliance CFE negotiators in March 1989 in Vienna. Here each side recognised the need to maintain a balance at *lower levels*, reduce forces that constitute a potential for *surprise attack*, and eliminate capabilities for conducting large-scale *offensive operations*. Further, both sides have now agreed on some of the specific forces which constitute offensive threats. These are: *tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, strike aircraft, combat helicopters, and personnel*.

Thus, without too much acrimony, NATO and the WTO have established the general terms of the forthcoming debate. This is a significant achievement in itself. Now, as Alexei Arbatov reminds us, defining "the limit of defense sufficiency is the cardinal question of modern political and military science".³ Arbatov's challenge, interestingly enough, is directed at military and civilian analysts. His charge points to an important analytical asymmetry between the major alliances. In the past, WTO military specialists have dominated arms control analysis, while civilians have controlled similar debates in NATO. Now we see civilians playing a larger role in the East and military analysts playing an expanded role in the West. This new analytical pluralism should provide, at a minimum, some new thinking and possibly pave the way for some reconciliation of perspectives.

PERSPECTIVES

It would be simplistic to suggest that there is only one perspective dominating each side. In fact, there are many views among the seven WTO states and the 16 NATO nations. Nonetheless, there is a tendency on both sides to ascribe a particular view to the major coalitions.

Indeed, there may be a real need for each side to reach *some* consensus on perspective. Otherwise, it might be impossible to negotiate as an alliance. This tension between individual and group beliefs is as old as civilization. Yet, if there is a need to reconcile perspectives, there is also a prior need to understand them. Further, I would suggest that

there are as many contradictions within respective "world views" as there are points of agreements. If this is true, reality seems to be a flexible commodity.

NATO is often portrayed as a subjective alliance.⁴ Just as frequently the WTO is characterised as an objective coalition.⁵ These polarities are modern attempts to classify an otherwise complex world. Yet, there appears to be some truth in these broad characterizations, each derived from philosophical heritage. The varying views of democracy provide an illustration.

The Socialist tradition tends to define democracy in terms of objective obligations, while the Western tradition tends to define democracy in terms of subjective rights. Critics claim that the citizens of socialism are too controlled, while Western democracies are too permissive. (Humorists often suggest that being good is the goal in the East, while feeling good is the goal in the West.) Clearly, citizens in every country have both obligations and rights, the difference is one of emphasis. Yet, this emphasis has produced very different societies. In one, the perspective is from top to bottom, while in the other, the perspective is bottom to top. Each is a legitimate, yet very different, vision of democracy.

Members of both alliances also like to think of themselves as rational. Indeed, rationalism seems to produce large crops of absolutes in both camps. One set is borne of dialectics, the other is borne of dogma. Yet, each is an attempt to define the same reality. Arbatov puts his finger on the dilemma: "Can recognition of objective reality be made conditional on the other side's subjective opinion? After all, the law of gravity would not be called off if the US refused to recognize it."⁶

On this point, I disagree with Doctor Arbatov. The laws of science and the laws of man have always been subject to revision. All laws change with time; they are changed by improved understanding. Reality is not objective or subjective; it is both, and much more. Indeed, truth and reality are belief systems. What we believe is real, and these beliefs are infected by myths as often as they are supported by facts. As long as there is more than one side to anything, reality is "conditional".

Arbatov's frustration with "subjective opinion" merely serves to remind us of the limits of reason and scientific method. In a perfect world, the ideal analyst assembles the correct facts, interprets them with proven methods, and then comes to reasonable judgement. Yet, even this is not enough! Who bridges the gap between analysis and acceptance? The barrier to acceptance is often a long-held bias that resists argument, reason, or emotion. Belief systems are as real as the laws of nature, and we need to understand both in order to build bridges to new consensus.

The current debate in the US over "rational deterrence" illustrates Arbatov's dilemma. American political scientists are concerned that our policy of deterrence might not be as rational as it could be. One school supports inductive models that tend to capture biases and the other supports inductive experiments that would root them out.⁶ How this debate will be resolved is far from certain, yet this much is sure. Both parties agree that national policies are vulnerable to *unreasonable* fears and beliefs. If this were not true, we would have few disagreements and little need for negotiations. (Political scientists are fond of studying the obvious.)

The subjective characterizations of NATO and the objective characterizations of the WTO are riddled with internal contradictions. If we put too much faith in either, we are hard pressed to understand why NATO methods for calculating the *military balance* are objective (i. e., using sterile numerical ratios), and WTO methods for calculating the *correlation of forces* are often subjective (i. e., using qualitative factors). Indeed, Western analysts regularly assume that NATO forces are qualita-

lively superior to those of the WTO, yet at the same time NATO uses few standard tools to measure quality or factor it into calculations of combat potential. Conversely, the WTO, assumed to be qualitatively inferior, uses analyses which calibrate quality.⁷

The dissonance which characterises these methods suggest yet a final level in our *matryoshka* where opposing views and misperceptions might be reconciled.

In 1988, General Yazov offered that the Soviet were willing to "compare quantity and quality" of arms and doctrine through "bilateral analysis" of combat potentials.⁸ More recently, Soviet academics have restated this requirement. "We must do it by joint effort," says Alexei Arbatov. Such proposals should not be dismissed too quickly. Inter-alliance forums for collaborative military analysis could get us to the heart, the core of perceptual differences.

MULTILATERAL ANALYSIS

To date, both alliances have demonstrated good faith in political, diplomatic, cultural, and economic forums. Yet, arms control requires collaboration on several levels: policy collaboration, negotiation collaboration, and *analytical collaboration*.

While perceptions spring from many roots (ideological, cultural, historical, etc.), military beliefs tend to be formalised by analysis, methods of assessment. There is a great need to understand comparative methods for calculating combat capability. The benefits of such exchanges are twofold. First, they would provide a primary source for illuminating what is, and is not, important in NATO and WTO calculations. Second, a better understanding of assessment methods could furnish an opportunity to identify the comparative values and weights assigned to critical factors.

An inter-alliance analytical forum might be composed of experts from civilian and military institutes within NATO and the WTO. Such a group would focus on comparative analytical processes in order to solve the objective and subjective differences that seem to plague arms control positions. Each side likes to believe that its position is derived from logic and reason, yet unilateral analyses continue to produce distinct visions of reality. The flaw of this approach seems obvious. Unilateral analysis does not provide adequate support for bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

There are two separate issues here. The first is the question of whether or not joint analysis would help to resolve long-standing data and methodological problems. The second issue is the question of whether or not qualitative factors (i. e., measures of effectiveness) should be used to determine the relative military balance in support of arms control. Proceeding on the assumption that we must walk before we can run, the answer to the first question should be an unqualified "yes". Multilateral analysis might then provide answers for the second question.

Both alliances waste too much energy arguing over what belief is "correct," "objective," or "realistic". In fact, unilateral analysis produces too many realities. Each alliance, captives of parochial analysis, produces its own version of truth. The problem is not so much a question of what is *real* as it is a question of how *beliefs* about reality are different. Bridging the gap between beliefs, analyses, and acceptance is the final test of reasonableness. This can only be done by reconciling different analytical methods. With such a process, reality is negotiable.

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19 June 89

¹ Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defense is Sufficient", *International Affairs*, April 1989, pp. 31-44.

² A *matryoshka* is a traditional Russian toy, a nested set of wooden dolls, one inside the other, usually painted as peasant women.

³ Alexei Arbatov, "Reasonable Sufficiency: Where Does It End?", *New Times*, No. 12, April 25-1 May, 1989, p. 13.

⁴ Robert Levine, "NATO, the Subjective Alliance: The Debate Over the Future," Rand Corporation, R-3607-FF/CC/RC, April 1988.

⁵ Dmitry Pogorzelsky, "Vienna: After and Before", (an interview with Victor Karpov, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister), *New Times*, No 7, Feb. 14-20, 1989, p. 7.

⁶ See *World Politics*, Vol. XLI, No. 2, Jan. 1989. This issue is devoted to the rational deterrence debate in the US.

⁷ Maj. Gen. Yu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, "On the Eve of the Second Round," *Izvestia*, 5 May 1989, Morning Edition, p. 4.

⁸ General D. T. Yazov, "On the Military Balance of Forces and Nuclear Missile Parity," *Pravda*, 8 Feb. 1988, Second Edition, p. 5.

THE CONGRESS TESTIFIES

THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES of the USSR reflected the key lines of Soviet foreign policy. It showed how far they meet the nation's fundamental interests and hence how durable they are.

The debate at the Congress indicated that the absolute majority of Soviet society expects policy and diplomacy to renounce the dogmas of "spearhead against spearhead" and "much defence can never be too much". Our society is looking forward to further vigorous progress in measures mapped by perestroika for reliably safeguarding national security, which should comprise a reasonable minimum of military might and a maximum of economic, social and moral power.

It is important specifically for the Foreign and Defence Ministries and the State Security Committee, for all Soviet government departments involved in the foreign policy process, to have a proper mandate for this from the new parliament.

This is probably the first time than we and others have had a view of the real disposition of forces determining Soviet foreign policy. They have nothing to do with the "monolith" of the earlier decades. Policy admits of no monolithic approach.

Contrary to what one might have thought at the beginning of the Congress, the dividing line is not between Moscow and other parts of the country, between workers and professors, the republics, servicemen and civilians, and so on. The main area of differentiation lies elsewhere. Let there be no mistake—perestroika does not at all enjoy universal support in our country. Those who are against perestroika understandably form the "right wing" of our politics. We also have a "centre". And for the first time ever, our political spectrum includes a "left wing".

In short, on the rise is an alignment of forces traditional for democracy. Every one of these forces is taking shape primarily in accordance with the convictions of its components. We would not like the new parliament to manifest even in the least what was described as an "aggressively obedient majority". We place our hopes on cooperation between "centrists" and "left-wingers", who are weaker in numbers but much stronger in innovations and in constructive and fresh ideas.

The message conveyed by the Congress will benefit our foreign partners and opponents. The unprecedented openness of our situation and intentions offers a unique opportunity for frank and sensible dialogue with all who really want it.

Boris PIADYSHEV

REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS—A GUARANTEE OF SECURITY FOR ALL

Mikhail MOISEYEV

NEW POLITICAL THINKING breaks customary stereotypes and long-established views on war and peace, disrupting the dogmas of ideological intolerance, suspicion and enmity, and changing opinions on ways of ensuring reliable security. Force or threat of force cannot and must not be used in the nuclear age as an instrument of politics, while the build-up of military might, far from being able to make a single country all-powerful, can bring a catastrophe to mankind.

THE SOVIET UNION and its Warsaw Treaty allies insist on an effective turn in solving international problems—a turn from reliance on diktat to a balance of interests, from military and other confrontation to demilitarisation of international relations, to trust; from the arms race and super-armament to a reduction of arsenals down to a stable balance on a lower level sufficient for defence.

The Soviet Union and its allies made their military doctrine purely defensive, advanced a series of constructive proposals and have taken unilateral steps in disarmament, thereby demonstrating to the world their firm adherence to an entirely new model of guaranteeing security not by building up military might but by reducing the armed forces and armaments of the sides and changing, on the basis of reciprocity, their structure, grouping and stationing for defensive purposes.

To meet its commitments on a unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces, the USSR is reducing its troops and armaments in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Mongolia. Three tank divisions, three training tank and two air defence missile regiments, aircraft and helicopter regiments, a training signal regiment, two air defence missile brigades, four airborne assault battalions, two landing and attack battalions, and other task force units will be withdrawn back to Soviet territory by October 1989. During 1990, three tank divisions, two air assault brigades, two tank and one motorised infantry training regiments, one air assault battalion and one chemical protection battalion will be withdrawn as well. Meanwhile six tank divisions, an air defence missile brigade, two training tank regiments and two air defence missile, aircraft and helicopter regiments will be disbanded. The number of armour hardware will be reduced by rendering the remaining units defensive.

In 1989-1990, three general-purpose divisions, including two tank divisions, as well as the entire air and air defence groupings will be withdrawn from Mongolia.

Considerable changes will be effected in the troops stationed in the Soviet territory. At present, department of the Central Asian Military

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District has been abolished, and its troops are attached to the Turkestan Military District. Department of the Urals Military District will be abolished by September 1989, and its forces will join the Privolzhsky Military District. Besides, we intend to disband the departments of four armies (two in the Trans-Baikal Military District and one in each of the Far Eastern and Turkestan Military Districts) and four army corps (one in the Byelorussian, one in the Far Eastern and two in the Turkestan Military Districts).

The strength of the land force will be cut by 24 motorised infantry and tank divisions.

In the air defence forces, sixty units and formations will be disbanded or reduced as well as anti-aircraft missile command higher school.

In the air force, it has been envisaged to abolish the departments of two large air units, four aircraft divisions, nineteen aircraft regiments and two pilot-training schools.

In the Navy, 26 submarines and 45 surface ships are subject to destruction.

As the INF Treaty is being implemented, we are disbanding units and formations of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. We have destroyed over 1,000 missiles since the time of its ratification. Of them, over 370 are intermediate-range and 668 are shorter-range. Over 380 launchers have been destroyed and 37 missile operating bases have been liquidated.

The total strength of the Soviet Armed Forces will be reduced by 500,000 persons: 50,000 in the territory of the allied countries and 450,000 servicemen in Soviet territory. Their number will be cut by 190,000 in the European part of this country, by 60,000 in the South, and by 200,000 in the East.

As of June 22 this year, over 22,000 officers and men, 3,000 tanks, about 600 artillery systems, 50 aircraft and other military hardware were withdrawn from the armed forces group in Mongolia.

Not only the stationing of army general-purpose formations, but also their structure are being changed along defensive lines. During 1989 and 1990, all the divisions of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces and the Central Group of Armed Forces will adopt a totally defensive organisational structure. The number of tanks there will be reduced (by 40 per cent in motorised infantry divisions and by 20 per cent in tank divisions), and so will the number of landing and attack facilities. Motorised infantry divisions will have no tank regiments, and their number in tank divisions will also be cut. Some tank regiments of the Western Group will be restructured into motorised infantry ones, and the number of tanks in them will be slashed almost by 60-80 per cent. Their chief mission will be to repel enemy aggression.

As a result of these measures, the capabilities of the troops for offensive combat operations will become much lower. On the other hand, their defensive capabilities will grow due to some increase in them of anti-tank and air defence means and engineering equipment (for building fortifications, organisation of defence lines and positions, and erection of obstacles).

The first line of an air grouping of the Western Group will include only fighters and army aviation belonging to purely defensive forces. In the second line, there will be combat support aviation and also reconnaissance aircraft. The number of aircraft in the air regiments of the Western Group and those stationed in the European part of the Soviet Union, will be cut back roughly by 20 per cent. All the bomber aviation will be withdrawn to the USSR.

Similar changes are taking place in the armed forces of our allies.

In May, the Warsaw Treaty countries submitted constructive proposals at the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms and armed

	Bulgaria	Hungary	GDR	Poland	Romania*	Czechoslovakia
Personnel (thousands)	10.0	9.3	10.0	40.0	5 per cent	12.0
Military spending (per cent)	12	17	10	2.2	5	15

* Reductions effected in 1987.

forces in Europe. A result of an initial agreement between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries, the proposals say, could be cuts in the armed forces and armaments of both sides down to equal levels: the personnel of the group forces and frontline (tactical) aviation would be reduced to 1,350,000; combat strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers and attack aircraft) to 1,500; combat helicopters to 1,700; tanks to 20,000; combat armoured vehicles to 28,000; and multiple rocket launchers, artillery guns and mortars (with a calibre of 100 mm and more) down to 24,000. At the same time the imbalances in combat strike aviation and helicopters on the part of NATO, and in tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers on our part would be eliminated.

Proceeding from the defensive character of its military doctrine, the Soviet Union took a unilateral decision to withdraw from the territory of its allies 500 warheads of tactical nuclear means (aircraft, 166; artillery, 50; missiles, 284). Moreover, the USSR is prepared to withdraw in 1989-1991 all nuclear ammunition from the territory of its allies on the condition that the USA does the same.

Our troops stationed along the Soviet-Chinese border are being restructured in keeping with the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency. We are ready to consider a withdrawal from the border regions, following a relevant agreement with China, army units and armaments, leaving there only the personnel required for routine border guarding.

AWARE OF THE NEED radically to lower the level of military confrontation and reduce arms until a complete elimination of the threat of war by liquidating the potential required for waging it, the Warsaw Treaty countries have come up with the idea that disarmament, which ensures confidence-building, should extend to all the armed forces in Europe: the ground, air and naval forces; and all arms: conventional, nuclear and chemical.

All means of warfare which are not yet covered by it, including tactical nuclear arms, must be put on the agenda of the dialogue on disarmament. There is an urgent need to extend the negotiation process also to the naval forces and their armaments, beginning with applying confidence-building measures to them.

It is important that no steps be made which could obstruct the negotiation process and provoke a stepping up of the arms race, also under the pretext of modernising weapons.

Disarmament, confidence and mutual security would be facilitated also by the all-round promotion of cooperation among European nations in various spheres of interstate relations, including the settlement of regional conflicts; in the extension of contacts between the two military alliances, in particular, in what concerns a discussion of military doctrines, exchange of information on proposals and initiatives, questions related to cuts in military budgets, exchange of military delegations, and so on; in establishing between the two alliances relations of political dialogue and contacts between their representatives.

The proposal on a unilateral disbandment of both military-political alliances, the preparedness of the Warsaw Treaty countries to carry out big asymmetrical reductions of their arms in order to achieve a sharply reduced ceiling equalling that of NATO—all this is a resolute step towards detente.

Of great significance in this context are contacts in the military sphere. In July 1988, for instance, a delegation of USSR Ministry of Defence headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Akhromeyev, paid a visit to the United States, and Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stayed on an official visit in the Soviet Union on June 12 to 22, 1989. William Crowe was accompanied by the deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force, and the Navy, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and representatives of the Department of Defense and State Department.

During his visit William Crowe was received by Mikhail Gorbachev. According to the head of the US military delegation, the talk with the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was a most important event in his life and posed before him many questions to be thought over. He also had meetings with General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, USSR Minister of Defence, had detailed talks with the Chief of the General Staff, and other Soviet military commanders.

The US guests visited a strategic missile unit, the cruiser *Kirov* of the Northern Fleet and a nuclear submarine, and watched exercises in the sea. In the Byelorussian Military District, they were present at exercises with service firing. The US delegates were shown modern arms of the Air Force at the air garrison Kubinka near Moscow. They were given an opportunity to see the conditions in which Soviet troops live. William Crowe highly estimated the combat training level of the personnel.

The stay of the US delegation in the USSR yielded practical results promoting Soviet-American relations in the military field. During that stay, US top commanders could see for themselves the state of affairs in the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, and their Soviet counterparts could see the position of the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the main problems involved in disarmament negotiations.

On the very first day of the visit, an agreement on preventing dangerous military activity was signed between the Soviet and American governments. The new agreement, noted the signatories, meets their mutual interests, helping to build up the foundations of predictability in Soviet-American relations, and is a new step towards stable peace.

William Crowe visited the USSR Academy of Sciences, where he attended an extended session of the Scientific Council on a programme of fundamental research, called "National Security, Strategic Balance and Arms Control".

At a reception given by General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, William Crowe said that the contacts established between our countries were becoming a regular and stable process. In fact, a new channel of communication between the armed forces of the USSR and the USA has been opened, greatly contributing to understanding and trust.

The official visit of the USSR delegation headed by Mikhail Gorbachev to France has been highly praised in political terms. During the visit Soviet and French military officials established direct contacts and within their framework they had talks with Jean-Pierre Chevenement, French Minister of Defence, Army General M. Shmitt, Chief of Staff, and other officials.

This work led to the signing of an agreement on relations between the armed forces of the USSR and France. In the opinion of the French side contacts along the military line help to eliminate the lack of mutual understanding between the parties and facilitate contacts. There is no

doubt that the military of various countries should meet each other more often because it promotes trust and consolidates security on the continent and throughout the world.

But this does not yet mean that the international atmosphere has improved completely. Addressing a session of the NATO Council in Brussels, US President George Bush proposed a reduction of conventional armed forces. The preliminary study of his proposals has shown that they meet to a certain extent our own position halfway and have constructive elements in them. In particular, the ceilings for three of the six categories proposed by the Warsaw Treaty practically coincide—those for tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery systems. The United States has budged from its former stance, when it had been opposed to negotiating over aircraft and combat helicopters, and also the numerical strength of the armed forces.

Still in essence, serious differences and different approaches to solving concrete problems remain, and joint work to overcome them is still ahead. Thus, the USA, as distinct from the USSR, insists that the aircraft subject to reduction should include not only the most destabilising ones—combat strike aircraft (bombers, fighter-bombers and attack aircraft) but also air defence fighters. Though these aircraft are purely defensive and are designed for protection against strikes by strategic and aircraft-carrier aviation, submarine and air launched cruise missiles, their reduction can be explained only by the fact that the Warsaw Treaty has more such aircraft.

The US proposals do not envisage fixing levels for the total numerical strength of troops equal for the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, including those stationed outside national territory. They provide for equal levels of troops for the USSR and the USA only in Europe, in the territory beyond national borders. This approach leads to a still greater imbalance in NATO's favour, since among the Warsaw Treaty countries only the Soviet Union has troops outside its national territory, while in NATO such countries, besides the United States, are Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands whose armed forces are not subject to reduction. The present-day NATO superiority in the total number of troops in Europe (roughly by 100,000 persons) would in this case be increased to 300,000.

The refusal to start without delay negotiations on tactical nuclear arms in Europe, which was confirmed in Brussels, and the desire to assert the policy of nuclear deterrence and thus thereby of a nuclear threat, are disappointing.

Though some progress has been achieved in matters of detente, no significant changes have occurred in the strategy of the North Atlantic alliance. The meeting of the NATO Council has shown that the cornerstone of the bloc's conception still is deterrence strategy which does not envisage, even in future, a possibility of removing the US nuclear arms deployed in Western Europe. The official opinion of the NATO leadership has been confirmed by its Secretary-General Manfred Wörner who, when asked if conditions could arise in which NATO would ultimately admit a possibility of removing nuclear weapons from Europe, replied: "Under no circumstances." He again named nuclear arms as the chief factor of safeguarding peace on the continent.

Even today, when Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons reopened in Geneva, the work on the SDI programme is in full swing in the United States, which sooner or later may kill the ABM Treaty, the groundwork of strategic stability. A reduction of strategic offensive arms is possible only if the treaty is observed as it was signed in 1972.

The extension of the list of alarming items, so much dangerous for the cause of peace, impelled the USSR and the USA to sign a treaty on

the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range ground-launched missiles, including cruise missiles. Meanwhile the attitude of the US administration to limiting long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles is still undecided. One should not ignore the fact that their deployment reflects a wish to side-step the agreements on strategic, offensive arms that are being elaborated and to replace the ground-launched missiles by still more dangerous means of destruction destabilising the situation.

These actions of the United States betray its striving for military superiority, and that is the goal set in its ambitious military programmes. At present, the USA is effecting 95 programmes of developing new types of weapons estimated at \$216,000 million (the actual figure being over \$750,000 million).

This is explained off by an alleged vulnerability of US interests in Central Europe before Soviet military might which, it is asserted, is superior to the NATO military potential despite the measures taken by the NATO countries to strengthen their defence. These thoughts underlie the report entitled The joint assessment of the general situation in the armed forces in 1989, submitted to the US Congress, in which the statements by the Soviet side on the change of the Soviet military doctrine and strategy are presented as Soviet rhetoric.

WHEN SOLVING international problems, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries follow a different course, which envisages:

- guarantee of security primarily by political means with reliance on the prestige and possibilities of the United Nations;
- elimination of nuclear arms during the negotiation process oriented on disarmament and reduction of the military potential of states down to the level of reasonable sufficiency;
- inadmissibility of the use or threat of force for attainment of any political, economic or other goals; in relations with other countries the principle of respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity is immutable;
- confidence-building measures, dialogue and negotiations aimed to achieve a balance of interests as the only reasonable way of solving international problems and settling conflicts.

This is a thoroughly grounded strategic line meeting the interests of the whole of mankind. The Soviet Union is dispelling, not by words but by deeds, the fears of the West, about our intentions and actions in the military sphere.

In the conditions when the United States does not give up the plans of building up its military might, our unilateral initiatives aimed at the reduction of the Armed Forces and armaments cause understandable concern among many Soviet people over the reliability of their country's security.

It must be stressed in this connection that the Soviet Union has not waived its interests with regard to its defence and security, as well as its allies. Not a single Soviet initiative has been undertaken without being thoroughly thought out and well grounded. Due attention was given to various versions and factors which could cause a lessening of security, making the protection of the USSR and its allies against possible aggression less reliable. It would be unforgivable complacency to ignore the negative trends threatening us. Any our step is securely backed up by great vigilance and proper combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

Defence sufficiency means, in military-technical and strategic terms, minimal military possibilities of a country (or a coalition of countries)

GUARANTEE OF SECURITY FOR ALL

having a composition and structure of the armed forces which would ensure reliable protection of a state (or a group of states), ruling out a possibility for attack or for launching large-scale offensive operations.

The level of sufficiency required for a reliable accomplishment of the tasks of defence in the development of the armed forces is determined by the composition of troops and armaments in each theatre of warfare. The level is different, as a rule, and depends on the international and military-political situation, the strength of the troops of the enemy and their combat capabilities and the extent of a threat, geographic conditions, and the economic, research, socio-political and intellectual possibilities of the sides meeting their military requirements, and on other factors. It cannot be the same and stable all the time. Depending on the conditions at a certain time, the sufficiency level may change, requiring a differentiated approach.

All the changes that ever occurred in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, also in their composition, have always been based precisely on these factors and trends. Thus, during the Civil War and at the time when foreign intervention was being repelled, their numerical strength increased, to reach 5.5 million officers and men by the end of 1920. As the danger of a restoration of capitalism in the country by the forces of national and foreign counter-revolutionaries receded, the strength of the army, after its reorganisation, was reduced in 1924 to 562,000.

During the Great Patriotic War, when the country was faced with the threat of fascist enslavement, we were compelled rapidly to build up the capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces, also by increasing their numerical strength. By the end of the war, the strength was 11,365,000 persons. Such fluctuations occurred also in the postwar years. As international tensions grew, the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces increased. This tendency was most obvious in the heat of the cold war in the 1960s and 1970s. But in the periods of detente our army was reduced by more than 2,140,000 persons between 1954 and 1958, and by 1,200,000 in 1960.

Precisely such changes are taking place at present in the development of our Armed Forces. The principled political objective of this development is to achieve effectiveness primarily by qualitative improvement strictly in keeping with the defensive military doctrine. The goal is not to build up the combat might of the Armed Forces but to maintain it at a level ruling out military superiority over us and guaranteeing reliable defence.

The practical measures and initiatives to further reduce the Armed Forces and armaments determine the stable tendency of these reductions which, we are firmly convinced, are desired by both sides and the nations of the whole world. But this course cannot be unilateral, for we have no right to forgo our defence capability and, therefore, should spend sufficiently on maintaining it.

The preparation of the Armed Forces is conducted accordingly. It is based on principles ruling out a deliberate unleashing of wars or a growth of an incident into a large armed conflict. The purpose of this preparation is to repel possible enemy attack and to defeat the enemy, making its intrusion into our territory impossible during defensive operations (combat actions). These problems are now being solved at all levels—strategic, operative and tactical.

THE SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES and the reduction of the Armed Forces associated with them concern the destinies of many people, especially those who have decided to devote their lives to service in the army and are now on the retirement list.

It must be noted that the reduction of the Army and Navy and the quality priorities in their development have brought into play a number of new factors that should be taken into account when evaluating the possibilities for cutting defence budgets and the amount to be cut. The impact of these factors is not very noticeable now, but as the reductions of the Armed Forces, their personnel, armaments and materiel will be growing, they will become significant.

Some of these factors are:

- employment and retraining of retired officers and warrant officers;
- financial, material and technical backing of the process of eliminating arms, materiel and ammunition and establishment of appropriate facilities, test ranges and equipment for exploding, dismantling or converting the excessive means of warfare, preventing a negative effect on the environment, and so on;
- conversion at the production facilities of the Ministry of Defence, and their modification for turning out goods for the national economy;
- solution of the most urgent problems confronting the Armed Forces, construction of housing for servicemen and their families, and provision of material incentives in military service.

Greater attention is now paid to employment and social maintenance for the servicemen retired from the Armed Forces as a result of the reductions. The USSR Ministry of Defence and the USSR State Committee on Labour and Wages have planned measures to assist the special commissions functioning at the executive committees of the Soviets of People's Deputies, which are to provide employment and housing for retired servicemen and their families. An opportunity would be offered to work in organised labour recruitment at the country's industrial enterprises and construction projects, including in the regions of the Extreme North and those equated with them or in areas where the retired servicemen had worked before they were called up. The retirees and their families will be assisted in retraining and learning new trades.

These measures, however, do not solve all problems. Decree On the Reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR and Defence Expenditures in 1989-1990, issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on March 21 this year, says that the local Soviets of People's Deputies should take necessary measures not only to provide employment but also housing for the officers, warrant officers, and extended-servicemen who are transferred to the reserve or retired. Incidentally, a three-month limit has been fixed for providing them with housing.

The Communist Party Central Committee and the government instructed the local power bodies that upon the arrival of ex-servicemen retired because of the reductions in the chosen place of residence, they should provide them with temporary housing and a residence permit, regardless of the size of a living space, until they receive permanent housing according to established regulations.

The USSR Ministry of Defence, for its part, will build within two years over one hundred houses with 60 to 80 flats in each in various parts of the country for the servicemen retired due to the reductions.

Provisions have been made for financial aid for starting a home. The warrant officers retired because of the reductions and not entitled to pension, would receive for one year the pay they used to get in the army.

The USSR Council of Ministers has passed a decision on paying pensions to officers and warrant officers who were retired due to the reductions but have not served the years required for a pension.

Reduction of Armed Forces is accompanied by the release of a considerable amount of combat equipment, means of communication, electro-technical and other equipment and ammunition which after some modifi-

cation would be handed over for the national economy to be installed at factories, collective and state-run farms, and be used by cooperatives, lease-holders and individual farmers.

The Ministry of Defence is going to market 500,000,000 rubles' worth of the combat equipment and stores converted for civilian use. The consumers have already received such goods to the tune of tens of millions of rubles. Ammunition costing up to 50 million rubles will be sold in the near future. All in all, the USSR Ministry of Defence will transfer and sell to the national economy 1,900 items of various goods, including trucks, communication stations, welding equipment, all kinds of instruments, spare parts, mechanical equipment, fuelling and lubricating equipment, as well as small abattoirs, meat processing machines, bakeries, field kitchens, footwear, clothes, and other property. All this is sold through wholesale bases and army shops, while medical equipment and medicines are sold through the USSR Ministry of Public Health.

The armed forces reductions will be accompanied by cuts in military production. Most of the facilities in the military industry will be switched over to civilian output. These facilities are expected to turn out 27 billion rubles' worth of goods already this year.

At present, 40 per cent of the produce of the defence complex are civilian goods. In 1991, this share is going to increase to 50 per cent and in 1995, to 60 per cent.

The use of space equipment in our economy has already yielded over 12 billion rubles of a conventional economic effect. When the Energia-Buran system was being built, more than 100 new materials, 240 technological processes and 130 types of advanced equipment were developed and are supposed to be used in ship-building, medicine and in other sections of the national economy. About 4,500 ships have been fitted out with navigational equipment, which has made it possible to reduce transport expenses and improve the safety of navigation. The use of satellite weather-forecasting information saves, by some estimates, 500 to 700 million rubles for the economy annually. At the present level of expenditures, space equipment will fully pay its way by 1995.

The total economic effect of the conversion of only the missile-producing facilities saved 300 million rubles for the national economy.

Conversion implies large-scale transformations in the make-up of the national economy. By 1995, more than 4,500 items of new equipment, including 3,000 at defence industrial facilities, should be brought into play for serial production in the processing sections of the agro-industrial complex.

Of the total volume of deliveries to the tune of 37 billion rubles, the defence facilities will supply the processing industries of agriculture with 17.5 billion rubles' worth of modern equipment and step up the output of machinery for the light industry by 130 per cent—50 per cent more than the amount of this equipment manufactured in this country in the past twenty years.

Over 340 factories in the defence industry will produce equipment for the light and food industries.

In 1989, the output of medical equipment by defence facilities will approach the mark of 240 million rubles, with the target being not less than 1 billion rubles.

The defence complex contributes also to the provision of the population with cultural and household goods. Today, they are produced to the sum of about 30 billion rubles a year, which amounts to 22 per cent of the total output in the country. In the 13th five-year-plan period, these goods will be manufactured to the tune of 250 to 270 billion rubles, exceeding the target of the current five-year plan by 100 per cent.

Speeded up conversion of military facilities and transfer of released

capacities and resources to the social and economic needs have brought about a change in the structure of the defence complex. The growth rate in the production of civilian goods, including consumer goods, is twice as rapid as in military output.

The reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, lending a new quality to them, the cuts in the allocations for the maintenance of the army and the development and manufacture of arms, and also the conversion of military production, will help reduce military spending as well. All these measures saved the country 10 billion rubles in the 1987-1988 period alone. In 1989, our military expenditures total 77.3 billion rubles. In the next two years the defence spending is going to be slashed by almost 30 billion rubles more, as against the approved five-year plan, which equals about 40 per cent of the country's annual defence budget. And this is not the limit. As we proceed steadily along the path of disarmament, the share of defence spending in the national income is going to be cut by up to 50 per cent by 1995.

Mikhail Frunze (a Soviet government leader and military commander) set great store by the country's defence. He stressed: "...Our objective, despite the extremely limited possibilities, remains the same: to give the republic a strong, firm and at the same time cheap army."¹ The USSR Ministry of Defence gives its closest attention to this objective.

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IN ITS MILITARY POLICY the Soviet Union proceeds, above all, from the fact that the stockpiling of arms and the increase of the number of troops does not ensure greater security and more stable peace. The danger will not grow smaller unless the states display goodwill, political culture, and mutual honesty and trust.

For their contacts they need a policy based on talent, knowledge and flexible thinking free from narrow-mindedness and dogmas, a policy leading to disarmament, security and vast positive changes throughout the world.

The Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation are demonstrating to the whole world their adherence precisely to this policy. They look forward to positive changes in this respect on the part of the NATO member states, changes that would facilitate the positive trends emerging in the relations between states, and call them for joint actions to ensure dynamic growth and general prosperity in the conditions of independence and stable peace the world over.

¹ M. V. Frunze, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p. 426 (in Russian).

STALIN'S ERROR OF JUDGEMENT

Valentin BEREZHKOY

IT IS STILL A POINT under debate: why did Stalin make that fatal error of judgement about the timing of Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union and, indeed, about the very inevitability of Nazi aggression against the USSR? What was the Kremlin's line of reasoning? What did it count on?

By early August 1939, it had become abundantly clear that a serious agreement with Britain and France was out of the question. The negotiations with the British and French military missions which had arrived in Moscow on August 11 for a discussion of joint resistance to aggression made that even more obvious. Asked by Marshal Kliment Voroshilov whether there was any accord with Poland about the passage of Soviet troops through her territory in the event of a war with Germany, General Doumenc, who led the French delegation, said he was unaware of Poland's plans.

What contingents could Great Britain field to reinforce the French Army? Voroshilov asked. British General Heywood declared that at the outset of the war with Germany, Britain would field 16 divisions and as many at a later stage, but at the time had as few as five infantry divisions and one motorised division on the Isles. These figures looked ridiculous in the face of the German war machine which already had over 140 divisions under arms. Nor could the British forces compare in any way with the 120 divisions which, London and Paris considered, the Soviet Union had to field at the very start of hostilities. Now, in reply to the Soviet delegation's question about the plans the Allies had in respect of Belgium, the French representatives declared that their forces could pass through the territory of that country only if asked to do so, which was not certain at all. That prompted Voroshilov to state on August 14: "Without a clear and unequivocal answer to these questions, further military negotiations are pointless... The Soviet military mission cannot recommend its government to participate in an enterprise so patently doomed to failure."

That was how things had shaped up when Berlin proposed improving German-Soviet relations. It could clearly be seen from documents published in the West that it was a German initiative.

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THE PACT OF AUGUST 23, 1939

IN A CONVERSATION with Georgi Astakhov, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, on August 2, 1939, Ribbentrop suggested working out a "new pattern of relationship" between Germany and the Soviet Union. He declared that there were no problems from the Baltic to the Black Sea that could not be resolved to mutual satisfaction. Asked by Astakhov what the Reichsminister actually meant, Ribbentrop said he was willing to negotiate current issues if the Soviet Government was similarly willing. The cable whereby the Reichsminister informed the German Ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, about the content of his conversation with Astakhov contained a further noteworthy point: it had been intimated to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires that Germany was willing to "come to terms with Russia about the fate of Poland".

It must have been expected in Berlin that Moscow would take such willingness as a sign of the German Government's serious intentions. For by that time, German-Polish relations had been strained to the breaking point, and an armed conflict could erupt at any moment. Naturally, that could not leave the Soviet Government indifferent. With Austria and Czechoslovakia overrun by Hitler, the same could happen to Poland. And then the German forces would have moved to a boundary passing close to Kiev and Minsk. Besides, we considered that boundary altogether unfair. When an independent Polish state arose after the October Revolution, its border with Soviet Russia was established by the Supreme Allied Council of the Entente in 1919 and has gone down in history as the Curzon Line (so named after Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary at the time). Incidentally, that line conformed to the ethnic principle: the areas inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians were left to the Soviet side. However, later on, in consequence of military operations, Poland's rulers forced Soviet Russia, under the 1921 Treaty of Riga, into accepting another boundary moved farther east. Now, in the event of Poland's defeat, the Ukrainian- and Byelorussian-populated territories could fall under the Nazis, which was bound to cause concern in Moscow. Berlin decided to use that circumstance as a kind of bait.

In the evening of August 3, 1939, Schulenburg was received by Molotov. The Ambassador repeated Ribbentrop's argument that there were no problems in the space between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be resolved and added that Germany wished "to reach agreement on areas of interest". Molotov questioned the seriousness of the German initiative, recalling a number of Germany's unfriendly acts: the Anti-Comintern Pact, support of Japan's hostile acts against the USSR, and the barring of the Soviet Union from the Munich accord. Under the treaty between them, the USSR and France were to have jointly come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression against her. When such a threat arose in the autumn of 1938, the USSR was ready to honour its commitment. Its Western military districts were placed on the alert. But France did not fulfil her part of the commitment and went for a deal in Munich without so much as consulting Moscow. Indeed, the Munich collusion itself was manifestly directed against the USSR. How could all that be squared with the German Government's statement regarding the normalisation of relations with the USSR? Molotov asked and added that he saw no proof so far on any change of Germany's position. From that conversation Schulenburg concluded that "the Soviet Government has now decided to seek agreement with Britain and France" and recommended Berlin to make some serious efforts to get the Soviet position changed.

Hitler and Ribbentrop followed that advice. But the Soviet side, too, showed interest in a continuing dialogue. Events were moving fast. On August 12, Astakhov called on a high-ranking German Foreign Ministry official, J. Schnurre and informed him of Molotov's readiness to discuss the issues raised by the Germans, including the Polish and other political problems, in Moscow. During that conversation, Schnurre mentioned a non-aggression pact, in particular. Astakhov said that the Soviet side proposed holding stage-by-stage negotiations, without undue haste. However, a "stage-by-stage" discussion did not suit Hitler who had already set the 1st of September as the date for the invasion of Poland. On August 14 Schulenburg was instructed to inform Molotov of Berlin's view that "German-Russian relations have reached a historic turning point", that "there is no real contradiction of interests between Germany and Russia" and that "friendship has always been good and enmity bad for both countries in the past". The Ambassador was then told to declare that Britain's inflammatory policy "has led to a situation" which made it necessary to "clarify German-Russian relations". Otherwise, he was instructed to say, the situation can reach a point where both governments "will find themselves deprived of an opportunity to restore German-Russian friendship and, at the same time, to clear up together the territorial issues of Eastern Europe".

As one can see, Hitler used both the stick and the carrot: he proposed friendship and territorial accretions and threatened irreparable rupture. Still at that point the reaction in Moscow to the German proposal was restrained. Molotov declared that the Soviet Government, though welcoming Germany's intention to improve relations with the USSR, was in no mood to be in a hurry. Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow "will require appropriate preparation so that an exchange of opinions could be productive". In the course of that conversation, Molotov showed interest in a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. There were other questions, among them whether Berlin was willing to influence Japan to have her improve her relations with the USSR and also to discuss the problem of guarantees for the Baltic states.

By that time, the idea of a pact appeared to have sunk in both in Moscow and in Berlin. While planning their attack on Poland, the Nazis were anxious to have a Soviet threat removed. On August 16, Hitler replied: Germany was willing to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and also exert her influence on Japan for improving Russo-Japanese relations. Schulenburg was also instructed to inform Molotov that, in the Führer's opinion, "considering the existing situation and the possibility of it being compounded by further problems, since Germany does not intend to put up endlessly with Polish acts of provocation, it was desirable to clarify Soviet German relations with regard to current issues thoroughly and as quickly as possible". It was also stated that Ribbentrop was ready to come to Moscow by air at any time from August 18 on with powers from the Führer to discuss the whole set of issues and to sign appropriate documents, if necessary. It is worth recalling that the British and French missions were led by third-rate officials who had arrived without any powers and by a cargo passenger steamship.

The Soviet side was still cautious, however. On hearing what the Ambassador had to say, Molotov suggested that "a number of important practical steps" should be taken before the Reichsminister's arrival in Moscow, as signing a trade and credit treaty and drafting the non-aggression pact, comprising a protocol setting forth, among other things, the essence of the German proposals made earlier. Here we have

the first mention of the document which was subsequently described as an "additional secret protocol" to the pact.

So the Soviet position was made clear. But there was no intention in Moscow to rush into negotiations. At the end of the conversation, the People's Commissar reiterated that Ribbentrop's visit required "thorough preparation" and that there was no point in advertising it, anyway. The Ambassador's account of that meeting reached Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berchtesgaden, in the Alps. The Führer's reaction was rather furious. He found it altogether unacceptable for the Reichsminister's visit to Moscow to be put off. He had to come to terms with Stalin before marching on Poland, for to reschedule the invasion when the whole of his war machine was poised in readiness and with a season of bad roads in the offing would have meant to have all his plans hang in the balance. So Hitler made one more effort. On August 19 Schulenburg received a further instruction—to call on Molotov at once and tell him that, although the German side would also have been prepared to negotiate in "normal conditions", through diplomatic channels, the extraordinary situation which had arisen at the time made that impossible. It was further pointed out that German-Polish relations worsened day by day and at any moment clashes might lead to an outright conflict. It was the Führer's opinion that such a conflict must not create difficulties for clearing up Soviet-German relations, all the more so since, it was significantly underlined in the message, "the Russian interests must be taken into consideration" in that conflict.

However, Moscow kept insisting on a trade treaty being signed and published before a non-aggression pact could be drafted.

But then the course of events changed abruptly. No sooner had the Ambassador returned to his residence that he was called back to the Kremlin. The People's Commissar informed him that he had reported the conversation to the Soviet Government and could now say that if the trade agreement were signed on August 20, the Reichsminister could arrive in Moscow on August 26 or 27. He handed Schulenburg the Soviet draft of a non-aggression treaty. That change of tack was certainly due to Stalin's intervention, which the German Ambassador could not fail to note. It was interpreted in Berlin as a sign of Stalin's readiness to meet Hitler half-way. And the Führer seized upon that favourable circumstance. He could not have the visit postponed until August 26 or 27: these dates were too near to the day set for the invasion of Poland. The Soviet-German trade agreement was signed without further delay, and then Hitler dictated his message of August 20 to Stalin personally:

"Herr Stalin, Moscow.

"1. I sincerely welcome the signing of the new German-Soviet trade agreement as the first step towards a new pattern of German-Soviet relations.

"2. I take the conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union to mean establishing a long-term German policy. Germany is thereby readopting the political line which has been beneficent for both States for centuries...

"3. I agree with the draft of the Non-Aggression Pact transmitted by your Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov and I consider it extremely necessary to clarify the issues related to it in the shortest way possible.

"4. The additional protocol, desirable for the Soviet Government, can, in my judgement, be agreed upon within the shortest possible time if a responsible German statesman negotiates it personally in Moscow. Otherwise, the German Government does not see an opportunity to agree on and ratify the additional protocol before long.

"5. The tension between Germany and Poland has become unbearable... The crisis can erupt any day. Germany is, in any case, determined to secure the interests of the Reich by any means in the situation which has thus arisen.

"6. In my opinion, considering that both Powers intend to enter into a new relationship with each other, it would be advisable to waste no time. Therefore, I suggest that you receive my Minister of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, August 22, or Wednesday, August 23, at the latest. The Reichsminister has the comprehensive powers for drawing up and signing the Non-Aggression Pact as well as the protocol. In view of the international situation, it would be impossible for the Reichsminister to stay in Moscow for more than two days. I would be glad to receive your reply soon. Adolf Hitler."

That was quite a noteworthy message. The Führer intimated that he was ready to accept far-reaching Soviet demands. Concessions were not of essential importance for him at the moment. His major preoccupation was to keep the schedule of the attack on Poland. He rather clearly hinted at that date in his message to Stalin when he said that Ribbentrop could not stay in Moscow for more than two days. With his long-term objective of attacking the USSR in mind, he believed that he would more than offset whatever he might have lost "for a time". Stalin, on the other hand, interpreted Hitler's message as evidence of his desire to cooperate with Moscow for a long period. Beyond doubt, the energetic and businesslike tone of the message and its author's concrete and definite position appealed to Stalin. That was a man to deal with! And how different his message was from the woolly epistles from Britain and France!

Having sent his cipher to Moscow, Hitler was in a state of near-prostration. He was restless and impatient. Yet he still hoped he had found the right approach to Stalin and would get the reply he wanted. The Kremlin, in those fateful days, was for the last time weighing the pros and cons of possible alternatives. On the one hand, Hitler's offers looked tempting, opening up an opportunity to stay out of the conflict between the capitalist powers, which could go on for months, if not years, on end. During that time, the USSR could strengthen its defences and also extend the Soviet sphere of interests to contiguous regions and maintain agreement with Germany for a long period. On the other hand, it was clear that Germany's attack on Poland was inevitable. Now, if one refused an accord with Hitler, what was there to guarantee that the USSR would not become yet another target of Nazi aggression? Then there could be no counting on any aid from Britain and France which would be only too glad to bring Germany and the Soviet Union at loggerheads. So Stalin chose the former option.

That was, of course, a deal between two leaders who did not trust one another too much. But either believed that agreement between them was in their mutual interest at that particular moment. Was that deal immoral, as many now hold? It certainly was, but then, who aided by strict moral principles at the time? Was there anything moral about the position of Chamberlain and Laval who sought to destroy the Soviet Union with Hitler's hands? Besides, one should not forget that in the period between the two world wars, force was still considered a "legitimate" political instrument for resolving international problems. Few challenged Clausewitz's theory about war being the continuation of politics by different means.

Stalin's reply to Hitler was handed to Schulenburg in the evening of August 21:

"Herr Adolf Hitler, Reichskanzler of Germany,

"I thank you for your letter.

"I hope that the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact will lead to a serious improvement of political relations between our two countries. The peoples of our two countries need peaceful relations with each other. The German Government's consent to conclude a Non-Aggression Pact creates a base for ending political tension and establishing peace and cooperation between our States.

"The Soviet Government has authorised me to inform you that it agreed to Herr von Ribbentrop arriving in Moscow on August 23. J. Stalin."

Soon after 11 p. m., local time, on the same day, German radio broke the news:

"The Reich Government and the Soviet Government have agreed to conclude a Non-Aggression Pact. The Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs will arrive in Moscow on August 23 to complete the negotiations."

Hitler was clearly in a hurry to tell the world about that agreement. He wanted to bar all the ways of retreat.

The rest is common knowledge. As projected, the pact was signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23. The ceremony took place at the Kremlin in Stalin's presence.

Now for the secret additional protocol. Some argue that its original text has never been discovered, although photocopies have long since been published in the Western press and experts whose judgement we have no reason to question are in no doubt about them. As you have just seen, the additional protocol was mentioned in the correspondence which preceded the signing of the pact. One should also pause to consider how could the Red Army have moved into the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia on September 17, 1939, to face the eastward-bound Wehrmacht without a prior accord between Moscow and Berlin, that is, without the German Command knowing of that action in advance, and without having agreed on the line the German troops would stop at and meet the Soviet armed forces. This writer was serving in the Soviet Navy at the time and was attached to the Dnieper Naval Squadron whose ships, having sailed up the Dnieper and the Pripyat, entered the territory of Poland, together with other Red Army units in the small hours of September 17, with maps indicating the line we were to meet the Germans on. And then, there was a joint parade of German and Soviet troops in Pinsk: they marched alternately in front of the stands with German generals and Red Army commanders on.

The Non-Aggression Pact was an unavoidable imperative for us. But, after the collapse of Poland and after the Soviet forces were moved into the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia and a common Soviet-German border established, it should, perhaps, have been enough to sign a border convention or just to agree on a demarcation line. Instead, Stalin went all the way to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Frontier with Germany. It was signed on September 28, 1939, during Reichsminister Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow.

The Treaty of Friendship and Frontier also contained secret protocols. In the first of them, either party undertook to prevent "Polish agitation" directed against the other party's region. The second secret additional protocol contained a provision amending Paragraph I of the secret protocol of August 23, 1939, to leave the territory of the Lithuanian state within the sphere of interests of the USSR. At the same time, the Lyublin and Warsaw voivodships were transferred into the sphere of interests of Germany, with the boundary line changed accordingly. It was likewise stipulated that the economic agreements in force between Germany and Lithuania were not to be affected by the Soviet Union's activities in the region. Just like the Treaty of Friendship and Frontier, both protocols appended to it were signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov.

One issue brought up after the signing ceremony in Stalin's presence, in a rather peculiar way, was that of the "Anti-Comintern Pact". The atmosphere had by that time been warmed up enough with champagne and friendship toasts. Those present examined an exhibition, put up there and then, of the designs of new sumptuous structures of the Reich's capital, worked out by Hitler himself and his favourite architect Albert Speer. Stalin liked the designs, which Ribbentrop did not fail to report to the Führer, in a cable.

A lively conversation went on. The Reichsminister informed his boss about it in every detail. "Stalin and Molotov," he cabled, "are very nice. I felt as if I were amongst my old party comrades." That is when the "Anti-Comintern Pact" was brought up. Ribbentrop encouraged by the "comradely" atmosphere, explained that "the pact is directed, as a matter of fact, against the Western democracies, not against the Soviet Union". Stalin, in tune with him, remarked: "The Anti-Comintern Pact has, in fact, frightened, above all, the London's City and the small British shopkeepers." The Reichsminister, heartened by such unanimity, took it up: "Herr Stalin is, of course, less frightened by the Anti-Comintern Pact than the London's City and the British shopkeepers." Wasn't it this exchange that gave rise to the idea of having the USSR join the trilateral treaty that was concluded shortly afterwards by the parties to the Anti-Comintern Pact?

The banquet went on. Stalin raised his glass in Hitler's honour. Molotov toasted the health of Ribbentrop and Schulenburg. All of them drank to the "new era" in German-Soviet relations. In parting, Stalin assured the Reichsminister: "The Soviet Union is very serious about this new pact. I pledge my word of honour that the Soviet Union will not deceive its partner." He expected Hitler to pledge his.

STALIN AND HITLER

IN ONE OF HIS TOASTS that night, Stalin said:

"I know how much the German people love their Führer. Therefore, I want to drink to his health..."

Hitler did not leave that unanswered. In a Christmas Day message to Stalin before long, he expressed "best wishes" for the well-being and "prosperous future of the peoples of the friendly Soviet Union". Stalin replied without delay: "The friendship of the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, cemented by blood, has every reason to be lasting and firm."

The reference to "friendship cemented by blood" sounds strange. Did he mean the latest events in Poland and the joint Soviet-German military parades in Brest and other cities after the Wehrmacht and the Red Army had met on a pre-arranged line? Or was it a hint at the heavy Soviet casualties in the snow expanses of Finland? Or, perhaps, Stalin thought of prospective action to divide the spheres of influence?

The paradox was that for all that made them different, these two sinister characters somewhat gravitated towards one another. Their rivalry did not at all preclude mutual admiration. When Hitler destroyed his devoted companion, the stormtroop leader Ernst Röhm and other SA commanders in 1934, Stalin praised that bloodbath to the sky. Anastas Mikoyan told me later on that at the very first Politburo meeting after the Röhm murder, Stalin said:

'Have you heard what happened in Germany? Hitler is just up to the mark! That's the way to deal with political opponents...'

That was the summer of 1934. Sergei Kirov was murdered in December, and then there was a crackdown on the Leninist Guard, that is, the Party's hard core that had grown up under Lenin, and the destruction of top-ranking Red Army commanders began. Hundreds of thousands of totally innocent people fell victim to that reign of violence.

It is noteworthy that after the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, the Führer recalled the short shrift Stalin had given to Soviet marshals and generals. After commenting approvingly on the shooting of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and other military commanders, Hitler, who certainly knew about the fakes of his security service, which had been used to trump up high treason charges against Tukhachevsky and others, still remarked that he "could no longer exclude the possibility of treasonous collaboration between the Russian and German general staffs" and he, Hitler, should long since have followed Stalin's example. It was then, too, that the Nazi rag, *Angriff*, carried articles by one of the Führer's henchmen, Robert Ley, vituperating, in all too familiar terms, against the German generals: "Degenerates to their very bones, blue-blooded to the point of idiocy, nauseatingly corrupt, and cowardly, like all nasty creatures,—such is the aristocratic clique... We must exterminate this filth, extirpate its root and branch."

When Molotov's third conversation with Hitler was over on November 13, 1940, the latter showed the People's Commissar out of the Reich Chancellory. The delegations of both sides fell well behind. Hitler, Molotov and myself, as interpreter, found ourselves all alone in the suites decorated with Teutonic symbols. When we stopped in front of a solid door, Hitler, shaking hands with the People's Commissar, uttered:

"I consider Stalin an outstanding historic personality. Well, I also expect to go down in history. So it is natural that two political leaders of the kind we are should meet. I ask you, Herr Molotov, to give Herr Stalin my regards and my proposal for such a meeting before long..."

On his return to Moscow, Molotov did, of course, tell Stalin about Hitler's offer which, all things considered, must have been an essential factor behind Stalin's error of judgement as regards the timing of Hitler's attack on the USSR. In fact, Molotov, too, while reporting to the Politburo about the results of the negotiations with Hitler, intimated that there was no reason to fear a German invasion in the near future. So Stalin appeared to keep on hoping, until the last moment, for yet another agreement with Hitler and even for a meeting with him.

Stalin considered Hitler an adroit and calculating politician who knew exactly what he was going to do. He believed he could see the Führer's line of reasoning and make out his plans. Hitler, too, thought he "understood" Stalin. Albert Speer, who had an opportunity to observe the Führer at close range and rub shoulders with him at home, notes in his memoirs that Hitler "spoke admiringly of Stalin", appreciating, above all, his self-control and toughness. Speer quotes Hitler as having said, strikingly paradoxical and half-crazy though it might sound: "It would be best, after Victory over Russia, to entrust the administration of the country to Stalin, under German hegemony, of course, since he was the best imaginable man to handle the Russians."

American journalist William L. Shirer also notes in his book *Berlin Diary* that Hitler "admires Stalin for his toughness". It is indicative that in the spring of 1945, Hitler, already in an utterly hopeless position, still counted on Stalin. In his diary entry dated March 4, Goebbels notes Hitler's ambition to come to terms with Moscow: "The Führer is right when he says that Stalin is in the best position to do an about-turn since he needs take no account of his public opinion."

In his last days, the German researcher Joachim Fest points out in his Führer's biography, Hitler felt "still closer to Stalin", and highly appreciated him as "a man of genius", deserving "boundless respect". Comparing himself with Stalin, the Führer "made no secret of his feeling of admiration" and repeated over and over again that the qualities they had in common, such as "greatness and steadfastness are immune, in their essence, from the waverings and pliability typical of bourgeois politicians."

Having outplayed Stalin in the diplomatic game on the eve of the war, Hitler lost in the end. It was Stalin who won. Now, while celebrating his victory, he still decided to show certain magnanimity in respect of his adversary. Having arrived for the Potsdam Conference, Stalin, who could not be unaware that the charred bodies of Hitler and Ewa Braun had been found and identified near the Reich Chancellory's bunker, declared that the Führer's body had not been discovered. That gave rise to a lot of rumours that Hitler had escaped and was in hiding either in Spain or in South America. There had been allegations, on and off, for years that the Führer had managed to find refuge on an uninhabited island, having reached it in a submarine. Some claimed that he had taken cover in a monastery somewhere in the Pyrenees, others said it was an Argentinian rancho. That is how Stalin gave Hitler years of a half-mysterious life hereafter.

Now that we all know so much about Stalin's heinous crimes, many, especially those of the younger generation, picture him as a loathsome and formidable monster. But in reality he could be polite, courteous, hospitable, and even charming, particularly when he found it necessary to impress his interlocutor. He was certainly a great actor. After all, he bewitched such perspicacious and inquiringly-minded world-renowned writers as Herbert Wells, Romain Rolland, Bernard Shaw, Henri Barbusse, and Lion Feuchtwanger. The latter, while attending the Bukharin trial, took everything that was going on in the Hall of Columns at face value and even praised Stalin for his "vigilance" in relation to "the enemies of the people".

It is worth quoting at this point an assessment of Stalin by the well-known American diplomat and scholar, George Kennan: "In manner—with us, at least—he was simple, quiet, unassuming. There was no striving for effect. His words were few. They generally sounded reasonable and sensible... An unforewarned visitor would never have guessed what depths of calculation, ambition, love for power, jealousy, cruelty, and sly vindictiveness lurked behind this unpretentious facade..."

"Those of my colleagues who saw more of him than I did have told of being able to observe other aspects of his personality: of seeing the yellow eyes light up in a flash of menace and fury as he turned, momentarily, on some unfortunate subordinate; of witnessing the diabolical sadism with which, at the great diplomatic dinners of the war, he would humiliate his subordinates before the eyes of foreigners, with his barbed, mocking toasts, just to show his power over them..." That was "a man great, if you will, primarily in his iniquity: ruthless, cynical, cunning, endlessly dangerous..."

For almost four war years I often had to translate Stalin's conversations with foreign visitors, sit next to him, draw up and let him sign the texts of coded messages to our ambassadors in Washington and London. I've been quite often asked: wasn't I scared? To tell the truth I wasn't! Perhaps, it was because I was young, naive and infected with a common belief in the fairness of the "father of nations" and his infallibility. Of course, I saw people disappearing around me who knew and could not suspect of anything. I found it difficult to believe that they could be "the enemies of the people", "spies" and "wreckers"

But, on the other hand, there was this feeling: take myself, I've never sinned against the people, and against Stalin, either by thought, or by word, or by deed, and I've not been seized, but another one has. So, perhaps, he has done something wrong, after all. I had no fear at the time. Now, with all that one knows, I do wonder sometimes: why did I survive? Indeed, it was enough to turn your eyes away too quickly, to say something out of place, or just to smile at the wrong time to arouse suspicion fraught with unpredictable consequences.

I remember reporting a telegram from Washington to Molotov once in the summer of 1944. The People's Commissar listened, while looking through some papers on his desk. Then he looked up fixedly at me and asked:

"What did you do in the Polish Consular Office in Kiev in 1934?"

I felt at a loss at first, puzzled by the question. Molotov looked at me intently. I realised I had to answer at once.

"In the Polish Consular Office?" I began to recollect. "Indeed, I happened to be there. I worked as an Intourist guide in Kiev then. Tourists usually went home through Poland. I collected their passports and took them to the Consular Office to get transit visas..."

"That much we know", Molotov said icily. "But the visit in question to the Polish Consular Office was not in the tourist season, but later, in the autumn, and you went in there through the back, not front, door. What did you do there?"

Just imagine! It was ten years back! During that time Kiev had lived through the occupation, and heavy fighting to liberate it. The old Kreshchatik Avenue had been destroyed, the Assumption Cathedral of the Lavra complex blown up, thousands of Kievans had lost their lives, but a report written by someone who was shadowing me then, in 1934, had survived and so had a dangerous piece of evidence.

"I went there to see a friend of mine. He had first worked as an Intourist driver and I was usually with him on his bus taking visitors on sightseeing tours around the city. Then he got a job at the Consular Office, surely upon recommendation of appropriate agencies. I met him by chance in a street and he invited me to drop in. We sat in his garage for a while, smoking Polish cigarettes, that's all..."

Molotov thawed a little and said:

"I accept your explanation. It's Beria who has written a report to Comrade Stalin about your visit to the Polish Consular Office. You may go..."

I was lucky. In fact, I could well have been declared a "Polish spy", who penetrated into the sanctum sanctorum of Stalin's office.

AT THE DAWN OF JUNE 22, 1941: GRAIN AND OIL FOR GERMANY

SO, FOLLOWING the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact and the Treaty of Friendship and Frontier with the USSR, Hitler, having already fixed the deadline for the attack on the Soviet Union, went on playing his diplomatic game with Stalin, drawing him now into negotiations concerning the accession to the tripartite treaty and a division of the spheres of influence.

As Hitler's third conversation with Molotov was over in Berlin, on November 13, 1940, the former explained that he would have some important business to attend to in the afternoon, so it was Ribbentrop who would finish up the negotiations with the People's Commissar.

In the evening we went to the Reichsminister's residence in Wilhelmstrasse, we, that is, Molotov, his Deputy in the People's Commissariat

for Foreign Affairs, Dekanozov, and two interpreters, Pavlov and this writer. The Reichsminister met us in company of the German interpreter, Hilger.

He had a sumptuous office, true, a little smaller than Hitler's. It had antique gilded furniture, wall-high tapestry, heavy-framed pictures and porcelain and bronze statuettes on tall supports in the corners. The first few minutes were allotted to press photographers. Ribbentrop was amiably smiling while shaking hands with the Soviet visitor. Finally, the outsiders retired. The discussion got under way at a round table in the centre of which stood a lamp with a thin leather shade decorated with coloured prints.

"In accordance with the Führer's wishes," Ribbentrop began, "we should sum up the talks and reach agreement on points of principle..."

Ribbentrop took a piece of paper out of his pocket and went on:

"This is an outline of some proposals of the German Government..."

Setting out to restate the same idea, formulated by Hitler before, of dividing what would be "the British property in abeyance" after Britain's defeat and the spheres of influence around the world, the Reichsminister did not finish the sentence. There was an air-raid alarm. Then bombs were heard to burst nearby and the glass to tremble in the high windows of the Reichsminister's office.

That was one of the biggest RAF raids on the Third Reich's capital. Knowing from press reports about Molotov's arrival in Berlin, the British High Command marshalled all forces available. Its aircraft broke through Goering's much-vaunted air defences and fiercely bombed the city.

"It isn't quite safe here", Ribbentrop uttered, "let us go down into the bunker, it's safer there..."

He led us through a long corridor to a lift. We descended deep underground and passed into a spacious office. It was also fairly lavishly decorated, notably with French impressionist paintings, apparently trophies from Paris.

When Ribbentrop resumed elaborating on Britain's collapse before long and on the need to dispose of her possessions, Molotov interrupted him with his famous phrase:

"If Britain is crushed, why are we sitting in this shelter? And whose bombs are falling so close that the blasts are heard even here?"

Ribbentrop appeared to be a little embarrassed, but then he regained self-control and peremptorily declared that the British would be defeated anyway.

"In the opinion of the German Government", the Reichsminister went on to say, "it will not be long before we shall have to take practical steps towards dividing the former British Empire. So the Soviet Union would do well to join the Pact of the Three, now comprising Germany, Italy and Japan..."

Let me remind you that a treaty officially intended to defend Western culture from communism was concluded between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936. The treaty had a secret additional protocol aimed against the Soviet Union. The pact was soon acceded to by fascist Italy which also pledged to fight against the "Bolshevist threat". The Western press rather widely commented on the aims of the trilateral treaty which was christened an "Anti-Comintern Pact" there and then. The pact died a natural death, as it were, little by little. And then, Germany, Italy and Japan signed another one, a treaty of military alliance, on September 27, 1940. In it, Japan recognised the leading role of Germany and Italy in creating "a new order in Europe", while they, in turn, left Japan free to create "a new order in the great Asian region". Just before the treaty was due to be signed, the German

Embassy in Moscow, on instructions from Ribbentrop, explained to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the pact was spear-headed not against the Soviet Union, but "exclusively against the American warmongers". Although Berlin attempted to dissociate itself from the "Anti-Comintern Pact", many still saw the new trilateral treaty as being associated with it. That was the treaty Ribbentrop wanted us to join, thereby making it a Pact of the Four.

The draft treaty, submitted by the German side, between Germany, Italy, and Japan, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, declared the common desire of the Four Powers to establish cooperation with a view to securing their "natural spheres of interests in Europe, Asia and Africa". Under it, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union were to commit themselves to "mutually respecting each other's natural interests". The treaty was to have come into effect upon signature for a term of ten years and might have been prolonged by consent of the parties to it. It was, besides, to have contained two secret protocols, one specifying the priority areas of interests of the parties concerned, including a southern one, "in the direction of the Indian Ocean" for the USSR, and the other concerning relations with Turkey, replacing the Montreux Convention with a new regime of the Straits which would account for special interests of the Soviet Union.

It took Stalin a mere ten days to prepare a reply to Hitler's proposal to that effect, made to Molotov in Berlin on November 13, 1940. When the Führer told Molotov about Britain's defeat before long and the need to come to agreement on how to deal with the British Empire's heritage, the People's Commissar dodged discussing that delicate issue which had been raised, as has since proved evident, in order to inveigle Moscow into a debate which would have finally spoiled its relations with London (Hitler presumed he would induce Great Britain to keep out of the German-Soviet conflict). But Stalin, unlike Molotov, landed in the trap set by the Führer. He still hoped to bind Berlin by yet another accord, declaring himself ready and willing to accede to the trilateral treaty of Germany, Italy and Japan, and to transform the Pact of the Three into a Pact of the Four. That is what he instructed Molotov to communicate to Schulenburg.

Count Werner von der Schulenburg, the Ambassador of Germany to the USSR, was invited to the Kremlin for a confidential talk on November 25, ten days after Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, had returned from Berlin. I was instructed to notify him in advance that his meetings with the People's Commissar would take place at 9 p.m.

I had already happened to meet that venerable diplomat at the German Embassy in Stanislavsky Street and in his mansion in Chisty Lane (presently the residence of the Patriarch of All Russia). I had seen Schulenburg last at the Byelorussian Railway Station during the official send-off given to Molotov as he left for the capital of the Third Reich for talks with Hitler. The Ambassador then had a glittering top hat on, a tail-coat and a cloak thrown over his shoulders. This time round, when I met him at the entrance to the Sovnarkom building, I found him wearing a long dark grey coat and a felt hat with slightly turned-up brims in the latest fashion. He got out of his black Mercedes in company of the Embassy counsellor, Gustav Hilger, who had a perfect command of Russian and served as interpreter.

Having left our coats in the cloakroom, we went up in a mahogany-finished lift to the first floor and on to the offices of the Chairman of People's Commissars. The Ambassador had always been spectacularly elegant, this time in a dark, barely striped suit, with a snow-white

handkerchief in his breast pocket, stiff cuffs with big gold cuff-links, and just as stiff a collar making him hold his head high so that you could well see his broad black tie in a free knot fixed with a tie-pin carrying a big pearl. His clean-shaven head and the dark skin of his cheek-bones made his face, with a well-groomed short moustache, look inimitable. Perhaps, it was due, in a way, to his long sojourn in the Orient. Schulenburg had come to Moscow from Tehran where he had represented Germany for many years. He clearly had a liking for Iran. What struck your eye in his residence were wonderful Istahan carpets, covering the walls, old steel, fancifully inlaid shields, sabres and daggers. There were Persian miniatures hanging all over the place, many on erotic subjects, which was considered somewhat shocking by the standards of the day, yet attested to the courage and "broad vision" of that hereditary aristocrat.

Schulenburg strutted ahead of me along the Kremlin corridor, tall, smart and self-respectful. Who could have thought that it would not be long before Gestapo hangmen would hang him up by a rib from a butcher's hook for his part in the abortive attempt on Hitler.

Having greeted his visitors and invited them to take their seats at a long table covered with green cloth, Molotov began by announcing that the Soviet Government had carefully considered the proposal made by Germany's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, on November 13, and was willing, given certain conditions, to accept the idea of concluding a Pact of the Four on political and economic cooperation. The conditions the Soviet side laid down comprised, in essence, the immediate withdrawal of the German troops from Finland; assuring the security of the Black Sea frontiers of the USSR by concluding a Soviet-Bulgarian treaty of mutual assistance; providing basing facilities for the ground and naval forces of the USSR in the area of Bosphorus and Dardanelles under a long-term lease; recognition of the Soviet priority interests in the region south of Batumi and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf; and Japan's renunciation of concession rights to the coal and oil of Northern Sakhalin.

Having set out the conditions, Molotov said that Ribbentrop's proposals regarding the protocols ought to be amended accordingly. The People's Commissar added that in the event of Turkey objecting to the Soviet bases in the Straits, three Powers—Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union—should devise and effect the requisite diplomatic and military measures. Molotov also proposed that, in accordance with the foregoing, the quadripartite treaty should be supplemented not with two, but with five secret protocols and summed up each of them.

The People's Commissar concluded by asking the Ambassador to transmit the considerations just expounded to Berlin as a matter of urgency and expressing the hope that the German Government's reply would not be long in coming.

Yet it never came. Hitler was fully engaged in preparing for an attack on the Soviet Union. However, the campaign of misinformation coming from the Führer's headquarters went on. Reports that Hitler was preparing an important and far-reaching reply to the Soviet proposals were reaching us, I mean our Embassy in Berlin, at regular intervals along with increasingly alarming signals about an impending invasion. The man who had a special part to play in that process was Otto Meissner, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. He met with Ambassador Dekanozov almost weekly right until early June 1941, assuring him that the Führer was just about to finish drawing up further important proposals for cooperation with the USSR, which the Ambassador reported to Moscow, of course. That reinforced Stalin's conviction that there would be no war in the immediate future. He

dismissed all warnings about an inevitable and imminent attack, considering them to be coming principally from Britain which saw her salvation in a conflict between Germany and the USSR.

Now, presuming, as some researchers do, the proposals communicated by Molotov to Schulenburg on November 25, 1940, to have been nothing short of a feeler to probe Hitler's intentions, his ominous silence was eloquent enough. It ought to have alerted Stalin and prompted him that there was no reason to count on any further negotiations with Berlin. But Stalin stood pat on his attempts to make Hitler resume discussions. That was the aim, in particular, behind the ill-starred TASS Statement of June 14, 1941, which said that Germany was as faithful as the Soviet Union to the Non-Aggression Pact and that the rumours about an impending conflict were being spread by certain warmongers intent on setting the USSR and Germany by the ears. The TASS Statement did nothing to change Hitler's position. The German press did not even mention it. But it misguided the Soviet people and the Red Army.

Even on June 21, that is, on the eve of the Nazi invasion, Stalin was still hoping to hear from Hitler. On that Saturday, we, in the Berlin Embassy, received a telegram from Moscow enjoining the Ambassador to see Ribbentrop without any delay and tell him that the Soviet Government was ready and willing to enter into negotiations with the Reich's top leadership and to "hear Germany's possible claims". That was, as a matter of fact, a hint at the Soviet side's willingness not only to hear, but to meet the German claims. Indeed, in the small hours of June 22 Soviet trainloads of grain, manganese and oil were crossing the border with Germany, although the Germans had long since suspended their shipments. Stalin was giving Hitler a kind of signal to show that the USSR would go on fulfilling its commitments. But nothing could stop Hitler any longer. Nor was that the end of the paradox. At daybreak on June 22, German aircraft were bombing Minsk, Brest, Lvov, Rovno, their bombs were bursting on our airfields and in tank depots, blowing up our fuel storages and ammunition dumps, Hitler's legions crossed the Soviet border from the Baltic all the way to the Black Sea, but Stalin was still wavering. Refusing to sign the order of retaliation, he told the marshals around him:

"Well, maybe, this is just an act of provocation by the German militarists. Let Molotov call in Schulenburg, he is in direct contact with Hitler, let him ask what is going on..."

The war is raging, but there is silence in Stalin's office, and Molotov goes off to order a call to be put through to the German Ambassador. The latter is obviously in no hurry to arrive in the Kremlin. Precious time is wasted. Finally, Schulenburg appears and, asked by the People's Commissar, replies that this is war and that the German troops have crossed the border of the USSR on Hitler's orders. And there is Molotov complaining in confusion:

"We haven't deserved that..."

Indeed, Stalin had unfailingly replenished Germany's strategic reserves and given out the people Hitler wanted, although he had himself obtained some of those he wanted to put away. He believed Hitler more than he believed those who, at the risk of their life, warned about the imminent danger. He thought he had figured out everything with precision accuracy and that he had fathomed the Führer's line of reasoning. That was self-deception. Stalin's error of judgement was unpardonable.

We won out in the end, but at what cost!

TALKS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE USSR IN 1939

Margarita PANKRASHOVA

AFTER THE MUNICH DEAL Europe faced the threat of another wave of Nazi expansion. On March 18, 1939, the Soviet government proposed convening a conference of the most interested states to agree on a joint position in the event of a new German aggression. That date may be regarded as the start of the 1939 Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations on setting up an anti-Hitler coalition.

From the very beginning the political negotiations ran into difficulties because of the dual position of London and Paris which did not want to bind themselves by rigid obligations in relation to the Soviet side. This is evidenced by the secret documents of the British cabinet, which were recently made public. The true motives of the British government are seen most clearly in the minutes of the government's Committee on Foreign Policy that is, the selected members of the cabinet. This article is based entirely on those minutes. They provide more detailed answers than other documents to the following questions:

Why did the British government decide to negotiate with the Soviet Union the signing of an agreement on mutual assistance?

What did the British government want to achieve in its negotiations with the Soviet Union?

Why didn't it discontinue the negotiations despite the obvious unwillingness to sign a really effective agreement on mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, and sometimes even delayed them, gradually, though grudgingly, yielding to Soviet demands?

Why did it practically disrupt the political negotiations in the end, as it disagreed with the Soviet definition of "indirect aggression", while acceptance of that definition would mean providing effective protection for the Baltic states against German aggression?

THE SOVIET UNION, being a major element in building up opposition to the aggressor, insisted that the British and French governments should give contractual guarantees *to the states neighbouring on it, the Baltic states in the first place, in the event of a so-called indirect aggression by Germany against the USSR across the territory of these states.* That was all the more important for our country since Germany, having no common frontiers with the USSR, could attack it only across the territory of its neighbours.

Confronted with the stubborn unwillingness of Britain and France to provide guarantees for the Baltic states, the Soviet government decided

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to find out in full the true intentions of the Western powers, and so changed its earlier stance.

On June 16, 1939, the Soviet Union proposed the signing of a simple tripartite pact only against direct¹ aggression. Such a pact, envisaging assistance by the three powers to each other in the event of direct aggression, would provide no guarantees on their part to third countries,² that is, the Soviet Union would not have to interfere on the side of Poland or Romania—and Britain or France on the side of the Baltic states—if they would be attacked by Germany.³ Meanwhile a direct attack of Germany on the Soviet Union was unlikely, for in that case it would automatically be followed by assistance to the Soviet Union on the part of Britain and France, in keeping with the latest Anglo-French proposal of June 15,⁴ and which would mean joint actions of the three powers against Germany, something Hitler did not want at all.

So, according to the provisions of a simple tripartite pact on mutual assistance, the Soviet Union, though it was to have no guarantees for the Baltic states, could practically stay away from a possible conflict between Nazi Germany and the Western powers if the former attacked Poland and Romania. Such a tripartite accord would have left Britain alone with its "guarantee" for Poland, and London was not too eager to back up the guarantees by practical actions.

The architects of the London policy were obviously confused. Various views and suggestions were expressed then.

The position of the Western powers was most clearly revealed during the discussion of the Soviet proposal of June 16 at the Committee on Foreign Policy in June and July 1939. The Western powers discussed how far they could go in their cooperation with the Soviet Union and on what terms a treaty on mutual assistance should be signed with it.

On June 20, 1939, when the Soviet proposal of June 16 was debated at a sitting of the Committee on Foreign Policy, Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, said, referring to the negative attitude of some committee members to that proposal,⁵ that he wondered "whether we were right in adopting a non possumus attitude towards Molotov's proposal for a simple tripartite guarantee arrangement" because "...a simple agreement such as Mr. Molotov had suggested would have a good effect on world opinion, and would be much less dangerous and embarrassing to us than the more elaborate arrangements".⁶ Though Chamberlain and Halifax did not speak openly against concluding a tripartite arrangement, Chamberlain declared that "there was a great deal to be said for the Home Secretary's point of view, but the disadvantage was not only that public opinion would think that the negotiations had, in fact, failed but that Russia would be left in a very dissatisfied and sulky state".⁷

Halifax backed up the Prime Minister, saying that "information from many different sources pointed to the necessity, after we had gone so far, of reaching an agreement with Russia, as otherwise Hitler might well be encouraged to take some violent action".⁸

Similar views were voiced also during a sitting of the committee on June 26, 1939, when the question was whether to agree to transfer the list of guaranteed states from the additional protocol to Article 1 of the agreement and what was to be done about the Netherlands and Switzerland.⁹ But within the framework of that discussion the debate, which had started on June 20, continued and the sides were to decide what was to be preferred—a simple tripartite pact against direct aggression or an agreement providing for guarantees to the Baltic states and Poland. Halifax stated that "whatever formula was suggested, it would be realised throughout the world that the efforts to conclude a satisfactory Treaty with Russia had in fact failed unless we could in some way satisfy Mr. Molotov on this Baltic State point".¹⁰

Asked by Chamberlain what was to be done if the Soviet government would object to including the Netherlands and Switzerland in the list, Halifax replied that "in this event he would favour reverting to the conclusion of a simple Treaty of Mutual Guarantee against direct aggression". "If we had to take a simple Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, this at all events should block the door to any agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia,"¹¹ he declared.

Minister of Coordination of Defence Lord Chatfield considered that "on the whole, in view of the difficulties and complexities, the best plan would probably be to have the simple Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between ourselves, France and Soviet Russia" and that "such a Treaty would prevent Soviet Russia from making a Pact with Germany".¹²

Cabinet member W. S. Morrison observed that "if Germany overran Poland she would then be on the Soviet Frontier. The same was true of Romania. It was therefore of direct and vital interest to Russia that she should assist these two countries in resisting German aggression."¹³ So, he evidently believed that the Soviet Union would intervene on the side of Poland all the same, even if it had no formal obligations, and that Soviet assistance to Poland would be ensured by means of only a tripartite agreement, not binding anyone by guarantees to the Baltic states.

Ultimately the committee adopted a decision which was then reflected in the Anglo-French text of Article 1 and the additional protocol to it signed on July 1, 1939.¹⁴ Though they did envisage an indirect aggression as such, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Luxemburg were added to the separate secret list of guaranteed states, which already included Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Greece, and Belgium.¹⁵

Though officially the Western powers did not respond to the Soviet proposal, and the USSR was interested in continuing the negotiations on concluding an effective agreement on mutual assistance, the question of signing a simple tripartite pact for the case of only direct aggression was not raised at the further negotiations.

The further negotiations were devoted mainly to the question of indirect aggression and to a definition of such aggression.

The Soviet side responded to the proposal of July 1 by a draft dated July 3, in which it rejected the idea of granting guarantees to the three additional countries and for the first time expressed the Soviet definition of indirect aggression ("which implies an internal coup or a change in a policy to suit the aggressor").¹⁶ It was rejected by the British representatives.

On July 4, at a sitting of the Committee on Foreign Policy, where the Soviet proposal was discussed, Halifax said he saw only two possibilities:

"1. to break off the negotiations—this course he did not favour;

"2. to fall back on the limited Tripartite Pact, which Mr. Molotov had himself suggested."¹⁷

He personally supported the second version on the grounds that it would be wrong to be "unduly controversial vis-a-vis Soviet Russia, as our main object in the negotiations was to prevent Russia from engaging herself with Germany."¹⁸

The Home Secretary, for his part, observed that "the definition of indirect aggression was too wide and too dangerous". The Lord President of the Council thought that public opinion would be quite satisfied with a simple Tripartite Pact, upon which might, if thought desirable, be based wider and more elaborate arrangements at some future time.¹⁹

The President of the Board of Trade said that he "entirely disagreed with this view". "We could," he said, "safely have taken up this position

three months ago, but after all the publicity that had been given to the negotiations, the conclusion now of a simple Tripartite Pact would be generally regarded as concealing a complete breakdown of the negotiations, and would be hailed in Germany as such. It would be asked whether this pact would cover Danzig—the most immediate and critical danger point—and the answer must be in the negative... During the next critical three months it was all important that we should secure Soviet Russia's guarantee for Poland which was the one country that really mattered at the moment.²⁰

Halifax replied that the definition of indirect aggression proposed in the Soviet draft of July 3 "was very difficult to swallow" and "would put us in Russia's power".²¹

The President of the Board of Trade said he doubted if the Soviet definition of indirect aggression was as dangerous for the British side as it was alleged to be. In his view it gave "endless opportunities for argument as to the real meaning of almost every word in it". "If we cared to be cynical," he said, "we might safely accept it with a mental reservation that if it ever came within sight of having to be implemented we could differ from Soviet Russia on every point of its interpretation."²²

Thomas Inskip, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, also "agreed that the definition was open to entirely different interpretations".²³ Halifax said he was inclined towards signing a simple Tripartite Pact.²⁴ The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster pointed out that "the definition of indirect aggression was most objectionable... If, for example, some totalitarian or right-wing regime was established in Latvia, this definition would enable the Soviet Government to intervene and to drag us in with it. He agreed with the Home Secretary that the definition was the real stumbling block. He thought that we were being forced back by the pressure of circumstances upon a simple Tripartite Pact. He agreed with the President of the Board of Trade that such a Pact would be a ridiculously small mouse for the mountains to have produced, but he doubted whether the effect of its announcement would be the same in Germany as here. He thought that here there would be general relief that an agreement with Russia had been concluded, and its terms would not be too closely scrutinised. In Germany it would be suspected that the Pact concealed various kinds of secret provisions. On these grounds he supported the Foreign Secretary's proposals."²⁵

Chamberlain said he was convinced that for the British government it was totally impossible publicly to justify or defend that definition about which he had strong misgivings and that "it would be, on the whole, wise for us to try for an arrangement on a simpler and narrower basis, i.e. a Tripartite Pact combined with the consultative provisions... He himself did not think that public opinion would regard a simple Tripartite Pact as a 'ridiculous mouse'. Public opinion wanted an agreement directed against aggressors, and he thought that such opinion would be satisfied."²⁶

Though Chamberlain and Halifax hoped that Britain would not have to war with Germany over Poland, they still feared that Hitler could draw his own conclusions from what had taken place. Halifax stressed that, perhaps, "the strongest argument against a simple Tripartite Pact was that such a Pact might encourage Herr Hitler in some violent Polish or Danzig adventure".²⁷

Chamberlain, for his part, said he did not believe that Hitler would decide to run risks in regard to Danzig because France and the United Kingdom would sign a Tripartite Pact with Russia instead of a more elaborate treaty: "He would suspect that behind the simple Tripartite Pact there were various secret provisions. He had never been able to see how Russia could render effective assistance of an active nature to France

and ourselves except by assisting Poland in one way or another." Chamberlain said further that "having gone as far as we had done, he was now disposed to agree that we should submit to the Soviet Government two definite alternatives to select one or the other:

"(1). That the Soviet Government should drop their definition of indirect aggression and that we should abandon our insistence on the inclusion of Switzerland and the Netherlands in the secret Protocol; or

"(2). That there should be a Tripartite Pact²⁸ plus the provisions for consultation to which the Foreign Secretary had referred."²⁹

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said he was convinced that "it would be better to have some agreement with Soviet Russia than none at all. Apart from other considerations, the bargaining over of the Soviet Government vis-a-vis Germany would tend to disappear if we made an agreement with them."³⁰

After the debate the committee took a decision to send to the ambassador in Moscow an instruction in connection with the above-mentioned item 1 proposed by the Prime Minister.³¹

While the British side was strongly opposed to the Soviet definition of indirect aggression formulated on July 3, it was still more implacable about the Soviet definition suggested on July 9, which said that "the term 'indirect aggression' referred to an action which any of the above-mentioned states would agree to under a threat of force on the part of another state, or without such a threat, and which would cause the use of the territory and forces of a given state for aggression against it or against any of the contracting parties and will therefore be followed by a loss of the state's independence or a violation of its neutrality."³² On July 10 the committee discussed the Soviet definition of indirect aggression proposed on July 9. Halifax said that he personally had reached the conclusion that "the latest Soviet draft of July 10th (sic—*M. P.*) was unacceptable".³³ He considered it necessary to declare unambiguously to the Soviet government that "we were not prepared to entertain any formula which did not exclude the conception of internal interference."³⁴ "The only protection afforded by the formula," said Halifax, "was (1) its obscurity which would permit each contracting party to place its own definition upon it; and (2) that the USSR must be involved in hostilities with Germany and not merely with, say, Estonia before the formula applied."³⁵ He said also that "subject to the Soviet Government's agreeing to our proposals regarding indirect aggression,³⁶ he (the Foreign Secretary) thought that we might try meet them on the point that staff conversations should be concluded before the political agreement was officially signed". "He (the Foreign Secretary) thought that our best course would be to try to bargain a concession in this matter against Soviet acceptance of our indirect aggression formula. If this failed we should then fall back upon the tripartite plan plus an offer to discuss the possibilities of extending that plan to other States. *If the Soviet Government rejected this proposal then we should have to recognise that the negotiations had broken down* (italics mine—*M. P.*)".³⁷ Thus the statement by Halifax implied that the latest Soviet definition of indirect aggression was unacceptable for the British side, and that it was ready to disrupt the negotiations because of that.

Halifax reported further about his meeting with Charles Corbin, Ambassador of France to Great Britain, during which he tried to impress on the Ambassador that, perhaps, *the military agreement might not be so important* as it appeared at first sight. "In any event so long as the military conversations were taking place we should be preventing Soviet Russia from entering the German camp."³⁸ Chamberlain agreed with Halifax that the British side could not accept the Soviet formula,³⁹ and, referring to item 2 in the telegram sent by British Ambassador in Mos-

cow Seeds, in which he wrote that item 3 of the Soviet draft dated July 9 could be acceptable if the words "under the threat of the use of force or *without such a threat* (italics mine—M. P.)" would be replaced by the words "under the threat of the use of force by another power", he said that at first sight he had no objections to that. Chamberlain added that he "agreed also with the Foreign Secretary in regard to meeting the Soviet Government on the point about the military conversations". He greatly disliked this proposal, but he had been impressed with the fact that it was one upon which the whole Soviet government were unanimous. "In these circumstances, if we rejected it we should have endless trouble, and *personally he did not attach any very great importance to it* (italics mine—M. P.).

"As he had said on a previous occasion, he believed that the Russians would become much more forthcoming when we had entered into some agreement with them. He was therefore prepared to bargain the military conversations point against Soviet acceptance of our indirect aggression formula.

"At the same time he did not believe that it was necessary here and now to take any decision on the question whether negotiations should be broken off if we failed to secure the wider agreement or even a simple tripartite arrangement. It was not necessary at the moment to look as far ahead as this."⁴⁰

It was sufficient to give Ambassador Seeds in Moscow an instruction telling him that if no wider agreement would be reached, he would have to go back to the proposal on a limited tripartite arrangement.⁴¹

Summarising the discussion of the issue, John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, stressed on July 10: "It was important to insure that we should retain a free hand so as to be able to tell Russia that we were not bound to go to war because we did not agree with her interpretation of the facts."⁴²

As he dwelled on the question of concluding a military agreement with the USSR, Lord Chatfield, Minister for Coordination of Defence, pointed out that "it might be found very difficult". "Up to the present," he said, "we had never made a military agreement with another country and it was a grave matter to have to decide in advance what particular action in the naval, military or air prepare we, and the French, would be prepared to take in different contingencies and in the case of various countries. In any case it might be anticipated that the discussions would be very prolonged and they would have to be conducted probably on the level of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff."⁴³

The minister emphasised that "the Russian Government attached great importance to these Staff conversations because they wanted a detailed agreement in which the French and ourselves would be bound to act in the various contingencies as the agreement provided."⁴⁴

Halifax replied that in his view, "when the military conversations had begun no great progress would be made. The conversations would drag on and ultimately each side would accept a general undertaking from the other. *In this way, we should have gained time and made the best of a situation from which we could not now escape* (italics mine—M. P.). In those conditions the committee took the following decision on July 10, 1939: "(1) That the Soviet formula of July 10th regarding indirect aggression is unacceptable and cannot be entertained. (2) That we should maintain our own formula about indirect aggression... (3) That we should accept a secret list of States, omitting therefrom Holland, Switzerland and Luxembourg but covering the case of Holland and Switzerland by a provision for subsequent consultation. (4) That if the Soviet Government agree to our proposals regarding indirect aggression we should agree, after pointing out our difficulties and making the most of the con-

cession, to the Soviet view as regards Article VI, namely, that the Staff Conversations should not be concluded before the political agreement is officially signed, and that both the military and political agreements should be executed simultaneously... (6) That on the receipt of the concurrence of the French Government, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be authorised to instruct Sir Seeds to communicate the above conclusions to the Soviet Government and to inform that Government that failing acceptance of our revised formula regarding indirect aggression or a formula to the same effect we consider that *the best course will be to conclude a limited tripartite agreement* (italics mine—M. P.) with a provision for consultation as to States not covered by that agreement. (7) That no decision should be taken at present regarding the policy to be adopted if the Soviet Government reject the proposals summarised in (2) to (4), and also the limited tripartite agreement mentioned in (6) above.”⁴⁶

At the sitting of the Committee on Foreign Policy, held on July 19, 1939, at the heat of the Anglo-German secret talks, about which you will read further in this article, the British side took the final decision not to accept the Soviet indirect aggression formula. According to Halifax, “the question, whether in any particular case aggression had taken place should be left to be determined by the three contracting Powers”, for otherwise the Soviet government would have an opportunity to decide whether aggression had taken place, which would involve the Soviet Union in a war and would therefore involve Britain and France in it.”⁴⁷

Chamberlain proposed that the Soviet government be finally informed that if it would accept the British formula of indirect aggression, the British side would agree to the Soviet point of view regarding Article VI (“Military Conversations”).⁴⁸ At the same time he pointed out that Britain would have the greatest difficulties in reaching understanding on the military aspects of the agreement because “the Soviet Government wish to have military obligations and contributions on each side clearly settled. On this point there should be no misunderstanding”,⁴⁹ he said.

In connection with the forthcoming military talks, the Minister for Coordination of Defence asked to inform him about the following: “1) Should the Chiefs of Staff be invited to prepare an appreciation on the question of Anglo-French-Soviet Staff talks?

“2) At what level should these talks take place...?

“... ”

“4) Should they not definitely be Tripartite talks?”⁵⁰

In his answer Chamberlain said he “did not think that the Chiefs of Staff Committee need consider the question immediately... The Sub-Committee had other and even more urgent important questions before it, and he thought that it would be as well to wait until replies had been received to the telegrams to be dispatched to Moscow.”⁵¹ In other words, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, the Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff did not have, for the time being, to prepare materials for military talks.

Thus Britain's consent to military talks was in fact a manoeuvre aimed at avoiding an open breakdown of the talks on the definition of indirect aggression, a breakdown which would have occurred at a time most unfavourable for Britain, when the secret talks with Germany were in full swing and the threat of a Nazi attack on Danzig and Poland was real. Already at that stage, in July 1939, it was quite obvious that the consent of the Anglo-French side to military talks was a tactical ploy, and Britain and France had no intention to conduct the talks in earnest.

THE POSITION TAKEN by the British Cabinet on both the political and further military talks was fully in keeping with the foreign-policy conception of Chamberlain, which was to appease Germany and agree with it on all the main aspects of Anglo-German relations. This is seen most clearly from the secret Anglo-German talks held in London in late July 1939 and the proposals made to Germany by the British side.

Throughout the political Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, Neville Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, never failed to say in conversations with the German that the British side was still prepared to reach agreement with Germany. In his reports to London, Henderson wrote that a precondition for negotiations with Germany was the conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement which will build up British positions with regard to Germany.⁵²

By mid-July, the British government evidently decided that the Moscow negotiations had gone far enough to be used as a trump card in the talks with Germany. Besides, at that time the threat to Poland from Germany increased,⁵³ and the situation in the Far East grew tense for Britain (the aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations around the Tianjin conflict,⁵⁴ which had gravely undermined Britain's prestige in the region). Chamberlain chose precisely that moment for coming up with a new initiative on conducting Anglo-German talks. Secret meetings were held on July 18, 20 and 21, 1939, between Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's closest adviser, and Robert Hadson, President of the board of trade, on the one hand, and Helmut Wohltat, on the other.⁵⁵ German Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen was kept informed about the talks.

The British proposals, which were not negotiated, though, because the German side did not respond to them openly, nor did it make its own proposals in response, are of great interest for understanding the true goals of Britain's foreign policy at the time, and especially for understanding its position during the forthcoming Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks.

Contrary to the widely advertised course of "struggle against aggression", those proposals are evidence of Chamberlain's striving to reach agreement with Germany. Despite their outwardly unofficial character, they reflected the essence of British foreign policy and the great significance Chamberlain attached to agreement with Germany. By contrast with the wish to bargain to the last ditch and to minimise future obligation, which was typical of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, the British side in its contacts with Wohltat readily met Germany halfway. Moreover, it itself proposed a global programme of settling Anglo-German difficulties, including the signing of a pact on non-aggression and non-interference in the each other's affairs, on limiting armaments in the sea, on land and in the air, and on a return of colonies to Germany. It was proposed also that Germany's economy and finances be assisted and Eastern and South-Eastern Europe be recognised as a sphere of Germany's interests. They discussed also a division of world economic markets, such as China, the British Empire and the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

"The ultimate goal of Horace Wilson," wrote Dirksen in a memorandum dispatched to Berlin on July 21, "is the broadest Anglo-German agreement on all major problems."⁵⁷ "Sir Horace Wilson," he said, "made it perfectly clear that Chamberlain approved of that programme; Wilson had offered Wohltat to have a talk with Chamberlain immediately, so that Wohltat would receive from him a confirmation of what Wilson had said. But Wohltat, considering the unofficial character of his talks, found such a talk with Chamberlain inappropriate."⁵⁸ From what Wilson had said it followed that agreement with Germany on the above-mentioned terms would make the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks and guarantees for Poland unnecessary.

As a result, Dirksen writes, in Wilson's opinion, "questions of such great importance would thus be raised and solved, that Middle East problems whose solution had come to a stalemate, problems like Danzig and Poland, would have receded into the background and lost their significance. Sir Horace Wilson said definitely to Mr. Wohltat that the signing of a non-aggression pact would give Britain an opportunity to free itself from the obligation in regard to Poland. Thus the Polish issue would have lost a considerable degree of its acuteness."⁵⁹

During a talk with Theodor Kordt, Counsellor of the German Embassy in London, Labour politician Charles Roden-Buxton, as Kordt put it, dotted his "i's" crossed his "t's". He said that Britain promised to stop the talks with the Soviet Union on signing a pact.⁶⁰

He could not have said it clearer.

On August 3, Wilson and Dirksen had a talk, about which Dirksen recalled that "from the conversation with Sir Horace Wilson it could be concluded that he looked upon the programme of the talks—reported to Wohltat and confirmed to me—as official sounding on the part of Britain which expected Germany's response to that."⁶¹

The fact of the secret contacts of Wilson and Hudson leaked into the British press and became known to the Soviet government. That inevitably affected the Soviet Union's position at the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks which were held in August.

EARLY IN 1940, during the strange war, the British government decided to publish, for propaganda purposes, the Blue Book, a collection of documents of the 1939 Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, and even reported the fact to Parliament. The purpose of the publication was to expose the Soviet stand at the negotiations. However, it did not go farther than discussing the make-up of the collection.

Since France took part in the negotiations on Britain's side (it almost entirely intrusted the conduct of the negotiations to Britain), the British Cabinet had to inform the French government about the content of that collection.

On January 12, 1940, French Ambassador Charles Corbin submitted to the Foreign Office a memorandum with remarks on the make-up of the collection prepared by the British side. The memorandum said, among other things, that while the French government had no objections to the content of the documents, "it could not but express serious doubts about advisability of their publication". "The reading of these documents," the memorandum said, "creates the general impression that from the start of the negotiations and to their end the Russian government worked stubbornly to make the discussed pact utmostly universal and effective.

"It seems that this desire of the Soviet government to block securely all ways for German aggression, no matter if it is sincere or not, constantly came up against Anglo-French restraint and a clear intention of both governments to limit the sphere of Russian interference. The very fact that all Russian demands were being accepted by the Anglo-French participants in the negotiations as these difficult negotiations moved along could not but weaken the effect of the quite substantiated provisions they had initially advanced. Accordingly, the Soviet positions grew stronger.

"As a result, the planned collection will give a confirmation to a number of the arguments of those who assert, sincerely or not, that the Soviet government had gone over to the German side only after Britain and France vacillated and displayed unwillingness to act unconditionally on the side of Moscow, and because of their unpreparedness to facilitate the direct actions of the Russian armies against Germany..." All this

prompted the following conclusion: "The British Blue Book runs the risk of setting off an argument most undesirable in the present situation."⁶²

In conclusion, the memorandum expressed apprehensions that the publication of the Blue Book will cause an undesirable publication by the Soviet side in response.⁶³

On January 18, 1940, the planned publication of the Blue Book was debated by the British Cabinet. Referring to the stance of the French government, Halifax spoke against its publication, proposing its postponement until a more appropriate time. He was supported by those present. Ultimately the Cabinet "agreed that publication at this juncture of the proposed Blue Book on the negotiations with the Soviet Government in the summer of 1939 was inopportune".⁶⁴

THE MINUTES OF THE SITTINGS of the British Committee on Foreign Policy, which considered the Soviet proposals made during the Anglo-Franco-Soviet political negotiations in 1939, show that such negotiations were needed by Britain above all for tying the Soviet Union to itself, preventing a possible improvement of German-Soviet relations and making it impossible for the Soviet Union to stay away from an Anglo-German conflict. Britain would have been satisfied also by a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance, which, however, would not have provided for effective guarantees for the states bordering on the USSR, including the Baltic states, that is, guarantees of the USSR's security—an agreement which could not involve the Western powers in a war against Germany on the side of the Soviet Union. Apart from that, the Chamberlain-Halifax Cabinet was not against using the very fact of negotiations with the Soviet Union for exerting pressure on Germany with a prospect of Anglo-German rapprochement.

In any case it was believed in London that the way to the East should remain open for Germany.

¹ Direct aggression against the USSR meant that its ultimate objective was the Soviet Union, and not the countries bordering on it; it implied the declaration by Germany of a war against the USSR.

² Poland and Romania, it should be recalled, already had such guarantees provided by Britain and France against an attack of Germany on them.

³ The memorandum of the Soviet government of June 16, 1939, said: "The obligations of Britain, France and the USSR regarding mutual assistance would be valid only in the event of a direct attack of an aggressor on the territory of any of the Contracting Parties, but it would not apply to cases when one of the Contracting Parties would be involved in a war in connection with assistance rendered by it to any third state which is not a party to this agreement and which was attacked by an aggressor" [*The USSR in the Struggle for Peace on the Eve of World War II (September 1938-August 1939). Documents and Materials* (Further reference is to *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, Politizdat, 1971, p. 452 (in Russian))].

⁴ See *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, p. 450.

⁵ President of the Board of Trade Oliver Stanley said, for instance, that "such an arrangement would be generally regarded as a complete breakdown of the negotiations and that it would be generally feared that Germany would seize Danzig and that if war resulted Russia would not be involved" [Public Record Office (further: PRO), Cab. 27/625, p. 185].

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁷ PRO, Cab. 27/625, p. 186.

⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁹ Fearing a German attack not only on Belgium but also on the Netherlands, Britain hoped in fact to obtain from the Soviet Union additional guarantees for the Netherlands and Switzerland in exchange for a consent to guarantee the Baltic states as well.

¹⁰ PRO, Cab. 27/625, p. 197.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

¹⁴ See *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, p. 476.

- ¹⁵ *Ibidem.*
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 480.
- ¹⁷ PRO, Cab. 27/625, p. 236.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 237.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 238.
- ²¹ *Ibidem.*
- ²² PRO, Cab. 27/625, p. 239.
- ²³ *Ibidem.*
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 240.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 246.
- ²⁸ Viscount Runciman, President of the Board of Trade and Lord President of the Council, and M. McDonald, Secretary for the Colonies, also spoke in favour of a simple Tripartite Pact (PRO, Cab. 27/625, p. 247).
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 249.
- ³¹ *Ibidem.*
- ³² *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, pp. 486-487.
- ³³ PRO, Cab. 27/625, p. 25.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 257.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 256.
- ³⁶ The Anglo-French draft agreement of July 8 said that the word "aggression" should be understood in the sense that it applies also to such actions to which a corresponding state has agreed under the threat of force from another state and which involve the renunciation by that state of its independence or its neutrality" (*The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, p. 486).
- ³⁷ PRO, Cab. 27/625, pp. 257-258.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 258.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 260.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibidem.*
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 261.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 266.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 268.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibidem.*
- ⁴⁵ *Ibidem.*
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 270.
- ⁴⁷ On July 25, Halifax informed the Soviet Ambassador about that (see *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, p. 515), and on July 27, the British and French ambassadors in Moscow made an appropriate statement to Vyacheslav Molotov (see *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, Vol. VI, London, 1953, pp. 521, 478).
- ⁴⁸ PRO, Cab. 27/625, p. 287.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 288.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 289.
- ⁵¹ See DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VI, p. 712.
- ⁵² See *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, pp. 487-490, 689.
- ⁵³ The Tianjin conflict started in June 1939: the Japanese government, pressurising Britain, France and the United States into recognising Japan's seizures in China, blockaded the British concessions in Tianjin on June 14, 1939. The reason for the blockade was the demand of the Japanese for extradition to the concessional authorities of the four Chinese charged by the Japanese with the murder of one of their protégés (*The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, p. 692).
- ⁵⁴ Helmut Wohltat was an official for special missions at the department in charge of the four-year plan of Germany.
- ⁵⁵ See *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. VI, p. 977; DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VI, pp. 407-408; *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, pp. 505-515, 519-524, 527-533.
- ⁵⁶ *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace...*, p. 501.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 500.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 501.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 520, 523.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 532.
- ⁶¹ PRO, FO, 371/24395, pp. 70-72.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 74.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

Hitler's Proposal to London, August 1939

Lev BEZYMENSKY

IT HAPPENED on August 11, 1939. The scene of action: Berghof, the Bavarian residency of the Fuehrer and the Reichskanzler of Germany near the town of Berchtesgaden. The dramatis personae: Adolf Hitler; Carl Burckhardt, the high commissioner of the League of Nations in the "free city" of Danzig since 1937, a Swiss diplomat; and Albrecht Forster, the Nazi Gauleiter of Danzig. The story is about an event which is of no small importance for understanding the political situation in the summer and autumn of 1939.

It was the middle of August, the situation in Europe was most explosive. Germany did not hide its intention to start a conflict with Poland, also over Danzig, a "free city" on Polish territory. The Soviet Union, Britain and France were negotiating the establishment of a military alliance against the aggressor. Germany, which had already decided to attack its eastern neighbour, conducted talks "on fronts"—with Britain and with the Soviet Union. In Danzig itself and around it tensions were running high. The German press and diplomats had launched a noisy anti-Polish campaign. The papers were full of reports on non-existent oppression of Germans in Poland. Passions were raging in the city. Storm troopers clashed with the personnel of the diplomatic mission. In response to the demand of the German authorities, Tadeusz Perkowski, the head of the mission, was recalled to Warsaw.

In the evening of August 10, Carl Burckhardt gave a farewell party in honour of Perkowski. Forster telephoned the high commissioner to tell him that Hitler had personally invited him to come to Berchtesgaden.

Burckhardt did not accept the invitation at once, fearing that the visit would become publicly known. But Forster dispelled his doubts, saying that the Fuehrer's personal plane was ready on the airfield cordoned off by the police, and no one would know about the flight. The Burckhardt put through urgent calls to Paris, London and Warsaw. Having received the consent of the three foreign ministers—George Bonnet, Lord Halifax and Josef Beck—he flew from Danzig the next morning. He had a talk with Hitler on August 11, after which the Swiss diplomat headed for Basel. On August 13, he was visited by two special emissaries—Roger Makins of the Foreign Office Central Department, and Pierre Arnal from Quai d'Orsay. Burckhardt informed them confidentially about what Hitler had told him.

Hardly had Burckhardt finished his story, when Arnal received this report: the newspaper *Paris Soir* had published sensational news about a secret meeting in the Fuehrer's residency. It said that Burckhardt had received a personal message for Chamberlain, in which the British Prime

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Minister was requested to take part in a joint campaign against Soviet Russia.

So what did Hitler say to the guest from Danzig, and what was behind the urgent invitation? After the war an English record of the talk written by Roger Makins was made public;¹ and its German version was published by Burckhardt himself.² It will be no exaggeration to say that the record is unique, Hitler in it is portrayed "in full view" as a skilful demagogue and a calculating politician.

THE TALK WITH HITLER

Hitler: I hope you enjoyed your flight. My Condor aeroplane is not as fast as the Douglas machines, but it is more solid and more useful as a military machine. It stands gunfire better. You have had a tiring week. I know you have done your best to find a pacific solution, but (his friendly expression changed to a menacing mask) all your work has been spoiled by the Poles. I told Forster to work through the representative of the League of Nations, I do not like that institution, but I have to admit that in the questions of the plebiscite in the Saar and of Danzig it has in general acted in a correct manner. I emphasise that Forster acted on my instructions because I know you are objective. In spite of economic reprisals and threats, Forster has not acted in an exaggerated manner. But the Poles, who are still, I believe, members of the League of Nations, do not make use of it. On Friday last* (the day of the delivery of the Polish ultimatum) a telephone message to you would have been sufficient. The Poles knew that conversations were possible, they need not have sent a Note. (Herr Forster here agreed that if the Poles had acted through Burckhardt, the matter could have been arranged.)³

Burckhardt: The conversations were put off through pettiness.

Hitler: (angry) That is lamentable at such a serious moment. M. Chodacki⁴ on Beck's orders took action two days before the matter was on the point of being settled; he sent a rude telephone message. And when Greiser⁵ denied that any measures against the Customs Inspectors had been taken, Beck trumpeted ('posaunte') in the press. (Furious) The press said I had lost the war of nerves, that menaces were the right course to take with me, that we had given way when the Poles stood firm, that I had only bluffed last year, and that my bluff had been called by Polish courage, which the Czechs had lacked. I have seen idiotic statements in the French press that I had lost my nerve and the Poles had kept theirs. (Herr Hitler was so carried away by anger that he was unable to speak for some moments.)

Burckhardt: I despise the press. It is one of the least admirable features of our time. One should not take it seriously, not even the German press.⁶

Hitler: (calm) I cannot do so. As a proletarian, because of my past, my rise, my being, I cannot see things in that way. The statesmen ought to understand this, and reckon with it if they want to avoid a catastrophe. It is not true that the British Government has no influence with the press, they conceal things when they so wish.⁷ (Crescendo) The State Secretary has sent for the Polish Ambassador and told him the hour which has struck ('welche Stunde geschlagen hat'). That is my answer to ultimatums and lost wars of nerves. (Fortissimo) If the slightest incident happens now I shall crush the Poles without warning in such a way that no trace of Poland can be found afterwards. I shall strike like lightning with the full force of a mechanised army, of which the Poles have no conception. Listen to that.

Burckhardt: I am listening. I know that that will mean a general war.

Hitler: (agitated and almost appealingly) So be it. If I have to wage war, I would rather do it today than tomorrow. I will not wage it like the Germany of Wilhelm II, which continually had qualms of conscience about the complete application of armed force. I will fight ruthlessly to the last. (Pause) I said to Lloyd George, 'If you had been a corporal and I a Minister in the last war, you (i.e. England) would be in a very different position than you are in today.' Italy (and here Burckhardt had an impression of slight uncertainty) will fight with us whatever happens, (Hesitation) Japan also. Thanks to my fortifications I will hold the West with 74 divisions, the rest will be hurled against the Poles, who will be liquidated in three weeks. (Switzerland has nothing to fear, I will respect its neutrality.) Where can they attack me? In the air? People try to impress me with figures and demonstrations of rearmament, especially in the air. (Hysterical laughter) I laugh, it is I who am the specialist in rearmament, not the others. Their air force! England has 135,000 men, France 75,000. I in time of peace have 600,000 and 1,000,000 in time of war. My anti-aircraft artillery is the best in the world; it was proved in Spain. The Russians (and we know them better than most, hundreds of our officers have served in Russia) have no offensive strength and will not pull the chestnuts out of the fire for others. A country does not kill off its officers if it intends to fight a war. We beat the Russians in Spain, the Japanese have also beaten them. (Angry) They won't make our flesh creep with the Russians. (Calm) This eternal talk of war is folly and puts the people in a frenzy. What is the question? Only this, that we must have grain and timber. For grain, I need space in the East. For timber, I need one colony, one only. We can live. Our harvests have been excellent in 1938 and this year. We can live in spite of the triumphant shouts of others that we are starving. We have these harvests thanks to the assiduity of our population, and above all to the use of chemical manures. One day the soil will have enough and go on strike like a body that has had too much medicine. What then? Can I accept that my people should suffer from famine? Shall I not do better to leave 2,000, 000 on the battlefield than to lose many from hunger? We know what it is to die of hunger. Perhaps in your country there are still apostles of humanity who remember 1919. I don't want it repeated. (Screaming) I won't have it. Free trade, open frontiers, all that is splendid, we've had it. But if it all depends on the mistress of the seas if we are subject to blockade, then it is my duty to create a situation in which my people can live off their own fat. That is the point, everything else is nonsense.

I have no romantic aspirations*; I have no desire to dominate. Above all I want nothing from the West. Not today and not tomorrow. I want nothing from the densely populated regions of the world. I look for nothing there, once and for all, nothing. All the ideas which people ascribe to me are inventions. But I must have a free hand in the East. Once more it is a question of grain, and timber (which I can only find outside Europe) in sufficient quantity. Once and for all I am ready to negotiate and talk about all this. But the point at which the possibility of negotiation is cut for me is the point at which they revile me and challenge me by ultimatums.

Burckhardt: I came here about Danzig. I have no authority to talk of things outside. Another war will end civilisation: there is a grave responsibility to the future. It is better to suffer in honour than to take such responsibility. The more strength one has, the longer one can wait. The greater one's honour, the more attacks one can stand. I have been told

* In the German text: "I have no romantic aims".

that the strength of Germany is clear from her patience in the Polish and Danzig questions.

Hitler: (interested) That is very important. (To Forster) We must tell that one to this Ribbentrop ('diesem Ribbentrop').

Burckhardt: I am fully convinced that every problem⁸ can be solved by negotiation and that the Western Powers are always ready to talk.

Hitler: (violent) Then why do they invite the Poles to boast of ultimatums and send us ultimatums?

Burckhardt: (sharply) There can be no question about it. London and Paris continually exercise a moderating influence in Warsaw. The Danzig question is a simple one, it concerns an international complex of rights which can no longer be disturbed by unilateral pressure, by force or the menace of force.

Hitler: (lapping the table) Pourparlers! but on what basis? Do you remember the disarmament discussions? I have made an acceptable offer to the Poles. In March, after dealing with the war danger from Czecho-Slovakia on my South-Eastern flank, I wanted to extinguish two smouldering fires, Memel and Danzig. If each time I take a step necessitated by history, I find England and France in the way, what can I do?

Burckhardt: Before the 15th March the argument of race⁹ was valid. It corresponded to certain natural laws which are opposed to existing international laws. There are people who sympathised with the argument.

Hitler: Yes, and the 15th March has invalidated it. The point is not strange to me, I've had it before. But an acute danger had to be eliminated by a moderate solution, which was better than was thought abroad. (Calm) There have been four grave incidents in Czecho-Slovakia. For two of them Germans were responsible. They have been punished. The intellectuals were against my solution. The workmen and peasants were content with it as they always are with simplifications. You have no idea how much war material we found in Czecho-Slovakia. It was astounding. We could hardly believe our eyes. And everything in splendid order. The inventories were much admired by our soldiers. The Czechs are excellent officials and always have been. Very different from the Poles. The Czech staff plans were schoolboy efforts. Precise, modest and narrow. Quite different from the Polish staff plans, which we possess and which leave the visions of Alexander and Napoleon a long way behind. Their technical and organisational side is lamentable. Our soldiers are pretty firm on the subject of Polish impertinence. Last year my generals were prudent and I had to urge them on. This year I have to hold them back. After my Reichstag speech my generals surrounded me and said with great respect, 'Thank God the Poles have not accepted, that would not have been a solution'. But for me it is true to say that it would have been a solution, my contribution for the sake of peace. Later I should have tried to regulate the question of our agricultural necessities by a conference. How well the Poles could have collaborated in this sphere! The extra-territorial road would surely not have been a jewel taken from the Polish crown. The extra-territorial road and the Polish road would have crossed each other bridges and tunnels. They would not have interfered with each other. Our separated provinces would have had natural communications with the Reich. That is essential for me.

Burckhardt: Is this solution definitely ruled out?

Hitler: (attentively) Unfortunately definitely ruled out by the Poles. After their position which they have taken up, they cannot retreat. That is the pity of it. (Long pause: Hitler rises and offers to show Burckhardt round his domain.)

Hitler: (in the garden) How happy I am when I am here. I've had enough, now I need a rest.

Burckhardt: (sententiously) You express the sentiments of the whole

world. You more than any other man have the chance of giving the world the calm which it so badly needs.

Hitler: No, it isn't like that (dismisses Forster). (Standing nervously and in low tones) If I recognised that England and France were urging Poland towards war, I would prefer to accept today rather than tomorrow, this year rather than next. But surely one ought to be able to find a reasonable way out. If the Poles leave Danzig absolutely calm, if they don't try to overtrump me with false cards, then I can wait. But one condition is that the sufferings of our minority in Poland should cease. They don't believe us here. But I have ordered the sensational cases not to be mentioned in the press (castration, etc.), they are too irritating to opinion. But I cannot now hold back the truth, the limit of tolerance has been reached.

I am capable of making sacrifices, e.g. in South Tyrol. But I am given no credit for it and there are cries of injustice and inhumanity. I can make political sacrifices, but everything has its limit.

I did not always know it, but now I know that England and France belong inseparably together. It is the nature of things. I don't intrigue against them any more, as they intrigue against my friendship with Italy. I fought for four years in the trenches against England and France, and I recognise the courage of their two peoples. But there is something in the Anglo-Saxons (and the Americans) which separates them profoundly from us. What is it?

Burckhardt: Perhaps it is the matter of fidelity to obligations.

Hitler: The interpretation is different. We recognise our acts for what they are, they dissimulate. I could give examples.

Burckhardt: Paix—Pax—Pact have a similar derivation, so have Friede—Freude.¹⁰ With the German it is rather a question of emotion.

Hitler: We are a Volkstaat, the English an Empire. 'Wir sind ein Körper', England 'an association'.

Burckhardt: With the Czechs and the Slovaks the idea of an 'association' begins.

Hitler: (calm) The Protectorate is a necessity for the moment. The Slovaks can do what they will. I will exert no pressure on them. They can remain as they are, or, if they wish, join up with Hungary. I shall not oppose it. But the Hungarians are incapable of administering or organising them. I return always to the same question: grain and timber. If they want to talk about this, I will accept. But it will be another matter if they revile me and cover me with ridicule as in May last. I do not bluff. If the slightest thing happens in Danzig or to our minorities I shall hit hard.

Burckhardt: Forster told me to put to you a question. Should I leave my children in Danzig?

Hitler: Things can happen in Danzig any day, but only if the Poles so will it. I think your children would be better in Switzerland.

Burckhardt takes his leave.

Hitler: (sadly) I have been glad to see you. You come from a world which is strange to me. But you have worked for a peaceful solution. I had great sympathy for another man, Lord Halifax. They have said much ill of him to me since, but my first sentiment prevails. I thought he was a man who saw things on a big scale and desired a peaceful solution. I hope one day to see him again.

Above is the record as dictated by Burckhardt to Makins and Arnal. At some time Arnal went out and left Burckhardt tête-a-tête with the Foreign Office man. To him he said the following (Makins' record):¹¹

Hitler: I want to live in peace with England and to conclude a definitive pact; to guarantee all the English possessions in the world and to collaborate.

Burckhardt: Then would it not be better to have a direct conversation with an Englishman? I say this spontaneously as a thought which comes into my head. It is my own idea. But I should think that the idea would be well received if the proposal were made.

Hitler: Language is too big an obstacle. I realised it last year. I understand a little English, I stumble over a few words of French. I had a hard and difficult youth, and was not able to learn languages. An Englishman who could talk German? They tell me that General Ironside talks it fluently, the General who went to Warsaw!

Burckhardt: Could I pass on such a wish?

Hitler: Yes. Could not you go yourself to London? If we want to avoid catastrophes, the matter is rather urgent.

One more addition to Makins' record:

Forster: (after the interview with Hitler). Did he say something about his desire to talk with an Englishman who knows German?

Burckhardt: Yes, an allusion how could such a matter be arranged, through the Wilhelmstrasse.

Forster: For God's sake not a word to the Wilhelmstrasse.¹² That would be the worst possible thing. No, through the Party, through me, that is to say through you to me. I will arrange everything.

As we see it, the situation was far more definite: Hitler made a direct proposal on August 11, through Burckhardt, on holding a fairly high level meeting (if not with Chamberlain, then with his proxy). Forster repeated that proposal. Moreover, a special document by the Foreign Office dated August 18,¹³ containing a list of German proposals on secret Anglo-German meetings, recorded a repetition of that proposal. That was done by Forster on August 16. So reference is to the fact that on August 11, 1939, Hitler himself (not any emissary) officially proposed talks with Britain (not France).

THE AIMS

IT IS LOGICAL to ask what made Hitler come up with that proposal? Or, perhaps, it was a chance reservation, or political manoeuvring?

There are enough grounds to reject both these conjectures. The first one is the extensive record of "secret diplomacy" in the summer of 1939, whose main elements can be reconstructed. On August 6, 1939, the Secretary of State of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ernst von Weizsaecker, wrote in his diary: "The covert probings made by Chamberlain to reach a compromise confirm that a talk would be held with Britain, if so wished".¹⁴ This is but one of many testimonies.

The political phenomenon of Western policy in the 1930s, which is termed the "Munich policy", has been examined in detail in historical literature. The British and French Munichists, adherents to this course in the quarters of international capital, and especially American Munichists, have been portrayed well enough. They are known to have greatly influenced the course pursued by the Western democracies.

When the Soviet proposal on setting up an effective military alliance of three countries was debated at the meeting of the British cabinet on June 7, 1939, Lord Halifax, the head of the Foreign Office, backing up his negative stand, referred directly to the opinion of William Bullitt, US Ambassador to Paris, who had advised Britain to avoid giving the impression that Britain made too much of the Russians.¹⁵ US Ambassador to London Joseph Kennedy directly intervened in British policy on many occasions. Moreover, there were instances of parallel actions by both ambassadors in favour of the Munich concept, for instance, when support was provided for the position of Charles Lindbergh, the head of the

overseas isolationists, who openly called for uniting with Germany against the Soviet Union,¹⁶ and also during the European mission of General Motors chief Mooney who tried to "reconcile" Germany, France and Britain in 1940.

If we refer to the early utterances by Hitler himself, especially at the time when the Nazi party was not yet in power, we shall see that they contain the concept of joint actions with Britain to restore Germany's world positions—joint actions on the basis of anti-communism. That is precisely what Hitler said to US military diplomat T. Smith in 1922: "it is much better for America and England that the decisive struggle between our civilization and Marxism be fought out on German soil rather than on American or English soil."¹⁷ He had good reason to say that: Sir Henry Deterding, a British super-tycoon, was on the list of "willing donors" for the Nazi Party (up to 10 million Reichsmarks).

To be sure, as a skilful politician, Hitler, did not identify himself with a no-alternative doctrine. When he could and had to unite with Britain, he did so (the first step in remilitarisation was marked by the Anglo-German sea agreement signed in 1935), and when he felt stronger, he would start a conflict. As Hitler claimed in his public speeches in 1944, "likes and dislikes did not exist" for him.¹⁸ But that meant that in his concept of world domination there "coexisted" different versions of a policy with regard to England, and especially to the British Empire as a major component of the world in the 1930s.

That "coexistence" had practical consequences. There emerged groups within the Nazi upper crust which undertook to elaborate one or another concept. For instance, Karl Haushofer, the "father of geopolitics", and his son Albrecht were long occupied with providing theoretical grounds for taking joint actions with Britain. Both of them had great influence on Rudolf Hess and later were the initiators of his famous flight to Britain. Practical functions were assumed by various Nazi leaders. In 1936 it was Ribbentrop whom Hitler appointed ambassador to Britain, and in 1937-1939, Herman Goering emerged as the main figure.

In this sense the Nazi upper crust was not as united as it was believed to be. Not only personal interests (which did exist, of course) but also group interests, including economic ones, clashed there. It is no secret that the major German monopolies differed on ways of pursuing a foreign economic policy. Moreover, their views were changing depending on a situation. Thus, Karl Brauch, one of the heads of IG Farben, believed in 1938 that Germany had opportunities to "avoid a conflict with a group of countries led by Britain", and in April 1939 he declared that "such pre-conditions no longer exist".

There is every reason to believe that in 1937-1938, the "Munich faction" in the German monopoly and political quarters was quite strong—otherwise the Munich deal, which was regarded as a major phase in the development of German success, would not have been made. And in March 1939 it was followed by an agreement between the Reichsgruppe Industrie ("Imperial Group of Industry") and the Federation of British Industrialists signed in Duesseldorf. The concessions yielded by Chamberlain and Daladier inspired those in Berlin who expected to have a free hand in the East, not through war but through an amicable settlement with Britain.

Only this can explain that the summer of 1939 became a time of intrusion of German emissaries who were probing into the possibilities of what was indicated by Arnold Rechberg, a German business world veteran, in a memorandum addressed to Hitler on November 18, 1938: "Should we not, proceeding from our military interests, turn back to... the attempt of setting up a front of the European great powers against the Bolshevik Russia." One will hardly fail to see here a resemblance with

what Goering had said at his secret meeting with British representatives on August 7, 1939: "The danger for the world of a defeated Germany was the spread of Communism and the benefit of Moscow."¹⁹

Judging by the available archive data, there existed the following "levels" of Anglo-German secret contacts in London (the list is incomplete):

The politico-economic level: primarily, the talks of H. Wollat (Goering's representative) with Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's closest adviser, and foreign trade minister Robert Hudson. These were followed by meetings, again, with Wilson, Theodor Kordt, a counsellor at the German embassy, and Fritz Hesse, a counsellor for the press (Ribbentrop's representative); and meetings of Prince Max-Egon Hohenlohe (Goering's representative) and Walter Hewel, a diplomat close to Hitler, with Halifax, Vansittart and conservative party leaders.

The military-political level: London visits by General Reichenau, Lieutenant Colonel von Schwerin, and Fabian von Schlabrendorff.

The level of anti-Hitler conservative opposition: talks by Erich Kordt, Ribbentrop's secretary, and the visits and memoranda of Karl Goerdeler.

The level of international mediation: visits by Swedish industrialist Axel Wenner-Gren, and particularly the frequent visits by another Swedish industrialist, Birger Dahlerus, who established direct exchange of messages and information between Hitler and Goering on the German side, and Chamberlain and Halifax on the British side.

The same "levels" also operated for Germany.

The politico-economic level: Berlin visits by British diplomats Ashton-Gwarkin and Drummond-Wolfe; the son of Lord Runciman; Lord Kemsley; W. Tennant, secretary of the Anglo-German society; parliament member Charles Roden-Buxton and, as a culmination, the secret meeting between Goering and British emissaries on August 7, 1936, in Schleswig-Holstein.

The military level: contacts between Baron de Ropp of the British Ministry of Aviation and Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

The international mediation level: the activities of Birger Dahlerus.

On top of that was operation of the secret services. Each of them was used, in addition to collecting information, as a means of exchanging views (this was widely used by Admiral Canaris who was close to the conservative opposition).

In other words, against that political background Hitler's address to Burckhardt does not look at all unusual.

WHY IN AUGUST?

SO, IF WE PLACE the conversation between Hitler and Burckhardt on August 11 among similar efforts made for many years to probe into the possibilities of an Anglo-German compromise (or even "collusion"), we nonetheless must, of course, spell out some specifics of that political action. For it is known that proposals on holding direct talks had been made by the Germans and the British before, in June, July and even in early August (during Goering's meeting). So why was it necessary to repeat the top-level invitation?

In the first place, one should not forget that all the probings were conducted when a decision to effect the Weiss operation not later than September 1 had been adopted by the political and military leadership of Germany. That decision, taken on April 3 and repeated in May, determined corresponding military deployment. The latter could not be delayed indefinitely, and on July 15 a schedule was adopted for deploy-

ing an invasion army. Thus the political backing of the future aggression had its time limits. So a decision had to be taken.

Besides, the probings in June and July failed to make Hitler feel certain enough that he could reach a compromise on terms acceptable to him. Even the British proposals which to a great extent met Hitler's wishes (the so-called Wilson plan) did not convince Germany that Britain and France would entirely agree to German domination in Eastern Europe. Hitler was a realistic politician and far from being dogmatic, so a conflict between Germany and Britain meant an "end to civilisation" for him.

Seeing that the chances for alliance between the two empires were bleak, Hitler also visualised "minimal versions" of a compromise, as, for instance, the possibility of deterring or intimidating London from joining a war immediately. He also saw the possibility of an open conflict. Therefore, adhering to his principle, Hitler could, even having taken a decision, continue the game without ruling out any opportunity.

Besides, the world situation in 1939 was far from what it had been in the Munich days. The honeymoon of Anglo-German concord had long passed, especially after the seizure of Prague on March 15. The mounting influence of the anti-German forces in Britain (Winston Churchill became their main spokesman) was a fact, causing apprehensions in Berlin over the prospects of British policy in the event of a possible war.

And, finally, an entirely new element, unknown in the Munich period, emerged in the diplomatic game of 1939. The point is that, as was admitted by Hitler himself, in the autumn of 1938 he had decided to study possibilities of securing Germany against a "war on two fronts" by coming to terms with the USSR. Starting with a cautious probing in the area of trade already at the end of 1938, German diplomacy had been proceeding in that direction since April 1939, and by August it had already decided to show its cards to the Soviet Union, openly offering, as Secretary of State Weizsaecker put it, the goods from its "political shop". At first, these two lines of the German game, played in London and in Moscow, ran parallel. But in early August Hitler had to make his choice.

In his book *My Danzig Mission, 1937-1939*, Burekhardt wrote that the published records did not mention what Hitler said to his Swiss interlocutor on that memorable day of August 11, 1939: *"Everything I am doing is directed against Russia. If the West is so stupid and blind that it cannot see this, then I will have to come to terms with the Russians. Then I shall strike at the West, and after it is defeated by joint forces, I shall turn against the Soviet Union. I need the Ukraine."*²⁰ The fact is that Hitler openly explained the significance of his negotiations with Moscow.

This is all the more meaningful since it was namely then that the Soviet-German negotiations entered a decisive phase. After Graf von der Schulenburg reported several times that Soviet diplomacy was restrained and even expressed apprehensions that the German advances in Moscow would cause Homeric laughter, Berlin decided to act more vigorously. On August 2, Ribbentrop put it straight in a conversation with Soviet charge d'affaires Georgi Astakhov that here were "no problems between the Baltic and Black Seas" on which the USSR and Germany could not come to terms.²¹ On August 3, Schulenburg was received by Molotov, and on August 10, Karl Schnurre, an official of the German foreign ministry, said in a talk with Astakhov that Germany would take into account the interests of the USSR even "in the event of a conflict with Poland."²² On August 12, Hitler ordered that Moscow

be approached about a possible reception of Ribbentrop by the Soviet leadership, which was done by Schulenburg on August 15.²³

The situation looked clearer. Before making a decisive move in Moscow, Hitler deliberately made an equally decisive attempt to get an answer from London, a more definite one than he had received until then.

The answer did not come, in fact. As for the "technical aspect" (the sending of a German-speaking British official to Hitler), this became the subject of an exchange of opinions between Chamberlain, Halifax and Wilson. Candidatures of Harold Rumbold and Ronald Lindsey were discussed.

The first version of a reply to Forster expressed a general doubt that Hitler knew nothing about the British stance, but at the same time it noted the wish "to provide conditions for direct talks" on Danzig. Halifax crossed out the mention of Danzig, after which the reply looked more significant, considering that it pointed out the importance of "preserving utter secrecy".²⁴ However, Chamberlain deleted the phrase saying that in the event of relaxations around Danzig it would be possible to think about further actions. He also crossed out the phrase about secrecy.

Ultimately, the letter was not sent, and Hitler could make due conclusions from that, as well as from the absence of an answer. As for the reasons Chamberlain did not catch the ball thrown to him, the absence of candidates was definitely not a fact. The opinion that an accord with Hitler in that situation would not meet the imperial interests of Great Britain, not to mention the public sentiments at that time, prevailed in London.

That did not mean, however, that the contacts were broken. But the choice was made.

Though Chamberlain believed that it would be wise not to stop the movement if the Germans would want it, Halifax remarked ironically that this would be the same as to discuss a hypothetical agenda and a programme to be used in hypothetical circumstances. For Britain the interests of imperial self-preservation prevailed over its anti-communist desires. So, a "holy alliance" against Bolshevism was not set up.

THE Meeting between Carl Burchhardt and Adolf Hitler is just one episode, one small piece in the mosaic of pre-war events. But it has its place in the political developments that led to the failure of the attempts to establish a united front of the Western democracies and the Soviet Union against the imminent aggression. Europe paid a heavy price for that failure.

¹ *Documents of British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, London, 1953, Vol. VI, pp. 688-697 (further reference in this article is to DBFP).

² C. Burchhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission, 1937-1939*, Munich 1960, pp. 362-370.

³ In the German record by Burchhardt: "Here Mr. Forster agreed". The conversation concerned a customs conflict.

⁴ The head of the Polish diplomatic mission in the "free city" of Danzig.

⁵ The President of the Danzig Senate.

⁶ In the German version: "You do journalists too much honour by taking them seriously. The Reichskanzler should be above such trifles".

⁷ Note in Makins' original: "I asked M. Burchhardt what Herr Hitler had in mind. He did not know, but thought the reference might be to the German reports of innumerable accidents in the air exercises."

⁸ In the German text: "this problem".

⁹ In the German text: "the arguments of nationality".

¹⁰ Paix—Pax—peace (Fr., Lat.); Friede—peace (Ger.); Freude—Joy (Ger.).

¹¹ DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VI, pp. 695-696.

- ¹² That is, to Ribbentrop.
¹³ DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VII, pp. 66-67.
¹⁴ *Die Weizsaecker Papiere*, 1933-1950, Frankfurt, 1974, p. 158.
¹⁵ *Public Records Office*, London (further: PRO), FO 371/23068, p. 11.
¹⁶ See *Berlin Alert*, Stanford, 1984, p. 155.
¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.
¹⁸ *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen*, Stuttgart, 1962, p. 715.
¹⁹ See DBFP, Third Series, Vol. VI, p. 757.
²⁰ C. Burckhardt, *Op. cit.*, p. 372.
²¹ *Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion*, 1939-1941. Tübingen, 1949, p. 43.
²² *Ibid.*, p. 51.
²³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.
²⁴ PRO FO 371/22976, p. 66.
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THE WINTER WAR

[Documents on Soviet-Finnish Relations in 1939-1940]

DOCUMENTS from the USSR Foreign Policy Archives made public for the first time will provide an idea of the Soviet-Finnish talks in spring and autumn of 1939, the failure of which ultimately led to hostilities between the two countries, and also of the negotiations on concluding the peace treaty of March 12, 1940.

In April 1938 the Soviet government made an unofficial proposal through B. Yartsev, Second Secretary of the Soviet mission, to the government of Finland to begin talks on concluding a mutual assistance pact. The Finnish government turned down this proposal.

In March 1939 a Finnish delegation arrived in the USSR to conduct talks on concluding a trade agreement. Taking advantage of this, the Soviet government on March 5, 1939, raised the issue, through A. S. Yrjö-Koskinen, the Finnish Envoy to the USSR, of the Finnish government's possible leasing to the USSR the islands of Sur' Saari (Hogland), Lavensaari, Seiskaari (Seskar) and Tuirinsaari (Tjutersy) located in the Gulf of Finland so that the USSR could ensure the safety of the sea lanes to Leningrad.

On March 8, 1939, Yrjö-Koskinen stated in a talk with Maxim Litvinov, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, that the Finnish government could not accept for consideration the second proposal for leasing the Finnish islands. Nevertheless, a proposal was made to the Envoy to discuss the possible exchange of territories.

At the same time trade talks were being held in Moscow, the Soviet government's representative, B. Shlein, the USSR Ambassador to Italy, who from 1932 to 1934 was the USSR Ambassador to Finland, conducted talks in Helsinki with Finnish Foreign Minister Erkkö, Finance Minister Tanner, Prime Minister Kajander, Defence Minister Njukkanen and Education Minister Hannula.

However, the Finnish Cabinet of Ministers arrived at the conclusion that the Soviet proposal was unacceptable. On March 24, during the last meeting between Shlein and the Finnish Foreign Minister the Soviet representative was informed that the government of Finland was prepared to give the USSR a written pledge: "1. To defend the territory of Finland against any aggression and 2. Not to conclude any agreements that could violate Finland's neutrality."

Due to the failure of the negotiations on an exchange of territories the trade talks were broken off as well.

The fact that the Western powers stymied the plans to create a system of collective security, plus the worsened situation in Europe after the start of the Second World War compelled the Soviet government to submit another proposal to the Finnish government to resume talks on Soviet-Finnish relations.

To conduct the talks, which began on October 12, the Finnish government had sent Minister Paasikivi, a State Adviser, to Moscow. Later the delegation was joined by Finance Minister Tanner. The USSR proposed

to Finland concluding a mutual assistance pact. However, this proposal was turned down under the pretext that that would run counter to the country's neutrality.

Then, on October 14, 1939, the USSR proposed that Finland lease it the port of Hanko for 30 years and turn over to it a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for Soviet territory of the Karelian Autonomous Republic. In the memorandum of October 23 made in response the Finnish side informed the Soviet side that the proposal to lease the port of Hanko to the USSR was unacceptable and that it would also be unable to discuss the possible moving of the border as far as was suggested in the Soviet proposal.

Later that day, October 23, Paasikivi and Tanner were informed that the Soviet side was prepared to change its proposal regarding the port of Hanko, specifically, to restrict the period its troops would be stationed in this area and to reduce the size of the Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus that would go over to the USSR in exchange for Soviet territory.

On November 3, 1939 the Finnish government replied that regarding the matter of leasing the port of Hanko it was adhering to its earlier stated viewpoint and that it refused to accept the frontier point proposed in the Soviet government's memorandum.

At a session held on November 3, 1939, the Soviet side proposed that the Finnish side sell the USSR the corresponding tract of land in the area of the port of Hanko or sell or exchange the islands of Härmansä, Kue, Hästähüsä, Longser, Furuser and Ökön. On November 9 the Soviet delegation received a note in which the Finnish government stated that "the reasons for which provision of the military base in Hanko is impossible also apply to the islands in question".

Later that day the Soviet government declared in a written statement that the Finnish government was incorrectly expounding the Soviet proposal of November 3, and returned the Finnish delegation its note of November 9.

On November 10, 1939 Paasikivi and Tanner sent Vyacheslav Molotov a letter stating that the Finnish government "does not consider it possible to agree in any form to cede for a military base territory in Hanko or in any other area along the coast of Finland". On November 13 the Finnish delegation informed the Soviet side that it considered it "expedient to return to Helsinki".

Thus, despite the fact that the Soviet proposals did not extend beyond the bounds of international law, the Finnish government rejected them and did not show an interest in reaching an agreement. The talks were halted and relations between the two countries worsened drastically.

In Finland, an additional army recruitment was announced. Large numbers of troops were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus along the Soviet border. A wartime regime was imposed in the country's ports and the coasts of the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia and the waters of the Åland Islands were mined.

In late November the Soviet press launched an anti-Finnish campaign, tensions were growing on the border, and the two sides were violating the border regime and each other's air space.

On November 27, 1939 *Pravda* carried a report from the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District regarding the shelling, on November 26 at 3:45 p. m., of Soviet troops in the hamlet of Mainila from Finnish territory. That evening Molotov handed the Finnish Envoy Yrjö-Koskinen a note from the Soviet government. After having lodged the protest, the Soviet government proposed that the Finnish government "immediately withdraw its troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus to a distant

ce of 20 to 25 km and thus prevent the possibility of repeat provocations".¹

On November 27 Yrjö-Koskinen handed Molotov a reply in which the Soviet government's protest was rejected and the point was stressed that Finland had not carried out hostile actions against the Soviet Union. The Finnish note proposed "getting down to negotiations on the mutual withdrawal of troops to a certain distance from the border" and also conducting a joint investigation into the incident by the border commissars of both sides.²

In the note of November 28, 1939, made in reply by the Soviet government the Finnish note is characterised as a document "reflecting the deep hostility of the government of Finland to the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in the relations between the two countries to an emergency". It was stated in the note that from that date the Soviet government "considers itself free of the commitments taken upon itself under the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland and systematically violated by the government of Finland".³

On November 29, 1939, Yrjö-Koskinen, the Finnish Envoy to Moscow, was summoned to the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign affairs, where he was handed a note on the severance of diplomatic relations. At 8 a. m. on November 30, 1939, the troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the Finnish border on orders from the Main Command of the Red Army. Later that day Finnish President Kallio issued a statement to the effect that Finland was declaring a state of war.⁴

The Soviet-Finnish Winter War, as it is called in Finland, lasted 105 days—from November 30, 1939 until March 12, 1940. This was not just a "military conflict" but a real war with all its specific attributes. Taking part in the hostilities on the Finnish side were virtually all its armed forces—ten divisions, seven special brigades, and militarised formations of the "schützker"—some 400,000 effectives in all. On the Soviet side, 52 infantry and cavalry divisions and several dozen separate brigades and regiments comprising two armies consisting of the specially formed Northwestern Front (commanded by Army Commander 1st Rank Semyon Timoshenko) took part in the hostilities during the period of the greatest troop concentration (March 1940). In addition, another three armies were committed on the sector from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea. These troops were equipped with 11,266 guns and mortars, 2,998 tanks and 3,253 aircraft. The actions of the land forces were supported by the ships of the Red Banner Baltic and Northern Fleets and the Ladoga Military Flotilla. The overall strength of this large grouping of different troop arms was 960,000 men.

Despite the obvious superiority of the Soviet side, the war became a protracted affair. The contributing factors here were the difficult climatic conditions, the poor training level of the Soviet troops, the interruptions in supplies and, most importantly, the desperate resistance offered by little Finland. Both sides suffered heavy casualties in the hostilities. According to Soviet figures, we lost 70,000 killed or missing in action, and 176,000 were wounded or seriously frostbitten. According to official Finnish data, Finland's losses were 23,000 killed or missing in action and some 44,000 wounded.

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic headed by Kuusinen, a Finnish emigre revolutionary and secretary of the Communist International, was formed on Finnish territory seized by the Red Army, in the town of Terioki. The Soviet government established diplomatic relations with it and, on December 2, 1939, signed a treaty on mutual understanding and friendship.⁵

On December 4, 1939, the Swedish Envoy to the USSR, Vinter, informed Molotov that the Finnish government wished to begin negotiations

to arrive "at a peaceful settlement of the conflict", he also raised anew the issue of providing him a mandate for the defence of Finnish interests in the USSR at the request of the Finnish government.

On December 3, 1939, the permanent delegate of Finland to the League of Nations sent the league a letter accusing the USSR of having made a surprise attack on Finland. On December 12, 1939, the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs received from de Matta, the Chairman of the Finnish Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations, a telegram in which it was proposed to "cease hostilities and begin, through the assembly's mediation, negotiations to restore peace". On December 14, 1939, the Council of the League of Nations passed a resolution to expel the USSR from the league.⁶

Unofficial and official representatives of the Norwegian and Swedish governments repeatedly informed the Soviet leadership through Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet Minister to Sweden, that they were concerned over the situation that had taken shape in the region and also that the Finnish leadership was not against their mediation in exploring the possibility of launching peace negotiations.

On February 10, 1940 Molotov sent a reply to the letter of Norwegian Foreign Minister H. Kut in which he consented in principle to concluding a trilateral convention on protecting the Gulf of Finland, but on condition that the Hanko Peninsula and the nearby islands were ceded to the Soviet Union in advance.

After Molotov rejected the Finnish government's proposal as a basis for negotiations, it officially asked the government of Sweden for military aid, but the request was refused. On February 19, 1940 the King of Sweden supported this decision, giving as his reason the fact that the dispatch of Swedish troops to Finland would nullify Sweden's neutrality and effectively spell its entry not only into war with the Soviet Union but also the war of the great powers.

On February 22, 1940, Swedish Foreign Minister Gunter passed on to Kollontai Finland's consent to the terms of the Soviet government contained in Molotov's letter of February 10, 1940, addressed to Norwegian Foreign Minister Kut. Later that day the Swedish Envoy to the USSR informed Molotov that the Finnish government was prepared for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

"The USSR has won a military victory, and Sweden, a diplomatic one," the Swedish Envoy Assarsson said on March 4, 1940, during a meeting with Molotov. He pointed out that Finland had requested Britain and France for aid. The latter two countries asked Sweden for permission for transit passage but were refused.

On March 5 the Swedish Envoy to the USSR handed Molotov a memorandum from the Finnish government in which it expressed consent to consider the Soviet proposals the point of departure of the negotiations. On March 6 Assarsson was handed a memorandum from the Soviet government inviting a Finnish delegation to come to Moscow for the start of talks on concluding a peace treaty.

The meetings between the Soviet and Finnish delegations were held from March 7 to 12, 1940. Attending the talks on the Soviet side, in addition to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov were Andrei Zhdanov, member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Brigade Commander Alexander Vasilevsky.

The peace treaty between the USSR and Finland was signed on March 12, 1940, and hostilities were stopped on March 13 at 12 noon. On March 20, 1940, Molotov and J. Paasikivi and V. Voionmaa, the authorised representatives of the Finnish president, exchanged the instruments of ratification.

As was pointed out in the preamble to the treaty, its aim was to ensure mutual security, including the security of the cities of Leningrad and Murmansk, and also that of the Murmansk Railway. A new line of the state frontier between the USSR and Finland was established. The USSR was leased the Hanko Peninsula to set up a naval base.

At the sixth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, held in March 1940, the self-dissolution of the People's Government of Finland was announced and the point was made that if the Soviet Union and Finland had reached agreement peacefully in autumn 1939 the war could have been avoided.

The conflict of 1939-1940 could not have but affected the subsequent relations between the two countries. In June 1941 Finland sided with Germany against the USSR.

**No. 1. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR WITH
THE ENVOY OF FINLAND TO THE USSR YRJÖ-KOSKINEN**

Moscow, March 5, 1939

I have called in Yrjö-Koskinen today and, after an exchange of customary compliments, told him the following.

There are two important issues on the agenda in our relations with Finland, requiring solution: economic relations and the Aland Islands. For a satisfactory solution of these issues, it would be desirable to create the requisite atmosphere of confidence and friendliness. This, in our opinion, could be achieved by the Finnish Government accepting the following offer of ours. There are several small islands in the Gulf of Finland, which are not of great value to the Finnish Government and are not used by it, namely Hogland, Lavansaari, Seiskaari and Tytärs. We would like to take these islands on a lease of some thirty years. We by no means intend to fortify these islands, but use them as observation posts in control of the important sea route to Leningrad. The Finnish Government's consent will certainly produce a favourable effect on the economic negotiations started yesterday. To avoid keeping the delegation here, it would be desirable to receive the earliest possible reply from the Finnish Government.

Koskinen answered, of course, that he would pass our proposal on to his Government, limiting himself to the comment that Hogland was not a small island, that it had, in his opinion, a population of several thousand, a bathing beach, and served as a tourist attraction.

LITVINOV

Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR,
Fund 06, roster 1, item 1, file 5, p. 47.

**No. 2. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR WITH
THE ENVOY OF FINLAND TO THE USSR, YRJÖ-KOSKINEN**

Moscow, March 8, 1939

Yrjö-Koskinen read out to me the reply he had received from his Government, which was roughly as follows.

The Finnish Government does not find it possible to consider the proposal for a lease of Finnish islands which constitute integral part of Finnish territory recognised as such by the Soviet Union under the Peace Treaty. On demand

from the USSR, the islands have been neutralised and still remain without any defence equipment. Even a discussion on the subject must be recognised as incompatible with the policy of neutrality pursued by the Finnish Government. It implores us in no way to disclose the proposal we have made because its publication can greatly excite public opinion in Finland. The Finnish Government is likewise asking us not to lump political issues together with economic ones. When Comrade Mikoyan told the Envoy about his consent to the arrival of a trade delegation, he did not mention any political issues, nor did he make the negotiations contingent on them. As far as the Aland Islands were concerned, the Envoy had already declared in negotiations with us that the Finnish Government pledged itself to defend these islands and that such an assurance must be a sufficient guarantee for us. Personally, the Envoy thought that if we insisted, it would be possible to make a declaration in writing and, perhaps, even through an exchange of notes.

I told the Envoy that my Government would be very disappointed for it had not expected such a reply. We know perfectly well that the islands in question belong to Finland, for otherwise we would not have addressed ourselves to the Finnish Government. It is just because Finland is in sovereign possession of the islands, that she can dispose of them and, consequently, cede them and let them, without in any way contravening her policy of neutrality, all the more so that, as I have already declared, we do not by any means intend to fortify the islands. We proceed from the assumption that the islands are of no value to Finland which can herself stand to gain by letting them for certain compensation. One cannot totally separate economic issues from political ones; there is always a certain measure of interdependence between them. We have made a proposal which, if accepted, could go quite a long way towards improving Soviet-Finnish relations in every respect. The Finnish trade delegation has put forward some proposals which were, perhaps, of no interest to us either, but we are willing, however, to take the Finnish interests into account and go as far as we can towards meeting the Finnish proposals half-way. We have the right, however, to expect Finland to give greater attention to our proposals in another area. I, therefore, want to hope that the reply communicated to me today is not the last word we hear from the Finnish Government and that it will be willing to reconsider its attitude to our proposal. My own feeling is that we could even negotiate an exchange of territory. Finland, for instance, might find it of greater interest to have an appropriate part of our territory ceded to her along the Karelian border than to keep those barren islands. Finland has always shown interest in the timber that abounds in Karelia. As far as the Aland Islands are concerned, I shall yet revert to this subject. I consider it more urgent to resolve the question we have raised in view of the continuing commercial negotiations. I, therefore, ask the Envoy to invite the Finnish Government to discuss the matter once more in the light of the arguments I have stated.

Koskinen said he doubted that the Finnish Government might reverse its decision but promised me to transmit our conversation and communicate a new answer in a few days.

I assured Koskinen that we have no intention to make our negotiations public.

LITVINOV

**NO. 3. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION
OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE USSR IN ITALY WITH THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND, ERKKO**

Helsinki, March 11, 1939

After the customary exchange of compliments, I passed over to the subject of interest to us. I told Erkkö that I had come to Helsinki to spend part of my vacation and was very glad of this opportunity to see Finland again because I had very good recollections of my sojourn here. After I left Finland I never lost interest in the subject of Soviet-Finnish relations. Just the day before yesterday I lunched with the Finnish trade delegation at Comrade Mikoyan's and had an opportunity to talk with him and also with Comrade Litvinov about the present stage of Soviet-Finnish relations. Comrade Litvinov informed me in detail of the substance of the conversations he had had with Yrjö-Koskinen concerning the islands. I got the impression that relations between the USSR and Finland can appreciably improve at the present moment and that this moment must be used. The Finnish wishes concerning the trade treaty can be expressed in terms of some 250-300 million Finnish marks. The Minister must understand that the wishes of Finland's delegation are not exactly of interest to the USSR, but the Soviet Government is ready to meet these claims provided that an appropriate atmosphere of mutual confidence and goodwill is created. It is in this context that our proposal concerning the transfer of the islands should be understood. On the other hand, there is yet another question on the agenda in our relations. I mean the problem of the Åland Islands. We reckon with the possibility that these islands will be eventually transferred to Germany on a voluntary basis or otherwise and, consequently, their fortification can be turned against our interests. Evidence of goodwill on the part of the Finnish Government could likewise help in resolving this issue. So there is a set of three problems and it is up to the Finnish Government to show that it is indeed anxious to build Soviet-Finnish relations on a sound foundation.

Erkkö replied as follows: the Soviet proposal for the transfer of the islands has come as a total surprise to the Finnish Government. He must draw my attention to the fact that under the Finnish Constitution the Government has no right to call on the Sejm to consider alienating even the smallest part of Finnish territory. That is why the Finnish Government had to give a categorical and negative reply to the first proposal transmitted through Yrjö-Koskinen. Equally, the second proposal, passed over by Yrjö-Koskinen, has been discussed in the Cabinet of Ministers and the decision was to decline it. This issue is not negotiable for the Finnish Government. Neither does he understand how the issue of the islands can be linked with the problem of the trade treaty. There are some quarters in Finland, too, which are against a trade treaty with the USSR just because, they claim, the USSR always links commerce with politics. Finally, the Minister does not understand either the connection of the first two issues with the problem of the Åland Islands. Never will these islands fall into the hands of Germany. Finland and Sweden have an agreement for a joint defence of the islands in the event of Germany attempting to occupy them. This treaty is the best guarantee against a threat to the Soviet Union.

I began to reply to Erkkö consistently, on all points. First of all, I called his attention to the fact that there is, of course, no strictly formal connection between the three problems he has been speaking about (transfer of the islands, trade treaty and the Åland Islands). Nevertheless, there is an intimate connection because economics cannot be detached from politics and it would

be senseless to do so. The connection between them is a fact, and it is impossible to deny this fact.

The Finnish Constitution which the Minister refers to forbids the simple cession of territory, but it does not in any way forbid an exchange of equivalent territories or appropriate forms of a long-term lease. It is my profound conviction that, given the will such forms as would not contradict the Constitution can be found. The islands in question are of no interest to Finland, while Finland could get, in exchange for them, some territory along the Karelian border and that territory is rich in high-grade timber. The Minister must know that it is from these regions that Finland annually imports a fairly substantial amount of timber which she then profitably re-exports. As far as the trade treaty is concerned, I repeat that the scope it will assume depends on the Finnish Government. Given goodwill, it will be possible to speak not only of meeting the requests of the Finnish delegation, but also of a number of other projects of great interest to Finland. Finally, on the subject of the Åland Islands I want to note only that the Finnish Government's promise is conditional at the given moment since in a parliamentary system you cannot be sure what the composition of your government will be tomorrow. That is why a manifestation of goodwill on the subject of the islands, which, as the Minister understands, are of considerable interest to us, as they lie on the major waterway to Leningrad and Kronstadt, would be desirable. However, I do not propose to go into detail over the problem of the Åland Islands at the present moment; I have mentioned them just in the general context of the current issues.

Erkko again declared that the problem posed by us was supremely delicate and difficult. However, as distinct from the previous occasion, he no longer said that a discussion on the subject was impossible. On the contrary, he expressed great satisfaction with my arrival for that gave him an opportunity to discuss the matter with me in detail. The subject was, certainly, very tricky and had to be studied in every aspect. In particular, he had not yet spoken with the military. Now, after talking with me, he believed it possible to speak with the military and would do so the day after tomorrow. Further on, the Minister presumed that it would be necessary, given agreement in principle, to talk over the forms in which the thing could be done. In particular, he was very apprehensive that such an agreement could leave the Finnish Government open to attacks from abroad and to the charge that it was backing out from its position of neutrality. He would like to know my opinion on the matter. Besides, he added that Germany might demand the same thing from the Finnish Government. I objected that one could not speak of a violation of neutrality because the point in question was an exchange of territories or a similar deal, say, a lease. This exchange was of no concern to anybody except the two parties involved and, being exceptional, exclusive, did not create any particular rights for the favoured Power in respect of third countries.

Erkko went on to draw my attention to the fact that a large amount of preliminary work was necessary to achieve eventual agreement. That did not depend on one man, many had to be talked with, and this would take time, by the Finnish standards. Then, provided an agreement in principle could be arrived at, the nation's public opinion would have to be prepared for it, considering that imprudence in this matter could ruin everything. The Government had many enemies who could kick up a great row over it.

Turning back to the question of consulting the military, Erkko remarked that the military would evidently produce a negative judgement. I replied that such a judgement would have no logic behind it: if the military pronounced themselves against the transfer of the islands, it would mean that the islands were of military importance to Finland. Yet the Finnish Government maintained that the islands were not fortified. It was either or: either the Finnish Government furnished incorrect information or, if that information was

correct and, consequently, the islands had no military importance, and, therefore, the military could not object to their cession. Erkko did not reply anything to this argument.

I repeated in brief my arguments in favour of the proposed deal. Erkko once more expressed his pleasure with my arrival and asked me whether I would stay for a few days more. After my answer, he said that we would meet again right after he had talked with the military and would continue this conversation. He then went on to assure me of his desire to keep promoting Soviet-Finnish relations. We agreed to meet on the 14th.

B. SHTEIN

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. I, i. 17, f. 183, 4
pp. 61-65.

**No. 4. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION
OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE USSR IN ITALY WITH THE MINISTER
OF FINANCE, TANNER**

Helsinki, March 13, 1939

Tanner received me in the Ministry of Finance. Considering that there were many people in his waiting-room and, consequently, we could hardly have talked long, I offered to have dinner together. Tanner readily accepted to meet in the evening.

After we had talked for a time about the Czech events and the overall international situation, I went over to the question of interest to us. Tanner was, of course, well informed of the matter since he had twice been involved in the discussion of our offer as a member of the inner Cabinet. He confirmed that the Government as a whole was unaware of our proposal and that it was known only to five members of the Cabinet (Kajander, Erkko, Tanner, Njukkanen and Hannula) as representatives of the three coalition parties. Tanner reaffirmed the motives behind the Finnish Government's refusal to accept this offer, exactly repeating the words of Erkko.

I apprised Tanner at length of my arguments in favour of accepting our proposal. These arguments boiled down to the following: 1) an exchange of territories or their long-term lease are wholly and entirely within the competence of the Finnish Government and in no way affect its neutrality; 2) a deal of this kind can under no circumstances turn out to be a precedent or serve as an excuse for any third party to demand anything like it; 3) the territorial compensation along the Karelian border, which we offer, makes this particularly advantageous for the Finnish Government because in exchange for some desert islands Finland will be getting a rich woodland; 4) in the event of the population of the islands (several hundred households) having to be resettled, we would be ready to provide financial aid for the purpose; 5) by accepting the proposed deal, the present Government would show to the Right-wing parties that with a peaceful and good-neighbourly policy it is possible to get real benefits from the USSR, which the Right-wing governments of Finland could never get with their vociferous anti-Soviet policy; 6) by accepting our offer, the Finnish Government would contribute towards creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence, which is essential both for resolving the problem of the Aland Islands and for effectively concluding the trade negotiations; 7) if the Finnish Government accepts our offer, it can count not only on our meeting the request regarding Finnish exports, made by the Finnish trade delegation but also on other trade projects of benefit to the Finnish Government.

Tanner was very closely following me. He said that if he were to consider our offer from the standpoint of business only, he would not hesitate to accept it, so advantageous it appeared to him. The point, however, was that

the Finnish Government must approach the matter not only in terms of business but from the political point of view as well. Now, the political situation inside Finland was such that it was impossible to count on this offer being accepted. The Finnish Government could not expect the nation's public opinion to approve of any deal involving Finnish territory.

Then, Tanner set out to persuade me that the islands in the Gulf of Finland were of no interest to us as observation posts. In time of war, we would occupy them anyway on the very first day of the fighting. The Government takes that into account, Tanner said. I answered that it was not wartime but peacetime that we had been speaking about and that it was in peacetime that these islands, lying on the straight route to Leningrad and Kronstadt, were of interest to us.

Tanner told me that the arguments I had stated contained many interesting details which were not there when the Finnish Government considered the matter last. We shall have to discuss it again, Tanner said. As if in passing, he asked me what territorial compensation in particular could be involved. I replied that we had not been specific about the matter so far, awaiting the Finnish Government's reply in terms of principle. Should that reply prove positive, the Finnish Government ought to make a proposal to us concerning territorial compensation. We are ready to discuss that proposal at any moment. As the conversation drew to a close, Tanner set out to prove that the subject of the trade treaty should not be lumped together with political issues. He said that when the question of a Finnish trade delegation going to Moscow was decided no political conditions were laid down. That is why the proposal made by Comrade Litvinov through Yrjö-Koskinen was a complete surprise to the Finnish Government.

B. SHTEIN

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. V, i. 17, f. 183,
pp. 66-68.

No. 5. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN ITALY WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND, ERKKO

Helsinki, March 17, 1939

As had been agreed, Erkkö called me in to read out the Finnish Government's reply being sent to Moscow. Before reading out this reply, Erkkö spoke long and rather excitedly about the events in Czechoslovakia. He told me that these events had a tremendous impression on Finnish public opinion, including the Rightists. The Rightists' sympathy for Germany had very seriously declined. Significantly enough, even Ajan Suunta had pronounced itself against the seizure of Czechoslovakia. This seizure had shown that the German aggression had nothing in common with the unification of the German nation, as Hitler had asserted earlier on.

I remarked to Erkkö that the lesson of the Czechoslovak events must have its effect on a number of small nations. It must now be quite obvious that attempts to fence oneself off from the aggressor with a declaration of neutrality can have no success at all. The only salvation remains in collective security and joint efforts to stop the aggressors. Erkkö did not object to this remark of mine.

Then he read out the last paragraph of the Finnish Government's reply. This paragraph reads: "the Finnish Government's negative reply on the question of the islands does not mean that the Finnish Government is not prepared to enter into negotiations on the subject of security, raised by the Soviet Government."

On hearing that paragraph, I said that, naturally, Erkko was not expecting me to commit myself to any stand on the matter since the reply was addressed to the Soviet Government. I thanked him for being so kind as to have read out this reply to me before sending it to Koskinen. I asked Erkko what particular sense and substance he put into the proposal for negotiations. Erkko said that the Soviet offer had been referred to the Defence Council for a study and judgement. He, Erkko, had personally reported it to Marshal Mannerheim who was the Chairman of the Defence Council. Erkko would have preferred to talk with me in more specific terms after the Defence Council had pronounced its judgement. I said I did not quite see the point in referring the Soviet offer to the Defence Council since the Finnish Government, according to Erkko, had already turned it down, so what a Defence Council judgement was for then. To this, Erkko replied that what had been referred to the Defence Council was not only the Soviet offer but the entire issue of security in the Gulf of Finland. The Defence Council had to state its opinion on the subject. Erkko had nothing to add to that at the moment. He believed that a great move forward had been made in our negotiations. One had to know Finnish mentality and slowness, Erkko said, to appreciate the significance of such a move within a single week. That was proof of the Finnish Government's and, in particular, Erkko's goodwill. The very fact of the Finnish Government's consent to negotiations signified very much.

While saying that the Finnish proposal was not specific as yet, Erkko, speaking of the Soviet offer again, noted that it was not specific either on the exchange of territories. You have been speaking, Erkko said, about territorial compensation along the Karelian border only in broad outline, but you have not offered anything definite. Well, many have asked me what territorial compensation can be implied. I told Erkko that we had not, indeed, specified this territorial compensation, waiting for the Finnish Government's reply in point of principle. In the event of a positive reply, the Finnish Government ought to make a concrete proposal which we were ready to consider immediately. Then I added: the very question Erkko had put regarding specific territorial compensation allowed me to presume that the Finnish Government's negative reply in respect of our offer was not final. To that, Erkko replied: "We shall see".

In parting, I told Erkko that although the Finnish Government had itself asked through Koskinen for these negotiations to be kept secret, it had informed the Swedish Government about them. I called Erkko's attention to that circumstance and warned him against an eventual and undesirable disclosure of the fact of the negotiations. Erkko replied that he had taken no initiative in informing the Swedish Government which, he claimed, had learned about it when the Minister of Foreign Affairs here was Holsti. According to Erkko, the issue of the islands had already been discussed last January or December and the matter had become known to the Swedes through the individuals with whom it had been discussed here. That is why when the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires had asked him about it several days ago, he had to brief him, while warning him that the fact had to be kept secret. Erkko told me again that it was in the mutual interest not to disclose the fact of the negotiations. I said we had never had any intention to do so right from the start.

We agreed with Erkko to meet early next week, i. e., March 20 or 21, but in any case after the Defence Council produced its judgement.

SHTEIN,
PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE USSR IN ITALY

**NO. 6. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION
OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE USSR IN ITALY WITH THE MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND, ERKKO**

Helsinki, March 24, 1939

Erkko began by apologising for not having been able to receive me yesterday. There had been Cabinet meetings yesterday and earlier today, and only now could he talk with me. He had just received a telegram from Moscow saying that Comrade Mikoyan had called in the Chairman of the trade delegation and declared that the treaty could not be signed until agreement on the political issues had been achieved. In view of the fact that the Chairman of the delegation, apart from never having been authorised to confer on the subject, was not even apprised of it, the conversation could not, of course, produce any results. In these circumstances, the delegation decided to leave Moscow. Half the delegation left yesterday and the other half was leaving today. Erkko considered that to be a breakdown of the negotiations and presumed that the delegation would not return to Moscow any more. The Finnish Government could not bear the expenses to maintain a delegation that was doing nothing. Should the negotiations be resumed, this time the Soviet delegation would have to come to Helsinki. He was apprehensive of the impression the delegation's return would produce here and did not know what explanation should be given to public opinion.

I said that it was up to the Finnish Government to recall or not to recall its delegation. As to the explanation Erkko had to give, I would advise him to explain this departure by natural problems arising in the course of negotiations and make no mention of political conditions. Any mention of political conditions would invite inevitable questions and Erkko would find himself in an awkward predicament. Erkko tried to assure me that should he refer to political conditions, the whole nation would go along with him, but toned down his remarks little by little and passed to the main issue.

The Finnish Government had decided to give us a written guarantee regarding Finland's position in the future. This guarantee must, in the Finnish Government's opinion, create precisely that sense of security which we had spoken about in formulating our proposal. The note of guarantee, according to Erkko, would comprise two commitments of the Finnish Government: 1) to defend the territory of Finland against any aggression and 2) not to conclude any accords that could contravene Finland's neutrality.

On hearing that, I told Erkko that, without prejudging my government's reaction to a note of his kind, I must point out that this offer was totally inconsistent with Erkko's original reply which said that "the Finnish Government is willing to enter into negotiations on the issue of security raised by the Soviet Government." What Erkko was now proposing had nothing to do with our offer concerning the islands. I had explained the sense of our proposal to Erkko in sufficient detail and several times. The Finnish Government had rejected it but agreed to discuss the problem this proposal had raised. In a conversation with Koskinen who had communicated Erkko's reply, Comrade Litvinov said that the Soviet Government was ready to hear the Finnish counter-proposal. However, Erkko was now making a proposal which could in no way be considered to correspond to our offer. Erkko had either to formulate a real counter-proposal or admit that his phrase about negotiations had no substance. I had to insist on that to make the matter perfectly clear.

Erkko was silent for a long time, and then rather unintelligibly muttered that he had nothing else to say. I kept on insisting and said, in particular, that in these circumstances I would have to inform the Soviet Government which was to make all the conclusions. Then Erkko said that he wanted to talk

with me "in private capacity". He wanted to tell me that he realised how serious the matter was and was doing everything within his power. I replied that those words did not convince me and that he had to prove the actual presence of goodwill. Then Erkko said that he had conferred with a number of responsible men concerning a counterproposal "in the spirit of the Soviet offer". I continued to insist on him being more specific. After some hesitation, Erkko said that the counter-proposal was to turn over to us two islands—Lavansaari and Seiskaari. But there could be no question, according to Erkko, of turning over the islands of Suur'Saari (Hogland) and Tyta'saari.

To that, Erkko added that the territorial compensation for those islands must be such that the Finnish Government could defend this deal both in front of the public opinion of its own country and in front of the outside world. The deal must be sufficiently advantageous for Finland, Erkko said. I asked him whether he could make any proposal regarding compensation, to which Erkko replied in the negative and, in his turn, asked me whether we had a proposal to make, to which I replied in the negative. I told him that he must think of territorial compensation and make an appropriate proposal which we would be ready to discuss.

Speaking of the islands. Erkko said, in passing, that these islands had been demilitarised to meet our earlier demand, but should we be agreeable, he intimated, the islands could be fortified. I did not elaborate, but it was beyond doubt that the Finns have certain plans in this respect.

Coming back to the issue of the note, Erkko asked me to drop in on Monday, March 27, to look through, together with him, the draft which he would have sketched out by then. Erkko went on to say that he had just sent a telegram to Moscow to tell the Chairman of the delegation not to leave.

I invited Erkko to lunch with me on March 28. We could then talk it all over in greater detail. Erkko accepted the invitation.

SHTEIN,
PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE USSR IN ITALY

FPA of the USSR, I. 06,
I. 17, f. 183,
pp. 84-86.

No. 7. TRANSCRIPT OF V. M. MOLOTOV'S CONVERSATION WITH THE ENVOY OF FINLAND TO THE USSR, YRJÖ-KOSKINEN

October 5, 1939

Comrade Molotov tells the Envoy that the Government of the USSR deems it expedient to exchange opinions with the Finnish Government on the current issues of Soviet-Finnish relations.

In recent discussions, the Envoy has been speaking of Finland's desire to move towards improving relations with the USSR. The USSR views it positively. A meeting of representatives of the USSR and those of the Finnish Government would make it possible to discuss specific issues concerning the improvement of relations between both countries.

The Envoy remarks that in his conversations he has been talking only about business relations between Finland and the USSR and that he intends to talk on the subject with the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade on October 7.

The People's Commissar reminds the Envoy that there have been pronouncements in Finland for an improvement not only of economic, but also of political relations with the USSR. The Envoy says that these pronouncements are in line with his Government's position.

The USSR has signed a treaty of mutual assistance with Estonia, is signing one with Latvia and discussing respective issues with Lithuania. It is

desirable to have an exchange of opinion also with the Government of Finland on matters of great importance both to the USSR and to Finland. The Soviet Government would be glad to see the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs or another plenipotentiary representative of the Finnish Government in Moscow.

The Envoy asks what particular issues are meant.

Comrade Molotov replies that the point is to improve Soviet-Finnish relations. The Soviet Government holds the issues subject to discussion with Finland to be rather urgent. Considering that there is a major war going on in Europe, it is desirable to discuss the situation and to make the necessary conclusions.

The Envoy says that he will postpone, under these circumstances, his visit to the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

The People's Commissar remarks that this is up to the Envoy and goes on to point out that an adjustment of Soviet-Finnish relations must deepen and widen economic relations between Finland and the USSR.

Comrade Molotov asks the Envoy's opinion about the proposal of the Soviet Government.

We would wish, the Envoy says, to stay out of the war.

Our policy, Comrade Molotov says, is directed towards the same end.

When and with whom can we meet? the People's Commissar asks.

The Envoy replies that he will immediately report the conversation to his Government.

In conclusion, Comrade Molotov expresses the hope that he will receive a reply from the Envoy not later than tonight or tomorrow morning.

FPA of the USSR, I. 06,
r. I. i. 1, I. 3,
pp. 89-90.

No. 8. MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND

October 14, 1939

There are two points of major concern to the Soviet Union in the negotiations with the Finnish Government: a) to ensure the security of the city of Leningrad, b) to be sure that Finland will hold fast to the principle of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Both requirements are indispensable for making the shores of the Soviet Union in the Gulf of Finland and also the shores of Estonia, whose independence the Soviet Union is under obligation to defend, invulnerable to an external enemy.

The indispensable conditions for all that are: first, a possibility for artillery cross fire from both shores over the entrance of the Gulf of Finland to prevent enemy ships and transports from penetrating into the waters of the Gulf of Finland; second, a possibility to stop the enemy reaching the islands in the Gulf of Finland, lying in the approaches to Leningrad, from the West and North-West; third, an arrangement for Finland's present border on the Karelian Isthmus, now passing in the 32nd kilometre away from Leningrad, i. e., within the striking range of long-course firing, to be somewhat moved back north and north-west.

A special point to consider is the borderline crossing the Rybachij and Srednij Peninsulas, which has been drawn in an absurd and artificial way and must be corrected according to the map enclosed herewith.

Proceeding from the foregoing considerations, it is necessary to resolve, by mutual agreement and in the interest of both parties, the following issues:

1) Grant the Soviet Government a lease of thirty years on the port of Hanko (Gange) and an area around the port with a range of five to six miles

south and east of the port and three miles west and north of it, of setting up a naval base with shore artillery defence capable of shielding the passage into the Gulf of Finland with artillery fire in conjunction with the shore artillery defence on the other bank of the Gulf of Finland at the Baltic Port. To guard the naval base, the Soviet Government shall be allowed to keep an infantry regiment, two anti-aircraft artillery battalions, two Air Force groups, and a tank battalion, a total of no more than five thousand men, in the Port Hanko area;

2) Grant the Soviet Navy the right of anchorage in the Lappvik Gulf;

3) Transfer to the Soviet Union, in exchange for corresponding Soviet territory, the islands of Hogland (Suur'Saari), Seiskaari, Lavansaari, both Tyta'saari islands, Björkö, and also part of the Karelian Isthmus from the Lipola Village to the southern end of the town of Koivisto, as equally the western part of the Rybachij and Srednij Peninsulas, altogether, 2,761 sq. kilometres—all that according to the map enclosed herewith;

4) In compensation for the territory ceded to the Soviet Union under Paragraph 3, transfer to the Finnish Republic Soviet territory in the region of Rebola and Lake Poros, 5,529 sq. km., according to the map enclosed herewith;

5) Reinforce the existing non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Finland by incorporating mutual commitments not to enter into groups or coalitions of States directly or indirectly hostile towards either Contracting Party;

6) Disarm reciprocally the fortified regions in the Karelian Isthmus along the Finnish-Soviet border, leaving standard frontier guards on that border;

7) Not object to the arming of the Aland Islands by the national forces of Finland so that no foreign State whatsoever, including Sweden, could have anything to do with the arming of the Alands.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. 1, i. 18, f. 193,
pp. 1-2.

No. 9. MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR

October 23, 1939

After having thoroughly examined the Soviet Government's proposal with a view to promoting the mutual relationship between Finland and the USSR, the Finnish Government has arrived at the following conclusion:

Finland appreciates the desire of the USSR to ensure the security of the city of Leningrad. Finland wishes, as she has underlined more than once earlier on, to preserve friendly and goodneighbourly relations with the USSR. For these two objectives, Finland is prepared, on her part, to discuss measures to meet the Soviet requirements. The natural supposition in this context is that the defence requirements of Finland and her possibilities for preserving total neutrality cannot be left out of account either. By this policy of hers, Finland best contributes towards strengthening the peace in Northern Europe. Finland considers this policy to be of the greatest advantage to her neighbour, the USSR, as well.

The Finnish Government is convinced that, given mutual goodwill, it is possible, without contravening the security and neutrality of Finland, to achieve the above-mentioned objectives which are, according to the memorandum transmitted by the Soviet Government to the Finnish Government, the starting point of Soviet policy.

For the achievement of these objectives, the Finnish Government is agreeable to the measures stated below, in the natural supposition that they will be approved by the Finnish Parliament.

1. The Finnish Government is prepared to conclude an agreement on the transfer of the following islands situated in the Gulf of Finland: Seiskaari, Pennisaari, Lavansaari, Tyta'rsaari (Mal. and Bol.) in exchange for Soviet territory. Furthermore, the Finnish Government is prepared to discuss the question of Suur'Saari, taking into account the interests of both countries.

2. Mindful of the proximity of the city of Leningrad to the Finnish frontier, the Finnish Government does not object, for the sake of strengthening the security of this city in exchange for Soviet territory, to a revision of the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus in places where this frontier is inconvenient for the USSR because of the afore-mentioned considerations. The suggestion is for it to run from Rajajoki in the south-east from the Haapala Village straight to the Gulf of Finland, leaving Kellomäki on the Finnish side. That removes the Kuokkala bend. In the same way, the border at this point will be drawn 10 km. back to the West. The Finnish Government will not be able to consider drawing the frontier back as far as suggested in the Soviet proposal since that would mean a threat to the position and security of Finland herself. On top of that, the afore-mentioned territory is a densely populated and ancient Finnish land the transfer of which would mean the destruction of the townships of tens of thousands of Finnish citizens and their resettlement.

3. As to the Port of Hanko, the area around it and the Lappvik Bay, the Finnish Government has to insist on the inviolability of Finland. Unconditional neutrality by itself, as it is understood in Finland and in general, rules out the possibility of military bases being turned over to foreign authorities. The idea of a permanent or long-term deployment of the forces of another State on the territory of Finland is unacceptable from Finland's point of view. The possibility of them being used for an attack against Finland cannot be excluded. Such a state of things would generate unending disputes and undesirable friction which would not be conducive towards strengthening the mutual relationship between both countries, which is precisely the purpose of above-mentioned accommodation.

4. The USSR has declared its readiness to reinforce the existing non-aggression pact between Finland and the USSR by including a reference to mutual commitments not to enter into alignments or coalitions of States directly or indirectly hostile for either Contracting Party. The Finnish Government is, nevertheless, of the opinion that Article 3 of the above-mentioned pact, proscribing involvement in any treaties, agreements or conventions manifestly hostile towards the other Party and contradicting the said treaty in form or in substance, includes everything that the States having a friendly relationship can rightfully demand of one another without prejudice to their good relations with other States and for their unconditional neutrality. The Finnish Government is prepared, since the USSR so desires, to reaffirm at any time that it will faithfully honour its commitment. To offer evidence of its goodwill, the Finnish Government can, on top of that, agree to Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the said pact, in which the Contracting Parties pledge to preserve neutrality if either Contracting Party becomes the object of attack by a third Power, being specified and ratified so as to commit the Contracting Parties to refraining from any support of the State making such an attack. It must be noted in this context that a relationship compatible with the general rules of neutrality, as, for example, the continuation of normal commodity exchange or transit of goods, cannot be qualified as support.

5. The Finnish Government is satisfied that the Soviet Government does not object to the arming of the Åland Islands by Finland's own resources. Therefore, the Finnish Government declares that its intention has been all along to fortify these islands with its own forces and at its own expense on such a

scale as required to ensure their neutrality, taking into account the commitments following from the 1921 Treaty which is in force.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. 1, i. 18, f. 193,
pp. 3-6.

No. 10. MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND

October 23, 1939

In connection with the Finnish Government's memorandum of October 23, the Government of the Soviet Union has the honour to state that proceeding from the considerations set forth in the Soviet Government's memorandum of October 14, the latter has put forward the minimum proposals dictated by the elementary requirements of the security of the Soviet State, notably of Leningrad which has a population of 3.5 million. These have been laid down precisely as minimum conditions, while the Soviet Government has dropped its proposal for a pact of mutual assistance to be concluded between the Soviet Union and Finland, so as to let the Finnish Government preserve its absolute neutrality, as equally it has dropped its proposal for the Aland Islands not to be armed or to be armed with the participation of the USSR, replacing that proposal by its consent to the arming of the Aland Islands by Finland's own national forces. The Soviet Government has made these cardinal concessions because it counted on Finland's friendly position and on her eventual consent to the minimum proposals of the USSR set forth in the memorandum of October 14.

The exchange of opinions on October 23 between the representatives of the USSR (Molotov, Stalin) and Finland (Tanner, Paasikivi) facilitated mutual understanding, while at the same time revealing the existence of differences between them. Taking into account the results of the exchange of opinion and meeting the wishes of the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government declares:

1. The Soviet Government cannot renounce its proposal for the naval base in Hanko to be granted to the Soviet Union, considering this proposal to be an absolutely indispensable condition for ensuring the minimum security of Leningrad, and in this context, the Soviet Government, modifying its memorandum of October 14, finds it possible to keep no more than 4,000 ground troops to guard the naval base, limiting the presence of these troops in the Hanko area to the period of the Anglo-Franco-German war in Europe until it is over.

2. The Soviet Government finds it impossible to agree to a 10-km strip of Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus being granted in exchange for the territory of the USSR, as proposed in the Finnish Government's memorandum of October 23, for it considers this measure totally inadequate for ensuring the minimum security of the approaches to Leningrad from the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Government, to meet Finland half-way, finds it possible, however, as a last resort, to modify its original proposal somewhat, by reducing the size of the territory in the Karelian Isthmus to be ceded to the USSR in exchange for the territory of the USSR, according to the map enclosed herewith, while still standing by the Soviet Government's original proposal regarding the Björkö Island

3. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to keep valid the rest of the proposals set forth in the Soviet Government's memorandum of October 14.

4. The Soviet Government accepts the Finnish Government's proposal about amending Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the non-aggression pact.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
i. 1, s. 18, f. 193,
pp. 7-8.

No. 11. MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR

*October 31, 1939 **

During the negotiations between the plenipotentiary representatives of the Finnish Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for an adjustment of political relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, it has turned out that there are considerable divergencies between the viewpoints of both Governments. The opinions of both Governments have been set forth in the memorandum of the Government of Finland of October 23 and in the memoranda of the Government of the USSR of October 14 and 23.

The Government of Finland, desirous of finding a solution to the issues still outstanding has accepted to reconsider the wishes expressed by the Government of the Soviet Union, and has the honour to communicate the following, as its opinion, in addition to what has already been stated on behalf of the Government of Finland earlier on:

1) The Government of Finland deems it necessary to maintain the viewpoint it has earlier adopted with regard to the Port of Hanko and its environs being leased to the Government of the Soviet Union and the Lappvik Gulf being turned over to the Navy of the Soviet Union for use as anchorage. The Government of Finland stands by the inviolability and neutrality of Finland. It cannot agree to a garrison or a base for the Navy of another State being stationed, in one form or another, on the territory of Finland. That would not be compatible either with the sovereignty of Finland, or with her international status, or with unconditional neutrality she has adopted. The Government of the Soviet Union, on its part, has likewise recognised in its latest proposal that it approves of the principle of preservation of Finland's unconditional neutrality.

2) The Government of Finland is ready to conclude an agreement about the cession of the following islands of the Gulf of Finland: Seiskaari, Penisaari, Lavansaari and the Tyta's, together with their territorial waters for territorial compensation to the Soviet Union, as has already been communicated by the Government of Finland in its memorandum of October 23. On top of that, the Government of Finland is ready to negotiate such an order to be established on the Suur'Saari Island as to take into account both the Soviet Union's considerations regarding the security of the city of Leningrad and the security of Finland. The Government of Finland draws attention, in this context, to the definitions of Articles 13 and 14 of the Yuriev Peace Treaty.

3) The Soviet Union's memorandum of October 23 slightly changed the borderline on the Karelian Isthmus, which had been proposed by the Soviet Government in its memorandum of October 14. Desirous of showing its appreciation of the wishes the Soviet Union may have for enhancing the security of the city of Leningrad, the Government of Finland, in search of mutual agreement, is accepting what are very heavy sacrifices for the people of Finland. But it appears impossible for it to approve the borderline proposed in the memorandum of the Soviet Government and in the map enclosed

* Handed in on November 3, 1939.

therein. This new borderline would turn out to be within too short a distance of Finland's largest export harbour and the entire centre of Eastern Finland. Apart from the inconveniences already mentioned earlier on, that would mean materially ignoring Finland's security considerations. It would likewise mean forswearing the principle that the object of the accommodation required must be to reckon with the security considerations of both parties concerned. The Government of Finland hereby declares that, upon a thorough discussion of this issue, it can agree, given territorial compensation capable of being approved, to a somewhat broader territorial concession on the northern coast of the inner end of the Gulf of Finland than that which it had proposed before. The new border would accordingly pass, as indicated in the map enclosed herewith, along a borderline from the Estuary of the River Vammeljoki—the River Vammeljoki—the River Lintulanjoki—Kauhajärvi—the present frontier (frontier post No. 70).

4) The Government of the Soviet Union has declared, as a special issue, its desire for correcting what it considers to be an absurd and artificially drawn border on the Rybaci Peninsula in the Pechenga, which would mean ceding to the Soviet Union the entire Western part of the Rybaci Peninsula, belonging to Finland. This question has not been explained by the Soviet Union by considerations of defence, nor have any other circumstances been indicated which would require such a territorial concession by Finland or which could convince the Government of Finland that such a readjustment of the frontier is necessary. But, desiring to show its goodwill, the Government of Finland is willing to enter into negotiations about the cession of the western part of the Rybaci Peninsula to the Pumanka Gulf in the south to the Soviet Union for territorial compensation. In this context, there would be ground for a re-examination of Articles 6-8 of the Yuriev Peace Treaty. These Articles contain definitions which either have not been applied in practice, or are no longer in agreement with the practical requirements of the time.

5) The Soviet Government announced in its very first memorandum that it proposed, in compensation for the territory to be ceded, to turn over to the Finnish Republic the territory in the area of Rebola and Lake Poros, in accordance with the map presented to the Government of Finland. In considering the issue of territorial concession, the Government of Finland must pay attention to the following viewpoints essential for a settlement consistent with the requirements of justice:

a) As the Soviet Government has itself stated in its proposal, the territories which Finland proposed to cede to the Government of the Soviet Union have entirely different value compared with the territories which the Soviet Union is proposing to cede to Finland. Finland is going to lose territories both on the mainland and on the islands and, besides, some territorial waters important to Finland. For the Soviet Union, these territories have, as has been stated by the Soviet Union itself, too, paramount importance for strategic reasons. Finland, on the other hand, would receive, through territorial exchange, some territories having no equivalent value, either strategic or economic. These circumstances ought, therefore, to be taken into consideration in fixing the size of territorial compensation.

b) In considering the settlement of the issue, a sufficient amount of time ought to be specified for drawing up the list and assessing the cost of the damage to be done to the Finnish Government and citizens of Finland on account of territorial exchange. In the territories which Finland proposed to cede to the Soviet Union, there are State-owned real estate, railways and other roads, barracks and college premises etc., as well as other, privately-owned real estate which is ceded along with the territory. The cost of the government-owned real estate to be ceded together with the territory must be taken into account in fixing the size of the territory to be ceded, but the cost of privately-owned real estate must be fully compensated for by the Soviet Union, in cash, to the Government of Finland to be paid out to the

persons concerned. A commission of informed persons should be appointed for the actual settlement of the issues just mentioned and it must be given enough time to accomplish its task.

6) In its memorandum of October 23, the Government of the Soviet Union stated that it approved of the proposal made by the Government of Finland for a reinforcement of the treaty of non-aggression it has concluded with the Soviet Union. The draft protocol is herewith enclosed.

7) The Government of the Soviet Union has proposed mutually disarming the fortified areas on the Karelian Isthmus along the Finnish-Soviet border, leaving standard frontier guards along that border. The measures taken by the Government of Finland on its side of the border have been prompted exclusively by considerations of defence and security, for which reason Finland cannot do without them. Unconditional neutrality which determines the policy of the Government of Finland obliges it likewise to concern itself with assuring the security of its own frontiers. That is what has prompted the fortification measures taken by Finland. In normal time, the Government of Finland had only frontier guards as an armed force in the borderland.

8) The Government of Finland notes that the Soviet Union does not object to the arming of the Åland Islands by the forces of Finland, which has been the intention of the Government of Finland in its determination to ensure the neutrality of the Åland Islands.

The Government of Finland has thoroughly considered its above-stated proposal. The negative standpoint of the Government of Finland in respect of some of the wishes of the Soviet Union has not been due to the Finnish Government's lack of desire to appreciate the aspirations the Government of the Soviet Union may have with a view to enhancing the security of the city of Leningrad. On the contrary, the Government of Finland has borne them in mind, having accepted the proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union within the limits of practical possibility.

The Government of Finland has thereby given the Soviet Union positive proof, on behalf of its unanimous people, of its desire to understand the considerations of security, important to the Soviet Union, and has likewise shown that in its determination to settle political relations in a satisfactory way, it has gone as far as the independence, security and neutrality of Finland can allow it to go. The concessions which Finland has agreed to make in favour of the Soviet Union for the sake of improving goodneighbourly relations and strengthening peace, are very costly to the people of Finland, as they concern the ancient places of Finnish settlement which have belonged to the national territory of Finland for centuries.

In conclusion, the Government of Finland has the honour to communicate that the implementation of this agreement depends on approval by the people's representatives of Finland in the order established by the fundamental laws of Finland.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. 1, i. 18, f. 193,
pp. 9-15.

No. 12. STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR

November 9, 1939

At the latest session, it was proposed by the Soviet Union that in the event of Finland not finding it possible to provide the Soviet Union with a military base in Hanko, such a base should be offered on the islands of Hämänsä, Kue and Hästabusä, lying in the vicinity of Hanko, and also an anchorage in Lappvik Harbour.

We have communicated this proposal to our Government and have now received its reply. Our Government considers that the same reasons for which it is impossible to provide the military base in Hanko apply to the islands in question. Finland cannot provide a foreign State with military bases within the confines of her territory and her frontiers. We have set forth these reasons more than once at earlier sessions. In view of that, the Government of Finland cannot agree to this proposal.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. 1, i. 18, f. 193,
p. 16.

**No. 13. V. M. MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO J. PAASIKIVI
AND W. TANNER**

November 9, 1939

Having read the written statement of the Finnish Government, passed to me by you today (November 9), I establish that this statement misrepresents the Soviet Government's proposal of November 3.

In actual fact, what the Soviet Government proposed on November 3 this year was the following:

1. The Soviet Government, taking into account the statement of the Government of Finland that it cannot agree to a garrison or a base for the Navy of another State being stationed on the territory of Finland, offered to the Government of Finland to sell an appropriate plot of land in the area of the Port of Hanko to the Soviet Union. Such a solution would remove the objection arising from the fact that this plot of land was the territory of Finland because, having been sold to the Soviet Union, it would have become the territory of the USSR.

2. Furthermore, the Soviet Government declared that if, for some reason, a plot of land in the neighbourhood of Hanko could not be sold or exchanged, it offered to the Government of Finland either to sell or exchange the islands of Hermansä, Kue, Hästäbusä, Longser, Furser, Ökön and some other islands in the proximity of those mentioned, as the Government of Finland had agreed to do while ceding to the Soviet Union some islands in the Gulf of Finland and territory on the Karelian Isthmus.

In view of the foregoing I consider the following objection set forth in Mr. Paasikivi's and Mr. Tanner's note of November 9 this year: "Finland cannot provide another State with military bases within the confines of her territory and her frontiers" as pointless and misrepresenting the position of the Soviet Union.

It stands to reason that if the area of Hanko or islands east of Hanko are sold or exchanged for corresponding territory of the USSR, they can no longer be either within the confines or within the frontiers of Finnish territory.

In view of the foregoing, I return to you your note of November 7.

MOLOTOV

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. 1; i. 18, f. 193,
pp. 17-18.

**No. 14. LETTER FROM J. PAASIKIVI
AND W. TANNER TO V. M. MOLOTOV**

November 10, 1939

Last night we had the honour to receive your letter on the subject of the negotiations which have taken place between us and also the note, which we

passed to you at yesterday's session, returned by you together with the said letter.

In consequence thereof, we have the honour to state the following:

After the session held on the 3rd (rather the 4th) of this November, we informed our Government that the Soviet Government still desires territory on the Hanko Peninsula for a military base and that the transfer of that territory could, by the choice of the Government of Finland, take place either in the shape of a lease or purchase or exchange. Furthermore, we reported that the Soviet Union had alternatively and with the same suppositions proposed the cession of the islands of Härmansä, Kue, and Hästäbusä, lying in the vicinity of Hanko, and also an anchorage within the limits of the Lappvik Harbour. The position of the Government of the Soviet Union under such circumstances had been communicated to the Government of Finland quite accurately.

To this communications of ours, we received the reply on November 8 that the Government of Finland does not find it possible to agree to cede in any form any territory in Hanko or elsewhere off the shores of Finland for a military base. On the basis of that instruction we drew up the above-mentioned brief statement of ours.

The three islands, proposed by the Soviet Union, at the session of the 3rd (4th) November,—Härmansä, Kue and Hästäbusä—are, as can be seen on the map, surrounded by the territory and territorial waters of Finland. That is to say that they would have remained within the frontiers of Finland even if Finland had ceded them to another State. The other islands—Longser, Furuser, Ökön and other islands listed in your yesterday's letter, which would have further substantially increased the territory in question—were not mentioned at the session of the 3rd (4th) of November.

The Finnish Government's reply of October 31, 1939, spelled out in brief the reasons why the Government, considering the international status of Finland, her policy of absolute neutrality and also her determination to stay out of all alignments of the Great Powers as equally out of the wars and conflicts between them, cannot agree to surrender Hanko or the islands lying close to mainland Finland to any foreign State for a military base.

The Government of Finland, which earnestly desires to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union, has declared its readiness to make great concessions to meet the wishes of the Soviet Union. But in doing so, it cannot, however, go so far as to renounce the vital interests of its own country, which is what the cession of a military base at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland to another State would imply.

In conclusion, we cannot fail to express, on behalf of the Government of Finland, the sincere wish that Finland and the Soviet Union may achieve an agreement on the basis of those concessions, directed towards mutual understanding, which have been offered to the Soviet Union by Finland.

J. K. PAASIKIVI
W. TANNER

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. 1, i. 18, f. 193,
pp. 19-20.

**No. 15. LETTER FROM J. PAASIKIVI
AND W. TANNER TO V. M. MOLOTOV**

November 13, 1939

Mr. Chairman,

In view of the failure to find the ground, in our negotiations with you and with Mr. Stalin, for an expected agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland, we deemed it expedient to return to Helsinki tonight.

Bringing the foregoing to your knowledge and conveying our sincere gratitude for all the courtesy accorded to us, we express the hope that negotiations in the future could lead to a satisfactory result for both sides.

Please accept, Mr. Chairman, assurances of our profound respect.

J. K. PAASIKIVI

W. TANNER

FPA of the USSR, f. 06,
r. 1, i. 18, f. 194,
p. 17.

(to be continued)

¹ *Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1939.

² *Pravda*, Nov. 29, 1939.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 1939.

⁵ See *Pravda*, Dec. 1, 2, and 3, 1939.

⁶ *Izvestia*, Dec. 5, 1939.

A VIEW FROM HANOI

For Peace, National Independence and Development

Nguyen CO THACH

Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Socialist Republic of Vietnam

THE SIXTH CONGRESS of the Communist Party of Vietnam held in late 1986 ushered in a new stage in the history of the Vietnamese Revolution. The two-and-a-half years which have passed since the Congress were a period of stable renovation in all spheres of party and state activities.

Within the general process of renewal carried out by the party and the people, efforts are being made to introduce changes in the foreign policy which, relying on major victories scored by the Vietnamese people for the defence and construction of the homeland over the last 40-odd years and the experience of our struggle, is called upon to ensure success in tackling the tasks of the Vietnamese Revolution against the background of the changes taking place in the world in the conditions of a rapid, global and unprecedented shift in international relations.

THE PAST 44 YEARS were an exceptionally difficult and complex period in the progress of the Vietnamese Revolution. In that period the world was tested by the cold war and a number of local "hot wars", the conflict in Southeast Asia being the most fierce and protracted.

From the very start the Vietnamese diplomacy, borne of the first workers' and peasants' state in Southeast Asia had to fight for its life against the powerful enemies who had an overwhelming superiority in strength and were not only armed to the teeth but also experienced and had the most formidable diplomatic machinery in the world. Their evil designs were truly atrocious and cruel. Our enemies, while backed by the most sophisticated weaponry with the most refined perfidy of diplomatic ruses, attempted to strangle the Vietnamese Revolution in the cradle, perpetuate the division of the country and isolate it, to overpower the will of our people for independence and their ardent desire for peace and freedom.

Inspired by the great truth of Lenin who said that peace is the supreme principle, and the undying idea of President Ho Chi Minh who

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said that nothing can be more cherished than independence and freedom, following the course charted by the Great October Revolution, Vietnamese diplomacy guided by the Communist Party matured and consolidated in the struggle. It always strived to rely on justice and the power of its people, combine the potential of the nation with broad support rendered by friends and simultaneously take into account the trends of our time and aspirations of the world. The Vietnamese diplomacy made an outstanding contribution to the record of the construction and defence of the homeland and the general struggle waged by nations for peace, national independence and social progress.

Vietnam, which was not even mentioned in the world atlas, is now an active member of the world community, a trustworthy ally of the socialist community countries and a reliable friend of nations fighting for their liberation. Thanks to its contribution to regional affairs today Vietnam is one of the vital factors of peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia. The preliminary agreement signed by Vietnam and France on March 6, 1946, the Geneva agreement on the cessation of the first Indochina war, the Geneva agreement of 1961-1962 on Laos, the Paris agreement of 1973 on the restoration of peace in Vietnam, as well as the present goodwill initiatives by Vietnam which are aimed at resolving the Cambodia problem and turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom, neutrality and cooperation---such are the landmarks reflecting the essence of, and testifying to the successes of Vietnamese diplomacy in the protracted struggle for peace and the independence of the country and the contribution made by Vietnam to the common cause of the world community.

These successes are really impressive. They are a reliable foundation for renovation in Vietnam. So as to score them in the last 40 years the diplomatic service of the country had to invariably take into account the changing international situation to preserve the invariable strategic goals of the Vietnamese Revolution in order to bring to success the process of national liberation and the unification of the country. At a new stage of the Revolution, the stage of constructing the socialist society and defending the homeland, the need for the revival is more urgent since the tasks of the Revolution and the international situation have changed.

Today the world is going through the most profound transformations since the October Revolution in Russia. The scientific and technological revolution and the high degree of the internationalisation of productive forces, the trend towards the integration of the world market, the destructive nature of modern war, as well as many other international problems, are global issues transcending national borders and providing nations with an epoch-making opportunity, while challenging them with a historic responsibility. Despite the fact that the modern world torn apart by a multitude of sharp contradictions, today the nations living in that world have many opportunities for progress and as never before need to cooperate for their survival and development.

Today the pace and scale of the development of any nation are directly proportional to the level and scale of its involvement in the international division of labour and its position in the world economy. The higher the level of the international division of labour the higher the interdependence of the countries involved, while this interdependence does not stifle the ability of a nation to preserve and develop its integrity. On the contrary, it requires the development of its potential in the ever closer international cooperation. Strange as it may seem, the countries with the highest level of development are more than others dependent on other states and the crisis of the 1970s confirmed that paradox. Thus, development and cooperation are one side of the same

coin. Today one cannot imagine a state, however big it may be, which could develop without peace and cooperation with other nations. Regionalism is becoming more popular, which means that the push for cooperation, economic integration included, by countries having favourable geographic conditions can overcome the barriers of military-political alliances. This is a new trend in the international division of labour.

One more point. The stockpiles of nuclear weapons capable of destroying every living thing on the planet rendered futile any attempts to gain an upper hand in a nuclear war. Any nation, whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons, is facing the threat of nuclear annihilation. The arms race, particularly in strategic weapons, has long been used by some imperialist states as an instrument in their hegemonistic policy becoming a factor seriously dislocating the socio-economic life and turning into a heavy burden for many states which can result in serious defeats in the global historical competition in the economic, scientific and technological fields. Now we see a situation when a country with the most sophisticated war technology and involved in regional military conflicts is invariably rolling back economically, while many states devastated by the Second World War but not involved in local conflicts have become viable economic powers.

That is the reason for the powerful movement for peace and disarmament, against nuclear war. The signing of the Soviet-US treaty on the elimination of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles gave the world a change for stage-by-stage disarmament and made feasible a general disarmament by regions. This also served as an impetus for the improvement of Soviet-US relations, US-Sino relations, Sino-Soviet relations and the termination of the cold war and confrontation. This created a new situation characterised by competition as well as cooperation within the framework of peaceful coexistence on the global scale. Due to the need for peace and stability in the interests of development many regional conflicts are settled through negotiations. The diminished threat of war and improved relations between big powers undermine the role of military-political alliances. On the other hand, the 40-year struggle for national independence, tests and conflicts in the world revolutionary movement forge the striving of nations for their independence and democracy.



LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES, Vietnam has favourable historic opportunities and faces a major historic challenge in the defence of peace and development. For us these tasks are particularly urgent since for almost 100 years Vietnam had been a colony, was devastated by the 40-year war and natural calamities. On the other hand, we made serious economic mistakes due to voluntarism and the disregard for objective economic laws. Now we have the urgent task of abandoning the economic course we have pursued for the last decade, and of renovating it so as to use favourable opportunities, overcome difficulties and accelerate the economic development of the country. Having realised the urgency of these tasks the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam showed its determination for undertaking comprehensive renewal. A resolution of the Congress says that the goal of the foreign policy of our party and the state is to "ensure favourable international conditions and use the moment for the utmost concentration of efforts for the solution of the tasks involved in the gradual stabilisation of the situation and the establishment of a basis for economic development in the next 10 to 15 years, the construction of socialism and the defence of national independence, an active contribution to the

general struggle of nations for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism". These are the strategic goals and supreme interests of the party and the entire Vietnamese people.

One of the four major lessons drawn by the CPV at its Sixth Congress on the basis of the experience gained in the revolutionary struggle of the previous 60 years is realisation of the need to combine the potential of the nation and the tremendous potential of our time. This idea permeates the diplomacy and foreign policy of our party and the state at the present stage.

The question posed is for what purpose and how to integrate at the new stage of the Revolution the potential of the nation and the epoch and turn it into a factor determining our policy and international activities.

Firstly, the Vietnamese people's experience of the last 50 years for the liberation and development of the country shows that for a small nation confronting powerful imperialist forces with their overwhelming superiority there is no other way but to mobilise to the maximum extent its own resources relying on the tremendous potential of the epoch and create a potential reliably guaranteeing our victory.

Of course, in analysing and resolving international issues it is necessary to adhere to the positions of the working class and in international affairs one cannot proceed from the national approaches. It should be stressed that strong aspect of the Vietnamese people and the CPV is that they always regarded the supreme interests of mankind—peace and national independence—as the supreme interests of the working class and all working people of Vietnam. In everyday battles the goals of our party and the people have been inseparable from the goals of the struggle waged by the nations of the world. Thanks to a clear-cut class position, the Vietnamese people led by the CPV always drew the difference between the ruling circles of the imperialist countries and broad popular masses in these states. The Vietnamese people regarded these strata as the victim of imperialism and demonstrated solidarity with the population of these countries in their struggle against aggressive wars unleashed by the ruling circles. Due to that in their struggle the Vietnamese people invariably enjoyed the powerful support of other nations including the population of the countries whose rulers pursued a policy hostile to Vietnam.

In their turn, the Vietnamese people not only took care of their own national interests but always believed, and continue to believe in their sacred duty to render support to the struggle of other peoples for peace and national independence.

The potential of our nation has grown manyfold precisely due to the skill of pooling together the power of the nation and the tremendous potential of our time, while the imperialists, despite their tremendous material potential, were constantly growing weaker and suffered defeats because their actions were at variance with the interests of nations and their striving for peace and national independence.

Today when peace, cooperation and development are the supreme interests of nations and the general trend in international relations, in order to combine the forces of the nation and the tremendous potential opportunities of the epoch it is necessary for countries to act in accordance with this trend, that competition be combined with cooperation within the framework of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems, that international disputes be resolved by peaceful negotiations. A country, even the largest one, will not survive if it contradicts that trend.

Secondly, if a nation even with a backward economy is capable of combining its strength with the potential of the modern epoch, it has

the opportunity of eliminating the centuries-old gap in a short period of time. This was impossible earlier: at the end of the 18th century it took 100 years to become an industrialised country and in the 19th century that process took about 50 years. After the Second World War the period of industrialisation was reduced to approximately 20-30 years. Unprecedented changes have taken place in the world economy since the early 1980s. Historical conditions are being created for the further reduction of that period.

This is born out by the following.

The new stage of the scientific and technological revolution is characterised by the extremely rapid growth of all productive forces and their more profound internationalisation which extends beyond national boundaries and military-political alliances.

The growing internationalisation of productive forces requires the discontinuation of the division of the world into closed, isolated markets within the framework of the existing military-political alliances. Today the world is becoming an integral market.

The high level in the development of productive forces and the formation of an integrated world market require a new division of labour on the global scale.

The changes taking place in the world economy are engendering new opportunities which could not emerge in the last two centuries. Today a poorly developed country, if it consistently uses the highly developed world productive forces and trends for integrating its market into the world market, has all opportunities to raise the level of its economic development in a substantially shorter period. This means that if countries involve world productive forces and offer their goods on the vast world market, there is every opportunity for rapidly bringing national economic structures up to the international level.

Here the decisive condition is the incorporation of the national economy into world commodity production and abidance by the general laws governing the development of the international economy. Human progress, as well as the development of the world economy, are governed by common social laws. The development of various peoples may have its peculiarities but it cannot be severed from these laws.

The same situation exists in the world economy: countries with different social systems and different modes of production, despite all specifics of their economic development, must abide by the general laws of the world economy. No country, whatever its socio-political system, can negate the basic laws of human history and the general laws governing the development of the world economy which are an integral whole. Nations can only use these laws in the specific conditions of their countries. But if somebody acts contrary to them, he is doomed to defeat. Today no country can be entirely self-sufficient and survive without external ties. And no military alliance by itself can ensure its own military power.

Thirdly, the tremendous potential of the epoch cannot, of course, be referred to in general terms. It is necessary to clearly realise that the forces representing the development of mankind are the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They are a reliable stronghold in the struggle of nations for peace and progress.

The 70-year record of the struggle of nations for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress is inseparable from the growth of the might of the USSR and the world socialist system. What would the world be today without the Soviet Union? What would the destiny of nations be if only imperialism is maintained which has the monopoly on nuclear weapons, and impudently wages wars against peoples and strangles them with the economic blockade?

The CPSU, the Soviet government and the Soviet people have always been the most reliable ally of the Vietnamese people over the more than 40 years of struggle for the liberation and development of the country. The victories scored by the Vietnamese people in the national liberation revolution, as well as in the restoration of the war-ravaged economy and the construction of the material basis of socialism are inseparable from the tremendous and valuable assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

At the new stage of the revolution the Soviet Union and Vietnam are pursuing the course of perestroika and renovation in order to achieve "more socialism". Under these circumstances cohesion and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries meet the vital long-range interests of the Vietnamese people, and cooperation with Vietnam corresponds to the interests of the socialist countries. At the same time, at present the urgent issue for both sides is efficient cooperation. Because of that it is necessary to carry out a radical overhaul of its mechanism and replace first of all command and bureaucratic methods and direct trade exchanges by direct interaction between economic enterprises and organisations possessing financial independence and accounting in money. It is a difficult task to renovate the mechanism of cooperation between the socialist countries because many of them are still in the grip of the command and bureaucratic system of management. The essence of this system is autarchy when the unnecessary is sold and goods in short supply are bought. This system is not based on commodity production. It is clear that the renovation of cooperation between the socialist countries is a matter of life and death for all of us. However, on the other hand, one should also realise that the restructuring of the mechanism of cooperation between the socialist countries is inseparable from perestroika, reforms and renewal in many socialist states. This is the reality of the problem which we face. The progress of perestroika in the USSR and the renewal of Vietnam give us grounds for optimism as regards the future of the Soviet-Vietnamese relations as well as our relations with other socialist countries.

Within the framework of Vietnam's ties with socialist states it is also necessary to mention the normalisation of our relations with the People's Republic of China, the most populated socialist country. This normalisation would correspond to the interests of the Vietnamese and Chinese nations, the interests of socialism, peace in Southeast Asia, on the Asian continent and in the world at large.

Fourthly, the non-aligned movement occupies an important place in the aggregate power of our time. It was formed in the 1960s during the cold war. For thirty years the non-aligned movement, in a rather difficult international situation, waged the struggle for the implementation of its vital goals—peace, national independence and development. Acting in line with the trends of world development, the movement has become the most diversified alliance of forces comprising more than 100 states making up a half of the world population. For over thirty years it has acted as a positive force in the struggle for national independence against aggressive military alliances. The non-aligned movement is a tangible factor acting in the interests of peace and international cooperation. As an active participant in this movement, the Vietnamese people hold in high esteem the relations of friendship and cooperation with the non-aligned countries. Here it is necessary to mention the friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and India. Our bilateral relations are becoming an ideal of cooperation between non-aligned states. It not only corresponds to the interests of development of the two countries but is also a factor of peace in the Asia and Pacific region.

Fifthly, the struggle for turning the Asia and Pacific region and Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, security and cooperation is a very important link in the efforts aimed at creating a favourable international situation for the development of the Vietnamese nation under new historical conditions.

For over 50-odd years the Asia and Pacific region was the scene of constant conflicts. Here three major wars were unleashed which involved many world powers. It was also the scene of dozens of lesser wars and conflicts with the participation of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. At the same time it is the most dynamic region of the world. Today its progress towards the 21st century proceeds in a most favourable political climate which was contributed to by the normalisation of relations between the USSR and China, the biggest socialist countries in the region, and this is against the background of the most dynamic economic development.

Southeast Asia is one of the most dynamic and promising areas of the Asia and Pacific region, but for 40 years it was one of the "hottest" zones on the globe where the most profound transformations have been taking place. The source of the conflict in the region which raged over that entire period in the region is the policy of aggression and wars carried out by imperialists with the aim of suppressing the struggle of peoples, primarily Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, for national liberation. By unleashing war against these countries imperialists strived to suppress the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia and simultaneously pursued a policy alien to socialism, the USSR and China and attempted to turn Indochina into the "hottest" spot in the West-East relations.

The victory of the peoples of Southeast Asia has radically changed the situation in the area. Peace, national independence and development have become the main trends in the region which is reflected in the concept of establishing there a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality which was advanced by ASEAN nations on the eve of the victory of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the war of resistance against US aggression. The desire to put that goal into practice is most visible and strong in the course advanced by the Prime Minister of Thailand "to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a zone of commerce".

The struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, along with the peaceful efforts of Indonesia and the new policy of Thailand, contributed to a radical change in the search for a political settlement of the Cambodia problem. Today Southeast Asia has a promising future: it has become possible to attain a political settlement of the Cambodia problem on the basis of the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from that country in September 1989 and the elimination of the Pol Pot clique which engaged in genocide. Good conditions are in the making for the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in this long-suffering region.

Proceeding from the interests of peace in Southeast Asia we stressed and continue to stress the importance of the normalisation of relations between the USA and Vietnam. This meets the interests of the Vietnamese and American peoples. Without such normalisation the moral wounds left by the Vietnam war will continue to bleed in the souls of the Americans.

In accordance with the general trend in the development of the situation in the world towards the combination of struggle and cooperation within the framework of peaceful coexistence, Southeast Asia is today on the threshold of a new era, the era of peace and cooperation. It meets the aspirations and interests of all nations in Indochina and

is the main goal in the struggle of Vietnamese diplomacy over the last 40 years and on the eve of the 21st century.



TODAY international relations are entering a new stage and substantially differ from relations of the past 70 years. The new situation requires from us renovation, and primarily a new way of thinking. Many old concepts which were valid for decades and affected international relations are today losing their significance. They are not applicable to renovating international relations. The renewal of thinking is not an easy process: this is the struggle between the new and the old.

On the other hand, in a changing world there are always some things which remain unchanged. Such are the general laws governing the development of human society which were discovered by Marx and Lenin. These are human labour which is the creator of history, and the moving forces in the development of the class society and the class struggle. Mankind will inevitably bring about the victory of socialism.

In summing up the experience of the people's struggle over the past five decades Vietnamese diplomacy is certain that in the coming years our country will achieve success in the struggle in the international arena for the consolidation of peace, cooperation and the development of Vietnam.

The Belgian Segment of European Politics

Leo TINDEMANS

IN THE COURSE OF HISTORY Belgium was more than once the battlefield of Europe. It is not surprising that more often than others it appealed with prayers to the heaven for peace. For most of its history the country was the heritage of monarchist European dynasties and therefore had no practical possibility of upholding its national sovereignty. Consequently, classical nationalism could not take root in the country.

In our region with its poor primary resources, with the exception of coal, almost all people's energy was spent on the struggle for daily bread. The geographic situation, the climate and the historical evolution also did not facilitate the creation of a solid cultural foundation.

Nevertheless, Belgium became a country which at all times and under any circumstances ardently aspired for peace. Under the Austrian domination there already emerged the idea of conferring a neutral status on Belgium in order to protect it from the quarrels of the Hapsburgs. With the emergence of the Belgian state the Great Powers of that time declared Belgium's neutrality an essential element in the policy of the European equilibrium and guaranteed that neutrality. Even during the First World War the Belgian government preferred to maintain that neutrality.

In 1936, our country opted for the policy of neutrality which it voluntarily accepted. Despite that, on May 10, 1940 Belgium was for the second time involved in a conflict of world dimensions.

The period that followed the capitulation of the Third Reich was marked by the growing antagonism between East and West which was particularly pronounced on the European continent. Belgium diplomacy had to rapidly search for a policy of adequate security. Having learned the hard lessons of the recent past, the Belgian governmental circles were closely attached to the implementation of the policy of detente. The alliances in which Belgium entered at that time were always regarded as the means against possible menaces or aggression.

It is not by chance that in 1967 Pierre Harmel, a Belgian, was entrusted with the task of drafting a report on the basic doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance. Actually this doctrine comprised two fundamental elements which characterised the instinctive attitude of Belgium: defence and detente. As for East-West relations it meant that it was necessary to make efforts in order to ensure a sufficient level of security but, simultaneously, it was necessary to make use of any opportunities for starting a serious dialogue.

Leo Tindemans, Prime-Minister of Belgium in 1974-1978, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1981 to June 1989, was born in 1922. He was Chairman of the Christian People's Party. Since 1961 was invariably elected to the Parliament of Belgium and occupied a number of ministerial posts.

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A more detailed analysis confirms that this line prevailed in Belgian foreign policy prior to the publication of Harmel report, as also in the days when he was Foreign Minister and in post-Harmel period.

The policy of Belgium in the field of international problems and the development of interstate relations has been always inspired by the ideas of peace and security and at the same time the country constantly and persistently, be it within the framework of any alliance or in bilateral relations, proceeded from the feasibility of such perspective.

Belgium would like its foreign policy to be treated as a serious interlocutor interested not only in attaining success at any price, resorting, incidentally, to the oratory art, but would like to defend its concepts and fulfil its obligations relying on honest and sincere arguments. We attached much more significance to the force of the convincingness of the ideas we defended than to the ephemeral considerations of prestige of a particular conference, the popularity of ministers or governments. Moreover, Belgium resolutely rejected the policy which is exclusively built on the considerations of prestige. Our country has considered it to be a matter of its honour to be a reliable ally who does not change its convictions and positions under any pretext or to suit the fashion, who does not repudiate either them or the previously assumed obligations.

The concept of "loyalty", although not always explicitly expressed, always lied at the core of the contractual obligations of our country.

In the process of any talks, as well as the dialogue, while agreeing with some proposals or rejecting them, Belgium has always strived to play the role of an intermediary or an arbitrator. It always took care so that the thread of discussion would not be broken and relied on the well-known saying to the effect that "diplomacy is a dialogue". If the need be, it always strived to make its contribution in order to preserve accord and solidarity within some alliance. For instance, much more, than it is usually believed, attention was paid to this element in the work over the Harmel report.

Belgium has never wanted to be isolated diplomatically. In really difficult moments it always searched for a compromise to which it could eventually join.

There is no need to say that the country never felt the inclination to be one of the "footnote states" or the allies who like to add reservations to the signed agreements or positions on which an accord has been already reached.

Finally, Belgian diplomacy has another distinctive trait typical of the Belgians: it rarely or never strived to exacerbate ideological differences. Thus, the pragmatism of its citizens is almost automatically reflected in the conduct of the country on the international scene.

Equally, the analysis of relations between Brussels and the countries of the East shows that in moments of tension the Belgian capital always strived not to dramatise the situation and, on the contrary, attempted as far as it was possible to facilitate its normalisation. From all evidence, Belgium has never deviated from that line.

On the other hand, the problem of security is invariably given priority over all other problems, a fact which cannot surprise those who still remember the Second World War (occupation and liberation). This security was always in the centre of attention of all Belgian governments in the Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union. This did not in any way affect their attachment to the UN even if they were deeply disappointed by the obvious helplessness of the UN on which so many hopes had been pinned during and immediately after the war.

Belgium supported all initiatives advanced by the United Nations with the view of safeguarding and restoring peace. At the same time Brussels defended the idea that regional pacts on security offered more guarantees

than universal pacts. And the facts confirmed the veracity of its reasoning.

Along with this Belgium constantly strived to develop its commercial relations with the countries of the East. While respecting the rules of the game (COCOM, for instance) it always actively strived to improve commercial exchanges. It never saw any obstacles to the eventual accession of the countries of the East to the Marshall Plan and displayed a favourable attitude to their joining the GATT, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

A new, important event took place on June 25, 1988 when in Luxembourg, after two years of negotiations, there was adopted a joint declaration of the EEC and CMEA, an economic organisation of Eastern Europe. Thus, there are now no roadblocks to the establishment of new relations in the second most important field, the economy. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this rapprochement. At present, security and economy serve as a new foundation for detente policies.

Six countries of the East have already applied for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the EEC. Belgium as the host country has to assume special tasks associated with this step. The signing of the joint declaration and the diplomatic relations cannot influence the legal nature of the ties between the member states of the EEC and CMEA.

For a long time the Soviet Union was reluctant to recognise the EEC. This attitude has changed but so far it has no contractual ties with the community. At the tentative talks between the Commission of European Communities and the Soviet government the wish was expressed to build the future relations on the broadest possible accord transgressing the bounds of purely commercial ties.

Such an accord would entail certain obligations in the field of foreign economic relations so as to more closely integrate the Soviet economy into the world's economic structures and strengthen its interdependence with the substantially reinforced EEC. It is hardly necessary to specify that such an accord is subject to the principle of reciprocity.

It is now necessary to know what other elements besides commerce this accord can embrace. The community organises new special seminars on this range of problems with the aim of forming a more clear and precise idea in such fields, for instance, as the environment (pollution of the seas and the air, nature conservation, climatic changes), nuclear energy, transport, fishing (particularly in the Baltic Sea). However, any cooperation should remain within the limits of the competence of the EEC and the CMEA as the latter must respect the priority of its bilateral accords with the countries of Eastern Europe.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE not to mention the CSCE meeting in Vienna where economic problems (the "second basket" of the Helsinki Final Act) have also been discussed. In the course of the debate the Twelve proposed to arrange a conference on economic cooperation in Europe.

Sometimes a question was raised whether Belgium would ever be able to elaborate a "global policy" for its relations with Eastern Europe. Or, in other words, whether they in Brussels, along with the preoccupation over matters of national security, are nurturing a series of initiatives in all spheres having in mind the improvement of relations in the world.

East West relations are the subject matter of political analysis in the EEC (Coopération politique européenne—CPE) and in NATO. Depending on the results of this analysis Belgium may modify or specify its position at various bilateral talks.

The security aspects of the East-West relations are examined within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union and, from July 1, 1987, in the CPE although the latter has to limit itself to dealing only with its political and economic aspects. Economic relations are studied by the Commission of European Communities as regards the CMEA as an organisation and its member states separately. And it involves not only the trade policy but also economic relations in a broad sense. For its part, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is exploring new economic opportunities.

In light of the above-said is it possible to expect that Belgium may advance a specific initiative?

Brussels has always been of the opinion that for every sovereign country its security is of an inestimable value. However, security cannot be measured exclusively by the attained level of military effort, nor by arms and disarmament control. It is broader in its content which was confirmed once again in Helsinki when the participants attempted to reach an accord on the measures provided for in the three "baskets". In Vienna, at the CSCE, some NATO members insisted on the adoption of a "substantial and balanced" set of measures.

Belgium holds that a global policy requires more than the willingness to improve commercial relations. Indeed, a broader policy implies a profound knowledge of the evolution taking place in Eastern Europe and the chances and opportunities it offers. In this context the words of Edgar Faure automatically come to mind: "There is no policy without a risk but there are policies without a chance."

While the military aspects of detente are discussed in Geneva, Vienna and New York (the UN), the economic aspects are dealt within the EEC and the CSCE. What else can Belgium do?

While waiting for the conclusions at which the Commission of European Communities will arrive upon, deliberations which have been already mentioned, Belgium could consider to what extent it is feasible and advisable to introduce into bilateral conventions and accords on cooperation and joint ventures the points on investments, the possibilities of studies, as well as projects in third countries.

On July 18, 1988, at the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Twelve in Athens, I suggested that a special meeting be held on October 15 and 16 (the famous Gimmich meeting of ministers) to examine the problem of a "global policy" between the EEC and Eastern Europe. It was decided to commence the preparations immediately.

On this occasion we have analysed the elements which generated the concepts of "glasnost" and "perestroika". We approached this problem taking into account the present changes in the international political and economic situation. In our opinion there is no doubt of Gorbachev's willingness to carry out the reforms. He had to undertake them although he knew that it would require tremendous and protracted efforts. Besides, there was a risk of upsetting the balance in relations with minorities, as well as other socialist countries and the West.

The success of perestroika still evoked doubts because the question as to whether this operation could be carried out without resorting to external aid was still open.

However, whatever happened the consequences could be very important both for the East and the West.

The European Community did not know yet what its interests and objectives should be in this aspect.

Hence, three conclusions:

first, the Twelve will gain nothing if they do not listen to what Moscow is proposing;

second, the governments of the Twelve should persuade their countries'

public that however enticing Gorbachev's proposals may be, they are still insufficient;

third, Western Europe failed to define its own positions and, besides, could not propose any initiatives to Eastern Europe.

The changes in Eastern Europe required supplement and an orientation. Has it not become an urgent problem for the Twelve?

We attempted to clearly define the starting point in our analysis: "In the field of international relations Belgium, for its part has certain obligations (NATO, WEU, EEC...) and its policies are directed towards the future and are pragmatic".

At the same time we have recognised that the relations with Eastern Europe are actually at the heart of the international reality. The Twelve are affected by that problem politically and economically, as well as security-wise.

The EEC countries have a stake in the progress of perestroika. The hour has come to show their inclination to look for converging interests and close cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe.

In the short-term, the Twelve could, as full-fledged partners, make a joint declaration on that issue, for instance at the closing meeting of the CSCE in Vienna.

Then the political leaders and the institutions of the community could proceed to a more serious and profound analysis of mutual interests and thoroughly investigate all aspects of relations and submit the results of their efforts to the next meeting of the European Council. For their part, state and government leaders should elaborate their proposals on that basis.

Furthermore, the Twelve could carry out an introspection of their actions and follow the establishment of a close link between the actions of the community and the position of the CPE which is an organisation for political cooperation of European communities. Their position in the UN vividly showed this cohesion. And, in general, why could not the European members of the Security Council transmit information to the European countries which are not its members? Why not systematically cover all initiatives launched by the members of the Security Council in the sphere of bilateral relations with Eastern Europe? We can hope that this will become a regular practice in the future.

The twelve ministers of the countries of the European Community (plus the president of the EC Commission) decided to charge the Political Committee with the drafting of the text of their eventual declaration in Vienna. Within the terms of reference the EC Commission was entrusted to identify the fields in which there could be similar or parallel problems. On this basis a working plan could be drafted.

At the same time the EC Commission could be charged with a thorough examination of the situation in Eastern Europe.

Thus, one more, although modest, step has been made. The establishment of new relations would be of great significance for the world, Europe and Belgium. It would be a turning point in the history of the world since 1945. The problem is whether Belgium would be able to agree upon this sharp turn with the other members of the Community when it comes to practical measures. In that case it could have a double mission: on the one hand, to participate in the collective "game" of NATO and the EEC and, on the other, to explore the margin of its industrial manoeuvre and tackle its own task of pursuing a sensible policy.

IN ALL PERIODS of history culture has been a classical instrument of diplomacy and the countries of the East have always shown a keen in-

interest in some of its aspects. Since the constitutional recognition of the "cultural autonomy" in Belgium (with a tangible subsequent extension of the meaning of this notion) the former possibility of making contacts and clarify the opinion on particular issues has been lost since a more coherent and broad diplomatic concept has taken shape. And, in general, is it conceivable to reach a sufficient accord on more developed cooperation between the institutions of the European communities on cultural cooperation and the EC ministries of foreign affairs and to incorporate "culture" into the "global policy"? This is not criticism of the revision of the Belgian Constitution but a more profound desire to eventually establish fruitful cooperation at least in this field with Eastern Europe.

Some people attempt to detach still more the foreign-trade departments of the EC countries from their foreign-policy departments both in the administrative and political respects. As a result, a global policy becomes impossible. Far-sighted diplomacy has always strived to involve economic considerations and interests. This can be said about all countries of the world. Is it possible to develop a purposeful policy without taking into consideration economic repercussions?

Not so long ago the Department of Foreign Affairs agreed to satisfy the request of an East-European country to evaluate its economic potentialities by an ambassador specifically appointed for this task who would perform his duty discretely without neglecting his specific activities. Does not the knowledge of the problems of a country imply the knowledge of its economy? But it seemed to somebody that this mission was unnecessary and, as a result this remarkable research found its way into the wastepaper basket.

Everybody knows that a more wide-scale policy requires certain prerequisites. Do they actually exist? One of the basic difficulties of the East-European countries is the lack of hard currency. None of the ministers in Belgium can resolve this issue. But is there enough interest shown in this problem? With the transfer of technology, too, the ministers have to be disposed to collaborate. Is it necessary to cite other examples?

The ideas which have to find expression in the "global policy" can be translated into specific actions only if there is the climate of mutual understanding in international relations and, specifically, in this case with the countries of the East. It seems that in the past experienced politicians cared more about the image their countries would acquire as a result of their policy.

Not so long ago the commissions of foreign affairs of the Parliament and the Senate of Belgium were headed by the presidents of these institutions. Often these personalities such as Frans Van Cauwelaert, Paul Struye, Paul Kronacker, Robert Gillon, Henri Rolin and others like Pierre Harmel had a perfect knowledge of international developments. The leaders of national parties believed that their duty was to actively participate in the work of these commissions and display their interest to the "other half" of the national policy, our relations with the external world. This "half" today is increasingly reduced to the marginal zone and for the initiators of this course this trend is fraught with the risk of losing the principal imperatives which determine the thrust of any serious policy.

Doesn't the fact that in recent years the foreign and defence ministers have not been invited to the summits of the EEC countries lead to certain reflection? As a result of these summits does not there emerge the danger of a total loss of any serious interest in the international policy of their countries? The danger of anemia, on the one hand and hypertrophy, on the other.

Recently it was often possible to learn from the press how the members of the governments of the EC countriesoust each other in foreign capi-

tals. It has been also reported on the declarations of the members of the government which were manifestly at variance with the positions taken in the EEC, NATO or the UN. When in 1987 Belgium assumed the presidency of the EEC at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Community attitudes incompatible with the official policy of Belgium in the field of European integration were adopted.

The increasingly flagrant lack of accord in the axioms of the foreign policy and the autonomous specialised departments can erect obstacles on the road to the "global" East-West policy, which would be balanced and feasible. In this age of growing international interdependence desirable harmonisation can be attained only through the close coordination of views of each government as regards the basic trends in the foreign policy. Only in this way is it possible to elaborate and make credible a global multifaceted policy.

Nobody can say with certainty what the future world policy will be. The new language of Moscow and different reactions it evokes in Eastern Europe poses enormous problems. What will expressions like "glasnost", "perestroika", "more democracy", "better human relations", a "credible foreign policy" mean in the years to come? Maybe these are nothing more than political slogans invented to stimulate a backward economy and administer a verbal opium to the population? And what is our situation on the threshold of fundamental changes today when the possibilities for development and the conditions for economic progress are better known?

Are science and technology capable of modifying ideological dogmas just as the invention of gunpowder destroyed feudalism?

In any case, certain reforms are inevitable. A country like the Soviet Union with its immense human potential cannot easily accept a political and economic decadence. It will have to make certain efforts to prevent its onset. We hear more often about the remarkable improvement in higher education and the training of managers. Its achievements in the scientific field are well known.

How far can perestroika go? Nobody can answer this question. However, if there is a real chance to positively react to concrete changes it would be stupid, if not unpardonable, to fail to use this chance to the fullest extent.

Such a global policy, a European one with a specifically Belgian segment, actually dominates our consideration as regards future relations with Eastern Europe. If this policy succeeds a new chapter in the postwar history will be opened when statesmen will be able to more effectively dedicate their energies to managing "the change" instead of being engaged in overcoming crises.

Belgium has to seriously examine what level of competence will be required in order to conceive, elaborate and, if the general development is favourable, implement this global policy.

AFRICA. CONTINENT AT THE THRESHOLD

Anatoly GROMYKO

IF WE ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD in Africa, as, indeed, in the other continents of the Third World, and if we are to be believed, we should discard some fixed stereotypes. The time has come for an analysis of the real ways of attaining social and economic progress in the Third World.

AS REGARDS socialist orientation. In my view, development can proceed either through capitalism or, under certain circumstances, through a sustained process of bypassing it, that is, without going into the melting-pot of capitalism.

Socialist orientation has been quite prominent in Africa since the early 1960s. In this context, one cannot fail to recall Dr Kwame Nkrumah's vision of Africa. His vision was Pan-African. Nkrumah considered that Africa could be run by a single strong government which ought to have set course for socialism. That was, certainly, a great idea but it was premature and even utopian, in many ways. A single state could not strike root in Africa at the time of colonialism's collapse. The continent remained as parcelled and weak as it had been under colonialism.

However, the main point I would like to stress is that Nkrumah and his followers believed that Africa had a socialist future in store for it, although their ideas were idealistic, of course, for their time, and still are, to a large degree. Such a vision of Africa's future did not go down well with the rulers of capitalist countries, nor, for that matter, with representatives of some of the African élite, above all, the political leaders of other emergent independencies. Nkrumah's ideas met with a hostile reception. They were, subjected to sabotage by many quarters. But his call for Africa to move towards socialism can be traced only to Tropical Africa itself, not to Moscow or to Beijing.

Socialist orientation made itself fairly perceptible in Africa in the 1960s. True, it experienced great difficulties in its development. These difficulties increased in the 1970s. As a consequence, some of our scholars began to attach absolute importance to them and tried to prove that socialist orientation "does not exist" at all in Africa. But if it doesn't, then there is no longer any sense at all in maintaining that the peoples of developing nations have the freedom of social and political option, including a socialist option. To deny the possibility of a social choice is dead-end thinking.

A socialist option is a long and complex period of transition from the old to a new scheme of things. As may be recalled, Lenin said that when he analysed the non-capitalist way of development in the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Mongolia.

By-passing capitalism in one's development is a reality you cannot disprove. How we all understand this reality and how far we are objective

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and correct in assessing the achievements and difficulties of socialist orientation, notably, in Africa, is another matter. In this sense, the scholars who object to an oversimplified approach to the evaluation of the possibilities of socialist orientation are right.

In this context, it is very important to emphasise that such orientation means no more than an advanced type of development involving a certain vision of its goal. Analysing the state of society in a particular stage, it is wrong to seek elements of socialism in it, and, discovering none, to become panic-stricken and assert that there is no progressive development in the direction of socialism at all. After all, the socialist revolution in Russia in 1917 did no more than open up opportunities for building socialism, which after Lenin's death, were almost reduced to naught by Stalin's distortions and crimes. But the advance towards socialism continued. And, without giving way to panic, we say: "We need more socialism."

Could one have expected that socialist orientation in the developing world, above all, in Africa, would not encounter its own specific, but no less dramatic, difficulties? Of course, not.

The coming decades will be extremely involved in terms of approach to the construction of socialism in the developing countries, particularly, the African ones. The economic crises they have been experiencing as well as the financial problems, difficulties of social and political development, and, finally, complications, in inter-African relations suggest that the period of transition from the old state of things to the new one, including socialism, will continue in the historical perspective, but it will take far longer than we have so far imagined.

It is very difficult to evaluate the real opportunities for socialist orientation in the specific conditions of Africa, especially Tropical Africa where economic backwardness and the influence of traditional structures are predominant. The subjective factor must be taken into account as well: the ability of the leadership of African countries to use the objective opportunities for moving from backwardness to socialism or capitalism through intermediate social structures.

However, it is not enough to state the objective and subjective opportunities for, and difficulties of socialist orientation. There should be a continued effort to work out constructive proposals to help the socialist-oriented countries overcome the difficulties they are facing. This must be done in cooperation with Africans, by all means, avoiding a lecturing tone in speaking with them. Even if socialist orientation fails in a number of instances in Africa for the time being, that is no reason for pessimism. On the contrary, Marxist science must do everything possible for the banner of socialist orientation to stay aloft. In this respect, much depends on us, above all, in the theoretical sense, but in the practical sense it is the Africans themselves who will, in the long run, decide their own destinies, including the destiny of any orientation, any social-political option.

It is well known that many political leaders of Africa reckon with our advice. What will they say if we tell them that there is "no prospect" for socialist orientation in Africa in the next few decades just because at the present time the Soviet Union cannot lend them extensive economic and financial assistance? In this context, I believe, there must be a sound approach combined with an objective analysis and new political thinking regarding the long-term opportunities for advancing towards socialism.

We can, of course, argue endlessly about the accuracy of pessimistic or, on the contrary, overoptimistic assessments of the prospects of socialist orientation in the Third World countries. This is not the first time that this subject has come up for debate in Soviet social sciences. And

still, in my view, the truth is that socialist orientation is not a brain-child of social scientists, but a social and political reality.

It is worth recalling Lenin's finding that "history as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes". I would add that history is richer than the most talented, let alone the most vainglorious theorists imagine.

A word of comment on the force of our example for the developing nations. This force will, of course, increase as Soviet society becomes more democratic, and, on the contrary, fall, depending on the character of our mistakes and failures. And that is a reality of life. You can neither detract from, nor add anything to it. A nation cannot be stronger beyond its confines than it is within.

We are striving to make our reform effort a success so as to create a society that will be a model for all to emulate in the area of economic and technological progress, social democracy and welfare and also in that of political democracy (which we did not care about particularly before 1985). This is an extremely complex task for us, to tell the truth. The obstacles we have to overcome to accomplish it are due to long established political traditions and stereotypes of thinking in the economy and attitudes to the outside world.

In the context of a one-party system, it is impossible to work out the optimal ways of carrying out the reform programme without everyone, from worker all the way up to leadership at all levels, realising one's own mistakes.

TO BACK UP my ideas on the subject, I will offer a few considerations of mine with respect to Soviet African studies and, to some extent, probably, to Oriental studies.

Stagnation in social sciences also affected us, beyond question. We looked at Africa and Asia essentially in the light of not only realities but of stereotypes as well. We saw the opportunities for building at least the initial foundations of socialism in a number of developing countries, for example, Egypt, Ghana, the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Algeria or Benin, through rose-coloured glasses. Not all of the possible obstacles which could have arisen in the way of progressive development were taken into account. I mean such things, for instance, as the economic and financial power of the major centres of capitalism, above all, the former colonial powers. The influence of France and its implications for the development of such a country as Madagascar, is a clear case in point, as is the influence of ethnic and other contradictions on political processes in Zimbabwe.

We were inclined to underrate the role of nationalism in the developing countries. We are still little aware of the specific features of African civilisation. We have not yet succeeded in identifying the formative processes in Africa with an adequate measure of accuracy. We are inclined to consider the contradictions between the developing nations and the capitalist world as antagonistic and irreconcilable, while experience shows that things are far more complicated.

Apart from what are really sharp contradictions between capitalism and the developing countries, there is a large community of interests in evidence as well. That is why, having driven Africa into debt bondage, the capitalist West appears to be seriously concerned at the present time with the problem of pulling the Africans out of it before they drown in a quagmire of poverty and disease.

Finally, we based our own approach to Africa on ideological and military-political instruments, rather than on a search for possible constructive solutions in cooperation with the West. Now whether or not the West itself wished such cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s is another matter. This does seem to be the case. Its diplomacy and policies in Africa were driven by profit-hunting and ideological motives. As a consequence, in the USSR we had such books as *A New Scramble for Africa* coming out while one that has quite recently appeared in the USA is *The Struggle for the Third World*, with the USSR and the USA as the major protagonists, of course.

A big shortcoming of our social sciences and, in particular, of Soviet African studies is that so far we have done no on-the-spot research in Africa, we send practically no scientists there, not to speak of expeditions. As a consequence, our knowledge of Africa is often bookish and abstract, not based on proper actual experience and its analysis using sociological and other research findings.

Another example. We, scientists, have not learned so far to explore thoroughly enough traditional African society with its communities, religions, hierarchical structures, faith in the cult of ancestors. But without knowing all that, it is impossible to understand the life of Africans.

Of course, that the stereotypes that have struck root in the theory of scientific Communism dominated and, as I see it, still dominate these studies. To my mind, nothing is more imperative for Soviet social sciences today than to establish what type of society we live in and how the theoretical postulates of 19th century Marxism work in the context of drastically changed human life now, on the threshold of the 21st century.

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IT IS ALSO HIGH TIME to find our bearings as regards the new modes of approach to Soviet-African trade and economic relations. Although Africa is generally in a sorry plight today, and many even hold it to be in a state of crisis, there are rather favourable requisites for the development of Soviet-African economic relations, paradoxical though it may seem to some. These arise, above all, from the fact that the economies of the USSR and the nations of Africa are intercomplementary, which offers additional opportunities for Soviet engineering products (machinery, equipment, and transportation facilities) and technical services to be exchanged for fuel resources, raw materials and foodstuffs from African countries.

There is yet another point we cannot discount. Africa is in possession of unique reserves of mineral resources, including some which our national economy need badly. In particular, Africa has sizable reserves of oil, manganese ores, bauxites, cobalt, zinc, tungsten, tin, tantalum, phosphorites, quartz, fluor-spar etc. It exports cotton, tropical timber, natural rubber. Africa is a major producer of valuable vegetable primary products, foodstuffs and flavouring substances, such as coffee, cocoa, avocado.

Do we often see these products in our shops? Have our distribution networks succeeded in organising the sale of, at least, one of these useful products for people in sufficient proportions and on a regular basis? No, they haven't. Yet it is high time they gave serious thought to it. We can and must organise the purchase, both through government and cooperative channels, of those foodstuffs of African countries which reach Western Europe and the USA in plenty.

However, Soviet-African trade and economic relations are not developing dynamically enough. In the relatively short historical period, since most of the African countries achieved their political independence, the Soviet Union's commodity exchange with them has increased 13-fold. In 1984 it was estimated at 3,500 million rubles. Subsequently, however,

the turnover began to fall to 3,200 million rubles in 1985, 2,600 million in 1986 and 2,100 million in 1987. At the present time, the Soviet share of the foreign trade turnover of the developing countries is a little over 3 per cent, while the African countries' share of the trade turnover of the USSR is still lower, under 1.6 per cent.

It goes without saying, in my view, that the state of Soviet-African trade and economic links is inadequate to the level of our political relations with the countries of Africa, nor to the rather favourable prerequisites for our economic cooperation.

At the present time, the USSR has intergovernmental trade agreements with 40 countries of Africa. But only with seven countries (Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria) does our commodity exchange exceed 100 million rubles; their share amounts to 1,626 million rubles, or 79 per cent of the Soviet Union's trade with all the countries of Africa. With the rest of them it is next to nothing.

Now, there is one extremely important element in this general picture. The bulk of the Soviet exports to African countries are capital goods. In value terms, 55 per cent of them are machinery, equipment and transport. These are, for the most part, machinery for the enterprises being built with Soviet cooperation, transports, building and mining equipment.

It should be stressed that upwards of 22 per cent of the entire Soviet export of machinery and equipment to the capitalist and developing countries currently goes to African countries which is extremely important considering the global objective of structurally upgrading the proportion of engineering goods. Can we afford to lose this market where many of our manufactures are competitive? Of course, we cannot.

The question is: what benefit do we derive from this trade? We do derive quite a good benefit, of course, but far from enough, particularly in the sense of buying the foodstuffs Africa has a large amount of, but we are constantly short of.

The major Soviet imports are minerals and fuel (oil and petroleum products from Libya and Algeria, ores and metallic concentrates from Guinea, Mozambique, phosphorus fertilizer from Tunisia and Morocco), which account for over 46 per cent of the Soviet imports from Africa. We import, if in small quantities, cocoa beans, cotton, citrus plants, blocks of valuable tropical wood, coffee, perfumes and clothing. Now, the truth is simple: the more equipment we sell to the Africans, the more foodstuffs we can buy from them.

Our reduced import of primary products, fuel and foodstuffs from African countries is due to inadequacies of our own export capacities, including those concerned with the output of engineering goods which are not competitive enough, after all. But that is not all there is to it. Yet another reason is the lack of true interest of industrial and foreign trade organisations in exports to Africa, partly due to our balance-of-payments problems. In these circumstances, Soviet planning agencies and departments have, in my view, developed a stereotype of "raw materials autarchy".

Serious factors behind this state of things have for a long time been the construction in Africa of major projects of no interest, on many occasions, to our national economy as far as their output is concerned; long delays in construction work, inadequate solutions to the problems of the sources of raw materials, energy supply, processing and marketing of finished products, provision of material resources and technical facilities (spare parts, above all), cooperation in maintenance. There is no full information on the subject as yet, but, by some estimates, between 15 and 20 per cent of such projects do not pay off.

We have to resolve the problem of furthering economic relations with the countries of Africa. We cannot mark time in such matters as

economic relations with whole continents. Still less so since they have something for us to take to our advantage. But we should clearly realise that the way out of this state of stagnation is through a sweeping economic reform in our country and through reshaping the system of external economic links. It is expedient for us to give top priority in our cooperation with Africa to promoting the development of those sectors of the economy in which Soviet organisations already have sufficient experience.

Considering our limited potentialities so far, a practical objective for the next few years will be to preserve and progressively consolidate our trade and economic positions in such countries as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Guinea, Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique, promote our economic links with Zimbabwe, and support the socialist option in Ethiopia. This does not rule out, of course, the possibility of actively developing relations with any other African country, should such opportunities arise. But that depends on businessmen, their competence and their ability to use the favourable financial and economic circumstances whenever present.

AFRICA IS, as matter of fact, in a state of profound economic crisis. At the end of the 1980s, most of the African states are poorer than they were when they gained independence. On balance, one must admit, that the 1988 performance changed little in this bleak picture. The per capita income dropped (1.5 per cent as against 2 per cent in 1986-1987), as did the effective demand, low as it was; the debt burden increased and the balance-of-payments deficit grew.

Nevertheless, some of the recent development have been encouraging. These are due to the collective efforts of all nations—the debtors in Africa and their creditors. The former, in my view, have covered their part of the way; but the West, too, appears to have finally recognised that the basic factors of the debt crisis are beyond many of the debtors' control, and a substantial reduction of the debt burden is the only sensible solution for the least developed countries.

We were among the first to realise that the debt is the major obstacle in the way of Africa's economic progress. To the Soviet Union it owes an impressive proportion of it—around 15 per cent. Most of the credit agreements the USSR has with African countries allow them to pay it off not in hard currency but on easier terms as, for example, through traditional exports. This gave rise to some unfounded optimism some 5 or 7 years ago about the prospect for debt service payments to the Soviet Union. It seemed the crisis would pass by.

In reality, things have turned out to be more complicated. African states have exerted all conceivable and inconceivable efforts to expand their foreign exchange earnings. Some of them have been "switching over" the exports originally designed for paying off their debts to the Soviet Union to other markets.

Since 1985 the situation has been changing tangibly. Throughout the last four years, the debt problem has been steadily rising in the scale of priorities of Soviet foreign economic policy. In its fullest dimension, the Soviet approach was presented in the programme the Soviet leadership brought before the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly. It went down well with the debtors. But some Western banks commented in the sense that these initiatives reflected the Soviet Union's own needs and could not provide the ground for its cooperation with Western creditors. The search for a consensus is inevitable in this case as well; separatist solutions will only lead to a deadlock. The world community must protect its weakest members.

It is quite obvious that Africa, now a disaster area, is not in a position to resolve the foreign debt problem unaided. The conditions of the existence of hundreds of millions on the African continent are not simply intolerable; they are dangerous for human civilisation. They mean building up a formidable potential of economic and social upheavals fraught with grave consequences for the entire world community. Poverty and hunger, ignorance and illiteracy, the ever rising infant mortality rate and epidemics have become the lot of a considerable proportion of a population of over 600 million. To this one should add the recurrent regional conflicts claiming thousands of lives, increasingly disorganising African economies and degrading the environment to the extent of producing an ecological tragedy right before our eyes.

This is a vision that is prompted by the actual state of things. Draught-haunted, hunger and disease stricken, torn by internal and external contradictions and conflicts, Africa cries out for compassion, help and salvation. One may even wonder: perhaps, it is too late already and there is no way out of the impasse the whole continent finds itself in today? Perhaps, all efforts are of no avail, and the time has come to declare a quarantine or, at any rate, to impose the "cordons sanitaires" to prevent the "African diseases" from spilling over into other countries and continents?

There can be only one answer to that: the disaster is not fatally inevitable. However, it is just as incontestable that the situation in Tropical Africa is extremely critical, with nothing to match it elsewhere in the world. It may be too late tomorrow; a kind of earthly "black hole" condemning all humanity to extinction may become a reality. But today we still have a chance to prevent that and must use it. Humanity has no time for debate and procrastination. It is time to act, and act we must in common, uniting the efforts and resources of capitalism and socialism, putting aside mutual recriminations and grievances, and constructively resolving whatever contradictions may arise.

The situation in Africa furnishes extra evidence that there is no reasonable alternative to worldwide cooperation today. Only the joint efforts of scores of nations can reverse the tragic tendency fraught with irreparable consequences not only for Africa but for the rest of the world as well.

For all of its distinctive civilised identity and problems and interests peculiar to it alone, Africa exists, nevertheless, within the system of common global political and economic relations and contradictions. It is tied to the rest of the world in a thousand ways. By the law of interdependence, Africa's sorry plight affect the interests of all the nations and peoples and becomes a challenge to their ability to act together.

Full-scale international cooperation is necessary for resolving the African problems. The first step that can be taken towards Africa's stable development and constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation with it is by gradually demilitarising the continent and defusing the rest of the regional conflicts. A major task for scientists in these conditions is, in my view, to cultivate a mode of political thinking by all the parties concerned based on the indispensable principle of settling conflicts by political means, instead of looking, as some often did in the past, for new arguments to fuel the dispute between conflicting parties.

It is perfectly obvious that the problem of steering Africa out of the present crisis ranks alongside other global problems of the survival of humanity. Therefore, no task is more important for scholars engaged in African studies, in whatever country they may be working, than that of mustering up the efforts of politicians, diplomats and members of the public for resolving this problem. They have no greater duty than to work

out an integrated system of specific activities designed to arrest Africa's drift to disaster.

Indeed, the first steps have been taken in this direction. There have been meetings of Soviet and American scholars in Moscow and Washington, starting a bilateral dialogue on the problems of potential areas of Soviet-American cooperation for Africa. The Soviet Union has been represented by scientists from the Institute of Africa of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the Americans—by those from the Center of African Studies and the Center of International and Strategic Studies of University of California in Los Angeles and the School of International Relations of University of Southern California.

It has been found necessary at these meetings to undertake joint or parallel activities of the USSR, the USA, and other states on the African continent. In the opinion of the scholars, such cooperation must be undertaken, first of all, in such areas as security and disarmament. There have been effective major joint actions. The positive role of the USSR and the USA working together in promoting the incipient political settlement of the conflict in Southern Africa is well known. The continued development of this process can lead to the potential of that sub-region being switched over from military confrontation to resolving the problems of social and economic backwardness. In this connection, the scholars of both nations have recommended that support be given to individual economic projects under the auspices of such sub-regional economic organisation as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

Joint projects have likewise been put forward for most diverse areas of life of the African continent, above all, in that of production and distribution of staple foodstuffs. Soviet and American scholars have recommended that assistance be provided to African countries in taking stock of their land and water resources, in creating the simplest types of agricultural machinery and capacities to produce them with, in building processing enterprises to meet domestic demand and supply some for export to the outside world, including the USSR and the USA.

With respect to the exploitation of mineral resources, it has been suggested that there should be greater assistance to African countries in mineral and fuel prospecting and in compiling geological maps and national cadastres of mineral resources. Joint Soviet-American designing and engineering consultation organisations have also been recommended. Specific proposals have been worked out for lending cooperative assistance to African countries in developing modern systems of communication, including telecommunication, and for providing these countries with Soviet and American communication satellite services at minimum tariffs.

Soviet and American scientists have given special attention to the issues of cooperation in environmental protection. The emphasis was on the problems to resolve to control desertification which deprives African nations of thousands of square kilometres of land every year. It has been recommended to launch an experimental project in an area south of the Sahara for small-scale irrigation along with developing technologies for food crop production in arid zones.

The ecological crisis in Africa is because, among other things, of intensified traditional farming and ecologically uncontrolled industrial growth. A further delay in the efforts to stop the degradation of the environment in Africa is fraught with grave consequences. In fact, the situation is already getting out of control. There has to be a collective effort of the international community, backed up with large-scale scientific investigation of the on-going processes. It is expedient, in these circumstances, to create an integrated system of ecological security in Africa complete with

appropriate centres or other organisational structures in each African country. These centres could carry out ecological control over industrial and agricultural technologies supplied to Africa and develop ecologically clean technologies and appropriate equipment with due regard for each African country's particular conditions. I believe that it will take the efforts not only of the USSR and the USA, but of other industrialised countries as well to create such a system of ecological security.

This is a time of danger for Africa. It requires adequate action by the Africans themselves and by the international community. A spectre of irreversible degradation is haunting the continent. That is why we have to look at relations with the states of this continent, above all, in the light of human morality. This means that the policy to pursue in dealing with other people must rest on the principle "do onto others as you would have others do onto you". And then the continent will have something to opt for and a social and political choice to make.

THE PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES

Bruce S. GELB

EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS between the United States and the Soviet Union are currently expanding at a rate which none of us could have foreseen only a few years ago. We are now engaging in and discussing contacts which would have been unthinkable in the past. I would be less than candid if I did not point out that these changes have taken place largely due to the significant changes which are now taking place in the Soviet Union. I say this because Americans have for decades engaged in all manner of international exchanges with virtually every country on the face of the earth.

We have long believed that our own lives are enriched by these international contacts. Thousands of our high schoolers spend a year abroad studying. For university students, a semester or year abroad is a very common practice. International professional meetings, study abroad, joint ventures, and tourism are a daily part of our lives. Millions of visitors and tourists and hundreds of thousands of long-term students come to the United State every year. In this age of instantaneous international communications, the world for all of us has become much smaller, but for Americans this has not replaced face-to-face contact through exchanges.

Now that Soviet and American citizens are reaching out to each other in ever increasing numbers and new possibilities emerge each day, it is appropriate to reflect on a number of related issues. In this article, I intend to discuss the American approaches (note that I say approaches, because there is no unified, single American approach to exchanges), review briefly the development of Soviet-American contacts, and put forward some thoughts on the current direction, future prospects and potential obstacles to the growth of these contacts and exchanges.

As Director of the United States Information Agency, I am concerned about all aspects of our bilateral relationship—a relationship in which the many threads are intertwined. USIA has a dual responsibility. We administer information programs, such as the Voice of America, publications like *America*, national traveling exhibitions like Information USA, etc.—all of which are, by law designed to present an accurate, and I emphasize the word accurate, picture of the United States and our policies. We also are responsible for exchange programs to which we pay no less attention.

Nonetheless, I have been asked to write about our approaches to exchanges and I will limit my remarks to this subject. I should note however that exchanges and face-to-face contacts between peoples of our two countries do have an impact, a positive impact, on other parts of our relationship, particularly ways in which we view each other and ways in which our two societies are portrayed in the media of our countries.

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Hopefully, expanded contacts will bring a more realistic picture of each other's society and will make it more difficult for the media of one country to portray the other inaccurately without calling forth objections from those in the country who from personal experience know better.

Americans engage in international exchanges for a host of reasons—some idealistic, some pragmatic, but what is important to note from the outset is that there is no single overriding principle of exchanges. Americans engage in exchanges out of curiosity about other cultures, in hope of having an impact on world issues, to improve mutual understanding, to seek to find transnational ways of addressing problems, to prepare themselves as specialists, to expand their professional contacts and horizons, and for a multitude of other reasons.

The salient point is that Americans choose as individuals to participate in exchanges, while organizations and government help to provide a framework for these individual decisions not the other way around. In the case of the Soviet Union and a few other countries, their governmental structures require an overarching intergovernmental agreement to sanction exchanges. For Americans, this is an unusual situation because most of our exchanges take place through agreements between interested organizations without the need for governmental involvement.

For the most part, we approach exchanges as a means and not an end, that is exchanges are part of a process in which long-term effects are perhaps more important than immediate objectives. In general, Americans take as a matter of faith that international contacts enrich and broaden their lives and perspectives. At the same time, many Americans assume that they will have virtually unlimited opportunities for travel to pursue personal and professional interests. If a specific exchange enables us to find a concrete solution to a problem, that is fine, but we generally do not burden exchanges with these responsibilities.

Pursuit of exchanges also help us overcome some of our own problems. There is no small irony in the fact that despite open access to travel and information, Americans tend not to learn foreign languages and recent studies show that our school children have inadequate knowledge of world geography. Exchange experiences do convince participants of the need to learn the language of other cultures. I am pleased that with the upsurge of exchange contacts between our two countries, there has been a commensurate increase in the study of the Russian language in this country.

The role of the U. S. Government is perforce limited. USIA is the primary agency of the government charged with responsibility for international exchanges, but without the interest, active participation, and financial support of the American people, there is little we can do.

We as an Agency provide considerable, but still limited funding to exchange programs—but our funding represents only a small percentage of the funding supplied to exchanges by private organizations and individuals. Our broader responsibility is to help private organizations through encouragement, advice and facilitation.

Our hope is that our relations with the Soviet Union will come to parallel our other exchange relations. We recognize the differences of our systems, but believe that ultimately it is desirable that our two governments gradually reduce their roles, allowing individual citizens and organizations to establish exchange relations directly. The governments would continue to offer financial support as necessary, but would increasingly serve as supporters and cheerleaders for exchanges rather than the principal implementers of exchange programs. We recognize that some programs, perhaps national exhibitions, exchanges of government officials, and a few others need to be implemented by the governments themselves, but these should be the exceptions.

THE EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIP between our two countries has gone through a slow and often difficult development and a few words about where we have come from and what faces us in the future might be instructive. Contacts and exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union from the October Revolution until the late 1950's were sporadic and sparse. Few if any Soviet citizens visited the United States, and only handfuls of Americans went to the Soviet Union. After the death of Stalin, things began to change.

The first agreement was reached in 1956 which began the exchange of *Amerika* magazine and *Soviet Life*. Those of us who were alive then remember well those few cultural events which presaged the growth of exchanges—the appearance in the U.S. of the late great pianist Emil Gilels and the first appearance of the Moiseyev Dance Ensemble, and the performance of Gershwin's *Porgy and Bess* and the victory of the young American pianist Van Cliburn at the Chaikovsky Competition. These were the trailblazers, who were soon followed by small groups of Soviet and American scholars who began to study in each other's country in 1958 thanks to the newly signed Soviet-American Cultural Exchange Agreement.

President Eisenhower, even in those days of chilly relations and minimal contacts, articulated America's desire for greater contacts. He proposed a people-to-people program which envisaged the annual exchange of thousands of American and Soviet citizens. I was among many Americans who responded to the President's call and journeyed to the Soviet Union. Now thirty years later as director of USIA, the government agency most involved in encouraging a broad range of international exchanges, I hope that we can finally realize President Eisenhower's dream. But it has taken us a long time to get to the point where that is possible.

From the late 1950's to the late 1970's, those interested in expanding our contacts and mutual understanding painstakingly put in place a broad array of exchange programs, largely funded and negotiated through government auspices. The annual exchange of traveling national exhibits, a regular program of performing arts exchanges, the annual exchange of research scholars, etc. became the core of our exchange relationship.

The goal of expanding contacts between our two societies was of such importance, that Americans tended to put aside their normal way of organizing exchanges through private channels, recognizing that Soviet exchanges flowed through government and other official organizations. We became used to the regular negotiation of an intergovernmental agreement, thus giving an "official" cast to exchanges which are normally thought of here as private exchanges.

While the numbers of people involved grew over the years and the range of exchanges expanded, it seemed to us that they were held in unreasonably rigid patterns. We did not come close to realizing the potential levels of contact between the two societies. Americans strained to open new avenues of contact, often frustrated by a seemingly uninterested and inert Soviet bureaucracy.

At the same time, we should not minimize what these pioneers accomplished. Our academic exchanges which have proceeded for over thirty years have produced the cadres of specialists who teach in our universities, staff our diplomatic missions, and play a critical role in improving mutual understanding. Performing artists gave audiences in each other's country a sense of our diverse cultural traditions. Our traveling national exhibitions gave millions of ordinary citizens a taste of life in each other's country, especially through the generations of young Americans who staffed our exhibits as guides.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought an icy halt to much of the progress we had made over two decades. The American side allowed

the General Exchanges Agreement to lapse as a protest to the invasion. Between 1979 and 1985, the levels of exchanges dropped significantly—there were no exhibits, no performing artists, no museum exhibits, and although academic exchanges continued, their numbers dropped off. This period once again called attention to the fact that our exchange relationship could easily be affected by political events—either by improvements or setbacks in our bilateral relationship. Whether this is good or bad remains a question, but both sides have over the years tied the expansion of exchanges to the current state of the overall bilateral relationship. During this latter period, in a small way, private American citizens moved to try to fill the gap in contacts, but the successes were small in scale.

THE POSITIVE CHANGES in Soviet-American relations, the renegotiation of the General Exchanges Agreement signed at the Geneva Summit in November 1985, and the Presidential Initiative on Soviet-American Exchanges, offered by then President Reagan and agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev, to expand our exchange contacts particularly in areas such as youth exchanges where we had very little contact—all of these contributed to a marked upturn in our exchange relationship after 1985. But, as I have said above, it is principally changes in Soviet society that have made this expansion possible. Americans have for a generation proposed youth exchanges, undergraduate exchanges, professional exchanges, sister-city relationships, etc. only to be met by unresponsiveness by the bureaucratic entities in the Soviet Union responsible for these areas.

Quickly following the signing of the General Exchanges Agreement, we were able to put back in place many of the exchanges we had developed previously. Exchanges of museum exhibits led the way, followed quickly by performing artists—the return of Vladimir Horowitz to the land of his birth, the appearance of the Kirov Ballet in the United States. Academic exchanges began to resume their earlier vigor. But there was a new spirit and a new enthusiasm captured by the President in his initiative. Groups which had not participated in exchanges began to make proposals, which were met positively on the Soviet side.

In September 1986, 250 Americans journeyed to Jurmala, Latvia, to engage in a week-long public forum on the state of our relations. For the first time, Soviet and American spokesmen shared a public podium to discuss the major issues of the relationship and were subjected to questions from this mixed audience. The Chautauqua-Friendship Society Conferences broke new ground and provided a unique forum for leaders and ordinary citizens to come together to discuss these significant issues. This tradition begun in Jurmala has been expanded and deepened in following meetings at Chautaugua (1987), Tbilisi (1988) and at the projected 1989 conference in Pittsburgh.

Sister-city relationships also offered a new forum exchanges, reaching out to new audiences that had had little exposure to exchanges. At the beginning of 1986, only Seattle and Tashkent had a viable relationship. Now, little more than three years later, there are over thirty such pairings with many more being considered. These pairs of cities have gone well beyond the traditional exchanges of official delegations, promoting meetings between professional groups, cultural exchanges, university pairings, and youth exchanges. In many ways, sister-city relationships were symbolic of other changes taking place in our exchange relationship—a growing decentralization in which groups from all over our two countries could aspire to participate in exchanges.

New scholarly exchanges have been developed, particularly through American Council of Learned Societies and the Soviet Academy of Sciences Commissions on the Humanities and Social Sciences. Many American undergraduates and a few Soviet undergraduates have been able to undertake language study in each other's country, but in the last two years, two new programs (agreements between the State Committee on Public Education with the American Collegiate Consortium and with the Institute for International Education) have been introduced which allow students to spend a year studying in their specializations.

In addition, we are discussing the possibility of mounting a major, joint cultural exhibition, highlighting the 20th century cultures of our two countries. The range of new and potential exchanges is a continual source of excitement.

For those of us who take a long view of exchanges and building relationships, contacts among young people have always assumed an important position. We guard our children with care. Over many years, there have been innumerable American proposals for the exchanges of undergraduate students and high schoolers. Each time, the Soviet side demurred, providing a host of reasons for rejection, including the fears of Soviet parents about the travel of their children to the United States.

At the Moscow Summit last year, President Reagan proposed a major high school exchange. General Secretary Gorbachev enthusiastically endorsed the proposal. A little more than six months later the program began. Thirty American high schools were paired with thirty Soviet schools, each committed to exchanging up to 15 students per school per year. This spring 400 Soviet students attended their sister high schools in the U. S. and nearly 400 American high schoolers paid reciprocal visits to their sister schools. In both cases, the children and their teachers lived in private homes and attended high school. Next fall the program expands to 50 schools on each side, and a year later to 100 schools. We look forward to a program which will allow at least 1,500 high schoolers from each country to study in the other's country each year.

On the American side, the program has been implemented through a consortium of private organizations, relying for advice, encouragement and some financial support from the U. S. Government and dependent on the good will of schools and parents throughout the country. In addition to the impact that this program will have on language teaching in each country, on broadening the perspectives of our young people, on the families who host an incoming child, and on the communities in which these schools are located, it represents a major political departure. We have reached a stage in our relationship in which parents on both sides are willing, even enthusiastic, to entrust the well-being of their children to parents and schools in the other country. All of those individuals and organizations on both sides who have been responsible for realizing this program can take just pride in moving our relationship on to a new plane.

IN SUM, WE CAN LOOK at our now existing exchange relationship with considerable satisfaction, even though many problems continue to exist. The scope and nature of our exchange relationship now far exceeds what we were able to accomplish up to the end of the 1970's. Side by side with our traditional programs of scholarly exchange, fine arts programs, exhibitions, and public policy meetings, new programs which include young people, ordinary citizens, and professionals in a host of fields have come into existence.

But before we pat ourselves on the back too often, we have much left to accomplish. We still face many obstacles to the smooth functioning of

exchanges which now exist and yet we know full well that there are many, many unrealized opportunities. It will take hard work and cooperation on both sides to produce the kind of exchange relationship, which, I believe, both sides desire. There is a certain irony that it is now often easier to agree at the political level to new exchanges, than it is to ensure that exchange participants can find seats on airplanes to participate in the exchanges.

Let us keep in mind that while over 100,000 Americans traveled to the Soviet Union in 1988 and nearly 35,000 visas were issued to Soviet citizens to come to the U. S. (these are visas for all purposes, officials resident in the U. S., official delegations, private visitors and exchange participants. Also the actual number of visitors is somewhat less because a number of Soviet citizens have visited the U. S. more than once last year), these numbers are dwarfed by other exchange relations we have. We have resident in this country over 25,000 undergraduate students from the People's Republic of China. Over 940,000 Americans traveled to Japan last year, and 2,639,000 Japanese citizens visited the U. S. Over 280,000 Americans traveled to the People's Republic of China last year, and well over 100,000 visitors from that country came to the U. S.

The number of visitors between the U. S. and the USSR who are traveling on the basis of private invitations is growing, but small, and the bureaucratic red tape needed to accomplish a private visit still too great. For Americans this is the most normal form of exchange and travel, and it is our hope that this will become a more normal aspect of the exchange process.

A system of visa issuance on both sides grew up in a period when only a few people traveled between the two countries. The hardworking folks in both Embassies dealing with visas are overwhelmed by the volume of work. Our two governments are taking steps to alleviate this problem, but it will take time.

On our side, while there has been an amazing outpouring of interest and excitement about exchanges with the Soviet Union, the necessary financial resources have not been as forthcoming. Government funding of exchanges has grown a bit, but certainly not commensurate with the opportunities. I would add that, realistically, government support in this time of constrained budgets is unlikely to grow much, if at all.

The major source of funding comes from the private sector in this country. Corporations and foundations have broad agendas, and while they have increased support for Soviet-American exchanges, many worthwhile projects have not succeeded because they could not attract the necessary funding. While much of the funding of exchanges on our side is done for idealistic and philanthropic reasons, corporations and others still consider commercial reasons for supporting exchanges. In short, where there is extensive trade between two countries, groups are more likely to see it in their own interest to sponsor exchanges and cultural programs. This is a problem for American organizations, but Soviet groups need to be aware that this is a continuing practical, not political issue.

The funding issue is complicated by a number of problems on the Soviet side. First, the non-convertibility of the ruble means that American groups must generally cover all Soviet costs in the West. Second, Americans who earn rubles in the Soviet Union—performing artists, authors, and others—have no way of using their earnings and thus have less incentive to perform in the Soviet Union.

Other issues are also of critical importance. For example, the lack of space on Aeroflot flights. While this seems a trivial matter on first glance, it is very serious. Soviet citizens are often forced to postpone or cancel their scheduled trips because they cannot get space on planes. On the

American side, this not only creates inconveniences and logistical headaches, but financial losses. Hotel reservations, travel reservations, etc., often purchased at favorable rates, need to be cancelled, usually involving financial penalties.

Another factor is lack of hotel space. Soviet organizers often change dates or cancel scheduled visits because hotel space cannot be found for incoming individuals or delegations. Intourist has not proven itself to be a great friend of the improvement of Soviet-American exchanges. One hopeful sign is the increased use of homestays to accommodate exchange visitors. Long an American tradition for exchange visitors, homestays are becoming a more accepted part in Soviet-American exchanges. We have long known that one does not have to be wealthy and have a huge home to be a good host—human relations, hospitality, and personal interest are more important in creating a positive hosting situation.

Finally, communications. In an age where youngsters communicate with each other instantaneously through computer networks, where nearly every American exchange organization has tele-facsimile machines and/or telexes, it is astounding that Americans and Soviets have trouble speaking to each other even by telephone. The logistics of many of our exchange programs require constant communication between the partners. We need to look to a variety of means to improve the level and reliability of communication links between our two countries.

While these are technical and logistical problems, they have become a major constraint to the expansion of exchanges between our two countries. At the same time, they are obstacles which can be overcome, some admittedly with great effort, by cooperation and hard work on both sides.

AT THE SAME TIME, we are two enormous countries with major responsibilities for the wellbeing of our common planet. Our perspectives for exchanges and contacts are unlimited, they depend on our interest and will. We can artificially constrain these contacts as we have in the past, or, as I believe we should, encourage the broadest range of contacts as possible. In this country, as I have said above, individuals and private organizations are the primary source of exchange activity, but I can assure my Soviet colleagues that the U. S. Government, in general, and USIA, in particular, can be counted on to support and nurture Soviet-American exchanges as much as is humanly possible.

I look forward to the day when our governments no longer have to play a role in this relationship, but rather individuals and groups in both countries who are interested in contact are able to accomplish their goals directly, when we exchange not thousands of people annually, but tens and hundreds of thousands. Perhaps one day we will no longer require an intergovernmental agreement to sanction exchanges.

Not long ago I saw an exhibit here called "Crossroads", devoted to the cultures of the north of the U. S., Canada and the Soviet Union. How similar these cultures are—they spring from the same roots. Alaska and Siberia are only miles apart. Perhaps one day, exchanges between these two far flung parts of our countries will symbolize our closeness, rather than our separation.

I appreciate the opportunity to share these views with the readers of *International Affairs* and can assure you all that as Director of USIA, I will take especial interest in the expansion of our contacts.

Cooperation with the Third World

Nikolai VOLKOV

THE SOVIET UNION'S economic positions in today's interdependent world largely hinge on the kind and extent of relations it maintains with the different groups of countries across the globe. This axiom applies particularly to this nation's new patterns of long-term cooperation with developing countries, patterns that go far beyond the bounds of traditional export, import and crediting operations. At the very least, these patterns must conform to the accepted business practices which have developed between the industrial capitalist states and Third World countries since the end of the Second World War. It would be tempting, however, to rise above those standards by increasing the share of those partnership schemes in the economic relations between the USSR and the developing world that are the most effective for the partners. Without a doubt, the attainment of this long-term objective must be preceded by a search for and practical employment of cooperation patterns that have never before been used in international economic relations.

TWO SIDES OF A COIN

CAN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DECADES of the Soviet Union's economic links with developing nations be described as completely successful and serving the interests of both sides? Can they bring immediate, rather than delayed, and acceptable economic benefits to the USSR on the enormous Third World market which is about to be invaded in earnest by the newly industrialised countries (NICs)?

These are not easy questions to answer. The situation looks bright from the point of view of the dynamics and scale of these links. Between 1950 and 1987, the Soviet Union's trade with developing countries increased 129 times, as contrasted with 47 times with the CMEA countries and 64 times, with developed capitalist nations. By early 1988, the USSR had helped developing countries build and start up 879 projects (including those under construction and in the works), 370 of which are rated as industrial enterprises, within their borders. In 1950, the Third World accounted for a meagre 3.3 per cent of the Soviet Union foreign trade, its share having risen to 11 per cent by 1988 (1.7 and 14.3 per cent for exports 6.3 and 7.8 for imports, respectively). Again, in 1950 the Soviet Union had a deficit in its 54 million ruble trade with the fringe areas of the then-worldwide capitalist economy, whereas in 1987 the Soviet exports to developing countries topped its imports from them by 5.1 billion rubles.

In terms of quantity, therefore, the USSR has impressively increased its trade and technological cooperation with developing countries. More vigorous progress in developing economic links with the Third World has

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been hampered by the limitations of the existing centralised and institutionalised monopolistic approaches to the formation and management of the Soviet Union's economic relations with the world capitalist economy. These limitations are quite conspicuous in the qualitative aspects of this country's cooperation with the developing world. This calls for some comments.

First, the property owned by the Soviet Union within developing countries' territory is too paltry to have any visible effect on the cultivation of demand for Soviet-made products. As an illustration, US corporations have nearly 12,000 businesses in Asia, Africa and Latin America, compared with the 34 Soviet-owned enterprises falling into the category of joint property in mid-1980s.* Not infrequently we overly appreciate a Soviet producer exporting its output to dozens of countries, including developing ones, around the world. But we prefer to be silent, not only out of modesty, of course, that all our exports, with the sale of fuels added, are miserably small for so large a country—they are smaller than Africa's total, and are only a quarter of the US exports, based on the ruble's official exchange rate. The lack of our presence in the developing countries' economy is one of the chief reasons behind our economic establishment's failure to penetrate the Third World's markets. There is a ready explanation for this state of affairs—but for a few exceptions, we have not been making direct investments abroad. In this area, we stand no comparison with the US which has poured over 60 billion dollars in direct investment into the Third World's economy. This huge sum enables US state-monopoly capitalism to safeguard its political interests at the fringes of the capitalist world economy by putting a finger in the developing countries' economic pie.

To some extent, the Soviet Union balances the absence of large-scale direct investment in the developing countries' economies by its impressive scientific and technological assistance. This kind of assistance yields very high social, economic and political returns, but it gives the benefactor virtually no right to ownership that is essential for closer involvement in the recipient country's manufacturing and financial activities and domestic and foreign trade.

Second, Soviet enterprises do not operate any of their plants in the Third World's free economic (frequently termed "export") zones, where the low taxation rates on property and repatriation of profits are most favourable to foreign capital involvement and give an ideal chance to a company venturing into these zones to trumpet its technological standards. Indeed, the free economic zones offer it an opportunity to demonstrate, in a most effective and speedy way, its technological edge over its rivals. In early 1987, the developing world had 175 such zones, with 110 more to be opened. The enterprises clustered in the free economic zones employed more than 1.3 million people among them, producing some 10 billion dollars' worth of output for export. The work force employed by foreign firms in these zones is, by and large, recruited from the locals, who are learning fast the essentials of the West's industrial and cultural values and whose impact on the population of the developing host country multiplies many times over through everyday contacts between the employees working in the free economic zones and the rest of the population.

Third, the Soviet Union's lack of a far-reaching specialised network of foreign banks incorporated in the developing countries' financial fabric (regretably, the several banks the Soviet Union operates abroad are no match for US, West European and Japanese banks on the international credit market) significantly hinders the establishment of long-term rela-

* Romania, Hungary and Poland, which are active in joint production undertakings in developing countries, had 45, 32 and 29 enterprises of this type, respectively.

tions between the USSR and the dynamic and aggressive firms in developing countries. Moreover, the weak positions Soviet financial institutions hold in the less developed nations' economies, especially in the case of the NICs, on the one hand, are giving the West free rein in monopolising the promising financial areas of the Third World's economy and, on the other, are creating an unfortunate situation for the Soviet banks which are forced to operate under conditions framed by the international banking community. Of course, this situation dampens initiative, restrains activity and deprives Soviet banks of profitable prospects in developing countries.

Fourth, the Soviet Union has, in practical terms, resigned its role in controlling migratory labour streams within the framework of the world economy, despite the ample opportunities for labour, including skilled workers, already in over-supply in some developing countries, to be contracted for work in some sectors of this country's economy.

I could go on listing the reasons why the Soviet Union has failed to utilise in full its economic potential to form a powerful and efficient complex of enterprises closely integrated in the manufacturing and service industries of Third World countries. It will hardly be worthwhile to indulge in criticism, no matter how beneficial it might be in a search for alternatives—the time history allotted us for this has obviously run out, and what we now can do is start up new economic programmes of cooperation with the developing countries. The new programmes should furnish an answer to the question of not what we must do but rather how we have to employ new patterns of external economic activities in forging² viable and, therefore, most efficient forms of economic relations between the USSR and the Third World.

EXPERTISE AND INNOVATION

WHERE ARE WE to start? To my mind, the most critical issue is perhaps the need to formulate a goal-oriented strategy of economic relations with developing countries, a strategy not quite unlike one that, in Western industrial nations, is an integral part of the structural policies they pursue in their economic relations with the outside world, in particular, state monopoly control over national economic proportions and processes in order to enhance the competitiveness and reinforce the positions of the national manufacturing industries. Within the framework of this strategy, the US, Western Europe and Japan are exploiting their investment, material, technological and scientific potential, and national and international legal institutions to stimulate large-, medium- and small scale business in the Third World.

In the Soviet Union, the structural policy has a more pronounced profile than anything existing in the West. Based on institutional monopoly, however, it denied individual enterprises and associations the right to engage in external economic operations and, worse still, it undercut the prospects for economic innovation to Soviet investors and exporters who had the potential to enter foreign markets. For this reason, any significant shifts towards greater efficiency of the Soviet Union's relations with developing countries could probably occur following a revision of the foundations of its foreign economic policies. With government departments retaining their authoritarian role, the practical implementation of a flexible strategy of economic relations between the USSR and the developing world on civilised principles of international economic partnership will remain beyond our reach for a long time to come.

Meanwhile the current favourable trends towards reforms in the Soviet Union's external economic policies, and the significant relaxation of

political tensions in relations between the socialist community states and countries belonging to the capitalist world economy offer, without exaggeration, unique opportunities for Soviet enterprises and associations to break into developing world markets. In this situation, the Soviet economic strategy towards the Third World must be geared to creating incentives for national producers, rather than government departments, and launching economic activities on the international scene with the developing countries in mind. To put it in more precise terms, we need a strategy that would encourage Soviet enterprises to enter Third World markets and underwrite their risk, which is inevitable in business.

In formulating such a strategy we must, of course, draw on international experience. There is in the world an abundance of specific approaches the different countries take to safeguard the interests of their national companies on foreign markets. In the case of the Soviet Union, however, its specific situation today and its place in the world economy dictate more than a duplication of any, however successful, external economic strategy (for example, that of Japan or West Germany, which rapidly built up its export potential in the post-World War II period), but rather grafting it with elements that help keep a close balance between incentives for national producers, insurance against risk and economic processes occurring in the mainstream of reforms unfolding in the Soviet economy.

Today when the reform in the nation's political system and the advancing modernisation of economic management practices have produced an entirely different environment, it is a matter of extreme urgency to make a transition from a declaration of the rights and freedom Soviet producers have been granted by the government to engage in external economic activities to the government's close commitment to provide adequate financial, material and legal safeguards. In other words, the government must use its control power as efficiently as possible, and utilise it for the benefit of the producer moving into foreign markets, including developing countries. In the overall external economic policies, special attention must be given to ways of controlling economic relations with Third World countries. How much can we rely here on international experience?

Most likely, we should start out with setting up a nationwide association of enterprises and cooperatives which maintain (or intend to establish) trade and production relations with developing states. So far we have followed the practice of setting up regional business cooperation associations, and we have made significant headway in improving the flexibility and efficiency of our economic cooperation with Asia, Africa and Latin America. Still, instituted for specific purposes the individual associations are unable to handle the entire range of problems that could be covered by our external economic strategy towards the developing world. Furthermore, Soviet exporters and investors in developing countries can only be offered effective legal and economic protection against the dictate of government ministries and departments through a representative body, in particular a nationwide association for business cooperation with developing countries.

Again, unlike the Western countries, the Soviet Union lacks a financial institution that promotes, and in some instances participates in, investment policies in Third World countries, safeguards Soviet capital investments against risk, and encourages Soviet enterprises to establish their manufacturing and marketing branches in developing countries. Unless we have a special bank, controlled by and serving as proxy of the national association of business cooperation, we will hardly be able, within acceptable time limits, to galvanise our producers into activities on the developing countries' markets, and imbue them with the confidence

one needs in making reliable and profitable investments in other countries. Such a bank must be tied by strong business links to commercial businesses, or professional intermediary firms that could undertake to find customers for Soviet-produced goods and operate efficient consultation and information services to explore market demand.

Once we have such a mechanism in place, we would easily, first, speed up the rapid growth of professionalism in carrying on business with developing countries and put up successful resistance to the strong Western rivals; second, integrate continuously market studies, framing of contracts, filling of orders, timely deliveries, and underwriting of transactions on terms favourable to the Soviet producer, and defend his rights against bureaucratic interference. Acting in conjunction, the national association for business cooperation with developing countries, a specialised bank for economic settlements with the Third World, and commercial businesses in charge of marketing and consultation services could become a first-rate economic team that would carry out the economic strategy towards developing countries in the national interests. Given this organisational core, we could turn our attention to the principles of the ownership of Soviet enterprises in developing countries.

It is still, regrettably, a theoretical puzzle why our producers do not have a ramified network of branches in Third World countries. The puzzle is perhaps rooted in the theory of neocolonialism which regards property owned by multinational corporations in developing countries as a sign of relations based on exploitation. This author has already voiced his attitude to dogmatism in the neocolonialism theory in this journal (*International Affairs*, No. 11, 1988, pp. 107-117). Now I will only say that since the property of socialist enterprises is based on relations different from those under capitalism (incidentally, exploitation as an intrinsic part of capitalist relations appears to be in need of a major revision, and different interpretations are to be placed on it in the light of the present state of capitalist society), it should be regarded, within the framework of mutually beneficial cooperation, as a means equal partners have to gain profits, rather than a cause for the strong to plunder the weak. Since we are serious about entering Third World markets and offering an alternative to Western capital, we would not be able to do so without increasing the proportions of property Soviet enterprises could own in this part of the world capitalist economy. We must, therefore, urgently work out principles to guide us in our investment policies in developing countries' economies.

Things cannot, however, work out entirely on their own—Soviet producers are short of experience in both foreign and domestic investment policies. The absence of stock exchanges in the USSR has delayed for decades the development of inter- and intra-sectoral transfusion of capital on the basis of the underlying principle of investment, profitability of outlays. Today that a balance has not yet been achieved between the planning and market principles, such a transfusion of resources within the Soviet economy is greatly inhibited by institutional barriers. This makes futile any talk about the freedom of investment Soviet enterprises could have in other countries. Too much is stacked against them at this juncture; the state's monopoly on trade and currency exchange, compounded by the non-convertible ruble, the administrative voluntarism of government ministries, which is actually tantamount to economic coercion, and a mountain of directives and instructions to put in place the over-zealous enterprises or associations attempting to do business abroad. Is this a dead-end? So far it is.

To break out of the dead end, the government must resolutely take the side of immediate producers, which means stimulating various forms of joint-stock ownership, not excluding the involvement of foreign capi-

tal, encouraging the migration of resources from one enterprise to another, from industry to industry through stock and commodity exchanges, developing marketing associations in the country, introducing a simple and comprehensible taxation policy, and encouraging the enactment of antimonopoly legislation consonant with the present state of the market and competition in the USSR. Even if we succeed in revitalising our economy by these measures we still would not be able to make any appreciable headway on foreign markets. We will have eventually to realise that no matter how hard our brightest professionals and administrators try to formulate and translate into reality our economic policy towards developing countries, no matter how fine and far-reaching decisions we make in this field, all the benefits we might gain will soon taper off unless this policy is reinforced with reforms in the domestic investment policies, in the first place. This is, however, a theme that deserves a separate discussion. Here I want to focus on those aspects of the reforms which certainly stimulate investment in the developing world through new approaches in our domestic investment policies.

Most probably, we will have to start out with the "landing strip" investment policy, which has for years been ineffectively stigmatised in this country and which the West has been carrying out in the post-World War II period by channelling government aid to the developing nations at the fringes of the world capitalist economy. Is there any other way? Certainly not. And there is increasing evidence to support this: without developing a social and manufacturing infrastructure in the Third World, where returns on capital invested take much longer to earn than in any other economic sectors, the bourgeois governments in the United States, West European countries and Japan could scarcely plant their roots, through their private investors, in the economies of Asian, African and Latin American countries. Aside from anything else, Western help to developing countries in establishing an infrastructure had a tremendous propaganda effect which enhanced the attractiveness of foreign investments in the economies of the recipient Third World nations.

Western experience in directing investment flow into Third World economies is a sound proposition, and I know of no compelling reasons why it should be dismissed offhand in formulating our own investment policies in developing countries. Rather, the Soviet Union should drastically review the patterns of its assistance to these countries by shifting accent to the development of the infrastructure. Paradoxically, we must admit, the manufacturing and social infrastructure (excluding public education, culture, health service and sports facilities) accounts for only 13.6 per cent of the 879 projects, completed or under construction with Soviet technical assistance in developing countries. Its biggest share (92.5 per cent) is claimed by road construction. True, the Soviet Union practically is not engaged in servicing this infrastructure (construction of motels, auto service stations, petrol stations, road and communication services, etc.). Although the Soviet Union undertakes capital-intensive projects in developing countries, it is much too slow in capitalising on the "natural advantages" these projects offer it in blending into the economic structure of the recipient nations by stepping up its involvement in boosting their non-material production sectors. Unless we learn to run profitable servicing businesses in Third World countries, we will hardly be able in the foreseeable future to significantly expand capital investment in their economies by Soviet enterprises. For example, the operations of private US capital owners in Latin America (where the larger share—59.5 per cent—of US private capital investment in the Third World is concentrated) are largely based on a range of diversified services offered by US transnationals in Latin American countries. In 1985, they invested 4.2 billion dollars in these countries, while the

sales of their services soared to 13.5 billion, or 320 per cent more. The West's experience shows that direct investments in foreign countries are most effective when they are propped up by services which ensure a rapid turnover of the capital. This we should remember in setting out to shape an investment strategy and mechanism for developing countries.

The Soviet Union's foreign investment strategy includes such key aspects as stimulation of capital investment in developing countries and geography. They require that, in developing incentive policies for direct Soviet investment in other countries, institutional ambitions be overruled and scrupulous attention be given to such important factors as taxation incentives and safeguards against possible risk. Again, the record of Western countries might suggest unorthodox and practically feasible approaches in this country's specific financial situation. What, in the first place, could be borrowed from that record?

First, the policy to tax remissions (or tax breaks) for corporations and firms making high-risk investments in developing countries; relieving investors from double taxation (they do not pay taxes into their home country's treasury if they are taxed in the host country) might also be considered a strong incentive. Special tax breaks are enjoyed in Western countries by small businesses exporting capital to developing nations. Significantly, small business can obtain "soft" investment loans to start up operations in Third World countries. For many years now tax benefits have been extensively accorded in West Germany, France and Japan to small-scale firms exporting capital to Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Applied to Soviet enterprises to encourage them to invest in the economies of developing countries (provided the investors have the exclusive right to dispose of the hard currency they earn and the government undertakes to issue loans to enterprises to finance their foreign investments), this policy could expand their presence on the Third World markets. A discriminating approach must, of course, be used—benefits and loans should go to enterprises which have firm positions on the domestic market. Since, then, we have quite a few such enterprises, it is contrary to any logic and to the reform policy picking up around the country to deprive them of freedom in investment policies (directly or through intermediary banks).

Soviet investments in developing nations' economies could be increased by conversion of their debts to the USSR into assets that could be utilised to develop the infrastructure in the territory of the debtor nation, with the Soviet Union acquiring property rights to the projects put up, or to switch the debts (except for the part the USSR undertakes to write off) to credit our direct outlays in the growth sectors of the beneficiary nations' economies. It is not unlikely that the developing countries' debts could be counted in as the Soviet partners' share of the chartered capital of a joint venture.

A state body to insure Soviet investments abroad must be set up to play an exclusive role in stimulating domestic producers to invest in developing countries. Its basic functions would include evaluating the prospects of foreign investments and insuring them against possible risk. It would give Soviet investors solid backing as they venture out into the investment business on their own. With the weight of the powerful state-sponsored financial body behind them, and with the likely risk gauged in advance, the investor enterprises could confidently invest into Third World economies.

As I have said above, geographic orientation is another inherent feature of the foreign investment strategy. As the world is rapidly changing so are our views of the political and economic aspects of its evolution. Leading positions in the Third World and in the world capitalist

economy today are being captured by newly industrialised states which have a vast domestic market, wield a sizeable export potential and boast burgeoning national monopolistic manufacturing and financial groups. Cooperation between these countries and the West by expanding financial, commercial and industrial relations is gathering momentum. In the meantime, we are just putting out feelers towards these states, looking back over the shoulder for inspiration from the outdated stereotypes of the recent decades. We should not, of course, renounce efforts to expand cooperation with our traditional partners in the developing world, but we should not miss the chance of establishing broad-based economically beneficial cooperation with the pro-Western part of the Third World which has caught up, in terms of the technological mode of production, with the majority of the developed capitalist states.

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THE PRESENT-DAY economic situation in the USSR and the Third World offers the promise of large-scale cooperation beneficial to both sides being established between them. Some effort is, however, needed to bring it about. Significant, perhaps even radical, changes are required in our approach to cooperation with developing countries. We have long neglected our economic interests for the sake of political—often ephemeral—ones. We always recalled Lenin's words on the need to utilise Western experience to put it to use in the building of socialism, but we applied them to our efforts to modernise the internal economy only. They equally apply to a new external economic strategy—we have to learn from advanced nations and use their expertise in the interests of our perestroika.

ON THE JAPANESE ISLANDS

Nikolai SOLOVYOV

THE TIMES WE ARE LIVING IN are unique, and an ambassador is a traditional figure of politics, and he functions in time. As I understand it, an ambassador should not fall behind the times, nor should he get ahead of them. In the past, if to simplify the situation somewhat, an ambassador carefully fulfilled the instructions from the Centre, even though they might not have corresponded to the times, the political alignment of forces in the host country, or the local conditions. And if he executed orders and wrote up his reports on time, it was considered that he was a good ambassador.

The question can be asked: Did the Centre formulate its instructions irrespective of the information from the localities? There was feedback, of course, but again there was the instinct of self-preservation at play here; ambassadors knew what information was expected of them and what their superiors' tastes were. As a result, the information proved to be not objective, but what was expected. Also, an ambassador might not have known the language of the host country, which compelled him to trust the information provided by his subordinates and, accordingly, be dependent on their viewpoint. It was a good thing if the ambassador was inclined to analysis and knew how to systematise information gathered by professionals, but if this was not the case, mistakes were inevitable. I am not claiming that knowledge of the language is the main thing for an ambassador, but I am convinced that if the ambassador knows the language he will be more useful than if he does not know it. What is most important for an ambassador is intellect and professionalism. In other words, an ambassador should be in step with the times.

For a diplomat, new political thinking is a fresh view of the ordinary nature of the link between peace and war. In olden times it was customary to say: "If you want peace prepare for war." This contention has long become an anachronism, for today preparations for war and the arms race spell the destruction of world civilisation. Von Clausewitz's contention that war is nothing but the extension of politics through other means should only remain as a subject to be studied by scholars. Incidentally, Clausewitz regarded warfare in its main outlines as politics itself, i. e., he ultimately perceived war as politics, only, instead of writing notes it gave battle. In our nuclear age such an option is an apocalypse for humanity. So comprehension of this reality is precisely a manifestation of new political thinking, which can perceive as the weapon of politics solely the diplomacy of peace.

The Address of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the readers of *International Affairs* contains an appeal to the public at large to take part in the discussion on the reforms apace in the country's diplomatic service. Is this not involvement of a mighty intellectual reserve in the work of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Just recently the Ministry was perceived by many to be an impregnable fortress.

What do I feel the relations between the public and diplomacy in the nuclear age should be like? Of course, even if open diplomacy were to be proclaimed, secret diplomacy would remain in any event. The practice of the most civilised nations confirms it as well. One must be clear, however, about the simple truth that diplomacy does not have the right to say one thing and do another. It is for this reason that public involvement in foreign policy-making is vital. If we do not create a constitutional mechanism for discussing and adopting major foreign policy decisions, we will make a historic mistake. Then we diplomats will be accused of having created a sort of military-diplomatic complex. Everything boils down to the imperfections in the forming of a rule-of-law socialist state, which makes those who elaborate decisions but are not accountable for their results irresponsible. We cannot permit a situation where the nation, which has come to believe in perestroika, is again alienated from foreign policy and, by implication, foreign policy is alienated from the people. As far as secret diplomacy is concerned, it should, with the passage of a certain span of time, be made public, too. I am in favour of control on the part of bodies elected by the people when external political actions are being drafted.

International Affairs. Geographically, Japan is our eternal neighbour. The activism of our Eastern policy is an acknowledged reality; however, to date there haven't been that many shifts in relations with that country.

Solovyov. Here we are talking about two countries, and what suits one of the sides does not always meet the interests of the other. But I believe that sooner or later we will find a solution to the situation, and it should be based above all on reason. Soviet-Japanese relations are making progress, and this is logical. What is more, Japanese foreign policy vis-a-vis us is becoming multifaceted in its own right. The new quality of our policy has compelled Japan to elaborate equal "rivalry". In the past Soviet diplomats would be accused of saying "No!" virtually before they sat down at the negotiating table. Today we are discussing all issues with them, including the state frontier line.

Regrettably, Japan still has a poor idea of how the domestic situation in the USSR is changing in the context of perestroika. They constantly called our attention to the lack of glasnost in the country on Soviet-Japanese relations, but now, when the Soviet press—*Moscow News*, *Izvestia* and *International Affairs*—have been publishing uncut the views of Japanese political figures, the Prime Minister included, plus the fact that Central Television in its feature "Resonance" has organised round-table discussions on this problem, the arguments of our opponents have been on the wane somewhat. Today the situation has reversed, our public knowing the Japanese stand and the Japanese knowing much less about ours.

At the same time, Moscow's new policy is telling on the perception of the Japanese, as different views are subscribed to here. Nor has this process bypassed Japanese Sovietologists, which, incidentally, is stated by American scholars, too.

One example is the classification given by the prominent American scholar Rothman in an article devoted to the attitude of Japanese Sovietologists to the developments in the Soviet Union. His conclusions

bear out the idea of diversity in Japan's approach to the USSR. He divides Japanese Sovietologists into five groups. The first is those who traditionally view the Soviet Union as a synonym for expansionism, and regard the revolutionary changes taking place in the country as "a ruse to delude the Western countries". The second is those who proclaim diplomacy from positions of economic might through which Japan should "insist on concessions from the Soviet side, including the problem of the Northern territories". The third is those who are called optimists, their viewpoint interweaving with the West European opinion that despite the initial difficulties "the reforms will be continued and will help the USSR preserve its influence as a superpower". The fourth is those who study the USSR's tradition and culture, through which they show the diversity of our society. The fifth group believes that the reforms are the age old demands of socialism and that their "sources date back directly to the postrevolutionary period".

Despite the fact that Japan is a mighty economic power, world public opinion has come to regard it as being "dependent on the USA". One may ask how the American factor influences Soviet-Japanese relations. I would say that the "love" in their relations is mutual, and that a "nervous reaction" on Washington's part appears at the slightest hint of an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, which fact is written about in the Japanese media. It is not fortuitous that during an interview for American journalists, former Prime Minister Takeshita unequivocally stated that both sides "have absolutely no differences in their views of the Soviet Union". Meanwhile Japan has grown into a major power; this applies especially to its economy and, naturally, it seeks to play an increasing role in the international arena.

International Affairs. Public opinion polls taken last year showed that 77 per cent of those queried in the USSR indicated that they "have positive feelings for Japan", while in a similar poll only 25 per cent of the Japanese felt similarly about the Soviet Union.

Solovyov. I know about this poll—it was conducted by the authoritative Japanese newspaper *Jomiuri Shimbun*. However, to fill out the picture I will add that in Japan the USSR has perennially held first place on the list of "unloved countries", which, of course, is due to the constant campaigns about the Northern territories and the "Soviet military menace". *The Japan Times* poll is even more eloquent—the Japanese are more distrustful of the USSR than are the Americans, Britishers, Frenchmen and West Germans. But perestroika is doing its work. Of late Japan has exhibited a marked lessening of a sense of "military threat" on the part of the USSR, which is evidenced by a poll ran by the newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*. Whereas in 1984, 36 per cent of the population stated that they were afraid of a military attack by the USSR, today this figure stands at 20 per cent. However, even this state of affairs does not suit us.

Generally speaking, the role played by public opinion and the mass media in foreign policy merits a separate discussion.

The possibilities for influencing public opinion through the press have long been taken advantage of in diplomacy. Napoleon, Bismarck and others used them skilfully. Until recently, however, a great deal in policy was done with the media's aid to manipulate society, and not always in the interest of the majority. The media served the powers that be, i.e., those who traditionally relied solely on political, military and economic factors in foreign policy. In effect the same approach was typical of the USSR, too. Today the course of world history is being affected by a fourth factor, public opinion, which will unquestionably enhance stability in the world.

Understanding the importance of the press in the nuclear age is one thing, but working with the press is quite another. World public opinion is an emerging factor in international relations, and this factor will become increasingly significant. In the nuclear age the task of diplomacy is not only to predict the next step of an opponent but also to presage what the public at large expects of it. The diplomacy of force is giving way to the diplomacy of public opinion; the argument of force is ceding to the force of arguments. An ambassador must be able to work with public opinion, and, if he fails at this, his mission is doomed to be a closed-doors affair. Diplomacy is already emerging from the reception halls and is solidly implanting itself on the screens of television sets in millions of homes.

Sometimes you encounter the view that turning to the people, to public opinion, is all but propaganda and even interference in internal affairs. What can be said on this score?

From the standpoint of international law, an ambassador's job is facilitated by the fact that the final document of the Vienna meeting of 1989, which deals with a free flow of information, was signed by representatives of other states as well as that of the USSR. What is more, any person, even the most brainwashed, will readily distinguish between the truth and propaganda.

Of course, after the division of the world into two hostile camps each of the sides has spoken of its own advantages, which is why their political relations are still viewed through the prism of ideology or, if you will, propaganda. The word "propaganda" has become a swear-word of sorts, like a foreador's red rag for a bull, i. e., a real stereotype has taken shape, and if you want to call something into question you can boldly term it propaganda. For this reason some ideologists continue to maintain that "perestroika is propaganda". It is necessary to remove the "foreadors" from propaganda. The times have shown that perestroika is not words but actions, actions existing in reality. People have ceased to trust those who are attempting to discredit peace initiatives. And if as many people as possible on Earth are to learn about these actions, they must openly be informed about them, of course.

International Affairs. The energetic efforts of the embassy in Japan are quite evident. They say you have allowed a film to be made about the embassy, about what diplomats' families are engaged in, how their children spend their time after school.

Solov'ov. The film turned out to be quite interesting. But then, do the families of Soviet diplomats engage in something special, something that the families of diplomats from other countries do not, or do our children play differently? We simply want people to know the truth about us. The Japanese have a saying: "Evil immediately loses its strength as soon as you lay bare its true identity." We have nothing to hide. Let the Japanese see the "evil empire" we represent here; let them see what the policy of perestroika is yielding.

The matter is not confined to this, however. For two years now, we have been holding briefings for Japanese journalists accredited at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. This past April I was approached by members of the foreign journalists' club requesting permission to attend these briefings. Evidently we will be holding separate meetings for them.

What is more, once a month we run meetings for the association of journalists writing about the USSR and East European countries. All the members of this organisation know Russian and have a high standing in Japan; their views are listened to closely. What good is all this doing?

First of all, by giving information ourselves, we rule out the search for uncontrollable sources of information, and the journalists are suited by the fact that they have access to the official viewpoint, which compels them to reject all sorts of rumours.

Second, normal relations are being established between the embassy and the press, personal acquaintanceships are being made and antipathies are being replaced by sympathies.

Third, journalists are beginning to trust us; they see that we are talking pointedly, without ideological intolerance, that we are not depriving them of their "piece of bread", so to speak. Respect works both ways.

For example, some time ago we phoned the foreign journalists' club and held a round-table discussion for them on the results of the consultations on the deputy foreign minister level on a peace treaty, which was covered the next day in the press and on television. The meeting was assessed very highly, and our official viewpoint reached the public at large.

There is still room for improvement. We are beginning to deal with the "new media". I think that involvement in the Kyodo Tsushin computer data bank and the like will be very useful for our country.

Before, speaking about progress, I was referring to the start of the development of a dialogue. During a bilateral foreign ministers' meeting last December, a working group on a peace treaty was set up. We believe this is a good form for objectively discussing all problems from a geographical as well as a historical and juridical viewpoint. Evidently, the efforts of diplomats alone will be insufficient here, too. Help from scholars, historians and legal experts will be needed.

How the Japanese feel about this problem is their concern. They do, however, have scholars whose opinions differ from the official views. For example, the newspaper *Hokkaido Shimbun* carried the opinion of professors S. Muroyama and H. Wada, who voice doubts over the fairness of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's claim that the notion of the "Kuril Islands", which Japan ceded under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, does not include the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, and that the Japanese Foreign Minister's reference to the Shimoda Treatise of 1885 to confirm the official position is untenable, since, in their opinion, at that time in all the diplomatic documents, as in the Dutch text of the Shimoda Treatise itself, Kunashir and Iturup are included in the notion of the "Kuril Islands", while the Japanese Foreign Ministry alludes to the Japanese text of the treatise, which is merely a mistake by the translator.

As far as the memorable note of 1960 is concerned, the point at issue here is the Japanese-American security agreement. Our attitude to military alliances is well known. Nor has it changed with regard to this agreement. But even its existence notwithstanding, we could sign a peace treaty with Japan.

Soviet-Japanese relations are developing extremely slowly, the aforementioned territorial question constantly being at fault here. The Soviet side is prepared to conduct a political dialogue; however, no preliminary conditions should be advanced here, and the dialogue should be effected on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. We have made the first step towards Japan; however, they are singling out a solution of the territorial problem as the underpinnings of an improvement in bilateral relations. If things continue in this way, the dialogue between the two countries will be reminiscent of contact between the deaf and dumb.

International Affairs. Have there been achievements in bilateral relations that you could be proud of as an ambassador?

Solovyov. The broadening of trade and economic relations (we rank third among the socialist countries in trade with Japan) can be considered a positive result, although in external affairs the principle of non-division of the economy and politics continues to prevail in Japan. A cultural agreement has been signed which is of inestimable significance in bilateral relations. Two peoples come to know each other better through cultural contact. "When the Muses speak the guns are silent." Ties in science and engineering are developing. All this is making for the shortest distance to understanding between our two countries, to which I suppose we are obliged for the aid which thousands of Japanese rendered following the earthquake in Armenia. This is a result not only of the traditional Japanese compassion for those who have suffered a disaster but also of the main course of our policy. The long lines of Japanese at our embassy was an indescribable sight. Many thanks to them.

The possible annual exchange of delegations between the CPSU and the Liberal-Democratic Party is being considered. Such exchanges will be the first instance of regular ties being established between the CPSU and Japan's conservative party. Lastly, an accord has been reached on launching preparations for a visit to Japan by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. There has never been a visit on so high a level in Soviet-Japanese relations. The sides should be well prepared for it, and there can be no preliminary conditions.

A "Blue Book" containing special achievements in diplomacy is published in Japan. Thus, for the first time in the Soviet years the efforts of the Soviet leadership to create stable East-West relations are positively assessed in it. Japanese newspapers have pointed to the exceptional nature of so high an appraisal of Soviet moves in such a document. In the sphere of Soviet-Japanese relations reference is made to the importance of buttressing bilateral political dialogue. Of course, I am proud of this not only as an ambassador but also as a citizen.

International Affairs. Today it is customary to talk not only about what one can be proud of but also about mistakes. *The Japan Times*¹ carried an interview with the former Soviet Foreign Minister, in which the point was made that Leonid Brezhnev made the decision virtually by himself to commit troops in Afghanistan.

Solovyov. Once again, I regard this as a consequence of the absence of a mechanism of laws that would rule out such a thing. This is also a chapter in our history, and we cannot just scuttle it. This is unequivocal. Everything should be decided by the law.

International Affairs. One last question. How did your career as a diplomat take shape?

Solovyov. My whole adult life happened to revolve around Japan. My parents had nothing to do with diplomacy. My father is an engineer. And my decision after finishing secondary school to enter the Institute of Oriental Studies came as a complete surprise to them. After I graduated from the institute I was hired at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1953 I was sent to the Soviet embassy as a probationer. So I have been involved in Japan for 38 years now.

As far as my roots are concerned. I was born in Cherepovets in Vologda Region. I try to go back to my home town every chance I get. It is certainly true that to feel love for your homeland you sometimes have to leave it. But what if your work keeps you abroad almost all the time? We need our roots. They nourish us.

¹ *The Japan Times*, May 5, 1989.

OUR READERS' LETTERS

THE APPEAL to put forward proposals for improving the work of the Soviet diplomatic service which is contained in the Address of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs* not only to professional diplomats and experts in international affairs but also the representatives of the public and all people wishing to discuss the problem is unprecedented.

I would like to use this occasion to put forward my ideas on how to raise the efficiency of the Soviet diplomatic service.

The restructuring of our foreign policy in line with new political thinking, the resolutions of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, including the fact that it adopted principles to guide our state in international affairs,—all this sets new tasks before Soviet diplomacy. It should be acknowledged that we owe the obvious and generally recognised successes of Soviet foreign policy in the first years of perestroika primarily to the innovative, creative activities of the leaders of the country and the top echelon of Soviet diplomacy. The first successful breakthroughs are only the starting point for the everyday, versatile and difficult work required for opening up the entire field of international relations, their structuring and the preparation of new breakthroughs in the interests of mankind. This work is entrusted to the career Soviet diplomats. And here arises the vital question: what should the model of a Soviet diplomat in the conditions of new political thinking be? What should be the methods for modelling a Soviet diplomatic representative?

Of course, they totally reject the command methods of the subjective and formal selection of the staff for the diplomatic service which were prevailing in the recent past. A Soviet diplomat is an expert in international relations and a professional who knows his business well and does it skilfully. He is able to scientifically analyse modern world development which is proceeding in line with the trend towards internationalisation, democratisation and humanisation, and profoundly realises the priority of common human values, the common interests of mankind and the global processes of our time.

An important feature of the Soviet diplomat and our diplomacy as a whole, a feature we often lacked in the past, is an intensified feeling of realism and the perfect mastering of the "art of the possible". Any actions aimed at achieving something lying beyond the limits of the possible are doomed to failure and, as the experience has shown, are very detrimental to the country.

At present, diplomacy is the noosphere of the political life on the Earth, and the diplomats are particles of this noosphere linking world politics with specific international problems. In order to successfully tackle complex modern problems we need active diplomats generating new ideas, carrying out novel actions, constantly bringing an economic, political and particularly diplomatic effect to Soviet foreign policy.

Since the diplomat is the face of the nation our diplomatic service needs outstanding personalities with human charm who possess the art of communication. So as to enroll such people in diplomacy we need an efficient system for training specialists in international affairs and

tough competition in selecting personnel for the diplomatic service.

For the diplomats of the Leninist school it was easier to tackle the more complex problems involved in the recognition of the Soviet Republic and the establishment of diplomatic relations. For years and decades they worked in emigration, studied the life of workers, peasants and intellectuals in the West. Besides, people there knew them well, respected and even loved them. Now we have to recall, restore and further develop the Leninist traditions of the diplomatic service which were the foundation for the creative activities of Georgi Chicherin, Leonid Krasin, Alexandra Kollontai, Maxim Litvinov and many other Soviet diplomats.

Thus, in order to carry out a diplomatic mission under modern conditions a diplomat must be well acquainted with the host country, integrate into it instead of simply viewing it as on a business trip. Only in this case the mission of a Soviet diplomat bear fruit: the number of our friends grows and the host country becomes an interested advocate of peaceful and equitable cooperation.

M. GUREVICHYOV,
Professor
Kharkov

AS SOMEONE who has been in the diplomatic service for many years I would like to put forward the following ideas as regards the ways for raising the efficiency of the work carried out by Soviet embassies and consular offices abroad.

Until recently the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursued a rather dubious, not to add fallacious, personnel policy. How was this reflected?

It is possible to cite a number of examples. Nepotism was a major factor in deciding who was sent abroad—children of high-ranking parents who were frequently spoilt by permissiveness, who often could not or did not want to work. This had a negative effect on the quality of the work of the embassies.

Besides, there was a practice to appoint to high-ranking posts in the embassies persons who were failures at their party or economic work, and this seriously damaged the prestige of Soviet establishments abroad. As a rule, these were ambitious, conceited people with little education, often having no idea of the finer points of diplomatic work, the history and culture of the host country, to say nothing of their poor knowledge of languages.

For instance, in 1960 a former first secretary of the Saratov Region Committee of the CPSU was sent to Bulgaria as an ambassador. This short-witted man, who was tremendously conceited uncerecermoniously butted into others' affairs tried to teach everybody around him how to do their jobs, while being incompetent in these matters himself.

Once at the General Consular Office of the USSR in Plovdiv there gathered for work party workers, none of whom knew the intricacies of the consular service or the Bulgarian language.

I say nothing of the damage to the prestige of the state and its foreign policy and diplomacy caused by the appointment of officials from various localities where, as in Uzbekistan, some top officials have been under investigation and accused of corruption, bribe-taking and other anti-state and anti-social crimes. Why was this done? I believe that this question still requires an answer.

A few words about diplomatic training.

At the meeting with the voters, a candidate people's deputy from the Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that at present this educational establishment enrolls up

to one-third of its students from among front-rank workers and soldiers-internationalists. I don't think this practice is right. Study at the institute should not be a reward for good work or military service. Other forms of encouragement exist for that purpose. The only criterium in the selection to such institute as the IIR should be knowledge and corresponding abilities.

It seems that it is very important that the embassies display a more creative approach to the forecasting of the policy pursued by the host country. On the basis of an analysis of the internal political and economic situation of a state, its relations with other countries, the ongoing and potential international developments one foretell, more or less reliably, how a government will act and what steps it will take at home and abroad.

For instance, in socialist countries one could foresee perestroika, economic reforms, their guidelines and the consequences of these actions for the foreign sphere (the establishment of mixed firms, changes in the foreign trade structure, etc.) and the introduction of customs restrictions on exports. Forecasts for probable shifts in the correlation of political forces in particular countries in the immediate future and their consequences for the foreign policy of that country are also possible.

Now a few words on the issue of awards. We are accustomed to conferring awards timing them to certain dates, while this should be done for concrete actions useful for the country, as was the established practice in the past. For instance, Alexander Gorchakov received an order from the tsar because he had managed to frustrate the entry of Austrian troops into the Danube principalities, and for his contribution to the repeal of the articles of the Paris Treaty of 1856 which was humiliating to Russia, he was awarded the title of "illustrious" prince. We could also nominate a person for an order or promote people for the successful conduct of negotiations or the conclusion of a treaty beneficial to the Soviet Union. For instance, awards should have been given to those who participated in the elaboration of the INF Treaty and the talks on the subject. Probably this is the case but then it should be made public.

M. POZOLOTIN,
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary (ret.).

Moscow

IN MY OPINION, the introduction of the section "Soviet Ambassador. USSR Embassy" is an important step on the way to glasnost in diplomacy which was reliably shielded from publicity by a stone wall. It's good that the "capital of our diplomacy" is used. What I mean are the reminiscences of veteran diplomats, such as Leonid Ilyichev and Lev Mendelevich.

As one involved to some extent in the sphere of external activities and a graduate of the Academy of Foreign Trade and one who has been abroad many times I would like to put forward some of my ideas.

While on business trips regularly in the 1966-1986 period to many West European and socialist countries, I noticed a declining professional level of our diplomats. In the 1960s and the early 1970s it was obvious that more skilled diplomats were working at embassies than was the case later on. And in the 1980s attention was drawn to the fact that in the diplomatic missions there were more people who came to the diplomatic service from party, Soviet or economic bodies and found themselves in shallow waters working abroad for the first time in their mature age.

What was most noticeable? The lack of skill in contacts with local officials and the fear of such contacts (which was very conspicuous) and the excessive use of propaganda cliches in talks.

It seems that we have to reorganise the training of diplomats. It seems that a new approach is needed to the Diplomatic Academy. Maybe we should send there only junior diplomats and experts in international affairs to raise their professional level. I believe that it is difficult, to re-train a seasoned administrator or an economist especially so since he needs to learn a foreign language.

One more point. Only diplomats who have undergone special party training or even gone through the course at the Supreme Party School, and not the other way round, should become secretaries of the joint party committees at the embassies. This is my profound conviction.

Besides, any person should have the right to apply and participate in the competition for admission into the Academy of Foreign Trade, the Diplomatic Academy and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Only competition, and not a recommendation. Only this approach guarantees the inflow of fresh forces to the spheres of diplomacy and foreign economic relations.

As for Mendelevich's publication I was surprised to learn that we have a service engaged in foreign policy planning and that it, as it turns out, operated during the period of stagnation when talks on disarmament and relations with West Germany, the United States and other countries were at a standstill. This publication makes it clear why this was the case.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is going through a period of changes. This is also seen from our foreign policy moves. However, people are still separated from the foreign policy which is elaborated in secrecy. Many of our major steps come as a surprise to the country and, besides, there is a trend to aim them at the foreign audience rather than at the Soviet people. It would be interesting, for instance, to know how the elaboration of initiatives on the reduction of weapons is progressing. Who is involved in the process?

I do not believe that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was involved in sending our troops to Afghanistan. But I cannot believe that the top officials of the Ministry were ignorant of the move. I wonder what their position was?

I thank the editorial board for these and other interesting publication and believe that it would be useful and interesting to go on with publications from the series "The Fund (Capital) of the Soviet Diplomacy". We talked too little about our prominent diplomats.

V. LATYSHEV,
Office employee,

Zhukovsky

TO MY MIND the road to diplomatic work should be more democratic. It is necessary that any person who wants to should be able to participate in the competition which, undoubtedly, should be stiff. As far as I know today the practice is that first of all a person needs a recommendation of a party committee and only then are his personal qualities as a candidate investigated.

I believe that there should be better ethnic representation among the workers from our country abroad. To my mind diplomats from the Asian part of the Soviet Union could work more efficiently in Asian countries. I can judge about that on the basis of my experience in fraternal Mongolia which I visited more than once. In the staff of the Soviet embassy in the MPR and consulates-general I have not met

Buryats who, as is known, have many features in common with the Mongols, including the language. To strengthen friendship between the Soviet and Mongolian peoples this circumstance would play a major role.

S. BUDAZHAPOV,
Party worker,

Bichura, Buryat ASSR

I'M A POLE, friend of your country and work at the Poznan University. I know many of your scientists some of whom are People's Deputies of the USSR. I would like to say a few words about the work of the Soviet consulate in Poznan and how we as Poles regard and appraise it.

I understand that the work of a consulate is a difficult and responsible task. I think that to raise its role, influence and improve the results of its work among the Polish public it is necessary to do the following.

It is necessary to send to Poland only workers who know the Polish language, the history of Poland, its peculiarities, the strong and weak points of all spheres of life. Unfortunately, today not everything is satisfactory in this respect in your consulate in Poznan.

It is necessary to cast aside the outdated practices of "isolation" towards Polish citizens. Why do Soviet people so seldom visit Polish families? Friendly relations are born in personal and not only official contacts.

The consulate building does not have a library with Soviet books, nor does it even have a reading-room with Soviet magazines, and Soviet films are not shown to Polish citizens. I have an opportunity to compare the work of the American and Soviet consulates in Poznan, and this comparison is not in the Soviet Union's favour. So, it comes as no surprise that young people flock to the Americans because the Soviet consulate does not arrange cultural functions for the Poles.

The British Council and Alliance Française are active at Poznan University. Why is there no such service sponsored by our neighbour, the Soviet Union? Why do the British and the French value contacts with and work among the Polish citizens and the Soviet side does not? What is the reason: are there no means for this or are these shortcomings in the work of the organisation concerned? Or perhaps new approaches do not work and things are rolling along the beaten path?

Consular officers seldom speak to Polish audiences. And when this does occur once in a while, the speeches are mainly reduced to common slogans about peace, friendship and other well-known and trite topics. There are too little lectures on what is going on in the Soviet Union and the difficulties encountered by perestroika. A demanding approach should be displayed towards public talks to Polish audiences, particularly today: either these talks should be of high quality or not be given at all.

Today all of us must look for new original forms of work. There should be more meetings with rank-and-file citizens and those who exert influence on public opinion and not only with Polish officials. Less time should be spent in the consular offices. The focus should be on higher quality of work instead of the higher quantity of various undertakings.

ON THE EUROPEAN SCENE

FOR ALL THE MULTITUDE of events in the Old Continent over the last few months, such as the Soviet leader's visits to the FRG and to France, the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states in Bucharest, the London Information Forum, the Paris Conference on the Human Dimension, the Vienna talks on conventional arms reduction from the Atlantic to the Urals, the summit meeting of the world's leading capitalist countries, elections for the European Parliament, elections in Poland, to mention just a few, there is still reason to speak of their definite interconnection and interdependence, and of a key note running through many of them, as it were.

A sense of European community is clearly gaining strength in what has for decades been a continent of estrangement and even confrontation between the two social-political systems. There are real opportunities for removing the barriers which have arisen in various years for various reasons (like the Western policy of the Cold War or Stalinism which did much to rupture many pan-European connections). It comes out that different states can jointly form a far more stable and humane system of good-neighbourliness which can be variously called: a common European home, a home of mutual understanding, a Europe of geography and history (the expression coined by President François Mitterrand of France) etc. Moreover, not only has it become clear what path must be taken but movement along that path is in progress.

The last few weeks have been a kind of landmark in this movement. Mikhail Gorbachev's trips to the FRG and France have shown that the Soviet reform policy is generally welcomed in Western Europe. West German commentators were unanimous in noting that not since the days of Charles De Gaulle and John Kennedy have foreign leaders been accorded such a rousing welcome on the Rhine.

Those who have witnessed the latest top-level visit to the FRG as well as the previous one, seven-and-a-half years ago, have detected changes in Soviet-West German relations and in Europe as a whole. In that not-so-distant autumn, when negotiations were conducted in Bonn and both parties expressed their sincere desire for peace (while supporting attempts to ensure their security mainly by military means), there were rallies of protest in various cities of the FRG against the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, human rights violations, etc. This time round, there was an entirely different demonstration in the centre of the capital, one in support of Moscow's new policy. In Paris, emotions were more restrained. But by any standards, the general atmosphere in Franco-Soviet relations was by far more favourable than before. There is a possibility of mutually renouncing not only the cultivation of the "enemy image", but also the dogmas and stereotypes of the past decades, including the customary system of coordinates: there is antagonism between capitalism and socialism, and confrontation is as inevitable as the replacement of capitalism by socialism. We no longer shy at the word "convergence", and still we have found this notion rehabilitated too recently for us to have really comprehended it. We say: More socialism! But, perhaps, this

is just the way for us to follow, taking in, notably, the worthy things we find in advanced Western democracies.

Do we realise how socialised modern capitalism is, especially and above all, in Western Europe? The Welfare State is, in fact, a primordial socialist concept. And in the West it offers far more effective and dependable socio-economic guarantees than under "actual socialism" and has struck root so solid and deep in the fabric of social life that it is not seriously challenged even by the most radically-minded conservative governments.

Now, look at the reprivatisation of State industry under way, in one form or another, throughout the whole of Europe. Let us not forget that what this means is not just turning over enterprises into private hands; it means opening up an opportunity of co-ownership for those who work at these enterprises, that is, in substance, ending the workers' alienation from the means of production and results of labour, which is, properly speaking, what Marx and Engels saw as the goal of Socialism. Now, what we have done, as a matter of fact, by proclaiming almost everything as the property of the State was to relinquish the birth-right of Socialist ownership. If you think of it, the Western nations intent on restricting State intervention in social affairs are well ahead of us in this sense, too.

Speaking seriously of common European space: law, information, economics and culture, one must understand that there will have to be serious domestic as well as foreign policy reforms. Unity can be achieved only between like societies. That does not mean uniformity, but just likeness of dissimilar societies. That is to say that they must all have a mechanism of democratic self-expression by people at the polls, a free press, as an institution of civil society, and an economy based on the principles of a social market. But the particular forms they all assume can be numerous.

It must be properly acknowledged that European statesmen, in their efforts to meet the challenge of practical politics, have arrived at the conclusions the theorists have yet to reach.

The joint statement signed in Bonn is particularly indicative in this respect. **For the first time in history**, two large nations, belonging to differing social systems, are speaking with one voice for a concept rising above ideological differences and stemming from universal values. Let us hope this is not just yet another statement of high intent by High Contracting Parties (of which there have been so many in the past!). The accords signed in the FRG and France are of a realistic, or to be exact, pragmatic kind. Beyond doubt, there will henceforward be more mutual understanding and more concert between the blueprints and work schedules for builders from various countries in the construction of a new European edifice of peace.

MAJOR AND MINOR SHIFTS attesting to a warming of the political climate in Europe are taking place in particular areas, too, notably, in so complex one as military-strategic. And the point is not just that today's Europe looks not so much like a building site for a common house as a mine-field for a coming battle. The decades of confrontation have effectively infected the minds of Europeans with mistrust, suspicion, enmity and even fear which deluded them into believing that security and stability can be achieved only through an arms race.

We have rejected the "Who will overcome whom?" formula of the past. And we do so not only in theory. Upwards of 16,000 Soviet soldiers and officers have left the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the strength of the armies of other socialist countries is being reduced, their armories limited and defence budgets cut.

What has been the response of the other side? One must admit, it is not in a great hurry to act. Although our partners are negotiating with us and signing important agreements, they are moving rather slowly, with reserve

and reluctance to give up the plans they have already worked out. However, certain positive changes in Western military-political tactics can be observed. In the negotiations in Bonn and Paris, our initiatives received proper attention, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President François Mitterrand presented their own interesting considerations and ideas about the reduction of armed forces. In consequence, for the first time, the reaction to our initiatives was not suspicion and criticism, but serious and concrete answers.

There are perspective new forms of economic links. Which? Placing orders with Soviet research institutes, using our space technologies for commercial ends, sharing in the exploitation of capacities made available for civilian production through reconversion, to mention just a few.

However, for the time being the level and character of economic relations on the continent cannot be found satisfactory. There have been no more than initial probings with a view to a fuller utilisation of the intercomplementary economic potentialities of Western and Eastern Europe, the EEC and the CMEA.

We are willing to become more actively integrated in world-wide economic links, including those building up on the European scene. Western Europe can be seen disposed to help us economically. In principle, references to help must not wound our pride. There is nothing to be ashamed of in accepting your neighbour's help in a European home if you are in difficult circumstances.

But we should note the authoritative opinion of the members of the Tri-lateral Commission, who have drawn up a report on the results of their trip to the USSR: The common interests of the Western nations prompt them to avoid periodically granting large credits to the Soviet Union: for the Soviet Union that would mean creating a situation of sustained indebtedness; for the industrialised democratic countries that would be tantamount to lending support of unlimited duration to an unbalanced economy in the absence of indispensable fundamental reforms, such as a price reform, greater freedom for enterprises and the introduction of a convertible ruble, with a potentially irresponsible approach to affairs.

Whatever the motives of the authors of the report, their considerations are, alas, not groundless. For example, of the three billion marks' worth of credits, granted last October by a consortium of banks of the FRG for the modernisation of the Soviet light and food industries, only 350 million have so far been used, in point of fact. What about the rest? A total of 1,600 million marks' worth of credits are still under negotiation, and over a billion marks have simply not been claimed as yet! We have hundreds of millions of petrodollars slipping through our fingers because of our failure to install the equipment required. No better is the lot of joint ventures. Many of them are in difficulties arising from confusion, fear of responsibility or other flaws typical of our departments.

Beyond question, all kinds of discriminatory provisions, like the COCOM's black lists, are also an obstacle to the development of business links in Europe. There are still, it appears, some who have to be persuaded that trade in Europe must be free from reservations, conditions and attempts to gain unilateral advantages.

FOR MANY YEARS we kept up an extremely negative posture in respect to international European organisations. As a matter of fact, we ignored them, read a contemptuous meaning into the name of the Common Market and declared the Council of Europe (CE) an "instrument of the Cold War".

The West repaid in the same coin, and therefore it certainly goes to the credit of the Council of Europe that it has realised that the new Soviet policy has opened up new prospects for the CE and extended a "special invitation" status to the USSR as well as to Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. This has made it possible, for the first time, for socialist states to participate in the de-

liberations of the most representative organisation of the Old World. And by the same token, the council has reaffirmed its right to be called European and justified the comment in the French *Le Monde* that the CE "is living in the hour of perestroika".

Future cooperation between socialist countries and the CE is but one of the numerous examples of a breakthrough on the European "humanitarian front". Unquestionably, our international actions in this area are closely bound with what we are doing at home. Unfortunately, there is still a gap between the laws we have in our country and our international agreements, particularly, in the area of civil and political rights. We repeat that the self-imposed isolation of Soviet people from the whole wide world must be ended. Yet things are changing slowly; suffice it to mention that four times as many people travelled abroad from our country before the revolution as now; on the other hand, the number of tourists alone from Western Europe travelling to other countries every year exceeds 100 million...

And yet, there has been progress. For instance, it was not so long ago that we proudly announced that our borders were "closed", but now we welcome the opening of all doors for international contacts and regard any delays in the issuing of visas, let alone refusals to issue them, as a relic of the past. The flow of Soviet travellers is swelling and so are the queues in front of consular offices. It seems it is high time to "humanise" consular troubles and consider our idea of a common European visa procedure. To this end, the West must meet us half-way, as it has done already, in fact, in other areas.

These are by no means trouble-free times for Europe. One cause for trouble is the present American administration's position which, to judge by all accounts, still operated according to the "wait-and-see" principle.

And yet Europe is becoming a generator for democratising, humanising and demilitarising international relations. Analysing this summer's events, it will be no exaggeration to conclude that this continent has entered a new period of its history, one of construction of a strong peaceful Europe.

OPTIONS FOR THE PERSIAN GULF

Victor POLYAKOV

FOR ALMOST A DECADE the Persian Gulf area has been a highly tense region. Here political and religious contradictions, having grown into a bloody war, which resulted in expanded foreign military naval presence, are not subsiding.

The Soviet Union supports the idea of normalising the situation in the Gulf, the transition of the states of that region to mutual relations based on peaceful coexistence which corresponds both to the Soviet Union's national interests and the interests of the international community at large.

In its idea of ensuring security in the Gulf area the Soviet Union proceeds from the necessity of a broad international agreement which would provide for a reliable system of safeguards on the part of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union believes that it is imperative to withdraw foreign warships of non-littoral states from the Persian Gulf and expresses its readiness to withdraw its ships at the initial stage of freeing the region from foreign fleets.

The Persian Gulf is a vast region of the Indian Ocean. In this regard Soviet initiatives on the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean zone and the measures in support of the UN resolution on convening an international conference to implement the UN Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace are relevant to the Persian Gulf, as well.

THERE WAS VARIED REACTION to the Soviet proposals.

There is no doubt that the Gulf countries are attracted to Soviet diplomacy's novel, vigorous and flexible approach to global and regional problems. They cannot but see that the Soviet Union has proclaimed and upholds profoundly moral principles on the international scene, advances and seeks to realise humane goals. That is why the thrust of the Soviet moves towards universal peace is appreciated and supported.

Kuwait, for one, supported the idea of setting up a comprehensive system of international security and, at the 42nd UN General Assembly Session, voted for a resolution calling for the further elaboration of this problem. It positively assesses the concepts of a nuclear-free and non-violent world, the proposals on ensuring security and developing international cooperation in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin. It shares the principles of the Delhi Declaration of 1986 and believes that they contain the foundations of equitable, peaceful and constructive inter-state rela-

tions. Our initiatives, with a greater or lesser degree of readiness, are supported by the leaders of other littoral states of the Persian Gulf.

Within the regional framework, our plans of 1980 for the normalisation of the military-political situation in the Gulf accord with the key interests of these countries by providing for the settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict and ensuring a transition from instability and war in the region to security, concord and peace. The session of the Council of Ministers of the CCG¹ which was held last September² proclaimed as the main principles of a peaceful settlement in the region good neighbourliness and respect for territorial integrity, the renunciation of aggression, subversive actions and interference of the Persian Gulf countries into the internal affairs of each other, the support of free navigation in the Gulf and the Ormuz Strait.

Thus, we have a similar concept of the region as an area existing according to the principles of peace, equality and reciprocity. Nonetheless the Arab states did not support our proposals which seemed to meet their interests. In fact, only the idea, the tenor of the Soviet moves and the perception of the image of the region by the USSR are approved, while the concrete implementation of the programmes is postponed.

It seems that this situation is due not only to the pressure exerted by the West on the states of the region in order to offset the Soviet efforts. Another factor is that the global interests of the USSR as a great power with regard to the political situation in a particular region of the world may objectively not coincide with the views of the regional countries. We make a package of initiatives, define their content and scale, the geographical scope, the composition of the participants in agreements and their guarantors proceeding from the national interests of the Soviet Union. We are guided by the principle according to which Soviet diplomacy must create an international political situation facilitating internal reforms and strive to convince our partners to move in the direction suggested by the Soviet Union.

The monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula as well as those on the other side of the Gulf have their own concepts of "security" and its priorities in their home region. They perceive security arrangements in light of their national traditions which betray psychological traditions of the East and are influenced by religious considerations. Of course, we have to take into account the right of our partners in the Persian Gulf to adhere to their own concept of ensuring security however contradictory and illogical it may seem to us in the elaboration of Soviet moves.

In their approach to the problems of security the countries of the Gulf proceed from the principle of self-reliance which is perceived as concerted political and military efforts by the CCG members. The stress is laid on political and diplomatic instruments in tackling the tasks posed, while the use of weapons is allowed only for defence purposes.

The thesis of defending the region by the forces of its states declared as the ideal arrangement implies a vigilant attitude to any attempts to impose a particular concept of defence or security and interfere, under the cover-up of political arguments, in the matters which the Arabian monarchies regard as their exclusive prerogative. Mistrust of outside initiatives has its historical roots: the semi-colonial dependence of the local sheikhs on Britain is a thing of the not-so-distant past, while complex relations with global US ambitions is a reality. Their vigilance is also explained by the desire to maintain a political balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Hence the slogan: "to exclude the gulf from the struggle of the Great Powers". It should be admitted that the proposals on the Persian Gulf which were advanced in December 1980 by the former Soviet leader in his speech before Indian MPs were couched in the terms which were arrogant towards and disrespectful of

the states of the region which were pushed into the background of the Soviet initiatives. The then chief of the General Staff of the Kuwaiti armed forces stated that Brezhnev was interfering in matters which were none of his business, while the states in the region were capable of defending themselves and had enough personnel and hardware to protect their interests and existence. The governments of Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain also showed a negative reaction. Saudi newspapers wrote at that time that the responsibility for the security of the Gulf region rested with its countries, while the USSR failed to take into account the might of the Arabs and was interfering into the issues of Islam and the region.

If we return to the present, what the Arab monarchies still favour most is a regional system of peace and stability whose participants could only be the states bordering on the Gulf, including Iran and Iraq, and to whom the above-mentioned formulations on non-interference in the internal affairs and non-aggression are addressed above all.

The CCG countries place the responsibility for ensuring the security of the sea routes in the Persian Gulf and the Ormuz Strait with the international community actually reducing the concept of self-reliance to the protection of one's own territory, airspace and territorial waters from outside encroachments. This concept apparently does not rule out the presence of foreign warships in the Persian Gulf. The Arabian monarchies say that they are no longer responsible for their presence and that this presence in the international waters of the Gulf concerns only the states whose flag they fly.

The reasoning of the Arab sheikhs shows an obvious discrepancy between the wish to defend the region with their own forces and the construction of theories dealing with security matters in such a way that they do not directly reject the presence of foreign ships in the Persian Gulf. It seems that this approach is associated with a recognition of the fact that their own military and political potential is insufficient to prevent operations of foreign fleets.

The monarchic regimes of the Gulf do not demand a total withdrawal of the American fleet. This situation creates the impression that most of the Arab Peninsular countries regard the military presence of the West as a factor guaranteeing the preservation of their own rule and offsetting the dangers emanating from stronger neighbours.

It makes more clear the reasons behind the cool attitude to the idea which is the cornerstone of the Soviet initiatives, the need to put an end to foreign military presence. To support their position Kuwait and other countries of the region reiterate the thesis that they do not regard bigger foreign fleets in the Gulf as a threat to the independence of the states situated there but perceive it as a form of exercising international responsibility for maintaining the freedom of navigation. In the same vein, as well as in order to offset the large-scale Western military presence, they see as justified the presence of the Soviet Navy in the Gulf and the escort of Soviet civilian vessels by military ships.

An important factor determining the conduct of the participants of the Council on Cooperation in regional affairs is the continuing instability of the military-political situation in the Gulf in connection with the stalemate in the Iran-Iraq talks. Without their successful conclusion the CCG members have to put brakes on the proposed changes, be cautious in appraising the situation in the Persian Gulf and resort to wait-and-see tactics in matters involving the development of relations with Iran. Mostly due to objective reasons the CCG postpones the implementation of the plans.

The CCG members are aware of the fact that the outlines of the postwar peaceful arrangement in the Gulf will become part and parcel

of an overall Iran-Iraq agreement. The participation of the littoral states in the elaboration of a foundation for peace is obligatory under Article 8 of Resolution 598 of the UN Security Council envisaging contacts of the UN Secretary General for these purposes with interested parties. Thus, there exists an indirect recognition of the important peace-making role of the UN in the processes affecting the region but simultaneously the issue of the UN performing one way or another the role of a guarantor of agreements on security in the region is passed over in silence.

The efforts by the oil monarchies of the Gulf are now concentrated on facilitating the full implementation of Resolution 598 which they perceive as a pledge for the settlement of the conflict and the normalisation of the atmosphere in the Gulf. Intensive work is in progress with Iraq and Iran and contacts with the permanent members of the Security Council have become more regular.

The CCG participants are worried by the initiatives which in their view can sidetrack the implementation of Resolution 598. They showed a rather cautious attitude to the Soviet proposal to create, under the UN flag, international naval forces in the Gulf (autumn 1987) as they saw it as an attempt to undermine the efforts exerted at that time in order to make Iran accept Resolution 598.

COMPARISON OF THE POSITIONS make it possible to draw the following conclusions.

It would be justified to regard the Persian Gulf area as a separate region where the Soviet Union concentrates its efforts aimed at establishing a zone of peace or conclude a multilateral agreement on confidence-building measures and the safety of communication routes. The Persian Gulf has political, economic and religious characteristics which link it with the rest of the Arab world and its problems, while it is less associated with the Indian Ocean. That is why by narrowing the scope of our efforts and reducing the number of those to whom we appeal we would facilitate the promotion of our initiatives.

Probably instead of concealing the host countries of the region, the littoral states, behind such wordings as "and other interested parties" it is advisable to involve them in initiatives and appeal directly to them so as to avoid the exacerbation of the "small countries complex". This would eliminate a lot of prejudice and evoke a positive response on their part.

A few words about the essence of the initiatives. Naturally, they should take into account Soviet interests and be the result of business-like coordination between the USSR Foreign Ministry and other Soviet departments involved in tackling foreign-policy and external economic problems. But it seems that the path leading to tangible positive results lies through preparatory talks on the essence and nature of the initiatives with the partners in the Gulf area, primarily all those with whom we maintain diplomatic relations. Direct contacts allow to identify common points in our usually far-flung plans and the pragmatic concepts of the local countries which are concerned with immediate and specific tasks of consolidating their security.

It is important to identify similar positions acceptable to the parties and subsequently develop them since, as the practice shows, when a proposal is made out of the clear blue without preliminary examination it is often perceived by the Gulf countries as an alien element and is met with a cautious and suspicious approach rooted in the historical prejudice towards moves of a great power. The efforts of ambassadors and special envoys are objectively not enough to overcome such a bias. It seems that

a preliminary probing can facilitate matters, and appropriate forms are gradually elaborated.

We can probably ponder over the feasibility of withdrawing the ships of the Soviet Navy from the Gulf when, naturally, they accomplish their tasks of escorting Soviet tankers. It is important to evaluate to what extent their further presence in the area will accord with tactical and political interests, whether the material inputs are compensated by political and military benefits or whether the withdrawal of their 20 warships by the United States beginning from last autumn will devalue the Soviet pledge on withdrawing our fleet at the initial stage of freeing the region from foreign military naval presence.

¹ The CCG, Council for Cooperation of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf was set up in 1981. Its members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE, Bahrein and Qatar.

SCIENCE, POLITICS AND GLASNOST

Vitaly GOLDANSKY

THE WORD "GLASNOST" does not need to be translated today. Perestroika introduced this term into international parlance. So now the "sputnik" has its own satellite. But let us abandon the play on words and look into the relationship between these two notions, one symbolising scientific and technological progress and the other, a policy of renovation and democracy. Does glasnost rest on a solid, objective basis or does it depend on the goodwill of "the bosses"? Can it suddenly end? And if it can, what would that mean for us?

Time is quickly running out: only yesterday, it seems, we argued over whether or not we needed glasnost, and what its limits should be, but today, along with tens of millions of TV viewers, radio listeners and newspaper readers, we are witnessing an event stunning in its openness—the Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR. And still, the question asked above is worrying many people.

All arguments—sometimes very sophisticated and lengthy—over what glasnost really is, how much of it should be in our society and whom (or what) it should or should not concern only show, as I see it, that we began to advance in a long dark tunnel towards the light at the other end. All these arguments, of course, can well be explained in historical terms, so I think there is nothing to argue about. We are witnessing an objective and historically irreversible process. And the very development of science is a guarantee of this.

People say, with reason, that technology is outdistancing human conscience. This is, above all, an exponential growth of the flow of information, its diversity, volume and the speed of its delivery, the improvement of the quality of the means of its recording, storing, and dissemination of information, concerning, for instance, basic parameters of modern computers and other information systems such as efficient operative memory and rapid action.

"The world is moving forward," as Gianni Rodari once said. It is moving forward whether we want it to or not and, moreover, our world has radically changed! It has become different—this must be understood now! And if we still have our scanty Xerox equipment behind steel-clad doors, we must realise, the earlier the better, the threat confronting science and the very intellect of our citizens. A few years ago Academician Roald Sagdeyev said at a general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "So long as we look on Xerox as a class enemy, we shall trail along at the back of science and technology." Unfortunately, the attitude to Xerox as to an evil spirit was also displayed at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

Scientific literature, for all its extreme ramification and specialisation, is becoming increasingly accessible to scientists, and thus Xerox's

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exclusive role. Xerox is becoming one of the major instruments determining the effectiveness of scientific information and productivity of scientific research. It is becoming the main "printing machine" for libraries, where the situation is, indeed, disastrous. The full and prompt provision of information is imperative for the rapid and effective development of science.

(Not to mention the great importance of the knowledge of foreign languages, primarily English. The situation here is improving, though slowly, but we shall be optimistic and hope that by the end of this century many millions of Soviet people, including 1.5-2 million of scientific workers, will be capable of receiving information in written and also spoken foreign languages).

Today, new types of international information and communication are emerging—all kinds of data banks with automated inputs and outputs for subscribers. International radio broadcasting will recede into the background in the future, giving way to an international TV network operating through space satellites. Personal computers, which are becoming increasingly widespread (mainly in the West, so far), not only store and manipulate information but also multiply it.

Today, the world is becoming more open than ever before. There is no sense in arguing if this is good or bad. One should realise that today openness is a way of existence for our civilisation, an earnest of its survival and progress. Therefore democracy and glasnost are objectively keeping pace with scientific and technological progress, complementing each other.

This means that one problem should not be solved separately from another: say, we would achieve success in science and technology first and only then would we begin to promote glasnost and perhaps would make Xerox equipment, for one, accessible for all. Democracy and the progress of science and technology are closely interrelated. This prompts the following conclusion: if we set ourselves only one task—I stress, only one—that of developing the productive forces in the country and improving the economy, we would require a streamlined, clear and logically verifiable policy in the field of information. Today this is the most expensive commodity, a gold mine for our country, the key to its power and success. Therefore people should be thoroughly informed today. They must be made a most active subject of world and domestic information flow. That, in my view, is a natural development of new-thinking postulates, a guarantee of man's active participation in politics and economics, and the way to reviving the nation's economy.

But opposition to our being kept informed, to glasnost, is tantamount to society's self-destruction.

I am convinced that the idea of the emergent information society should be coordinated with the policy of national security. To begin with, let me remark that the concept of nuclear deterrence has grown outdated technically and morally. One must admit, of course, that in the past it did act as a brake, preventing a war between East and West, but it has now degenerated into a threat to the existence of mankind. So, there is a danger of an accidental conflict, and the destiny of people is made dependent on computers, which may fail.

Yes, we are alive largely due to deterrence, as they say in the West. But is our life, the life of nuclear hostages satisfactory in such conditions? Can we not think of anything better than this?

The satellite equipment designed for surveillance from space fitted out with all kinds of sensors to monitor everything that is going on down on the Earth surface (and sometimes underwater and underground) has been developing at a rapid pace. Now it can count stars on servicemen's shoulder-straps, horrifying the keepers of secrets. But,

perhaps, this is the beginning of entirely new and safe deterrence? Of a reliable system of mutual verification? Isn't this system already in operation, verifying compliance with the INF Treaty? Nuclear deterrence, I am sure, must be replaced with verification deterrence based on mutual control and inspection.

Such methods are very effective, which is easily proved by negative examples. Recently we lost a great deal, having underestimated and fearing these methods. I shall remind you that from 1958 to 1961, the USA and the USSR observed an undeclared moratorium on all types of nuclear weapon testing. Regretfully, and to our shame, we violated the moratorium. The declared reason for the violation was that France went ahead with the testing. That decision was strongly censured by Academician Andrei Sakharov. We were very close to complete prohibition of all nuclear tests, but, unfortunately, the chance was lost. The treaty signed by the USSR, the USA and Britain in 1963 banned the tests only in three environments: the ground, water and the atmosphere. Underground tests have not been banned largely because, among other things, at that time we were opposed in every way to verification, regarding it as a form of espionage and a violation of sovereignty.

Speaking about nuclear tests, I think that the unilateral moratorium we adhered to for some time has not made us any weaker. On the contrary, it enhanced our prestige abroad and strengthened, in fact, our negotiating positions, and it should not have been ended. The principle of parity is outdated, wasteful and senseless. And this goes double for parity in nuclear tests. Bad old habits should be given up.

People often ask if this idea of verification deterrence is shared by our foreign colleagues. To answer this question, I shall cite one example. I spent some time early last year in the United States where I had very interesting meetings in a number of political science centres, as, for instance, at Harvard University, or rather at one of its research centres headed by Prof. Paul Doty, a well-known political scientist, and at the Herbert York Institute in San Diego, and the Los Angeles political science centre headed by Michael Intrilligator. In each of these places I gave reports devoted, by and large, to one subject—scientific and technological progress and new political thinking. Of course, the idea of verification deterrence was present one way or another in all these reports. It won over new supporters.

I have heard quite often that scientists and their reckless curiosity are to blame for all our misfortunes—the environmental danger, the presence of mass destruction weapons, new diseases and viruses. I strongly disagree with this. Apart from the creative quest of scientists, there exist ideology, politics and, finally, the politicians with their likes and dislikes.

More than thirty years back, Bertran Russel and Albert Einstein addressed mankind with a manifesto. Were they heeded, those scientists? But if we take a closer look at their ideas, we shall not fail to see that they were the ABC of new thinking with all its attributes. They appealed that we must learn to think in a new way, we must learn to ask ourselves not about what steps are to be taken in order to attain a military victory of the camp to which we belong, for such steps no longer exist. We must ask ourselves another question: what steps can be taken to avert the armed struggle whose outcome would be catastrophic to its participants?

Ahead of us lies the road of uninterrupted progress, happiness, knowledge and wisdom, went on their appeal. They asked: Shall we opt for that road instead of destruction? We appeal to all, as people to people: remember that you belong to the human race...

Having read this text, Nikita Khrushchev felt offended for himself and for socialism. Our leader, whose time I remember, on the whole, with warmth, was convinced that in a possible future war only capitalism would perish, because it was "historically doomed".

Now about the environment. I'd like to recall an American researcher, Rachel Carson, who as early as 1962 wrote the book *Silent Spring*. That was, in fact, the first alarm signalled: life on Earth was threatened. For the first time scientists warned of the destruction of the ozone layer and the hothouse effect.

We all remember the "great construction projects" of communism that so much imbalanced ecology. Were they proposed by scientists? No, everything was being done on orders from the "great architect" Stalin. Scientists only fulfilled those orders. Those who dared to object disappeared in hard-labour camps. Prophets and careerists have always been among scientists throughout the world—the former sounded the alarm, and the latter were prepared to do anything they were told. The servile, too, were among them. This, unfortunately pertains to those Soviet scientists who were forced to go against their consciences.

If we are to fear anything, it is precisely anti-intellectualism. The defamation of Academician Andrei Sakharov at the Congress of the People's Deputies on June 2 left a heavy impression on me. I think that only about 300 persons of those present in the hall—whatever their attitude to Sakharov's position, to his utterances and style of conduct—realise that after many years history will certainly preserve the name of this People's Deputy of the first congress. When intellectuals are accused of all misfortunes and derided, and when workers, for instance, are incited against them—that is horrible, indeed. Then darkness gathers over the country.

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS I happened to watch Soviet embassies at work in foreign countries. I am often asked to give my impression of that work. How do I visualise the operation of our entire foreign-policy machinery in general? Am I satisfied with glasnost in that sphere?

There is no easy answer to that. But why don't we examine the problem from its origins? Perhaps, we should begin it *ab ovo*, starting with the CPSU Central Committee?

I had to deal more often with three of its departments (when it had its former structure, of course)—those of science, propaganda, and international affairs. It was a pleasure to work precisely with the latter. As for "propaganda", it gave me the best satisfaction to work with the section of that department which dealt with diverse foreign affairs, including the international cooperation of scientists. (I should make it clear right away that I don't mean the Central Committee's Department for International Information. My attitude to it is straight-out: that department obstructed both normal circulation of international information itself and our foreign ties in science.)

As regards old problems of ours like, say, "agitation, propaganda and the scientific intelligentsia", I cannot help recalling one detestable episode. In the summer of 1983, there emerged the idea of publishing in the newspaper *Izvestia* a letter signed by a group of scientists denouncing the activities of Andrei Sakharov—unanimously, of course. That was, I must admit, one of the foulest letters I had ever seen. It was entitled "When Honour and Conscience are Lost" (what an irony of history!). It had already been signed by a number of persons, but that was obviously not enough for its original high-ranking authors. Then the Central Committee began pressing me to give my signature. I refused.

It is really strange, as you know, that there are actions one is proud of all his life, but, as it happens here, one is sometimes proud of a non-action! My non-action still gives me, to use the language of that time, "a deep sense of satisfaction". However I felt a whole gamut of feelings at that time. When I flatly refused to sign the letter, a high-ranking official told me in a lone many of us know: "It's a great pity we haven't come to terms". I felt no pity. But I pity now the people who go into raptures of servility any time they are told to "condemn", "stigmatise" and express "general contempt", which they readily do. Haven't the lessons of history taught them anything?

But let's go back to diplomacy. It has completely changed. I, for one, now have very good relations with the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In all its hierarchy I feel a sincere interest in enabling our scientists to be most active in shaping our foreign policy, so that a "diplomacy of scientists" can develop as part of people-to-people diplomacy. We now receive practical assistance for a large number of our actions and initiatives. I say this as the chairman of the Soviet Pugwash Committee.

I received a new confirmation of my impression when, as a member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs at the USSR Supreme Soviet and also at the session of the Supreme Soviet itself, I heard the programme speech by Eduard Shevardnadze and his replies to numerous questions. According to public opinion polls, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the highest rating among his colleagues in the cabinet: 82 points out of 100.

Now about embassies. We had normal relations with embassy personnel previously as well. We were always satisfied with the elementary work done by embassies. That is, they were efficient in fulfilling their formal functions concerning us. And we are happy to know that today our relations (I mean both delegations of scientists and members of the Soviet Pugwash Committee) with embassy personnel have acquired a new content. In the past such routine matters as reception or seeing off prevailed in them, whereas now more lively interest is displayed in the cause for which we visit a country. Previously our embassies were interested, to put it bluntly, in scientific and technological novelties which we were supposed to see, but now they take interest in our ideas or using foreign experience at home. It is no longer a collection of information for formal reports that matters but what may really be useful for the country. What can and what cannot be used in our country? How "their" specifics be taken into account? And ours? In a word, a more serious and businesslike approach is obvious.

Consequently, our new attitude to embassy work places new demands on the person of the ambassador himself. Therefore I think it is totally inadmissible when an embassy is viewed as a place of exile, when persons who have compromised themselves in domestic-policy matters are sent to occupy the high post of ambassador of the Soviet Union. In my mind, this practice, which continues to this day, should be resolutely abandoned.

In general, our embassy personnel should consist of high-ranking experts, not to mention that they should know a foreign language. The paradox is that it is believed here that all embassy officials should know the language of the host country, with the exception of the ambassador. Isn't that strange?

Another problem. It is often said at many meetings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in some publications that people making decisions urgently need to have a choice of variants, an alternative. But how can this be done?

I think we simply must have a number of independent centres of political science. Academician Roald Sagdeyev, for instance, has already set up his analytic centre at the Institute of Space Research. As far as I know, it works efficiently. Indeed, if not only the US Establishment but ourselves, too, closely follow the ideas produced by the RAND Corporation, then why shouldn't we have an appropriate structural unit in our foreign-policy mechanism?

However, it is not a matter of just one unit but of the guaranteed existence of a whole spectrum of views on a problem. It is clear that this is needed not merely for a mental play. This is the main condition for breaking the monopoly on the knowledge of truth and a version of an action. There is no need to say how harmful such monopolism is.

It is not hard to find examples. Let us refer not even to political science but to the sphere of expert assessment. Say, the problem is how and at what distance is it possible to detect by physical methods the presence of nuclear warheads in missiles on board a ship? A good deal was spoken in the past about this problem which is extremely important for signing a relevant agreement and for maintaining a balance of forces. In the Soviet Union many experts worked on the problem and have arrived at different conclusions. Some asserted that nuclear weapons on board a ship could be detected at a distance of a few kilometres, while others argued that the distance could be 100 to 200 metres. At first, the former point of view gained currency, but then it was proved unfounded. In physics and mathematics this is possible: no one will argue in earnest against the multiplication table. But what are we to do in political science?

In this case several assessments of a specific situation are possible and, moreover, natural. This alone should make one take the matter more seriously. So, it is necessary to analyse the situation, hold an analytical discussion, and know various tactical ways of attaining one strategic goal. Briefly speaking, the validity of any decision should be duly confronted with an opposite view, and the need for one or another action should be proved to the opponents, and to the public, rather than be "agreed" with an anonymous authority. Only in this way can we calculate our policy and not correct our "errors" when they have been made.

In this case the role of the press is extremely important. Today, the attention of the whole society is riveted to it. The press is sometimes censured, which is done from different positions. Does our press reflect the entire diversity of views and the whole complexity of the domestic political process? I don't think it does, yet. But if we remember what we started with, the present day will seem to us a feast of information.

Should an historian decide to write a treatise on the subject "The USSR in the 1970s" using only newspaper reports, he could have got a more or less correct picture of the country from the Western press. It would be absurd to look for any "pre-crisis" in our publications of those years. It was then that the catch phrase gained currency: "There is no news in *Pravda* and no truth in *Izvestia*" (in Russian "*pravda*" means truth and "*izvestia*", news).

Not all is well even now, at the time of perestroika. For instance, in 1987, after the publication in *Pravda* of an article commemorating the birth centenary of Jan Rudzutak, I wrote to the editors of our chief newspaper a letter entitled "On Curtailed Truth in *Pravda*". No reply came. However, at the letters department I was told they had a fixed time limit of three months for replies. When the three months passed, I wrote a personal message to editor-in-chief Afanasyev. It was not answered either. Later on, it became clear to me that to seek an objective attitude and truth in *Pravda* on many questions of our

country's history and on problems of literature and the arts was a doubtful undertaking. Of course, as regards people-to-people diplomacy, the activities of scientists in that sphere, and foreign policy in general, all our central papers without exception are doing an important work.

To ensure that this work does not suffer, our press should be granted legal guarantees. So far, they do not exist. The practice here is this: a law which looks good is passed, after which various amendments and "clarifications" are made, reducing it to naught. Take, for instance the infamous resolution on "special" permits for correspondents to cover various events, which had to be obtained at the Ministry of the Interior. And the limitation of subscriptions to the press in 1989 was just as bad.

Briefly speaking, we need a clear-cut law on the press, which would register the rights of newsmen and the rights of people who, for instance, were subjected to defamation. In the latter case the courts should have their say. The rights of the press itself are no less important. In my view, it should be free to interpret any questions, publish any discussions and articles, with the exception of those, of course, which call for the forceful overthrow of our system, hate material and pornography. If the press works on the principle "what is not prohibited is allowed", life will be made easier not only for the press, but also for the government. So far, unfortunately, those versions of the law on the press that I have seen evoke no optimism in me. I think it is not without reason that the following two expressions have appeared: "democratic perestroika" and a "bureaucratic version of perestroika".

It is encouraging that many business-like and clever speeches were made at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. What was said by Shmelyov, Popov, Afanasyev, Bunich, and Yemelyanov and the concrete programme they proposed—seemed to me a good contribution to the answer to the old question: "What is to be done?". To be sure this was only a part of the ideas which had been discussed at the meetings of the so-called Moscow group. I deliberately said "so-called"—the meeting of the group where I was present was attended by 300 people, of whom the Muscovites were, perhaps, not more than 10 per cent. So, this is not so much a Moscow group as an inter-regional group of deputies.

As for social and political problems, the opinions sharply differ.

The polarisation of forces on social and political problems is caused, I think, above all by the differences on the question of what should be given priority—common human values or any other values. It would be useful to ask why precisely in our foreign policy we have been most successful? The problem evidently is that, having proclaimed the principles of new political thinking in foreign policy, and above all the principle of common human values, we are in no hurry to apply it in our "domestic" practice.

THE KOREAN PROBLEM IN FUTURE

Vasili MIKHEYEV

THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION in the relations between the two world systems has proven fruitless as far as a solution of one of the oldest regional conflicts—the Korean problem—is concerned. The situation has looked hopeless for a long time. Periods of intra-Korean activity in terms of North-South contacts in the early 1970s and the 1980s gave way to a lull in talks and an exacerbation of the rivalry between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea. The vagueness of prospects led to a decline of interest in the Korean problem on the part of the world community. Debates on Korea in the UN and at forums of the Non-Aligned Movement gradually eased off.

However, political processes on the peninsula did not cease. They continued to develop, though remaining as if hidden from the view of the rest of the world. Interest in Korea has grown markedly of late. On the one hand, this is due to the overall improvement in international relations and the hopes that have appeared for a settlement of global and regional conflicts. On the other, there is the revelation of South Korea to the world in a new light. Will the new impetuses of the 1980s be sufficient to attain real shifts in a Korean settlement? What will this settlement be like? What are the Soviet Union's interests and how can they be realised?

One thing is obvious: in the 1990s the Korean problem and the Korean Peninsula will become a sphere of a dynamic clash between the growing tendencies in international relations and the old stereotypes and ambitions. Success will hinge largely on consistent application of the principles of new political thinking with due account for existing realities and the interests of all the sides involved in the conflict.

PITFALLS OF THE PAST

THE DIFFICULTY with the Korean problem is due largely to the atmosphere of distrust and a mutual lack of understanding on the peninsula. The approach to a formula of unification remains the centre-piece of the differences.

The evolution of the DPRK's stand has passed through a number of stages: proposals for assistance to a then backward South in the 1950s-early 1960s; plans for the country's unification by a "revolutionary path" in the second half of the 1960s;¹ the transition to a dialogue in the 1970s; and, lastly, advancement of the idea of establishing a Confederate Democratic Republic of Koryo in the 1980s, with the political regimes that were established in the North and the South being preserved. The sharply negative attitude to the idea of mutual recognition of the DPRK and South Korea and their simultaneous joining the UN as two

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independent states is an invariable stand of Pyongyang. Creation of the confederation is viewed above all as a political solution. Contacts and cooperation between the population of the North and the South and their economic and public organisations are unequivocally regarded as a consequence of rather than preparations for political accords.

Seoul's "Northern policy" has evolved as well, from non-acceptance of all ideas about cooperation and contacts in the 1950s and 1960s to recognition of the expediency of intra-Korean dialogue and advancement of the idea of "crossroads recognition" (the USSR and China establish diplomatic relations with the South, and the USA and Japan, with the North) in the 1970s and 1980s. The country's economic achievements, which enabled it to enter the group of "new industrialised countries", was definitely one of the factors that affected a change in Seoul's stand. An economically weak South Korea "feared" cooperation with and aid from the DPRK, and a strong South Korea is now seeking this cooperation and rendering of assistance itself.

Unlike Pyongyang's approach, Seoul's approach is geared not to a united state but to recognition of political realities through the establishment of two Korean states. Even though Seoul has repeatedly stated its readiness to discuss unification questions, students of the Korean problem have frequently gotten the impression that the South Korean authorities in the 1970s and early 1980s were more imitating dialogue, while actually pursuing other goals, namely, "gaining points" in the rivalry with Pyongyang in the eyes of world public opinion.

The contradiction in the sides' approach to the main issue of the future of Korea is intensified by the military rivalry on the peninsula.

In the 1960s the sides began building up armaments and maintaining the military balance on increasingly rising levels. The situation was exacerbated by the presence of American troops on the peninsula and, since 1975, by tactical nuclear weapons as well. A destabilising influence is also exerted by the annual American-South Korean military exercises Team Spirit, which are greatly irritating Pyongyang. The latter regards the American military presence as the main impediment to a dialogue and unification, and demands the withdrawal of US troops as a preliminary condition for a settlement. However, Seoul, proceeding from the "two Koreas" idea, considers this matter its internal affair.

The military tension is telling on the domestic situation in the North and the South. The campaigns of mutual distrust and enmity that are constantly being whipped up in South Korea, the maintenance of an almost three-million-strong army of recruits, the regular exercises of the anti-aircraft missile defence troops that are irritating the population, and, lastly, the law on state security, which declares the DPRK a "terrorist organisation", plus the bans on contacts between Northerners and Southerners—all this has remained virtually unchanged during the moments of an upswing in intra-Korean dialogue and has hampered positive political processes on the peninsula.

The standstill in a Korean settlement has been largely due to the lack of coordination in the actions of the great powers, whose interests are present in Korea in one way or another. During the years of confrontation on the global level the USSR and the USA regarded Korea through the prism of mutual military-political rivalry. The onus of military commitments under the allied treaties between Seoul and Washington and between Moscow and Pyongyang exerted their impact on the situation. In the early to mid-1980s steps were taken with the aid of the great powers to modernise the armed forces of the North and the South. We were not the first here. Chronologically, the modernisation of the South Korean army with US aid began earlier, and the responsibility lies

both with Washington and Seoul. However, they also took advantage of Soviet actions to exacerbate the situation.

The *Washington Times*, which was close to the Reagan administration, wrote in August 1985 that the opportunities for North Korea to conduct offensive operations were growing thanks to Soviet deliveries of weapons and supplies and to tactical cooperation.² Washington, echoed the *Christian Science Monitor*, will not let all this to go unnoticed. It plans to maintain the combat readiness of American troops on a high level.³

Thus, the opposite views of the sides to ways of resolving the Korean issue, the growth of the military factors of rivalry, and the lack of coordination in the actions of the great powers have created formidable stumbling blocks on the path towards peace in Korea.

FAVOURABLE PREREQUISITES

THE POSITIVE SHIFTS in Soviet-American relations that have been taking place over the past few years and the affirmation of new approaches to global and regional problems, such as the Afghan and Cambodian ones, are promoting a completely different climate in the world. Peoples and states, including those in the Asia and Pacific region, are seeing for themselves that the mechanism of negotiations and safeguards are more effective than the logic of confrontation and a search of unilateral advantages over the other side.

Normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations is becoming exceptionally important for solving the Korean problem. An atmosphere is gradually being created for frank and positive discussions of the Korean question by the main concerned sides at the ever more frequent meetings of members of scientific community on Korea and at talks of officials of the foreign policy departments of the USSR, the USA, China, Japan, and so on.

The successful staging of the Olympic Games in Seoul, the economic and social achievements scored by South Korea, the processes of democratisation (though they have not been that rapid), and, lastly, Seoul's political initiatives advanced in the declaration of July 7 of last year and at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly helped alter South Korea's image and role in regional political processes. The South made a name for itself as an economic and political force which should be reckoned with and cooperated with rather than fought against.

The "new Northern policy" has become perhaps the main feature in Seoul's changing political identity. Its foundation was laid in the aforementioned declaration of July 7. The core of the document is the attitude of the Roh Tae Woo administration to reunification problems. We hope, the South Korean leader stated, to put an end to the unproductive diplomacy of competition and confrontation between the North and the South and will strive for cooperation which will ensure North Korea's positive contribution to the international community. We also hope that representatives of North and South Korea will freely contact each other and cooperate for the sake of protecting the interests of the entire Korean nation.⁴

Seoul has proclaimed a course for creating an atmosphere that is favourable for ensuring a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and has expressed a readiness to promote the DPRK's efforts to improve relations with the USA and Japan, and itself to improve relations with the USSR, China and the other socialist countries.⁵ This idea was developed in the UN address by the South Korean President in which he set forth an essentially new formula for a settlement: international safeguards plus dialogue. The South Korean leader proposed holding a sum-

mit meeting with Kim Il Sung to sign a declaration of non-aggression and non-use of armed forces with the aim of laying the foundation of mutual trust and security (the idea of such a declaration had been earlier advanced by Pyongyang). The idea of an international conference with the participation of the DPRK, South Korea, the USA, the USSR, China and Japan for discussing security problems in the Far East was simultaneously advanced. An important statement was also made about non-first use of force, and it was proposed to create a "city of peace" in the demilitarised zone.⁶

These proposals garnered support in many parts of the world. Initially the USA displayed certain restraint. But during George Bush's visit to Seoul early this year full support was expressed for the South Korean proposals. The former rigidity, however, was preserved in the issue of American troops. The DPRK rejected these proposals on the grounds that they "are aimed at formalising the split of Korea and the surrender of the fate of the Korean nation into the hands of the great powers".⁷

Seoul has also changed its attitude to the formula of a Korean settlement. It has declared its readiness to agree to a united Korea as well as the "two Koreas" version. With regard to the former the South Korean President advanced the assumption that this is possible by the year 2000. South Korea has also declared its readiness to develop intra-Korean cooperation even now. The bans on direct trade with the DPRK were lifted in October 1988. The validity of anti-Communist legislation has been limited. The view of a need to "help the brothers" raise the living standard is establishing itself in the business community. According to South Korean estimates, the per capita gross national product in the South (4,000 dollars) is seven times higher than the North Korean level and the DPRK needs infusions to the tune of 4,000 million dollars to improve the economy. The South is stating its preparedness to clear off the North's debt to the West.

Changes have taken place in the relations between South Korea and the socialist countries. Diplomatic relations have been established with Hungary, trade is apace with the USSR, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Yugoslavia and Vietnam, and versions of cooperation with Mongolia are being explored.

Shifts are occurring in Pyongyang's relations with Tokyo and Washington. The sanctions against the DPRK imposed in the USA and Japan in connection with the crash of the South Korean liner in 1987, the responsibility for which was placed on Pyongyang, were lifted in 1988. The ties between the Worker's Party of Korea and the Japan Socialist Party have been stepped up. Information on the contacts between the DPRK and Japanese government quarters has been filtering into the press. Early this year Japan changed its stand, making it clear that it is prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang even without a linkage to a Korean settlement. A proposal has been made to the DPRK through the Japan Socialist Party to exchange communications missions.

Unofficial contact between Washington and Pyongyang has begun. Pyongyang's approach to the possibility of establishing relations with the USA has changed as well. Whereas in the past this was linked with the withdrawal of American troops, in an interview granted by President Kim Il Sung last January it was associated with US repudiation of the "unjust policy which is hampering our people's endeavour for the country's unification" and with practical measures "to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula".⁸

Fresh shifts in Pyongyang's assessment of the international situation have appeared and its intra-Korean policy has been stepped up. As distinct from preceding years, in 1988-1989 the DPRK leadership began talk-

ing about the appearance of signs of a "gradual easing of the international situation as a whole".⁹ A connection is drawn between the development of international processes and trends and the lessening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁰

In late 1988-early 1989 Pyongyang advanced reciprocal initiatives providing for unification of Korea by 1995. For the purpose it is proposed to hold trilateral talks between the DPRK, the USA and South Korea for deciding matters pertaining to a phased withdrawal of American troops and nuclear weapons from the South and on a reduction of the armed forces of the North and the South to 100,000 effectives by late 1991. It is envisaged to formalise the accords on these matters with a peace agreement between the DPRK and the USA and a non-aggression declaration between the North and the South. It is also proposed to hold military-political talks and to end mutual propaganda attacks, major manoeuvres and all joint exercises involving foreign troops. Pyongyang is of the belief that all this will make it possible to hold a summit at which the matter of a confederation will be considered.¹¹

In elucidation of these ideas, President Kim Il Sung last December voiced considerations regarding the convening in Pyongyang of a political consultative conference of ranking officials of the North and the South. Among those invited to the dialogue are leaders of the Democratic Justice Party, the ruling party in South Korea, and those of the main opposition parties.¹² However, this proposal was rejected by Seoul under the pretext that Roh Tae Woo had been invited to Pyongyang as the party leader rather than as president.

The DPRK's approach to cooperation with South Korea and to contacts between the other socialist countries and Seoul is changing. Its attitude to these steps was sharply negative until recently. However, since late last year criticism of non-political contacts between the socialist states and Seoul appears to be easing up. Pyongyang diplomacy is focusing chiefly on keeping such contacts from developing into political recognition. The reaction to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and South Korea is telling in this respect. Pyongyang assessed this action as "treacherous", which Budapest considered groundless, as it concerns Hungary's internal affairs. The DPRK scaled down its diplomatic relations with Hungary—to a *chargé d'affaires ad interim*.

The direct economic and trade contacts between the DPRK and South Korea launched late last year have been another catalyst to inter-Korean ties. According to the foreign press, North Korean vessels are calling at South Korean ports with their cargoes.¹³ This past January, one of the patriarchs of South Korean business, Chung Ju-yung, the honorary chairman of the Hyundai transnational corporation, visited the DPRK for the first time since the Korean War. During the visit he discussed the formation of North-South joint ventures in the ship-repair and carriage-building sectors and the travel industry, and also variants of North-South joint enterprise on the territory of the Soviet Far East.¹⁴

The changes that have been observed are unquestionably imparting a certain dynamism to the situation in Korea. But they are not removing the impediments that lie in the way. The key problems of a settlement are not being removed.

It is true that South Korea has exhibited a readiness for unification, but it has expressed disagreement with the DPRK's proposed formula for the establishment of a Confederate Democratic Republic of Koryo. There is no proof of this complicated issue of economic and political convergence between the North and the South being widely discussed or of even approximately agreed mechanisms of this convergence being

elaborated. Nor are the sides' stands regarding international safeguards of a settlement being dovetailed.

It is also true that the proposals of Pyongyang and Seoul have become more realistic and less hostile of late. But it is still difficult to fully get rid of the feeling that the sides to a more or less degree continue to use these initiatives to "gain points" in the eyes of the world community in the political fight for the right to appear as a "true champion of unification".

Nor can one fail to mention the marginal progress made in the issue of the American troops stationed in South Korea. We believe that without serious Soviet-American accords on problems of Asian-Pacific security on the whole it will be very difficult to decide this matter. Pressure from South Korean radicals and the logic of intra-Korean dialogue can prove insufficient.

There is still another side of the problem. Despite the fact that the leaders of the political parties of the South are generally at one in matters of unification and the "Northern policy", other voices are heard in the National Assembly. Specifically, proposals are being set forth not to rush with the development of contacts with the socialist countries without forgetting about the patently anti-capitalist orientation of their policies (Kim In Kee, deputy from the Democratic Justice Party), to isolate intra-Korean dialogue from external forces and reduce it to top-level North-South contacts (Park Son Chje, deputy from the DJP), and under no circumstances to withdraw American troops, since this would increase the threat of war in Korea (Park Chon Suh, deputy from the DJP).¹⁵

Thus, gradual positive shifts on the Korean Peninsula and around it do exist, but they are more of a preliminary nature and do not remove the main contradictions on the path towards a settlement and inspire new vigorous steps.

THE OLD AND THE NEW

IN POLITICS, concrete actions are always logically associated with a basic philosophical stand. The complexity of the present moment is that the new political philosophy is not being affirmed equally intensively at the different levels of Soviet foreign policy. The new philosophy has already displayed its advantages in the priorities: improvement of Soviet-American relations, normalisation of relations between the USSR and China, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and so on. Generally speaking, this is explainable, as the priority spheres are closer to the areas of direct control over the situation by the top Soviet leadership. At other levels of our foreign policy the decision-making obligations devolve upon the apparatus of the foreign policy departments. And the very logic of the functioning of this apparatus—implementation of decisions of the Centre and only then proposals for adjusting them—frequently sets in motion the mechanism for slowing down processes that obtain from the logic of the new philosophy but have yet to be formalised as new decisions and instructions from the Centre that abrogate the existing ones.

The specific nature of the Korean situation is that in the context of the tough political rivalry between the North and the South the foreign policy interests of the USSR will be formulated in different areas depending on the philosophical conception that is made the underpinnings of this work. The difference between the old and the new here is that the former views the world as irrevocably divided into two opposing systems, while regarding all regional conflicts from the standpoint of strengthening the military-political positions of socialism and weakening the posi-

tions of capitalism. The new thinking, whose core comprises acknowledgement of the integrity of today's conflict-ridden but interdependent world, proceeds from the need to resolve conflicts on the basis of a balance of interests, compromises and consideration of the interests of all the involved sides. It presupposes the priority of universal values and, consequently, deideologisation of interstate relations.

With regard to Korea the old approach views any step capable of reducing the volume of the rarely effective Soviet-Korean cooperation as being detrimental to the world socialist system and to the structure of confrontation with the West that has taken shape in the Far East. The economic and political compensation that, say, is possible as a result of cooperation with South Korea is not taken into account.

The new approach makes it possible to view Soviet-Korean relations in the broader picture—from the standpoint of their contribution to the overall improvement of the situation in the region. It poses the tasks of ensuring peace and security and settling the conflict higher than the tasks of permanent unilateral efforts to enhance and strengthen Soviet-Korean cooperation at all cost.

The proponents of the old approach believe the intensification of military presence in the DPRK to be correct, pointing as they do to the ongoing tensions in the Asia and Pacific region as a whole, Korea included, and to the presence of American nuclear weapons on the peninsula, as well as to the need to strengthen the Soviet Far Eastern regions in step with the departure from the policy of the symmetric naval confrontation of the USA in Asia. Their opponents note the contradiction between the principles of new political thinking and our Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives, on the one hand, and the actions to bolster military cooperation with the DPRK, on the other.

The new political philosophy proceeds from the need to acknowledge political realities. In Korea, this reality is the existence in the south of the peninsula of an economically powerful state that wields clout in the Asia and Pacific community. To counter this, the old thinking is prepared "not to notice" this reality for the sake of ensuring the former military-political priorities.

The old thinking can in no way extricate itself from the contradiction between verbal support for the idea of unification on the basis of a confederation, on the one hand, and an understanding of the danger of its implementation for our strategic interests in Korea in their former reading, on the other.

From the standpoint of the new approaches, even if a united Korea spells a formal "subtraction" from the world socialist system, it can, in the event of unification on a *democratic independent basis*, play an important constructive role in the Asia and Pacific region. A united Korea with a population of over 60 million, with a solid economic potential could become an independent source of political initiatives in the region and play a "balancing" role in big-power relations in the Far East. If it suits Pyongyang and Seoul, a "neutral compromise" can also meet the interests of the great powers. Its chief advantage is that reaching it means a settlement of the conflict situation in Korea and the creation of conditions for establishing normal goodneighbourly relations in the Far East.

The new approach is also making it possible to assess the workability of unification. As we know, in Pyongyang's interpretation, it is proposed to set up the confederation "by uniting two self-governing governments, with the two different systems being preserved on the basis of self-government so that the one would not seize the other".¹⁶ Of course, this formula contains much that is unusual from the standpoint of the customary vision of the opposites that socialism and capitalism are. All the

more so since the stages of the creation of the new structures on the Korean Peninsula and their possible characteristics are unclear both theoretically and in practical terms. Many interesting and important questions arise. If unification means convergence (and if not convergence, then what?), what will this convergence be like? Authoritarian socialism and authoritarian capitalism? Then on what basis? An authoritarian one? Then will this promote development? And if not on an authoritarian basis, then on what other kind? What elements of economic and policy commonality can be found or created?

There are a host of questions. But the new thinking is making it possible to pose and tackle them. The transition to a united Korea is impossible without vigorous contacts between the North and the South in all spheres of human endeavour and in an atmosphere of peace and trust. Consequently, in order to launch movement to the new political realities, it is imperative to stabilise and democratise the situation on the Korean Peninsula through recognition (not necessarily formalisation of the existence of the two states) of current realities and the status quo.

There is still another sphere where the old and the new thinking presupposes different assessments and different formulas, namely, attitudes to the development of ties between the socialist countries and South Korea. From the standpoint of the old thinking the latest moves by the socialist states regarding Seoul could be characterised as at least "unreasonable", since they are evoking a negative reaction from the DPRK and, consequently, pose a threat to the interests of socialism in Korea.

The new thinking notes that, for one thing, there are no "bans" or "collusion" here and, for another, the search for a balance of interests has led precisely to a situation where most countries, the USSR included, are acting according to the formula of economic cooperation with South Korea without political recognition. Herein lies the compromise nature of the variant, which takes into account present-day realities in the Asia and Pacific region and the economic needs of socialism for a search for new partners in this region, and the DPRK's attitude to "crossroads recognition".

The Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives of the USSR are, from the Korean standpoint, also important in that they spelled practical affirmation of the new philosophical principles regarding the specific regional conflict. The proposal for a multilateral discussion of "a lessening of military confrontation in areas where the coastlines of the USSR, China, Japan, the DPRK and South Korea draw close together" and also the tenet on the possibility of economic contacts with South Korea were real moves of Soviet diplomacy in the spirit of modern ideas. They were received with approval in many countries. South Korea included.

Developing the idea of new political thinking as applied to Korea, we arrive at a question that is difficult theoretically and in practical terms—a change in the very content of strategic partnership. What is meant by this? From the standpoint of the old political thinking strategic survivability was determined above all by the level of defence capability. The possible acts of aggression by a military-strategic enemy were considered the main destructive force. Acknowledgement of the interdependence of the world and the threat of its complete destruction as the result of a nuclear war or ecological catastrophe changes the situation. The nature of strategic partnership cannot be reduced to military components. Ecological and technological factors should advance to the forefront in it. The former ensure the survivability of man from the viewpoint of environmental protection, and the latter define a country's place in the world in the period of the energetic introduction of technological breakthroughs.

Clearly, the road to affirming the primacy of this understanding of partnership is not an easy one. Progress along it objectively requires

maintenance of a constant balance between detente in East-West relations, on the one hand, and changes in the structure of the components of strategic partnership, on the other. This contention fully applies to Korea. We believe that attempts to create a new structure of ties between the USSR, on the one hand, and the North and South, on the other, proceeding from the proposed priorities, would benefit regional peace and prosperity.

Thus the USSR finds itself before a choice. Either follow the old thinking (its tenets remaining invariable or touched up with the rhetoric of dialogue) and develop its military-political positions in the North while dosing economic ties with the South, or consider the political realities on the peninsula and start taking an active part in Korean affairs. From the logic of the new political philosophy it follows that it is the second option, with its orientation for development of intra-Korean dialogue, that accords with the USSR's interests.

VARIANTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS

THE PROPOSAL advanced by the North and the South on unification issues, intra-Korean dialogue, and international safeguards can be considered the main components of a Korean settlement. However, considerable efforts are needed on the part of all the sides in the conflict to enable these components to produce the desired results.

First and foremost, a political mechanism needs to be created that would make it possible to reduce to a common denominator the many proposals the North and the South have advanced of late. A similar mechanism is also imperative for coordinating the interests of the great powers—the USSR, the USA, Japan and China. The range of problems to be discussed and agreed could include stabilisation of the military-political situation, a balance of interests of the sides, elaboration of a conception of creating a united state, and so on.

This mechanism could be worked out in the course of stable bilateral and multilateral consultations on Korea and thus the development of "circum-Korean" as well as intra-Korean dialogue. Scientists, businessmen and politicians from all six countries could take part in the former. The aforementioned international conference on Korea could be the final or intermediate result of the development of a dialogue.

Soviet participation in a dialogue around Korea is possible through the advance of "linking ideas". The task of these ideas is to generate political interest in all six capitals and spark a pointed exchange of views. As a topic for discussion we venture to propose, for starters, an idea which we feel could, if implemented, promote a balance of interests for the confronting sides.

Creation in the Far East of a "zone of normal trade and economic relations" or a "zone of goodneighbourliness and cooperation" could contribute to pooling the efforts of the countries interested in a Korean settlement. The goal of such a zone would be to involve all the members of the Far East region in an economic dialogue on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Even now a number of problems, such as fishing, mutual use of ports and maritime ecology, to name a few, need a mechanism of stable multilateral consultations. Development of integrational processes offers great prospects for regional cooperation—not only on the basis of the raw materials and cheap manpower existing in a number of Far Eastern states but also on the basis of mutually beneficial production use of the scientific and intellectual potential of the Soviet Union by the most advanced Japanese and South Korean corporations.

This zone could be created by agreements between the USSR, China, North and South Korea, and Japan on different economic problems, mu-

tual provision of most favoured nation status, establishment of an unofficial international consultative commission on matters of regional cooperation with the participation of scientists and businessmen, etc. The creation of such a zone would be of great stabilising importance as well. Its political significance would lie in shaping the prerequisites for bringing into play the mechanism of multilateral consultations around Korea. Work could begin with relatively less acute economic issues.

It could be said, of course, that the Korean problem is not the only impediment to the normal development of economic cooperation in the Far East. However, it is the Korean Peninsula that could politically and symbolically turn from a factor of dividing the sides into one of uniting economic and political initiatives.

Alongside the above considerations, unilateral moves—without waiting for major military-political agreements—between the DPRK and South Korea to reduce their armed forces and armaments could be a step towards stabilising the situation on the Korean Peninsula and furthering the dialogue. The key issue here, of course, is security safeguards of unilateral disarmament. And again the sides, but this time the main military-political partners of the North and the South—the USSR, the USA and China, could assume unilateral guarantees that the disarmament moves by Pyongyang and Seoul will not lead to greater tensions on the peninsula. These measures could be supplemented by coordinated or unilateral commitments by the USSR and the USA, as well as China and Japan not to boost their military aid to the DPRK and South Korea.

NOT TOO LONG AGO researchers into the situation in Korea were examining four theoretically conceivable variants of its development: unification, establishment of two Korean states, dialogue without end, and a return to confrontation. Despite the complexity of many aspects of a Korean settlement, the situation has changed today. We would like to hope that the last variant—return to confrontation—is no longer possible. The guarantees are the changes for the better that are taking place in the world, including those around Korea. The political infrastructure of the Korean dialogue is progressing, providing as it is the prerequisites for balanced solutions.

Whether the hopes for a settlement are fated to grow into confidence depends decisively on whether the North and the South jointly with their political allies scuttle the past approaches and together create new variants for resolving old contradictions. Will there be sufficient wisdom and tolerance to cease feeling affronted and to launch creative endeavour?

¹ Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, Pyongyang, 1972, pp. 218-221.

² *Washington Times*, Aug. 9, 1986.

³ *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 9, 1986.

⁴ *The Korea Herald*, July 7, 1988.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *The Korea Herald*, Oct. 19, 1988.

⁷ *Information Bureau of the Central Telegraph Agency of Korea*, Pyongyang, Oct. 26, 1988.

⁸ *Nodon Shinmoon*, Jan. 30, 1989.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Pravda*, Nov. 9, 1988.

¹² *Nodon Shinmoon*, Jan. 1, 1989.

¹³ *The Korea Herald*, Jan. 1, 1989.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, Feb. 12, 1989; *The Korea Herald*, Jan. 14, 1989.

¹⁵ *The Korea Herald*, Oct. 29, 1988.

¹⁶ *Nodon Shinmoon*, Sept. 9, 1988.

THE ART OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATING

TODAY'S GUEST CLUB discussion centres on the problems of diplomatic negotiations. The panel consists of the following Soviet scholars and diplomats and also American political analysts.

Bruce Allyn, Director, John F. Kennedy School of Government/Soviet Joint Study, Harvard University;

Scott Brown, Associate Director, Harvard Negotiation Project;

Prof. Victor Israelyan, Director, Special Project Group of Diplomatic Negotiations, Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Oleg Peresypkin, member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Vladimir Pryakhin, Adviser, Evaluations and Planning Directorate, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Robert Ricigliano, Management Director, Carnegie Project on US-Soviet Negotiations, Harvard Negotiation Project;

Alexander Stepanov, First Deputy Director of the Main Directorate for Personnel and Educational Establishments, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Prof. Roger Fisher, Director, Harvard Negotiation Project;

Vladimir Shustov, member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, head of the Research and Coordinating Centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

REACHING AGREEMENTS

Israelyan: I suppose there is no need to talk about the ever increasing importance of negotiations in international relations in the nuclear-space age. Diplomatic talks are conducted on a bilateral and a multilateral level, within the framework of official and unofficial sessions, and at diplomatic receptions. The conduct of talks is one of the decisive forms of diplomatic activity. The following figure, for example, shows the intensivity of negotiations: 10,000 different bilateral and multilateral talks are conducted in Geneva in one year. They cover an extremely wide range of economic, political, humanitarian, ecological and other matters. The success of talks depends on many factors, above all, on the political will of the participants and their motivation and readiness to attain accord. However, success also hinges in no small way on how the negotiating mechanism functions.

Does the negotiating mechanism meet present-day requirements?

Many questions arise: Has the theory of negotiating been sufficiently elaborated with regard to today's nuclear-space age? Are the breakthroughs in science and technology, specifically, computer technology, being utilised to the full? Are psychological factors being duly taken into account in the negotiating process? Is the professional training level of the persons taking part in them high enough?

Fisher: I would like to dwell on the problem of how to strike a balance of interests at the negotiating table. In the past, the preparation of a govern-

ment for talks too often boiled down chiefly to developing a solid stand that was favourable only to that government. As a result, talks would turn into a drawn-out process during which one diplomat would criticise the extreme stand of his interlocutor and would compete with him in stubbornness and reluctance to make concessions. Hostility, sluggishness and inefficiency were typical of this too familiar process. Such talks more reflected the sides' reluctance to arrive at an honest, mutually beneficial agreement.

Top-level Soviet leaders have repeatedly called for talks aimed not at exacerbating confrontation but at attaining a balance of interests. It seems to us that the chief subject of talks should be not the existing stands but the balance of interests of the sides behind them. The goal of negotiations should be not concessions in stands but fair satisfaction of legitimate interests.

Serious joint efforts will be required to elaborate a concept of an analysis and mechanism of talks that would ensure a just balancing of often conflicting interests. As we see it, it is important above all to determine the interests of the participants in talks that underlie their stands. No matter what these interests may be, they have to be understood, not rejected out of hand. You have to clarify for yourself the needs, aspirations, wishes, hopes, fears and concerns of the sides, that is, all the elements comprising the general category we call "interests".

For example, if Israel's stand is that there must not be a Palestinian state, we can analyse this stand from the viewpoint of Israel's ensuring its security interests—deliverance from fear—which underlie this stand. If the Palestinians' posture is that a Palestinian state should be established, we can consider their interests: attaining recognition, self-government and the territory belonging to them.

After determining interests, we must assess them. If, say, I want to influence you, it is important for me to know whether you are worried most about your personal reputation and benefit or socially important matters.

President Gorbachev has referred to Lenin's thought that universal interests should have priority over class interests. Preference should probably be given to such basic human needs as food, housing, security and recognition, and not to such interests as spread of ideology and pressuring one's neighbour.

Having determined the interests we are to evaluate, and having acknowledged that some of them are more important than others, we must then select a scale or criteria for assessing them. For example, were we to decide to juxtapose Brazil's vested interest in control over tropical forests with the interest of all the inhabitants of the planet in lessening the danger of a global warming, what would the results of such talks be? How do you compare the traditional postulates of international law with science and the concept of the existence of one fragile planet? And how do you correlate immediate benefit with possible long-term consequences? Naturally, cancellation of all the debts of the developing countries would yield immediate benefit to millions of people, but this would hamper provision of the required credits to the developing countries in future.

Recognition of the fact that the task of participants in international talks consists in ensuring a fair balance of interests is an important step forward. And this balance should be established on the basis of objective criteria which are not a simple reflection of the sides' desires.

Ricigliano: As to international talks, we should touch upon such important related problems as their value and risk. One prominent American participant in arms control negotiations described the degree of risk at the talks as follows: Negotiations are risky. They are reminiscent of crossing a tempestuous stream on slippery rocks. The possibility of losing one's balance is present for both sides, but this is the only way of crossing a rapid. There are many streams which the nations of the world need to cross. However, the

greater the risk of crossing a stream the less we tend to make an attempt to do so.

During the talk with us, Vladimir Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, made an interesting generalisation that diplomats perceive negotiations in a somewhat military sense. As he puts it, even the language of negotiations borrows military terminology. For example, "tough stand", deal "from a position of strength", or the sides regard each other as "enemies" who are "fighting" to "win".

Aside from the appearance of the appropriate terminology, this confrontational model in effect also leads to the emergence of the corresponding structure of the process itself. It is entirely obvious that talks should promote the achievement of a set goal, not the waging of a battle or war of words. They should further the formation of such a system of their conduct as would be based not on upholding stands or demands for concessions but on the attainment of mutual understanding, a balance of interests and ensurance of the right to choose and would focus the negotiators' attention on what their countries should undertake to wisely solve the problem tabled for discussion. In this instance the talks would not involve risk.

The main thing is to give the negotiators such instructions as would enable them to find the optimal means of solving the problem and then vest them with the authority to accept the appropriate commitments. It is better for both sides to state at the initial period in the talks that they are attempting to understand each other's stands and mutual interests, avoiding polemics.

Instead of a process which exacerbates relations between the sides, a process should continue which has to do with essential differences, their depth notwithstanding. Matters pertaining to relations should be considered separately from essential problems so that the difficulties linked with them would not weaken the sides' capacity to surmount the differences existing between them.

The present model of negotiations exhibits a movement towards a type of process that is lessening attention to rivalry between the sides and allows problems to be tackled cogently. Over the past four-odd years we have begun seeing examples of these changes, such as the creative interplay during the Reykjavik summit and, despite the existence of serious differences, the development of working relations between former Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Furthermore, conduct of preliminary talks during which neither side would take decisions on the subject of the negotiations would be of positive importance. During this period a general scheme for holding talks could be elaborated and possible variants of a future agreement mapped out.

Another proposal to upgrade the negotiating process is to hold, during the negotiations themselves, unofficial meetings and talks to discuss new proposals and select optimal variants.

Shustov: I would like to dwell in particular on the issue of a balance of interests which Prof. Fisher spoke about. Indeed, this is the most important part of international negotiations, one which helps find mutually acceptable solutions to problems, if the reasons delaying or hampering the attainment of accords are ruled out. The Geneva talks on drafting the Non-proliferation Treaty are remembered. Our side arrived at the conclusion then that the Treaty should have been ensured with the aid of the IAEA safeguards system. We were certain that the Americans would agree. However, things turned out differently, since the USA was having problems with Euratom requirements.

There was a moment when the Americans came over to us (incidentally, this was Ambassador Adrian Fisher) and informed us that they would have agreed to accepting the IAEA safeguards system, but they could not ignore the existence of Euratom, which had its own system of safeguards. The Americans could not disregard it since this was a matter linked with sensitive aspects of their relations with their allies in Western Europe.

It was here that we tried to understand the actual, not invented, difficulties of the Americans, and they in turn attempted to fathom our problems, namely, the fact that we could not fully count on the Euratom safeguards system, which would not have fallen within the IAEA safeguards system.

In the situation the Soviet delegation decided to study precedents that could have served as analogue. Specifically, we closely familiarised ourselves with the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco under which the safeguards procedure is implemented either individually or collectively. This was the idea that we proposed to the American delegation, which accepted it enthusiastically.

Article 3 of the Non-proliferation Treaty was thus born. Here we managed to handle a problem which had emerged in connection with the Euratom safeguards procedure. It is a rather graphic example of how interests can be balanced on a mutual basis and a way out of a deadlock found.

The above example shows that if both sides exhibit a sincere desire and candidness, when we want to cross the tempestuous stream on slippery stones, this is best done by helping each other. Then we will definitely cross the stream, i. e., we will solve the problem facing us.

Peresypkin: The psychological mood of the sides is of great importance if negotiations are to be a success. First of all, it seems to me that each side should have a desire to hear and understand the other. Second, it is imperative to repudiate the confrontational approach to talks that predominated for many years, an approach which is based on the notion that victory for one side is a defeat for the other, and vice versa. Third, a readiness for compromises at the negotiating table is very important. For example, by permitting foreign observers to visit our munitions plants, we have of late limited our national interests and sovereignty to a certain extent. However, we have done this, just as the American side has, for the sake of a lofty goal—disarmament, the creation of a nuclear-free world and the removal of weapons stockpiles worldwide. For this reason, I want to stress that it is the idea of compromise that should always be present at international talks, and that each person who sits down at the negotiating table should be geared to exploring compromise solutions.

To back this view I shall refer to a renowned authority on negotiating problems, Anatoli Kovalyov who is First Deputy, of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹ He says that a major component of the negotiating art is, perhaps, the skill of breaking down the stand to be advanced. Within the range of the maximum and a minimal limits set by one's government, one splits the stand into as many intermediate phases or sub-stands as possible. The idea of this breakdown is not to introduce some artificial inducements to diplomatic "bargaining". Far from that. Whenever a new sub-stand comes up which is in essence a fresh proposal, the talks get a new spark, get fired up. The more there are such sub-positions or proposals the broader the scope of search of accord, the more variable options of either side. The negotiations keyboard gets, so to say, extended making it easier to bring the sides' positions and interests to a harmonic whole (a mutually acceptable outcome).

To be sure, whatever the subject—disarmament, regional security problems, the ocean resources, or peaceful cooperation in space, the effectiveness of talks depends above all on the political will the negotiating nations bring to the discussion. When there is a political will to arrive at positive results, the negotiating methods or skill in finding a common denominator for the sides' positions acquire a substantial importance.

The fundamental approach of the USSR to negotiations is clearly defined compromises, never easy to come to, a balance of interests which is gainful for the parties, for the cause of peace and international security. Such approach only makes it possible to overcome inertia or attempts at cold war revival, and to set going normal and smooth relations between states with

a certain trust and ability to take into consideration the rightful interests of each other. Such approach absorbs the detente experience and stimulates it; it alone fortifies the nations; willingness to settle their differences and disputes not through use of force or threats and sabre-rattling, but through peaceful means at a conference table.

Brown: As we know, any diplomatic talks are a part of relations among states. These relations can improve or worsen the atmosphere of the talks, and therefore influence their outcome. In past times relations between the USA and the USSR left much to be desired. We saw each other through the prism of the "image of the enemy", interpreting the opposite side's behaviour in the international arena as most negative, and reacted accordingly.

Many people believe that good relations are friendly relations. This is not so. It would be unwarranted to expect a drastic change in the relations between our two countries to take place. We may not be friends, but we should strive to have good working relations which, naturally, presuppose the existence of disagreements.

Many people equate good relations with friendship. Inasmuch as we share many interests with friends, work well with them and are pleased to associate with them, friendship is viewed as the ideal of mutual relations. But it is unrealistic to expect hostile relations to turn into friendship. And it is unreasonable to pursue the goal of establishing friendship, since unfulfilled expectations lead to still greater problems.

We do not need to be friends to improve our working relations. Today the USA has excellent working relations with Japan. But we have serious differences and many people on both sides would not call our relations friendly. At the same time Soviet people have many questions regarding friendship with West Germany. Nevertheless, the Soviet government is developing successful working relations with the government of West Germany. Today's world is posing increasingly complex global problems before us. It is our common goal to establish such relations between our two countries as would enable us to work together to solve these problems. It is this type of mutual relations that we call working relations.

Shustov: I would like to discuss what is hampering the process of international negotiations. I will adduce an example from the Vienna talks on reducing conventional arms and armed forces in Central Europe, which I took part in more than 15 years ago. Why did they drag out the way they did? One of the reasons was that their participants began the discussion with what divided the stands—evaluation of the quantitative indicators of arms and armed forces. Today, at the new talks, the sides have agreed not to focus on this and have launched the talks by defining the categories of weaponry to be reduced. The western participants have named three categories, and we, more. But this is truly getting at the heart of the matter, so I am certain that the negotiating will ultimately lead to an agreement.

Peresypkin: The question I would like to touch upon deals with the political infrastructure, i. e., all sorts of commissions, committees and conferences at the regional as well as global level. It seems to me that we need preliminary talks at the expert level which should become an element of the political infrastructure. As an expert on the Middle East, I, for one, believe that one of the reasons the problem of a Mideast settlement is not being solved is that there is no sophisticated system of a political infrastructure there.

To my mind (experts on Europe can correct me), war in Europe today is impossible even though there are two military blocs facing each other there. It is impossible because Europeans, Americans and Canadians, who take part in the European process, meet virtually every day at all levels—government, public, etc.—and talks, consultations and exchanges of views constantly take place. In the Middle East, Asia and Africa there is no developed political infrastructure, and efforts to settle conflicts make slow progress. A political infrastructure in which talks between experts in a specific problems should

become a prime element needs to be created in different parts of the world.

Brown: In the past, when serious differences arose between the two countries our relations worsened. We lost our ability to overcome difficulties precisely when we needed this ability. We would leave the negotiating table or would return to ideological polemics and mutual threats which undermined our capacity to work together intelligently. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has condemned this habit of "door slamming" in our relations.

We developed this habit inasmuch as we used relations to obtain substantial concessions. In the past the American government used to hear the Soviet government say: If you don't scrap your plans to deploy SDI we will not negotiate strategic arms. And the USA would state: We will not improve our relations if you don't make concessions on human rights. When relations themselves become a subject of considerable concessions, the sides prove to be incapable of taking up such important problems.

The more serious our differences, the more important it is for us to have relations capable of surmounting such differences. General Secretary Gorbachev has admitted that it is imperative to maintain working relations even when there are great differences on major problems. In his book *Perestroika* Gorbachev wrote about his talks with President Reagan that a serious dialogue has been conducted between the president and himself, despite all the difficulties.

If dealing with the problems and differences that emerge between us is the purpose of our working relations, we should not interrupt them when difficulties arise; in other words, they should constantly be constructive. A clear-cut delineation of the goals and problems we are dealing with should be the first step towards building such relations. Goals touch upon the way we work on a problem: emotionally or rationally, realistically or tendentiously, honestly or not.

I want to single out six main elements from which relations between countries are shaped and to give a few recommendations.

1. Rationality. You have to behave rationally, even if the other side shows emotion. Uncontrolled emotions have a negative effect on the decision-making process.

2. Understanding. Try to understand your counterpart. Lack of consideration for his viewpoint limits chances of elaborating mutually acceptable solutions.

3. Communication. Even if the opposite side is not listening to you try to hold consultations with it; relations will thus improve.

4. Truthfulness. Do not give false information, even if the other side does so. This behaviour weakens your arguments and also hampers cooperation with other countries later on.

5. Avoid a didactic tone. Do not try to preach to your counterpart. Be open to his arguments and try for your part to convince him.

6. Acceptance. Try to accept the other side and be open to learning something new from it.

DIPLOMATS AND MODERN TECHNOLOGIES

Pryakhin: I want to emphasise that technology plays a very important role in international negotiations. For examples, in 1962, during the Caribbean Crisis Nikita Krushchev needed six hours to contact John Kennedy. They had to use the services of the mass media. Science and technology have made big strides since then; however, utilisation of modern means of communication in the negotiating mechanism continues to lag far behind the needs of the times.

In 1983 scientists and other experts in chemistry held a scientific teleconference on environmental protection. It lasted two months and over 1,000

people living in many countries took part in it. And yet, in 1982, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, only 286 people participated in the discussion of so important a matter as prohibition of chemical weapons. This example shows the advantages modern telecommunication means can provide.

Automated dialogue organisational and scientific information systems, which are in effect sophisticated teleconference systems functioning on computer networks, appear to be very promising for use in multilateral talks. Such systems are making it possible to render the negotiating process virtually uninterrupted, since the delegations are provided constant mutual contact irrespective of whether they are directly in attendance at the negotiations or at their workplaces in their own countries.

Servicing negotiations with electronic mail and providing them with simultaneous communications equipment at the expert level are additional functions of these systems. Computers will make it possible to include non-governmental institutions and research centres in the talks. On the whole, computerisation of negotiations would in this sense make for a considerable increase both in the number of issues discussed at them and in the number of participants, which is quite in tune with the spirit of the times.

Israeliyan: Vladimir Pryakhin has touched upon the very important problem of computer technology in the negotiating process. We do not have much to boast about in this sense, but at talks with the Americans in the recent past I did not notice their delegations using computers particularly extensively. Could our American colleagues shed light on this matter? Why are computers, which have been put to use in a wide range of fields in the USA, including business, science and medicine, still not being employed actively in the negotiating process?

Allyn: In the early 1960s there was a period in the US academia, specifically, in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, when a research team made a computer model of conflict which was then offered for use to the political leadership.

This, however, finds less enthusiasm with us than with the USSR where they've turned attention to employing applied systems analysis in the international relations and management of society.

Brown: I don't think we are using computers at talks to the extent we could be. They are employed rather for gathering information and elaborating ideas. But we have yet to develop a negotiations system directly involving computer technology. Many people in our government, including those who conduct negotiations, regard the negotiating process more as an art rather than a science. I believe that computer technology should be used for analysis and for elaborating scientific approaches to talks.

Shustov: I agree with you, Mr. Brown. I have exchanged views with my American colleagues on this matter and they have told me, and I have read in many articles, for that matter, that during the war in Vietnam computers were used to model situations, but all these attempts were unsuccessful. Similar attempts in Japan and France were failures as well. That is why computers are used in negotiations more as a source of information, for rapid access to required data. At present we at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, too, are discussing the possibility of using computer technology for modeling situations and adopting optimal decisions, but we have yet to arrive at a definitive opinion.

PREPARING NEGOTIATORS

Allyn: I would like to dwell on the matter of joint work, joint discussions and also joint training of personnel. We have seen for ourselves that the process and methodology of negotiating and training of negotiators are no less, if not more, important than defining the actual subject of talks and elaborat-

ing the respective stands of the sides. We have focused on the utilisation of organised thinking, so I believe that the idea of joint personnel training is revolutionary compared to what we could do a few years ago. It seems to me that joint training of experts in international negotiating fully accords with the new political thinking, when it is becoming obvious that truth can be found only in the process of a joint search.

Our task is to develop such methods of training negotiators as would enable them to put themselves in their counterparts' shoes as early as at the stage of the preparations for the talks. The ability to understand one's counterpart and to view a problem from his vantage point is the main quality of a negotiator.

We would be able to hold joint seminars in third countries, too, and prepare joint training and seminar materials. Conducting a joint training seminar for Soviet and American negotiator-diplomats is an interesting idea.

The matter of national styles of conducting international negotiations is also of no small importance in this context. Dozens of books on the Soviet negotiating style are published in the USA. I think that it would be very useful for Soviet and American negotiators to exchange views on a mutual perception of styles, i. e., how Americans assess the Soviet style and how Soviet negotiators evaluate the American style.

Stepanov: I would like to draw your attention to the fact that we have already begun cooperating with other countries in training experts in international relations, including the negotiating theme. Thus, an international student conference, which was attended by a student delegation from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, was held in Luxembourg from March 2, to 5 under the auspices of Harvard University and the government of Luxembourg. The conference was an imitation of hearings in the Senate of the US Congress and sessions of the National Security Council.

In recent months consultations have been held between representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Office of Great Britain regarding implementation of the accords reached by Eduard Shevardnadze and Jeffrey Howe and exchange of diplomats who are to undergo probation at an institution of higher learning in London and Moscow.

A Letter of Intent Regarding Exchanges Between the Institutions of Higher Learning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA) was signed in Washington on March 31 this year in the presence of representatives of the State Department and the Soviet Embassy. An APSIA delegation is to arrive in Moscow this September to draft a protocol in which the content, volume and forms of cooperation, including the duration of the exchanges, number of participants, and financing terms, are to be agreed.

A believe that the establishment of business contacts between the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and the leading American educational and research centres training experts in international affairs, on the other, can make a contribution to the further development of Soviet-American relations. MSIR and the Diplomatic Academy regularly hold meetings with diplomats, scholars and journalists from the socialist, developing and capitalist countries. Unquestionably, this dialogue, for which a high professional level is typical, accords with the interests of everybody taking part in it and promotes the development of useful cooperation in training specialists.

Shustov: I agree that joint Soviet American training projects will be useful, even though this is not easy. Aside from writing joint training manuals and seminar materials, it is necessary to elaborate methods for conducting international talks and reaching effective agreements from the standpoint of the technique of conducting them.

The first Soviet-American seminar of this type that has been held is a very positive fact. We are not conducting talks with ourselves, after all. And, if

after elaborating an optimal negotiating procedure we become more predictable for each other, this will only have a positive effect on the results of negotiations. Practical workers as well as lecturers and scholars should take part in this joint work. We have already begun including scholars in our delegations at international talks.

Peresypkin: I would like to support the idea of forming a joint Soviet-American group for teaching negotiating methods and techniques and preparing joint training and seminar materials. We are also prepared to reach agreement on a standing seminar, i. e., conduct it, say, once a year alternately in the USSR and the USA.

Fisher: I want to point out two big problems: teaching diplomats how to deal with journalists, on the one hand, and teaching journalists to understand the negotiating process, on the other. Both of them are definitely interconnected. I am prepared to take a most active part in holding a seminar for Soviet and American journalists covering international talks. We could make it very attractive with due account for the specifics of journalism.

Israelyan: If negotiations are to be successful they have to be approached creatively. Negotiating is a very labourious and exhausting process which requires enormous expenditure of mental and physical energy. Patience, stamina and resolve are required in all instances. Giving vent to emotion—becoming indignant at unexpected difficulties or delays or displaying pusillanimity—means further complicating the already difficult negotiating process.

Before entering into negotiations it is necessary to have a good understanding of what the government being represented expects of them and what its goals are. One has to have a perfect command of the issues at the negotiating table. Their complexity is one of the distinguishing features of diplomatic talks today. So without a good, professional knowledge of the subject under discussion at talks it is hardly possible to guide a delegation successfully or coordinate the interests and views of experts.

Ups and downs, breakthroughs and protracted crises are all part and parcel of negotiations. No difficulties should lessen a negotiator's will for a patient and persistent search for a way out of a crisis. It is especially important to display such will in conditions when one of the sides exhibit symptoms of inertness and disbelief in the possibility of reaching an agreement at the negotiating table.

Trust and integrity, which should become the mainstay of the relations between the sides, are a prime condition for reaching an agreement. An atmosphere of trust and frankness between counterparts provides favourable conditions for their joint creative search for solutions to complicated issues. Honesty and openness, of course, do not mean that the sides should be prepared to reveal all state secrets to each other. Candid admission that an issue that has been raised cannot be commented on will unquestionably be understood by a serious interlocutor.

Success at negotiations can be attained only with a knowledge of the stand and interests of the other side. The conclusion that suggests itself is that the sooner the participants in the talks are able to understand each other's stands and interests the greater the chances they have of success.

¹ A. Kovalyov, *The ABC of Diplomacy*, Moscow, 1988, pp. 258-264 (in Russian).

Charles W. Maynes, Editor of "Foreign Policy" magazine (NSA), donated the fee for his article in "International Affairs" (June issue) to the aid fund for children who were victims of the Bashkirian railway disaster.

On the author's request, the fee for the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Denmark to the USSR Rudolf A. Torning-Petersen's article ("International Affairs", July) was donated to the aid fund of the Armenian earthquake victims.

WILL WE BE PREPARED?

THE SOVIET UNION has joined 23 West European states in the Council of Europe, having been given, for the time being, a status of a "specially invited" state.

The USSR was received quite friendly at the Palace of Europe in Strasbourg. We need the Council of Europe and the Council of Europe needs us. Today the sphere of its activity is expanding, with some exceptions, from the Atlantic to the Urals (the status of a "specially invited" state was received also by Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia). If future Europe is to have a single political organisation, it can be established most likely on the basis of the Council of Europe. The speech by Mikhail Gorbachev on July 6, in which he set forth the philosophy and a practical programme for a common European home, was regarded as a major event in the 40-year history of that organisation.

On the next day after the speech by the Soviet leader, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe held a special debate on the prospects of cooperation with the USSR and other East European states. The speeches by a score of parliamentaries and also the detailed conversation with Anders Björk, the Assembly's President, have produced a definite impression. The gist of their meaning is this: the USSR's entry into the Council is an important event for us. But it would be a grave mistake to receive it as something solemnly ritual, giving one the pleasant satisfaction that yet another summit of world politics has been conquered. Joining the Council of Europe, we assume considerable obligations, and Europe will follow closely how well we meet them.

Having declared our preparedness to join some international conventions of the Council that are open to other states—conventions on the environment, culture, education and television—we shall have to provide for European parliamentaries a possibility to see how our domestic legislation corresponds to international standards. You may be sure that they will do this well, making no allowances. They will be unimpressed by arguments like the inadmissibility of "interference in internal affairs". It used to be "interference" yesterday, but today it is a norm of civilised contacts among states, a condition of building a common European home. Functioning in the Council of Europe are 14 committees and a host of sub-committees scrupulously considering reports on violations from any member state, say, violations of human rights, of the freedom of the press, environmental protection arrangements, and so on. Shall we be ready for this?

Further. Even a single day of acquaintance with the debates at the Parliamentary Assembly and lobby interviews with parliamentaries make it abundantly clear that the delegations of all countries consist of professional politicians well versed in international affairs (and speaking several foreign languages at that). There is no place for amateurs. The Soviet parliament has been given 18 seats in the Parliamentary Assembly. Shall we be ready to sent to Strasbourg deputies who would feel at home in the new and very specific situation? The traditional prin-

ciple of forming delegations out of representatives of the working class, the farmers and intellectuals will be of no help here.

And one more thing. The meeting was addressed by the heads of the Polish and Hungarian delegations. The former is deputy chairman of the Solidarity faction in the Polish Sejm and the latter represents the opposition in Hungary. By the old standards their speeches could well be regarded as unacceptably anti-socialist. But the point is that those speeches reflected the real political picture in Poland and Hungary. One should reckon with this and change the attitude to relations with delegations from socialist countries. The time of "eternal and unbreakable friendship" has gone. One is to be prepared for this with no reservations.

Boris PYADYSHEV

OUR READERS' LETTERS

(Continued from page 121)

More attention should be paid to the moral and ethical features of consular officers, their personal traits, as well as the atmosphere of relations between consular workers. Today this is a weak point. Who needs the personal "struggle"?

In presenting these views I would like to stress that improved work in the consulate in Poznan is needed not only for you: we Poles need it very much, too.

Czeslaw MOJSEWICZ,

**Professor, Poznan University,
Poznan, Poland**

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